Uncommon in Dow law
Hello Rabbi, I saw in several places that the G.M. says that there was room to divide within the law of the law between common and uncommon cases, for example in B.C. 12 regarding perishable goods, the G.M. suggests that there should be a distinction whether it is on the part of the harmer or the damage, between the one who caused the damage and the one who did not, and as in 17 (although the G.M. says something different there) on page 6a regarding fire damage, the G.M. would hold that the G.M. is obligated to pay damages specifically because of the damage.
In the case of the laws of the Dow, which are fundamental laws, there is not much room for these divisions, is there? And if so, I would be happy if the Rabbi could refer to another dog, please.
I didn’t see anything like that regarding thorns on page 6. And regarding carrion, it did indeed look a bit off.
Although in principle it is possible that even on a principled level there will be a difference between a common and an uncommon case.
why?
Why not? Sometimes it makes sense to establish one law for a common case and another for an uncommon case. For example, when common murderers abolished the death penalty. And so in Gilead regarding exile.
Beyond that, in the laws of the rabbis you agree that in the case of a common case they did not decree. But there are cases in which the laws of the Torah are also a type of decree (Etvan of the Torah discusses this, whether there is a restriction in the Torah. And he cites a rabbinic opinion on fearlessness and on uniqueness).
Thank you very much. Just for the sake of accuracy, the author of the Athon Daw discusses this, but I think it appears in the book Lekash Tov.
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