The second problem of naive faith

In the SD
In honor of Rabbi Michael Avraham
Peace and blessings
I went through the first notebook, I enjoyed it very much. Although I didn’t understand every word, I think I got the basic idea. I feel obliged to say this in advance because I am completely ignorant of philosophy and even of the methods of deduction and argument, and I will ask that you accept logical ‘exits’ with understanding.
You wrote:
Naive Faith: Second Problem
But beyond this obvious difficulty, another question arises from the description we offered above. In what sense is this innocent believer indeed a believer? Think of Reuven, who was born into a Jewish home and believes in Jewish tradition. In the opinion of Rabbi So-and-so, if Reuven were to open up critical and philosophical literature, he would reach the wrong conclusions, and therefore he forbids him from doing so. Reuven, of course, listens to his voice, for he is a man who fears God more than most, and is strict about the dictates of the law, both minor and serious.
Is Reuven a believing Jew? In fact, if we analyze his current perception, he is an infidel, but he does not do what is necessary to expose this. If Shimon the atheist were to present him with some logical argument, Reuven would change his perception and become an atheist. We have already seen that if Reuven is convinced by some logical argument, then it is clear that the conclusion of the argument was already with him unconsciously. So, even before he heard the argument that would lead him to the conclusion that there is no God, he is essentially an unconscious atheist. So, even when we forbade him from dealing with these issues, we did not gain anything. The man is an atheist (hidden, even from himself) who observes the commandments.
In light of the picture we described above, we can say that he does indeed hold in his mind the idea “God exists,” but only in the first two senses of bringing it to mind. In the third sense – no. The essential content expressed in this sentence does not exist within him, and therefore, at least on the essential level, he is an atheist.
The meaning of this is that a person who believes in naive faith can never know whether he is truly a believer? He may be an unconscious atheist, because if logical arguments really would convince him to become an atheist, then he is already one. Until he examines himself and his coherence, and exposes the assumptions implicit within him, he will not be able to know whether he is a believer or an atheist.
It seems to me, and so the impression emerges from your columns, that an unconscious believer is not defined as a believer. That is, the villain who confronts Anselm, assuming his arguments are correct, is not defined as a believer until he hears his lecture (and accepts the argument). On the other hand, in your quoted words you make a simple assumption that an unconscious infidel is an infidel in every sense of the word.
I can understand the distinction, in that faith is a positive consciousness, and as such, as long as it is not conscious, it does not exist. Whereas heresy is a negative consciousness, and it is enough that the believer’s assumptions include heresy, in order to negate the validity of faith. However, it is difficult for me to define the difference clearly, and I would be happy if you could refine the distinction further.
But even if we accept this, I can still understand the approach of Rabbi So-and-so who forbids Reuven from opening the books of inquiry or engaging in a conversation with Shimon the atheist. Rabbi So-and-so believes that Shimon’s arguments and/or those the books tell about are incorrect . Either because the premises are incorrect, or the conclusion is wrong. (His knowledge is based on independent investigation, or trust in other thinkers who have investigated this independently.) There is a concern that Reuven, despite his traditional faith, is mistaken and already accepts the unjustified premises, or alternatively will be mistaken and accept the unfounded conclusion. Logic is not a science free from errors, and in your notebook you have already shown how philosophers make mistakes, and sometimes big ones (and let’s not forget the ‘Nagies’…).
I think that a person who commits apostasy by mistake and is unaware of his apostasy is not an apostate.
That is: A disbeliever due to a mistake who is aware of his disbelief – is a disbeliever in every way. (Even if it is due to the fact that he is unaware of his belief); A believer in a mistake who is unaware of his disbelief (as long as the premises that establish it are correct, and the conclusion is also correct) – is also a disbeliever, because his belief is based on an incorrect conclusion or on premises whose invalidity can be clarified to him. But a disbeliever in a mistake who is unaware of his disbelief – despite his (erroneous) premises that contain heresy in their content (to those who know only), as long as he has not brought the disbeliever conclusion to his mind, in my opinion he cannot be defined as a disbeliever.
Rabbi So-and-so, in his concern for Reuven’s soul and to save it from the hell reserved for unbelievers, seeks to prevent him from the stronghold of error that lies before him. Therefore, he forbids him from the investigation that could divert him from the position of a believer to that of an unbeliever.
Even with regard to the first problem you raised regarding ‘innocent faith’, there are people who complain. But we’ll save that for the next opportunity.
Regards