Transferring strangeness
The fact that the universe has suitable conditions for life, against all odds, is strange. What you do with the physio-theological view is simply to transfer all this strangeness to God (because an omnipotent intelligent being without a body that exists without a cause is at least as strange as the universe). The question is, what did you do with it? After all, the first is no less strange than the second, right? What priority does it have in positing one strange thing over another? Is there any measure of strangeness? Why is positing a multiverse weirder than positing God or weirder than positing that the universe just happened to be suitable for life? They all seem equally strange to me (the same goes for infinite regression. It doesn’t seem any weirder or less weirder to me than the stop of regressions).
Ultimately, when you give an explanation for something strange, it has to be at least as strange as the thing you’re explaining, so why consider it an explanation in the first place?
