Tool training today

Hello guys.
This topic is very important and interesting, but it is very broad and difficult to cover here. Therefore, I will only address it in general terms. The halachic questions need to be addressed individually.

Let me start by saying that I have always been reluctant to deal with mixtures and prohibitions and permits, as it is clear to me that I will not agree with anything there (these are all kinds of ancient physics or just physical intuitions that are really unconvincing, certainly not nowadays). Perhaps it would have been appropriate to confront them head-on, but I felt that I should leave that for last.

In addition, I would not define the issue as halakhah and rationality, but as halakhah and science. This is not a question of rationality, but rather how facts are determined. The question is whether the realistic assumptions of halakhah are determined with scientific (up-to-date) tools or not. For example, the words of the Chazo”a (Yod”d 65) who invented the issue of two thousand years of Torah are well-known. I think he was rational too, but in his opinion, halakhic facts are not determined scientifically. Several articles have been written about this (Rabbi Daychovsky, Rabbi Rabinowitz, and others. Many refer to Maimonides’ words about the laws of trepit that do not change with science, although he also distinguishes between trepit of animals and humans. Not to mention the evil eye and demons, which in his scientific opinion should be eliminated from halakhah).

And to the point.
1. In general, it seems to me that the laws of mixtures assume realistic assumptions and are not intended to be fictions (as they are increasingly becoming due to the difficulties), and therefore the very fact that they are established tells us that at least in this context the determining reality is the scientific one. This is how the sages saw reality itself, and not that they simply established a gibberish.
2. The question is whether ancient vessels actually swallowed spit as the Sages describe (that a kapila would taste them and feel the taste)? If not, this raises the question of why the Sages determined this? Perhaps we misunderstood the meaning of the determination. For example, the determination that the thickness of the walls is the determinant does not necessarily mean something realistic, but rather they determined it as a limit because they did not know how to determine something more precise in a simple way. If this is so, then this should not be dependent on the question of the actual existence of the taste, but rather on volume calculations as if the entire wall was filled with a prohibition.
3. A distinction must be made between determinations that were established in the Talmud, which has halachic authority (and even if the reason is invalid, the regulation is not invalidated), and things that were established after it, which have no authority and there is no problem in changing them.
4. Even in Talmudic rulings, a distinction must be made between rulings that were correct but that reality had changed, and a situation in which it became clear retroactively that the Sages had made a mistake even then (which there is no problem in changing to a final ruling, although most of the poskim do not do so, as in the case of killing a louse).
It is also necessary to discuss whether, when a metal today has a different property, it is the same metal of Chazal or whether the determination does not apply to it at all (and this is as a new material).
5. Regarding his three arguments for why these laws should still be retained, each one must be discussed on its own merits, and so on.
Here I just say two things:
A. The disconnect he makes between the kashrut of the vessel and the prohibition of food is puzzling. What is the point of kashrut of vessels without there being a problem with the kashrut of the dish? It is clearly illogical to kashrut of a gaziyak without a real need. And even if there are rishonim who believed this (this should be discussed), then, with apologies, their words are rejected out of context.
on. The opinion of the Rishonim that the abolition of a prohibition from the outset is from the Torah is a singular opinion and I would not be afraid of it in practice.

I apologize for the brief treatment, but this is truly a deep and broad and interesting and important topic, and I hope that when I turn to this chapter, I will change it. It is important to address this because this issue makes the law seem oppressive to the public. —————————————————————————————— Isaac: Is it similar to the prohibition of legumes on Passover, when the reasons change? The road has been repaired… —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: Not necessarily. It may not have been true in principle and it may have changed. Either way, there is a fundamental difference in that here we are talking about a law and not a concern (like legumes).