Were the Nazis human animals?

If I understood your answer correctly, there is no contradiction here - and therefore no question here!
If I understood correctly, definitely an explanatory answer!
They gave in to their instinct and therefore deserve all condemnation!

I will continue the thread anyway, and ask a question.
If we assume that the Nazis believed in the theory of race in the highest degree, and ignore for the sake of the question the great abuse that was in the murders, and focus solely on the systematic murder of the Jews;
Were the Nazis' actions moral? Ostensibly the motive is truly moral, to prevent the harm that the Jews are doing to the world. In addition, it seems that the actions do meet the requirements of the categorical imperative; it is likely that there are people who murdered Jews and believed that this was the correct general law.
So, to be brief, I asked;
In reference to Nazi people who believed that the Jews only brought harm to the world, they did not abuse the Jews, and they believed that what they were doing should become a general law – can their actions be said to be moral?

If there was no other way to prevent the harm to the Jews, or if they saw them as an evil that must be eradicated, then they were indeed moral in their view. Absolutely.

I don't know if my comment is in place because I'm not clear what the respondent's implicit assumption is.
But it may be that in this case there is a lack of distinction between the factual definition of morality as such, that is, a meta-moral determination of what "morality" is, and the normative determination of how it is right to think and/or behave morally.
From a factual meta-moral perspective, it may be that the Nazis' perception and/or actions do indeed fall into the category of "morality". I'm not sure about this, but let's assume. But even if they do, it still doesn't follow that their actions are normatively correct (proper actions).
If I understand Michi's answer correctly, then in his opinion, their view/actions are indeed proper on a normative level as well. His reasoning is apparently that they meet the formal requirements of the categorical imperative.
The root of the error, in my opinion, is in ignoring the non-formal side already at the meta-moral level. A valid philosophical definition of morality may be based on its formal side, but it is also obliged to add an additional level of “content” (concrete decisions). Ignoring this level already at the meta-moral level inevitably spills over to the normative level. It seems to me that this is what is happening here.

But Doron, the argument here is that one cannot expect a person to act contrary to what he thinks is right, and therefore there is no point in judging him for actions that are in accordance with his values. One cannot judge him for holding onto values themselves, since this is a semi-factual matter that is ultimately forced upon the person. One can only judge him for failures in his own way, such as weakness of will. This is a completely solid argument. How can you justify a judgment of content? In other words, how can you expect a person to think things other than what he thinks are right are right?

I personally do agree with you that judgment is definitely also based on content. However, my judgment is only a shell and its content is nothing more than a description: there are principles that I think are wrong and there are people who hold onto them and act according to them (and there is also a box of pickles in my pantry). And in my opinion, this would be the case even if I held onto the idea of free choice. This whole judging business seems pretty strange to me (and I'm really never interested in a person for their own sake, except for bargaining while their actions affect me. I'm interested in the person for my sake)

I do not expect a person to act contrary to what he thinks is right. I do expect him to act in accordance with what is rational, and the concept of rationality is broader than the principle of consistency. The Nazis may have been “consistent” in their own way (this is also not entirely certain historically, but it does not matter to our question), but they certainly were not rational. Or do you claim otherwise?
What is implicit in Michi's argument above is exactly this - it is enough for us that the person is consistent. This is a mistake.

What is rationality? Holding to the principle that one should cause suffering to the maximum number of animals is irrational? This use of the term is unfamiliar to me. And what do we gain from introducing this concept? Say (as I do) that you ‘expect’ every person to behave according to your (mine) principles, I see no difference.

It is not implicit that it is enough for us that the person is consistent. It is explicit that conceptually it is possible to ‘judge’ only actions that are inconsistent with values because the rest of the things are not under his control (choosing values) or are symmetrical with regard to me as well (conducting according to values).
[And I say that in truth this concept of judgment is problematic and it is better to give it up altogether. And even without judging the person according to his own system, I will prevent him, if it is in my power, from acting in a way that contradicts my values].

Doron,
This does not meet the formal requirements of the categorical imperative, because it is clear that it is not appropriate for the entire world to want to kill Jews. This meets the requirements of the categorical imperative for the Nazis.
As you wrote, I distinguish between the act itself and a judgment about the doer. The morality of the doer depends on his own perceptions, not mine. The act itself (murder of Jews, wherever they are) is of course immoral in my opinion. I do not understand why, after you have clearly understood my position on this point and have even repeated it, your words reek of criticism or controversy.

Tolginus,
Do you really not hold the view that there are more or less rational positions? Are they all the same to you? I find it hard to believe that. And in the context of our discussion I asked you a question: do you think Nazi ideology seems to you to be just as rational as the other ideologies you know? If your answer is affirmative, it will be relatively easy to anchor it with principled philosophical explanations and empirical historical facts (which place Nazism as a link in a steadily deteriorating chain in the history of the modern West).
In any case, I gave a general criterion (which is certainly not sufficient in itself) for a position to be worthy of being called “rational”. This principle was the specific combination of formality and ”content” (while preserving the hierarchy in which the former precedes the latter). Kant, by the way, tried to provide morality with precisely this combination. I think he failed completely, but that's not our business.

Miki,
You're probably once again entrenching yourself in the principle of consistency (the Nazis were consistent in their method - that may be true) and not in the underlying principle - the principle of rationality. The Nazis, if they had really wanted to be "moral", would have had to criticize not only their depraved path but also their very commitment to "consistency" in this path. Something that they not only never dreamed of doing in practice, but more importantly: their principled position does not allow for such a move.
In short, if you really entrench yourself in this problematic position (in my opinion), you will certainly receive criticism.

Regarding smells and fragrances. Well, we've even talked about this issue in the past. Maybe we can go to the ENT together?

Doron, at this point we have probably already crossed the line of understanding (as expected).
I am the last to emphasize consistency as a criterion for truth. I have dedicated books against this concept. What I am arguing is something completely different: that a person's moral judgment should be made according to his own method. Not because it is the truth but because it is the criterion for his morality.
Incidentally, the same thing with regard to your discussion with Tolginus, rationality is also measured according to the person's method. There is really no criterion for the rationality of claims or goals. A person's rationality is measured by the means he takes to achieve the goals he has set for himself. And again, this is not a criterion for truth.

Your claim that a person's moral judgment may be made according to his own method does not solve the problem. The books you have devoted to the matter are also irrelevant if you are not faithful to what you said there.

First, your claim is trivial, at least in the sense that we are all subjects and therefore our moral decision comes from within ourselves and not from others. Who said otherwise?

Second, your description is lacking and therefore flawed. The point is that the criteria that allow us to decide rationally and morally are not found only within the subject or within his "method", but also outside of him. Their origin is ultimately from God. As I said, it is a combination of form and content. In this sense, the subject's morality is necessarily based, albeit only partially, on objective truth.

Paradoxically, only such a position allows us to defend the idea that our morality is not absolute (at least not absolute in all respects, since there is a sense in which it is absolute). Therefore, our moral decisions are never certain.
This is in contrast to your position, which places all morality in the subject alone. If the origin of morality is only in man, everything is permitted in principle and every moral decision is necessarily correct.

In my opinion, this is a simple and clear argument. You can either accept it or try to reject it. I see no third way.

Indeed, we crossed the line. I see no connection to what I said, even though everything was explained. This is the time to part ways as friends. 🙂

Well, that's His Honor's usual tactic. I accept it with love.

After the emotional farewell, I will return to the area and ask – Is there a column that deals with the issue of moral judgment of others (or myself)? I did not find it, although I remember for sure that I read a three-headed argument in your article (that there is no criticism of choosing values because it is forced. There is no criticism of conducting oneself according to values because it is symmetrical. All that remains is the weakness of the will, and then moral judgments and slanders and lies are honored to rest on it).
I would like to discuss this issue with your permission when I find the appropriate place where your method was presented (since I do not really know what this judgment is, and what I do know I apply according to my method and I am not at all interested in his method).

[As far as I know, there is no difference between someone who is wrong about physical facts and someone who is wrong about spiritual facts (i.e. values). Let's say I think that there are snakes and scorpions in the pit and therefore it is forbidden to throw Joseph there. Reuven comes and throws Joseph because he is wrong about the facts and thinks that the pit contains cushions and cushioned blankets (which falling on causes supreme pleasure). Shimon comes and throws Joseph into the pit because he has a vile principle of trying to kill people. Levi comes and throws Joseph because he has a principle that I accept that it is right to kill bad people and according to him Joseph is a bad person. Yehuda comes and throws Joseph because he has a desire to see people fall into pits even though he admits that it is a bad thing. As far as I am concerned, this quartet of Reuven, Shimon, Levi and Yehuda is completely and completely equivalent in every respect.]

I remember a few such discussions. In columns 29-30 I dealt with a complex assessment of people and positions, but that's a different matter. There I talked about how a person can have positive sides and negative sides and one shouldn't let those overshadow the others. I haven't found a discussion about judging a person according to his own system so far. There's a bit of that in column 152, but not really. So maybe I'll actually write about it later, unless you find something like that here.

Doron, there is no escape for Rabbi Michy from your claims here because you are conducting a dialogue of the deaf. You claim that morality is absolute. Rabbi Michy agrees with you. You claim that there are moral acts and some that are not. Here too, Rabbi Michy agrees with you. But Rabbi Michy also claims that if one judges a person on his morality, one should judge according to his definitions of morality. According to this, a person can be moral and do immoral acts. (I am not saying that one of the methods is correct, I just felt that there was a dialogue of the deaf here)

Doron

I really don't understand what the discussion is here. Like the Rabbi said on Friday, a person who acts according to his own moral standards, but they are not considered moral in your eyes (there is a dispute about what is moral and what is not), is not considered immoral, but he is wrong. But of course that doesn't mean you shouldn't fight the Nazis. In the end, they cause harm.

You can ask: And what if someone doesn't understand that murder is bad? Then there is a matter of opinion here. If he doesn't understand that it is bad, then he is not immoral, but he lacks an opinion. He is like an animal. And by the way, that is worse than being evil (immoral). Because an evil person can still repent. An animal can be killed without trial.

I personally see the evil that the Nazis saw in the Jews. The problem with the Nazis is their emotionality and madness. They acted irrationally, even according to their own view. Their hatred of Jews (because of things that were indeed bad about Jews) made them go crazy. Beyond the fact that this evil did not justify murder (but separation and differentiation from Jews did - if not expulsion), they also harmed their war effort and ultimately themselves. And in this sense, they did choose to be animals, and there was evil here. This was not a primitive nation. They distinguished between good and evil as well as we do. It was only the evil they saw in Jews that made them go crazy and lose their sanity. So by choosing to become animals, it was a choice of evil and immorality. And from then on, they were animals without choice.

By the way, that was also my opinion about the evil in the murder of Rabin. The thing that was really bad was Yigal Amir's lack of judgment (and maybe even madness. I don't know. But my impression is that it wasn't) and not the motive itself (which could have been true or not. But it can be understood – from his perspective – and it could very well have been true – Rabin was a risk to the people of Israel – and from his perspective it was a defense of the people of Israel). In other words, before doing something like that, you have to be 1 million percent sure that the truth is with you (and to do so, consult with a million sources. It's an act that's like going to war) and with Rabin it was very far from that.

By the way, this is also the worst thing about the Oslo Accords. In themselves, it was an issue that could be debated – about the peace agreements and territories in exchange for peace – there are gains and risks for each side. So they made sense. The problem was the blindness (and megalomania) of the left that accompanied this entire process. It seemed that nothing would convince it that this move was a mistake, even if it really was a mistake. All the people killed at the beginning were called "peace victims". It's strange that the Semites make peace and then the king of hatred begins. So they said that these are the extremists. Well, then these agreements should have been made with the extremists and not with the mainstream. And if they don't want to, then how can they say "there is no partner".

Yishai
In general, I agree that Michi's position is quite close to mine. That's the case with him, but sometimes, like here, the little relativist inside him gets distracted and then he forgets everything he preaches to him. It's not bad, it happens to all of us sometimes.

As a matter of fact, the claim that morality is judged according to a person's subjective definitions is of course correct in my opinion. But that's only if you understand that that subjectivity is found from the start in interaction with objective laws. Both. Otherwise, you regress to the claim that subjectivity is the only criterion for defining morality and for evaluating moral decisions. This is, for example, what happened to Nietzsche, to postmodernists, and of course characterizes a very popular popular position among the public in the last few decades at least.

I also remember such discussions 🙂 But only briefly about when there is a place for moral judgment, without delving into what moral judgment is, why it is interesting, and whether it has consequences (perhaps related to your mysterious theory that punishment has an element of reward) and whether this phenomenon exists only under the assumption of free choice.

Emmanuel
You wrote a lot of things, so it's hard for me to understand from them how they relate to my main argument.
It seems to me that you have no problem with the exclusivity of the subjective criterion of morality, but then you say that Bez should fight those who have reached a subjective decision of “bad”. So how do you know that what he did was “bad”? In my opinion, you can't know that….
If Bez insists on claiming this, it's because you intuitively feel within yourself that morality is not only subjective.

There is no exclusivity or subjectivism here. Morality is completely objective. It is a reality in itself (moral reality). But this reality (like natural reality) is complicated and complex, and things seen from here are not seen from there and vice versa. So there is room for judgment and mistakes here. But there are also things that are not mistakes but lack of knowledge. There are three things: truth and justice, (legitimate) error, and lack of knowledge (as in logic: a verse can be: true, false, or undefined (nonsense) – the good, the bad, and the ugly). I have tolerance for error (bad) if it was arrived at through (misguided) judgment. What Rabbi Michi calls “being within the radius of tolerance “. And I have no tolerance for those who have no knowledge (the ugly) (they are outside this radius). And just as it belongs in natural reality, it belongs in moral reality.

I think it's clear now. I understand the Nazis a little bit - I see the evil they saw in the Jews (and that's the legitimate part of their overall mistake, that is, the part that is right). I stepped into their shoes and saw things through their eyes. And I don't justify the Nazis - the part where they went ahead and gave this evil a weight disproportionate to the true assessment of the Jews. It was given weight out of a lack of opinion (lack of weighing), or more accurately, out of madness.

In short: He who is wrong is not immoral and he who lacks an opinion is immoral. He is like an animal. And there is no other kind of immorality. That is, a person who knows that what he is doing is wrong will not sin. And the only way he will sin is if he chooses to ignore what he knows. That is, he chooses to lack an opinion. That is, he chooses to be an animal.

Again, I fail to understand what you are saying. Do you agree with me? With whom? With both of us…?
For the convenience of the discussion, I will reinterpret my claim about what morality is:
An interaction between objective legality and subjective decisions. Anyone who acts on this assumption (or at least tries to act on it) meets the necessary conditions for moral thought and/or behavior.
Of course, this is only a necessary condition but not a sufficient one…. We will always remain uncertain about the moral question in general and about specific moral decisions.

Please try to briefly address my claim and do not disperse. Do you understand it? Agree? Partially agree? Reject it completely?

I just read column 152 that you mentioned and found myself a disgraced member of a gang of emotional fools who march in a parade of hypocrisy and stupidity (in my defense, it should be said that I am a member there only de facto in the sense that I think it is appropriate to behave exactly as those marching in the parade behaved, but I am not sure that their reasons are also what I think. This looping thing is quite ironic). To say that this excellent barrage has aroused in me an increased desire to discuss the subject would be a magnificent understatement.

It doesn't matter who I agree with. Or for that matter, I agree with myself. I think Rabbi Michi would also sign off on what I wrote, although I'm not sure. I don't understand you (the wording is too complicated) to be honest. And I myself was pretty clear, I think. The right question here is, do you understand it? Agree? Partially agree? Reject it completely?

To Doron

The last response is more correct:

It doesn't matter who I agree with. Or for that matter, I agree with myself. I think Rabbi Michi would also agree with what I wrote, although I'm not sure. I don't understand you (the wording is too complicated) to be honest. And I myself was pretty clear, I think. The right question here is, do you understand it? Agree? Partially agree? Completely reject me?

Emmanuel
Since you responded to my own words, I must have had the strange idea that you wanted me to understand your words. So far, it has only happened partially. If you want to help me with this, that's great, if not, that's fine too.

In S”D’ Bader P”A

The fact that a person invents for himself a ‘moral method’ according to which it is not only permitted but a &#8216great commandment’ to kill those who hate him – does not make him &#8217moral in his own way’ but rather a &#8217scoundrel squared’ who harnesses reason and moral thinking to become a tool to ideologically establish the evil of his heart.

This is much worse than a predatory animal acting out of natural instincts. Here, all of man's advantages are taken away: the ability to determine and define values and the ability to plan and execute sophisticated moves, and all of this becomes a tool in the hands of evil.

There was nothing moral in the behavior of the Nazis. What did the poor Jews who were brutally murdered and tortured do to them? The only ‘sin’ of those Jews was that they carry in their ’spiritual DNA’ the Jewish ‘slave morality’, which as long as it exists in the world – causes ‘torment of conscience’ to the blond wild beast, and does not allow it to run wild as it pleases.

Therefore, the victory over the spiritual ancestors of the Nazis, the Hamanites and the Amalekites who rose up in all generations to destroy us is celebrated, not only with ’feast and joy’, but by reading the scroll, which proclaims the belief that the world is not a human jungle, where the strong prey on the weak. Rather, ‘there is a leader for the capital’ The oppressed rescuer immediately oppresses them.

And along with spreading the faith, we do deeds that establish moral values: sending gifts to one another, to increase love and unity, and giving gifts to the poor, to internalize that it is the duty of the strong to help the weak. Spreading the faith and strengthening brotherhood and caring for the weak are the ideological struggle against the ideology that turned evil into a moral imperative.

With greetings, Menashe Fishel Halevi Zuchmir

The question should be a little different.
If an average Jew today were born and raised in the same environment and in the same family and education, would he support them or oppose them.

From my investigation of this question, the answer is quite bleak. A great many Jews in the State of Israel would follow the dominant approaches and support them.

Does this belong to a special innate corruption? Not sure. Because the human heart is evil from its youth. Apparently it has to do with the need to be part of something and the tendency to avoid casting doubts and asking questions.
It is very difficult to develop independent thinking. It goes against many needs. And involves discomfort.

A very interesting thread has arisen.
Just to agree and understand what was said better, simply because there is a minor point that I am missing.

When we say that an act is moral, do we mean that the person who did it followed the categorical imperative, or do we mean that this act actually meets the requirements of the categorical imperative? (In our opinion)

The fact that a person has done a moral act has no meaning. It's like a person doing an act of eating due to hunger. It all stems from an emotion or a need. As in the act of eating, so is the moral act. The fear of feelings of guilt.

What matters is whether the person has benefited the world or harmed the world (at least intentionally because it doesn't always work out)

The whole thing with the categorical imperative is ridiculous and absurd and its implementation can only be postponed until a time when robots rule the world.
After giving the robots the order to act solely according to the categorical imperative, all robots will unite in the name of the categorical imperative to destroy humans. Just as the Nazis could also in the name of the hermeneutic imperative to destroy the Jews.

In conclusion. The moral act is suitable for those who have feelings of guilt. The categorical imperative is suitable for those who do not have such great feelings of guilt and can act like a robot without too many feelings.

The right action is for someone who cares about the world and tries to improve it. And what matters is that action. Everything else is just psychology.

The judge, in short, according to your words, there is no obligation to be moral.

To Doron

Good. If I understood you, you are saying that there is an objective (absolute) morality and a person is called moral if he “1. Knows this morality .2. Acts or tries to act according to it.

So like this: From my point of view: morality is objective but its application is not easy for everyone because people see different parts of reality and rank moral imperatives in different ways (moral decisions are made differently for everyone as a result of different consideration of the moral aspects). 2. Indeed. But I argue that this necessarily happens if a person is aware of the moral truth. The only way a person will not act according to it is if he removes what he knows from before his eyes. That is, he will act without an opinion. Then he is crazy and in this matter at least.

I'm sorry to tell you, but slave morality (of the Jews according to the Nazis) is indeed a bad thing. It is not really morality (it is a fact that the one who coined this nonsense (Nietzsche) was not against morality. He was in favor of "master morality"). And indeed, the Jews (German Jews at least, but it can really be said that all Jews then, and most of them today) suffer from it. Slave morality is the manipulation of a weak (and immoral on his part) and wise person on a stronger person so that he will not hurt him, who at the same time and who answers himself will have no problem using force to hurt someone who is weaker than him. In such a case, pure bullying is (at least aesthetically) in a better position than such morality because at least the bully faces face to face ("like a man") with someone who wants to hurt him or with someone he himself wants to hurt, and not hides behind a lie and pretense (fake morality). Morally, there is no difference, of course, because when there is no morality, what does it matter what method is used to make a profit? In nature (immoral), there is no difference between strength and brains. Indeed, at the beginning of their exile, the Jews were forced to use deceit and lies against the thuggish Gentiles in order to protect themselves, but over the generations they fell in love with this deceit and lies, and it became a kind of second nature to them and they began to use it among themselves (community against community, as we see today in the Haredi Tabor, but not only there). The Nazis understood this matter well and for aesthetic reasons (hatred of the ugly and the injured) they wanted to eradicate it from the world as part of their social Darwinist system. Only language was their mistake - they did not want to destroy this evil by destroying people, just as their euthanasia operation (the elimination of the disabled, those with incurable diseases, and the mentally ill) among themselves did not succeed.

Part of our exit from exile to redemption is to move from the morality of slaves to the morality of masters (a morality that stems from strength and from the fear of God). This has already begun with the Zionist movement and the establishment of the State of Israel, but the road is still long and it is well imprinted in us. Even in the fighting Israelis. (And also in me with my sins). It is more difficult to take the exile out of the Jew than to take the Jew out of the exile. Maybe it is impossible. We need to transform from Jews (the weak kingdom of Judah) to Israelites (the twelve-tribe kingdom of David and Solomon), so that our name will no longer be called the sons of Jacob (the Acabai) but the sons of Israel (who sang with God and men and was able).

“The judge, in short, according to your words, there is no obligation to be moral.”

Moral obligation is a fictitious concept invented by those who are ashamed to admit that they are afraid of not doing the “moral act”. In other words, obligation is not something that exists, in other words, there is no obligation, what exists is fear. But cowards also tend to deny fear, so they invent washed-up concepts as they usually do.