True and Unstable Chapter 15
peace,
You really mentioned that it is unstable according to the criterion that David Yom created-
That when we receive evidence about something that contradicts our previous experience, it is better to assume that it is not true. That is, it is better to stand on the second alternative, which is false and based on a fundamental error.
And I saw that you wrote that according to Yom, it is even possible to increase his criterion to the point that even if we see the miracle in our eyes, then it is better to claim that it did not happen in reality and that it is an illusion.
But I wanted to ask, even if I accept the criterion of a day towards a witness, why should I accept it towards my own eyes?
After all, our general understanding – experience and all other understandings, intuitions, etc., do not precede the seeing of the event (and then indeed the criterion of a day applies here as well) but are active and change even while seeing the events.
And therefore, in any case, the miracle that my eyes saw is already in the experience, and there is no reason to deny it. (And in such a case, the criterion of a day does not apply anyway).
In contrast, in the case of testimony, our experience precedes the testimony. Then the criterion of a day applies to it. The content of the testimony (the miracle) comes after the experience, which has not changed (because there is no evidence, etc.).
So, the absurdity that is sometimes tried to be presented by a person whose words are very unintuitive about the idea of such thinking falls flat.
I would be happy to explain in my rabbi’s words why testimony about a miracle is the same as seeing a miracle?
I don’t think it’s the same and I don’t think I wrote it either. Read the entire discussion there (to the conclusion, in certain circumstances testimony is also admissible). My argument is that in order to formulate a position, the chances of the two alternatives must be weighed against each other. Everyone will weigh for themselves what chance they give each of them and thus make a decision. I assume that many of us usually don’t give the same chance to eyewitness accounts and testimony. And yet each of them needs to be tested against the alternative.
Specifically to your question, you need to distinguish between a one-time experience that can result from a mistake and cumulative experience that has been confirmed many times.
I wanted to ask another question, the Rabbi in the notebook writes that the moment we assume that it is likely that there is a God, then it is likely that He will reveal Himself, etc., etc., and on the other hand, we have evidence of this. So there is no reason to reject it.
But in the end, this intuition also stands against Moses, so how does the Rabbi accept it?
Hello. It's hard for me to have a discussion at such intervals.
There is no way that it could be a one-time event. What was is what will be is about the conduct of nature. And also in nature: for example, I was born only once. Does this contradict Moses? The Big Bang also happened only once.
Sorry, maybe I should open a new question then? With an introduction and everything? I'll try to be brief here.
When you were born, no contradiction to the laws of nature occurred. But an event like a miracle is a "break" in the laws of nature. If so, it does contradict Moses.
Moses, in other words, on the subject of the laws of nature, says that the laws of nature are eternal (the value for them is always positive and never negative/empty [only before their creation the value was empty]).
Why do I claim this? Because we have an intuition - recognition - of the eyes of reason for this claim.
Proof of this is that you assume that the laws of nature also exist outside of the earth, and also existed in the past before our existence. However, we have no reason to assume that the laws of nature have always existed.
The only reason that can confirm this is only an external recognition of the eyes of reason in the reality of the universe.
So, when I hear evidence of a break in the laws of nature. It contradicts my basic intuition - cognitive. That the laws of nature are eternal. In such a place I have a significant reason to reject the report of this.
On the other hand, the Rabbi mentioned that David Yom's argument also applies to any new scientific discovery. But according to the principle I mentioned, this is a mistake. Not everything that is not in our experience becomes implausible.
His argument is anything that we have a contrary cognition towards - intuition, in such a case testimony about it becomes implausible.
For example, what is the thing like, when you see a red table. A friend will testify to you that it is blue, will you believe him?! So also in the case of Didan, intuition is cognition and testimony against intuition is significantly weak. Therefore, because we have an intuition that the laws of nature are eternal only in such a case, testimony about a break in them should be rejected.
On the other hand, testimony about the discovery of a new substance, a new animal in the world, a new equation for the laws of nature. All of this does not contradict the intuition that there are laws of nature. Nor do we have any intuition that the current equation for the laws of nature does indeed best describe the laws of nature. It is merely our attempt to quantify our knowledge of the laws of nature into an equation. But we do not have any certainty about this.
In such a case, new evidence cannot be rejected.
I don't see any difference. If we have come to the conclusion that there is a God, there is no problem with His decision to reveal Himself once or to create the world and it does not contradict Moses.
It is clear that creating the world with its laws is not a problem.
I argue that the problem is that after the laws were created, then what was is what will be, which basically means that we have an intuition that the laws of nature are eternal. So revelation is a contradiction to this intuition.
And if you say that you do not have this intuition, then why does the Rabbi assume that the laws of nature also existed in the past, or will exist in the future, as is the whole problem of induction.
Well, I don't really understand what the problem is with God deciding to reveal Himself once in history and how it relates to Moses. But I have nothing to add.
Perhaps our definition of Moses is different.
I mean specifically in the sense related to induction and the assumption that the laws of nature are permanent. Not necessarily for all human experience. Only in the sense of the laws of nature.
From what does the Rabbi assume that they are permanent? As you wrote in the book from a certain recognition. The eyes of reason, etc.
So, there is recognition that the laws of nature are permanent.
And you hear about someone violating them, it contradicts this recognition for you. Because as soon as they were violated even once, they are no longer permanent (it is a logical contradiction, then).
So I don't understand what is not understood.
Your claim that God's decision to reveal himself/perform a miracle – does not contradict this matter. I don't understand.
After all, the moment you claim that the laws of nature were violated, then it is a sign that your recognition is incorrect. After all, it claims that the laws of nature have always existed both in the past and in the future.
And if the belief is no longer true, then you have no reason to assume that the laws of nature are eternal.
So you have to decide either that the belief is true, and then you have a basis to assume that the laws of nature have prevailed throughout the entire creation of the world from the big bang until now. Or that it is wrong, and then you have no reason to.
Maybe this clarification will help:
We have three recognitions -
1. There are laws of physics in the world.
2. The same laws of physics prevail throughout the universe.
3. The laws of physics are eternal.
I agree that it is possible that God can perform miracles, etc., etc., and God is parallel to the laws of physics, for example, and therefore there is no problem with 1.
But I argue that if you accept the third recognition, you cannot accept miracles. Because a miracle is a break (even momentary) in nature. And that is no longer possible. And in any case, the end of the testimony about a miracle being denied.
I will write one last time. God's decision to reveal himself is not a contradiction to the laws of nature. And it certainly doesn't matter whether he did it once or many times. Especially if his very existence doesn't seem to you to contradict the laws of nature. That's it. I'm done.
I'm not talking specifically about revelation, but about miracles in nature that are against the normality of nature, for example, the plague of blood, the burning bush, etc. (Revelation is metaphysical, perhaps spiritual vision, so it has nothing to do with nature)
So, finally, there is a contradiction to the law of nature in a miracle. The laws are supposed to operate in way A and it operates in way B. Why isn't this a contradiction?!?
Now we have moved on to another question. Not the revelation but the miracles. I answered that in the book.
That's the main question. I just now realized that you are dividing the idea of revelation from miracles.
In the book of If it seems that you have proven the opposite that there can be no miracles.
(In the case of miracles and natural laws), there is a contradiction with Moshe's induction.
Then you said that we might contradict this intuition if we had a better reason.
But in the next chapter you already mentioned how correct Moshe's intuition about natural laws is. And this is from the fish of f=ma, where we see how well Moshe's intuition fits induction and therefore their being permanent.
Therefore, if you have an intuition of permanent natural laws + long-term empirical foundation. It follows from the perfection of your words that miracles cannot be reported.
^?
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