The theological view from the sun

The question is whether you think this is valid evidence.
The difference between it and all the other evidence that is being talked about in your style.
Is that while it can be argued that all the things we live and think are, let's say, more survivable. And that can be used as a correlative factor in terms of survivability.
David's question comes today towards analogical inference, and I use it in the sense that even evolution at best cannot make us coordinate our thinking in terms of analogies and what will happen in the future.
And in addition, evolution is a circumstantial process within the laws. But it cannot provide us with understandings about them themselves. Only an entity external to the “human world” system can do that.

Therefore, even if the sun has been shining for 14 billion years, and therefore we “assert” that it should shine tomorrow. There is nothing in an evolutionary process that will make us coordinate towards metaphysical assumptions about reality itself. And if so, we have no justification for assuming this.
That is, even if the laws of nature are truly fixed, we will never know.
Only a party outside the system can provide us with the data about it.

I didn't understand anything. Briefly describe what I'm claiming and what exactly you disagree with?

You claim that evolution cannot constitute justification for a number of reasons.
And I claim that most of them can be argued (let's say that both thinking and eyes have better survival and that we know that enough time has passed)
But it would still be possible to give evidence against inductive thinking that would not be justified “even if everything is true”. Because evolution is essentially causal and not logical. And there is nothing in it that would make us coordinate justification with metaphysical assumptions about reality itself (say Moses”). But only what has been until now and that is it.
On the other hand, an entity external to the “Adam-Olam” system could well provide us with justification for our knowledge of the world. (While evolution is part of the world).

I still don't understand what you're writing, so I'll only address the second part.
I understand that you want to argue that while my evidence from physical and mental traits is invalid (as I said, I didn't understand why), it's still possible to provide valid evidence from inductive reasoning (which I actually did. So what's the argument about?). But your claim is actually incorrect. If you accept evolution as an explanation, it can certainly also explain the inductive ability. This ability yields correct insights into reality in light of the few cases we've encountered in the past. Those who have developed good inductive ability survive better, because they're prepared for what they'll encounter in the future.
That's it. If nothing new or becomes clear here, I'm done.

You understood it largely correctly. And so I will address the heart of the matter directly.
Although you claimed that those who developed good inductive ability survive better.
And indeed, this is precisely the point of this argument and thus it differs from your argument. Because I agree that it could indeed explain why we developed the inductive ability, in the “sensory” sense of why we feel that the sun will rise tomorrow. (As an actualism)
But it could not bring any justification to our belief that *indeed* the sun will rise tomorrow. In the ontic sense.
Because this assumption is not derived from the fact that the sun also rose yesterday. Like David's question today in the circular justification of induction from induction itself uses this assumption.
Therefore, the ontic justification is to make metaphysical assumptions about reality for which evolution cannot provide justification because it is causal and not teleological.
And the better explanation is an entity outside the system of “world and man” that would provide this justification.

And here is the difference from all other evidence such as the eyes or ordinary thinking. Because even if evolution could indeed provide an explanation for them because they have a survival advantage, inductive thinking would not be justified. And those who do believe in inductive thinking believe in a factor external to the world system.

I don't see any difference.

Don't see a difference in meaning who thinks the evidence I presented is invalid?
Or in relation to your evidence and you believe both are valid?

I don't see any difference between your argument about induction and mine. It's the same thing.

Interesting, I'm not sure it's the same thing.
But if that's true, what do you think most atheist scientists or philosophers are just “confused”? and don't correctly recognize that they are secret believers.

Absolutely. I detailed it in the first and fourth notebook/conversation.

First conversation regarding Anselm, who might not be aware of it?

The problem is that I really don't understand or understand this conversation, is it enough to read the fourth one? Or is there another important aspect to the first one?

There is no connection between them. Each one claims it from their own perspective.

Y”K
Some comments
1. On what basis do you assume the theory of correspondence as the theory that best describes the truth of a sentence? The answer, according to what you wrote, is because there is a God who corresponds between thought and its teaching (and even then we have to deal with Frege's criticism, that unlike the Wittgensteinian solution, God does not escape it). But then we find that there is a circularity in your argument, since it is structured in the form: 1. God exists, therefore: the theory of correspondence of truth is valid (since otherwise, from what else would its validity stem?), 2. The theory of correspondence of truth is valid, therefore: God exists (since since the theory of correspondence of truth is valid, it is necessary that there is some correlation between the sentence and reality). If we were forced to accept the theory of correspondence, then there would still be a real argument here, but today we know that the Torah contains many contradictions of its own (and the philosophers who resolved these contradictions and rebuilt the theory of correspondence have already answered the question of how correspondence exists, and did so in a more excellent way than God).

2. I didn't quite understand what the hasty denial of the possibility that thanks to man (i.e.: subject, society, etc.) there is correspondence between the statement and reality is based on? After all, from Kant to the present day, there are very central schools of philosophy that accept this option as absolutely correct, and prove it in an exemplary manner over and over again. Even if you don't agree with them, there is still no reason to dismiss this whole thought casually (even in today's discussion of the concept of truth, the schools that attribute it to man are more numerous than those that don't).

3. As for evidence, let's assume that we accept it. Now ask the question: Does the thought “There is a God who correlates thought and reality” also prove God? If so, then this is the desired assumption (since on what basis do you assume that there is truth in this claim), if not, then we cannot prove God from other thoughts (since there is no ontic difference in them). One could even say that every thought about thought (consciousness) negates this proof.

4. I also see no reason to deny the claim that the source of this understanding is the world. Yom himself believed this. The first time we saw the sun rise we were filled with wonder (Avodah Zara 8:1), the second time as well, but by the tenth time we had already gotten used to it happening. From that moment on, it is not a theory that says “The sun will rise tomorrow”, but rather a psychological habit of the form “If the sun rises tomorrow, I will not be surprised”, and this habit leads to the guess expressed in the first sentence (which is not an initial statement, but an expression of habit).

There are a number of other comments that could and should be made, but it is late. Good night.

I think these comments should also (and perhaps more) address me. I will address them briefly, because it is difficult to extend and I have addressed some of them in my book/notebook.
1. To the best of my judgment, there is no other solution that offers a satisfactory definition or explanation of the truth of a sentence. I am familiar with some of the analytical treatment and absolutely do not accept it, and certainly not Wittgenstein. Nor do I think that the difficulties that lead to this treatment require it. But those who think that this is a game, and truth is just a rule in it, or actually a convention (even if its source is embedded in all of us, but not in the world), do not innovate much on the subject beyond subjective (or inter-subjective) theses. The argument is addressed to those who are not subjectivists (and therefore skeptics).
2. The existence of certain schools of thought in philosophy is not an argument. In my understanding, in the end they all map to conventionalism (even if it is built into us), mere speculation, or conformity (obligated by God). It is important to distinguish between the language in which the truth is described and the truth itself. I agree that language is human (subjective), but in my opinion the content is objective. When a tree falls in the forest, it does not make a sound but rather evokes an acoustic wave. But in our language the existence of an acoustic wave is described as a sound (because when there is an ear there, this wave generates in the consciousness of the owner of the ear a cognitive phenomenon of sound).
3. This is the only question that has substance in it, in my opinion. Its answer in two parts: A. I have explained more than once that every logical argument assumes the desired, and therefore the assumption of the desired is nothing more than a statement that the argument is valid. This is the emptiness of the analytical, and therefore all valid logical arguments, as Malcolm once said, are an illuminating tautology. B. Even if the basis for the claim about God is also God, there is no disproof here. Just as the statement that the basis for determinism is itself deterministic (determinism that forces truths on me) is not a disproof of determinism (which I do not accept, but for other reasons). After all, if you claim that this claim itself is forced on me by God, you have again arrived at the conclusion that God exists, so why does God exist? Just as if you claim that determinism is forced on me, you have again arrived at the deterministic conclusion. We have returned to the desired assumption in the matter, and on this see section A.
Another formulation (in the negative way): The claim that God exists is consistent (presupposes itself but is consistent), and its opposite is not (because it is true as a correspondence without God. It is impossible). I explained this more in the fourth conversation in my book, when I talked about evidence of a “theological”-revealing nature (as opposed to “philosophical”-creating nature).
Incidentally, reflective claims about consciousness are of a different nature, and there it is perhaps possible to speak of truth without assuming God, because it is an inward and not outward look. According to Schopenhauer. Therefore, your comment at the end is incorrect in my opinion (although I am not sure I understood its purpose).
4. In order to hang understanding on the world itself (empiricism), Yom emptied it of its content. Thus, causality became for him a purely logical-temporal connection, while omitting the essence of causality as a relation of causation. I expanded on this in my book The Sciences of Freedom (on the three components of the causal relation, as I think in the fifth chapter). The evidence is addressed to those who are not willing to accept this emptiness and understand that a causal relationship is what we usually see in it. Again, “theological” evidence (and the desired assumption is omitted).

In short, a logical argument is always based on some assumptions, and the assumptions contain the conclusion in one way or another (otherwise it could not be extracted from them by logical tools). Therefore, a logical argument always addresses the ”convinced”, and in fact reveals to them the fact that they are ”convinced” unaware.

Mikyab
1. I meant the solution of the early Wittgenstein (who supported the theory of correspondence), not the later one. In any case, there are other possible theories of truth besides the theory of correspondence that are not subjective (for example: the theory of coherence of truth). Or one can even deny truth altogether (which is a common approach nowadays).
2. This is not an argument intended to prove their thesis (Kant says x, therefore: x), it is simply an argument against the casual demise of the possibility that correspondence originates in man. I remember in several places I saw you also support the position that if there are serious claims on some subject, they should be taken seriously, even if the opinions that emerge from these claims are far from your mind. And what prevents us from believing that reality does not exist objectively but is founded by consciousness (as Kant believed)? After all, if we assume 2 substances (language/thought and the reality external to it) we will be forced to explain the connection between them, and then we will soon arrive at absurd theses like the conventionalism you described. We cannot say that consciousness is matter either, since we have evidential certainty that it is not matter. It follows that our only option (if we are as careful as fire about subjectivity) is to assume that the foundation of reality is in consciousness, and it is the one that assumes the *objective* reality.
3. Regarding A, then there is nothing in the argument presented above to prove God. Since the deductive argument “illuminates our eyes” Only with regard to the new information that we have absorbed through induction/analogy, but if we challenge with difficulties, such as Hume's fork, the validity of the way in which we receive the new information for our knowledge, then it is as if we are asking for new information from deduction itself. For the new knowledge about God cannot come from induction, nor from analogy (in the strict logical sense), and we have agreed that we have no other tool for receiving new information (I base my argument on the fact that you wrote above that you deny philosophical rationalism). As for B, and is this not a subjective thesis? In a more “pure” formulation, it could be formulated in the form “I believe because God compels me to believe”>”And how do you know that God compels you to believe?”>”Because I believe that God compels me to believe”, and so on. The argument based on negation also negates itself, since it assumes the coherence theory of truth (according to which truth is what is consistent with the rest of the system) in order to explain its basic premise, and then from there proves that the correspondence theory of truth is the correct one. And if you say that in this way the correspondence theory of truth becomes part of the coherence theory of truth (since the correspondence theory is consistent with the rest of the system when we have taken out God), then you have negated our reason for accepting God.
4. I still don't understand what the reason is for not accepting Hume's attack (even if in stronger formulations of it)? Then you are bringing the matter back to the issue of faith, and on which you base God: 1. I believe Hume's attack is wrong, 2. Since this is the case I have to explain how there is causality, 3. Eureka! There is a God! Why not say from the beginning “I believe there is a God” if the first premise is based on faith?

You are entering into a discussion here about all the details of the argument, and they were not raised here, and I don't think they belong here. I have detailed them in detail elsewhere. You forget that this is a specific question that was raised by one comment following reading those materials, and there is no point in reproducing that entire discussion here. When you say that someone dismissed an argument casually, you are referring to what is written here, but what is written here is based on a very long discussion elsewhere.
Therefore, I will answer briefly:
1. It is not for nothing that Wittgenstein himself was not satisfied with his initial phase. Truth as coherence means subjectivism (as long as you are coherent, you are right). All this talk is empty.
2. A match that originates in a person is impossible for several reasons that I have detailed in my essays.
3. A deductive argument never gives us new information, and this is precisely the emptiness of the analytic. Logic only clarifies for us what is hidden in our assumptions. Therefore, the essence of logic is a tautology (sometimes enlightening and sometimes trivial).
I really don't deny philosophical rationalism, and I don't remember writing anything like that. But rationalism needs to be redefined for that, and this is not the place.
The circle of reliance on God is incorrect. If you assume it, you inevitably fall into subjectivism or conventionalism. I have evidence regarding an encounter with Him or assumptions from which His existence can be deduced. But without Him, the evidence has no meaning, since I can't be sure of them either (because of your circle). And again you return to coherence, which is synonymous with subjectivism.
4. Simply because it is clear to each of us that causality is not just a logical connection and a temporal order. A clear intuition that there is no reason to deny, and in my opinion even Yom himself did not deny it, but for some reason chose to ignore it.