The revealing argument against naturalism

I mean to ask, if a person assumes that he only has premises from which the existence of the coordinating agent can be deduced.
But not that he “knows/meet” with that agent.
Is his belief in coordination valid? It just sounds like a somewhat problematic and more circular justification than claiming that he has evidence of an encounter with him.

He doesn't claim it. I claim it towards him. If he presents himself as an atheist I tell him that there are indications that he is not. All of this is explained well in the fourth conversation/notebook.

It is true that in the book this is presented as an argument against him,
but while philosophical evidence goes from premises to conclusions, theological evidence goes from conclusions to premises.
Therefore, when a person has a sequence of premises about the rationality of the world, and through them he comes (philosophically) to conclude about the existence of God.
It seems that his justification for the premises themselves goes in a circular manner:
Why does he trust the ”presumptions” about the rationality of the world, because I have come to the conclusion that there is a correlative factor. But why does he assume that there is a correlative factor, because he believes the premises.
But if this is the case, then the source of his justification for the basic premises is circular. God or “Moses” for that matter, serves here only as an entity that will be coherent with the premises, and he claims nothing against it.
On the other hand, in a “pure” theological inference That a person discovers that he is actually a secret believer:
We are asked why do you believe in the premises? And the answer will be that in fact you believe in a correlative factor. But here a second-order question already sounds only skeptical.
That is, the source of justification is not the premises themselves but God.
Therefore, I ask regarding the first option, whether it can indeed serve as justification, even though it is circular. And in fact, to some extent, it is only trying to maintain coherence and nothing more.

Well, here you are completely confused.
He starts by saying that he believes in the premises. Then he asks himself why, and answers that implicitly he believes in God and therefore believes in the premises. There is nothing circular here. Ask him why he believes in God, the answer will be because of some argument (not this one).

I don't understand,
you wrote “There is nothing circular here. Ask him why he believes in God, the answer will be because of some argument (not this one).”
But that is not accurate, because given that we expand the argument that reveals to ”evidence from the entire epistemology”, then certainly a situation will be created, because every argument, for example, like the physio-theological one, is based on the epistemic premises themselves.
And as the rabbi himself wrote about “the physio-theological argument from the other side” . And so here we are talking about a circular process – because the claim that he believes in God comes as a result of him giving trust to the premises themselves and not vice versa.
And if so, belief in God does not constitute justification for the premises, but only confirmation that they are coherent at most.

On the other hand, if belief in God does not come from a place of inference about His very existence following “philosophical” assumptions, but rather a belief that is based on a kind of encounter with a coordinating being – God, then yes, the argument will not be circular. And we can say that the reason and justification for believing in the assumptions is God.

In this sense, everything is circular. The belief that there was an encounter is also the basis for faith in God. Just because you experience an encounter does not mean that it really happened.

It is true that in the broadest sense of the entire system, everything is somewhat circular.
But I don't think it's the same here, because claims about a direct encounter are more reminiscent of reflective claims of looking inward at consciousness rather than outward. And so are differences from a priori assumptions about the physical world itself.
But on the other hand, using arguments such as the physico-theological view is exactly the same part of a circular argument,
Because why do you assume the rationality of the world? Because I assume there is a correlative factor. Why? Because if the world is indeed understandable, there must be a beginning that understands.
And you also explicitly wrote that the evidence against naturalism is related to the physico-theological view only from the opposite perspective.
And therefore if it is indeed the same argument only from the opposite direction. Then of course it is circular.

But the point is It is clear from the book, and from the map, and from your response elsewhere, and more, that you also see the circular explanation as using the physico-theological argument as a sufficient justification for God and through it justification for all thinking (of which it is a part):
“I have evidence regarding an encounter with Him ****or assumptions from which His existence can be deduced****. But without Him, the evidence has no meaning, since I cannot be sure of them either (because of your circle). And again you return to coherence, which is synonymous with subjectivism.”