The Shulchan Aruch as a formal authority
Hello,
I would ask His Eminence to clarify what the difference is from his perspective between accepting the Gemara as formal authority and the Shulchan Aruch, does the Rabbi accept the authority of the Shulchan Aruch, what is the criterion for determining formal authority, for example, Gemara yes, Rishonim no… etc.?
This evening, after the “Zurba” class, a lively debate arose regarding the Rabbi’s approach. I would appreciate a reasoned answer.
In the Torah blessing
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Hello,
I sent the Rabbi's response to the ”Maggid Shiur” of Zurba (Rabbi Daniel Segron) below is his response:
“In practice, the Jewish people also undertook not to disagree with the tenets of faith and not to disagree with the Rambam's interpretation” Therefore,
I would ask the Rabbi to clarify his position
Sorry for the excessive correspondence
With blessings
I explained this well in column 74. In short, the people of Israel cannot accept facts. This is baseless nonsense. If the people of Israel accepts any fact, does that make it true? There is no formal authority regarding facts, and in any case, there is no meaning to the acceptance of the people of Israel. Therefore, regarding facts, at most, one can be persuaded, but not to make claims by virtue of authority or acceptance of any forum. Segron has also heard this from me in various debates (if he is one of the two brothers who argued with me several times), and it is a shame that he did not understand when I explained it. Let him read and understand.
Peace and blessings.
I would be happy to clarify. If, for example, a person has taken on certain behaviors - someone who does not believe in a certain fact will be considered an infidel and will not join the minyan, etc. - then it is not true that the person who does not believe in that fact, because he is forced by reason, etc., will be punished, but it is true that a person must continue to hold him to that view (because the halakha has established normative behavior for the holder of a certain fact or lack of fact).
If I define the principles this way, then will there indeed be a problem?
And if Ami decides not to act according to logic, will that also be okay? I don't understand this strange question.
I didn't understand what was difficult.
Suppose the formal authority determines that anyone who does not present himself as a believer in private providence because it is so conveyed in tradition, etc., or in the resurrection of the dead, or in the Torah from heaven, which is something that cannot be logically proven to be false, will be considered an infidel as above. What is the problem with that? Well, the person himself will think as he thinks, but the formal authority said that anyone who does not renounce that tradition, etc., will be considered an infidel.
There is no point here in contemporary factual claims that are refuted. No?
The formal authority can also determine that anyone who does not declare that 2+4=17 is an infidel. There is no problem with that.
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