The problem of other minds
B.E.
peace,
I would love to hear the Rabbi’s opinion: There is an epistemological-skeptical question that usually forms the basis of solipsism: How do other people have a mental dimension of consciousness? After all, it cannot be discerned with sight.
I assume that the rabbi will argue in the first view that an analogy can be drawn here, and will even argue that according to his method (as written in the book ‘Truth and Unstable’) one can see the soul of another through his external appearance.
However, I wanted to ask whether such a trivial solution would actually help in this matter?
After all, the claim that other people have no mental dimension speaks from the perspective of their subjective perception of reality. Their “individual authority.”
So, although we may have the ability to recognize that another person has a psychophysical structure, we will never be able to know how he experiences things (like the philosophers’ chestnut) and whether he experiences at all (problem of other minds).
So my question is, is there even a way for us to overcome this question? Is there a way to step out from the wall of “I” towards the being of the other?
Have a good week!
Kobe
As far as I understand, we have no way of knowing this. Just like the philosophers’ chestnut.
If so, why does the Rabbi think that other people have consciousness (and are not robots)?
Does the Kantian analogy prevail over Horssell?
I didn't understand. Why do I assume that people see colors? That's the analogy you accepted. The question of whether we see the same colors is a different discussion. As for me, I said there's no way to know. The question of whether other people have consciousness - in my opinion, of course they do. That's the analogy to me. Do they feel like I do? That's the philosophers' chestnut.
I argue that, in addition to this, even the very existence of consciousness as a personal entity is like the philosophers' chestnut. Because our very awareness that another person is experiencing can never be observed by us because it is his "individual property".
I agree that it is possible to argue that we see that he has the ability to have consciousness within him, and it is even possible in the logical sense to observe his "soul". But we can never know for sure that his soul is indeed alive and that it is not a soul without life. And this is what I do not understand, what is different from the Rabbi's method from the philosophers' chestnut.
To claim this, you must assume that all the people around you are lying to you. After all, they report that they have sensations and consciousness just like you do. This consideration + the analogy to you raises the conclusion that they have consciousness, unless you are extremely skeptical and suspicious. The question of whether they feel the same sensations is the philosophers' chestnut because here their report is irrelevant. They have no way of knowing, nor of conveying to you, whether they see the same color or the same sensation.
I didn't understand what the “analogy to you” is, does the Rabbi mean the ideal view? After all, as we agreed, it is not possible to experience the subject of what is outside of me. If so, how can it be experienced that it is “alive”??
And if the Rabbi means an analogy in the Kantian method and more, then the Rabbi doesn't think that these methods really hold water.
The first claim you wrote sounds a bit strange, because when I claim that there is no consciousness, I don't mean that it doesn't exist, but that it is like an input-output machine. In any case, if we accept the assumption that there can be a physical reality without the mental dimension, we can easily accept the conclusion that the person I am talking to is nothing more than a machine. He is simply built that way.
An example of this claim is with animals. We often see facial expressions of joy and sadness in animals. But we know that they evolved to respond like this. Not every living being with facial expressions that we think really “feels” Behind.
An analogy between me and any other person. I don't understand what is unclear here. The similarity between us shows that we are also similar in the nature of consciousness, as in any other analogy.
The other questions are purely skeptical, and if you are skeptical there is no point in talking. I am also not sure that you are asking me, and that the questioner is worth a conversation (after all, maybe he is an input-output machine).
I find no point in this discussion. It is exhausted.
I did not understand at all the analogy of the analogy in the matter of Didan.
After all, just as the Rabbi accepts that it is not possible to make an analogy whether the person in front of me feels like me (-the chestnut of the philosophers), and the reason this cannot be done is because his perception of reality is his and can never be mine.
So also in the very analogy that he is “living” = experiencing and feeling, can never be through my perception because it is a “subjective” non-objective reality. The very clear distinction that I am not him is such that we can never know that he actually experienced.
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Regarding the rest and whether this is a skeptical question, this is a different discussion and it seems to me that it is less relevant now. Maybe in the end?.
You do not perceive other people as having consciousness, it is not possible. You do not perceive yourself as having consciousness, consciousness is the one who experiences the experience of perception, perception does not perceive consciousness.
For example, when a person does things for himself, he does not do it because he has consciousness, for example, when a person feels hungry, he does not say to himself that because I have consciousness, then I deserve to take care of myself and go eat, but he goes and eats, ignoring the fact that he has consciousness.
Kobi,
Here we are, we have reached the end.
Posek,
You are mixing up two levels: When I do something that I clearly have no reflection on. When I eat, I do it because I am hungry, not because I have self-awareness and I say to myself, “I am hungry,” and then I eat. But beyond the current activity, I also have reflections in which I do experience myself. When I think about myself and my consciousness, for example when we are having this discussion, this is reflection.
If we have reached the end then…
The rabbi writes that this question is a skeptical question. But I am not at all sure that this is the case. After all, the accepted argument is not to be too shy when there is no need for explanation.
Therefore, if the only way to solve the question is by analogy, and the analogy in this case is weak to the point of failing (for example, it is not clear that a correlation can be made based on a single event), does this not mean that we have no basis for assuming yes? Unless we use a higher factor such as evidence from epistemology.
Or is it a fundamental belief that is not refined by external evidence at all.
My words were spoken on the level of human dignity or human value, I showed that the question of consciousness is not related to the matter.
Regarding the question of whether consciousness is the cause of anything in reality, I think not. And all the uses we make of the word consciousness are not related to consciousness itself but to other mental processes that are strongly correlated with consciousness. Such as, the assimilation of memory (we remember things that we are aware of) or speech (we are aware of what we are speaking).
That is, consciousness is the final result, and is not a cause of anything. Including the word consciousness and the speech about consciousness, consciousness is not a cause of them.
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