Three shades of Occam’s razor

The razor principle has been criticized quite a bit. For example, some argue that the razor principle leads to unjustified conservatism. What seems simple to me is always what I think now, and therefore the razor principle tells me to simply stick to my position. The assumption here is that simplicity is not a completely defined (and not objective) matter. Furthermore, the razor principle compares explanations that are equally valid, and among them the simpler one must be chosen. But it is not clear when the explanations are truly equally valid, and whether there is an objective measure for this. For example, one could propose adopting Newtonian mechanics because it is simpler, let’s say, than quantum mechanics or relativity. But this is nonsense of course, because the two new theories explain more facts and are more valid, and therefore they should be adopted even though they are much less simple. In our case, there is no clear criterion for using the razor principle, and therefore one should be careful not to follow it when the situation is not unambiguous. If you believe that your explanation is more correct and more in line with the language of the Tosefta, there is no reason to abandon it because of the razor principle. And even if the private explanations exist (i.e., explain other facts that are not currently under discussion), it is possible and perhaps appropriate to adopt them even if the razor principle apparently rules this out. In short, the razor’s principle says take what is most likely. But what is most likely is up to you. In most cases, this principle does not change much. Only when there is a clear comparison may the situation be different (originally Occam spoke of how applicable the explanation assumes, which is a clear and objective quantitative comparison, although there too the above points should be discussed).