Titles of the evidence
In the SD
Hello,
I wanted to know how the Rabbi sees the descriptions of God that emerge from cosmological and physiologic evidence (as well as from morality, etc.)’.
Are these adjectives themselves adjectives or adjectives of actions?
After all, if they are descriptions in their essence, then this is a problem because they violate the uniqueness of the Creator.
And if they are descriptive of his actions, then how can we conclude from this that we need revelation?
Hello Moshiko.
First, I do not see a fundamental difference between these two types of adjectives. Kant already taught us that every adjective exists only in the phenomenon, that is, it exists as it is perceived by us and not in itself. Colors, sounds, shapes, are all concepts that exist only in our consciousness and not in the world itself. Therefore, when I describe God with any adjective (not only in adjectives of action), I am referring to my perception of Him and not to Him Himself. What happens with Him Himself? I do not know. It is possible that the same completely simple object can be perceived by us in many ways. When we look at Him morally, we see Him as the source of moral validity, and when we look at the creation of the world, we see Him as the Creator of the world, and when we look at Him ontologically, we see Him as the perfect object.
Second, I don’t know where the assumption of uniqueness in this sense (which is basically just without multiple descriptions) came from. I can think of a few arguments in its favor, but I am far from convinced that it is correct. The fact that Maimonides or any other thinker came to the conclusion that it seemed logical to him does not make the matter a core belief for me. Personally, I see no problem with saying that God is both whole, the Creator of the world, its designer and component, and the source of moral imperatives. What is the problem with that?
And third, beyond all of this, none of these are really adjectives. These are functions of it, not descriptions of what it is itself (by the way, in my opinion, these are not adjectives of action either. These are not adjectives at all). Ask, then, why did I write the previous two paragraphs? Because they are correct and important, even if not for this matter.
Thanks for the quick response 🙂
I can indeed understand what you wrote regarding Maimonides.
However, I think you did not answer the end of my question.
Assuming that titles are only in our consciousness (actions, etc.) and not of the objective object.
So how can we deduce from this understanding that we need revelation?
I didn't understand the question.
How can you assume what will happen if you have no understanding of the essence of the matter? Naturally, the question is simple.
You can only predict future processes assuming that you know the matter, right?
It seems to me that if we do not have a perception of God's essence, how can we say that He has a purpose in creation and hence expect His revelation, and believe in one that comes to me (by virtue of the fact that I expect His revelation).
I didn't understand why I needed to know him to assume that if he wanted something from me, he should tell me.
In addition, this is not a conclusion drawn from thin air. A tradition came to me that was a revelation, and therefore it is not an a priori expectation. This tradition is consistent with the conclusion that if the Creator wants something from me, he should tell me.
The Rabbi wrote in the fifth notebook Kammedoni on pages 17-18,
that after we see that God created the world, planned it and outlined the moral laws in it - we assume that He wants something from us and therefore He must tell us.
(I do not dispute that assuming that He wants something from us then it requires revelation, I dispute the assumption - that He wants something from creation).
And I do not understand how we can assume that God wants something from us if we do not know Him?!
[In contrast to the question of why God killed so many creatures during evolution, and why it was such an unproductive process. So the Rabbi answers that we do not know its essence]
After all, only after assuming that God wants something from the world and from us can we then come to the conclusion that revelation is needed and that Judaism is correct in any case. But without the above information we have no interest in believing in revelation.
As I explained, revelation comes to us in tradition. The a priori argument is just an appendix to this tradition.
Beyond that, if X does something, he probably wants something from it. You don't need to know X to conclude this.
The evolutionary remnants, that's a completely different question, and I explained it there. First, it's probably a necessary consequence of the laws of nature. Second, I argued that if I see him acting differently than I think, then his head is probably different. But the evidence from complexity itself stands regardless of the question of how his head works. And third, regarding the evolutionary remnants, even if we assume that this is his choice and not a necessary consequence of the laws of nature, I see that he acts differently than I would, and therefore the conclusion there is required that he has a different head. But in situations that I haven't seen, there is no reason to assume this.
I think that the above a priori argument is not only not an appendix to the tradition (certainly not in your presentation in the notebook) but the basis for the tradition of the dream of a Khazar king (as you wrote in the notebook).
Also,
I think that the statement ”If X does something, he probably wants something from it. You don't need to know X to conclude this.”
It borders on a great fulfillment. After all, the deistic God is completely different from the body in our experience.
I would love to know why the rabbi thinks otherwise.
PS
Does the rabbi think that to the extent that one accepts the evidence from teleology, then the understanding that God wants something from the world increases significantly?
I wrote what I had to write. In my opinion, everything is clear and simple, and I don't see what needs to be added here.
Moshiko does not claim that this refutes the vision, but rather that it refutes the foundation on which faith in our tradition is based. Faith is also based on the knowledge of the existence of God and that He wants something from humans.
I understood. And I explained why I think it's not true.
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