The problem with the arbitrariness of will

שו”ת › Category: moral › The problem with the arbitrariness of will

asked 6 years ago

Hello Rabbi,
I read the fourth notebook and at the same time I also encountered Leibowitz’s method.
As I understand it, you claim that God established the idea of goodness and morality, and when a person thinks about whether to do this or that act, the observation will be based on ideas and not on realistic facts, and therefore the naturalistic fallacy does not apply to that observation.

A. Did I understand correctly? If so, why would there be a difference between observing reality and its facts and observing ideas? Why would knowing that something is good or moral (necessarily) make him choose that way? In other words, where is the avoidance of the naturalistic fallacy?
B. From this perspective, I did not understand why Leibowitz’s method was incorrect, that is, why the claim “I am moral because I chose this way” is not the only answer to the question of why I am moral, and all the others do not answer the question because the question “Why?” can be asked about them themselves.
C. Hidden within your argument is the assumption that the will does indeed look at the moral ideal. Why assume this is so? That is, I accept the evidence from morality, but why is it not more reasonable to assume that the comparison between it and the act follows the determination of the will?

I hope I was clear enough, thank you very much.

Discover more from הרב מיכאל אברהם

Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.

Leave a ReplyCancel reply

0 Answers

0 Vote Up Vote Down

מיכי Staff answered 6 years ago

A. The avoidance of the fallacy is that ethical facts (characteristics of the idea of the good) are charged facts and not neutral like physical facts. The fact that the chair next to me is yellow says nothing except a description of a fact. In analytical ethics, this is said to be a descriptive (descriptive) sentence. In contrast, the statement It is forbidden to murder does not describe a neutral fact but an ethical fact. An ethical fact is charged with a charge that motivates action (do) or deters action (don’t). Therefore, the statement It is forbidden to murder is prescriptive and not descriptive. Therefore, anyone who wonders: I know that it is forbidden to murder and it is still not clear to me why not to murder, simply does not really understand the sentence “It is forbidden to murder.” Anyone who understands it does not ask such a question (because he understands that it is a prescriptive sentence whose practical conclusion is part of it itself). B. Leibowitz, as a positivist, was not willing to accept claims that lacked empirical justification as binding claims. Any such claim was perceived by him as arbitrary. Therefore, when he came to justify a moral or religious principle, the only justification was “so.” However, in my opinion, his positivist limitations prevented him from understanding that the “so” he was referring to was not so in an arbitrary sense, but rather so in the sense of being self-evident and not requiring justification (prescriptive). See here: https://mikyab.net/%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%A9%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%AA%D7%99%D7%95%D7%AA- %D7%94%D7%A8%D7%A6%D7%95%D7%9F-%D7%91%D7%9E%D7%A9%D7%A0%D7%AA%D7%95-%D7 %A9%D7%9C-%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%91%D7%95%D7%91%D7%99%D7%A5-%D7%A4%D7%95%D7%96/ C. I didn’t understand.

Discover more from הרב מיכאל אברהם

Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.

איתמר replied 6 years ago

A. What is the basis for this assumption? How do we know that there is such a thing as charged facts? (Beyond the semantic claim).
B. I read the article before and that is what led me to write the question. I agree with the claim that there is a true/false value to a value after I have decided as such, but why would that make me act on it? In other words, the question repeats itself – why would I act on what is true or true? (This is a bit of a repeat of section A, I feel like there is something I am missing here).
C. My point is that the will does not go through a process of observing ideas. It is “simply” decisive, just like the decision whether to accept this or that axiom. The observation of the idea can come later (when I decided to pass an old woman across the road, I actually said that the value “pass an old woman across the road” is true. Then another part of consciousness examines whether the decision of the will was correct and equal to the idea, but this is not what ”caused” the will to decide. That the will is a separate part.
And perhaps this is actually the gist of the argument.

Sorry for the length, the subject is close to my heart and it is important for me to understand it properly.

מיכי Staff replied 6 years ago

A. How do we know uncharged facts? We simply see. That's how we know charged facts: we simply “see” (but with the eyes of reason and not with the eyes of the flesh. Sometimes this is called intuition or conscience). Anyone who understands that their ethical and aesthetic observations are not just hallucinations sees that there are prescriptive facts.
B. I do repeat A.
C. I didn't understand what "decisive" means? A lottery? It's not a decision. True or false is not possible unless there is some external standard. Otherwise, it's an arbitrary lottery.