The program “Etishat Tzadik” and the laws of slander

Now I saw that in his follow-up response he softened his position a bit:
https://ethics.tzohar.org.il/qa/%d7%99%d7%a6%d7%90%d7%aa-%d7%a6%d7%93%d7%99%d7%a7-2/

What is the difference between the program and journalism? Not to publish that Nohi Dankner is on trial for stock trading? That Olmert received envelopes? That Rabbi Berland is a crook? The immediate motive of the journalists and police officers is to receive a salary for achievements and status, and their additional moral motive (which probably also exists for at least some) does not seem different from the motive of the program's editor on television. I will note that I personally tried to watch the program and it does create an unpleasant feeling of catching a person in their own way. So I don't see it because it's a bit embarrassing, doesn't provide me with any pleasure, and isn't particularly anticipated, but I'm certainly glad that many other people are watching.

The Rabbi wrote:
“Speech is permitted if it is beneficial and not if it is intended to be beneficial.”

I did not quite understand this sentence.
I would be happy if the Honorable Rabbi could explain.

If Reuven is going to do business with Shimon, and I clearly know that Shimon is a problematic type, it is permissible to tell Reuven. This is for the sake of benefit. The question is whether the permission to tell him is conditional on whether I intend the mitzvah or not. In my opinion, no. What is important is the benefit itself (the result) and not the intention.

The rabbi wrote that the parameter is the actual mitzvah and not the intention for the mitzvah. And after all, mitzvahs require intention and in any case there is no mitzvah? And as for Yael, even a disbeliever in private providence like you admits that at that time there was providence and many ways for him to save his people from the rebellion of corruption.

I didn't understand what I wrote about the mitzvah and the intention. I wrote that the main thing is the result, not the mitzvah.
Regarding the paths to the place, this is my question in the column on Rabbi Druckman. Why does Pikuach Nefesh reject Shabbat, since God, blessed be He, will save even without us committing a sin. Therefore, it is clear that even in their days, we should not rely on a miracle. Even if God, blessed be He, intervenes sometimes, we should not rely on it. To me, this exactly means that the assumption is that He does not intervene (except in sporadic cases)

The Torah said that one should desecrate the Sabbath for the sake of saving a soul. God can save, but He commanded us to save. I don't know what happened with Yael, but if the Torah didn't say to act like that even in a way that would destroy the people of Israel, then wow, it's a good thing to die for our Torah.
As for the permission, did the Rabbi understand that it is permitted for benefit because there is benefit and the prohibition (which exists only in a way that is harmful) is removed, or because there is a mitzvah to benefit and the mitzvah rejects a prohibition, but there is still a reason for the prohibition?

First, the Torah did not say. The Sages demanded it. From the course of the matter, it is quite clear that they assumed this even before the sermons. Second, see the column on Rabbi Druckman, where I dealt with this phenomenon more broadly.
As for your question at the end, I did not understand it. It is clear that lashon hara has harm along with the accuser, but when there is benefit, there is no prohibition. You are asking whether it is permitted or prohibited? There is no nef”m to this (even in the context of impurity and purification).

I'm simply asking whether "benefit" is a commandment or not.

I don't think it's necessary. Although, there are some commandments like loving your neighbor that almost everything falls under.

How does a benefit permit and overturn a prohibition? (I thought it was a do-or-don't-do for Tomi)

It has nothing to do with doing something that is offensive to the public. When there is benefit, it is not defined as being offensive. It is only offensive when you tell it to harm.

Is it permissible to watch the program even after the benefit has been received, according to the categorical decree? Or is it permissible to watch it a few seconds after the benefit has been received, and as with electricity on Shabbat because it was turned off in a secular and profane way, and the benefit has already been realized?
I think this is the gist of my argument (apart from the other things mentioned that it is not consumed for the benefit, which is why there is perhaps room to hear that it is consumed for the sake of ratings, and according to the rabbi's instruction, perhaps the harm is equal to the benefit).

I think so. The program is intended for viewing, and viewing will enable additional programs. Moreover, the benefit received increases with each viewer. There is no way that the benefit has already been received.
When there is a situation where the benefit has already been received, then it is clear that it is forbidden to violate Shabbat. I have already answered this on the site. That is not the discussion here.