True generalizations?

The truth is that the business with the ox and the donkey bothers me the most.
And what the rabbi wrote is not enough for me.
I'm just going crazy about it. Many animals are not suitable for fighting on an altar because they are unclean and a host of reasons. From here to creating an indication of this specification about the mind of a donkey..? Even though it is a donkey..?
This is simply outrageous.

This is an interesting and sufficiently focused challenge. I will try to think of some explanation for this question.
Just as a background, I will mention that all the laws of torts in the Torah are based on similar concepts: Why does it matter whether the bull intended to cause harm? Why is the exemption for tamon only for fire damage? Why is half the damage paid for in bundles (and why is it money and not a fine)? Why are the four fathers defined in the following way: horn, tooth, leg, pit and fire? Where does this division come from? Some of the things have reasonable explanations, but it should be remembered that in the background the entire framework is built on assumptions that are errors of inquiry. Perhaps such an inquiry could also shed light on the point you asked about.
But as I said, I will try to think. If I have any insight, I will update.

Initial thoughts:
A.
I looked again at the Gemara in the Book of Revelation, and there is an important point there that should not be ignored. It is not permissible to require only an ox and not a donkey. The context is a particular rule in which, according to the rules of Midot, the particular rule came to exclude something from the general. The Torah instructs us to exclude something. Now the question is what is the exception. Even if you have nothing to exclude that makes sense, you still have to exclude because the Torah wrote the structure of a particular rule that requires it. Therefore, here there is more room to say that if you already have to exclude and you do not find anything, there is a possibility to exclude a donkey that was not sacrificed at the altar. Otherwise, what would you exclude? Note that this is not a self-standing explanation that we would say ourselves to exempt a donkey. The question is what did the Torah intend to exclude.
I once explained this in relation to Shimon Ha-Amsoni's sermon in Pesachim 22, where he wanted to give up on the sermons "Et" because he couldn't find anything to include in "Et" (God, fear). To whom will you compare me and compare me?! That is, he has a reason that forbids including "Et" (fear), and he is not willing to do so even when he gets stuck with the word "Et" (which he has nothing to include). But then the Rebbe came and said to him: You are right, but we have the word "Et" (which he has nothing to include). There is no choice but to include "Et" (which I assumed was that Rebbe G was also aware of the logical-planning problem, and only adds because of the constraint. This is how the Gemara came to be). You see, even though the Hasbara says not to include fear of God, because the Torah obligates us to include something, we choose what is least unreasonable. In the above passage I argue that the rule and merit obligate us to exclude something. Even though there is not much logic to exclude something severe, I look for some criterion (the least unreasonable) and exclude because I must.

B.
Beyond all this, and further to my comment in the first answer above, we must remember that this is a matter of tort law in halakhic law. There the matter works in halakhic categories and the divisions do not always make sense. But at the same time there is the logical and moral law (the king's law), the laws of the sons of Noah, and it is possible that there was no reason to exempt something severe. This puts the whole story in a completely different light... It is of course my opinion that morality and halakhic law are two independent levels that operate in parallel.
According to this proposal, even if we were to choose a lesser evil, we would be liable for the harm caused by the evil, but according to the laws of the king and morality, and not according to the laws of the Torah. A possible explanation: that even from the principle of the law, there is no need for relatives for this.

Transferring the question from the Sages to the Torah is only to make it easier to associate this explanation with the non-moral halakhic realm, right?

Indeed, but not only that. I argue that the moral plane also remains intact and plays a role in our lives (not on the halakhic but on the legal-moral plane).

Thank you for the generous consideration.
(Although the supervisor taught me Sha'at, including the T'ach of R'a, it really changed my perception 🙂

The question is, should you fear this watcher? 🙂