Trying to continue from where I left off.

You can give examples of a methodological norm in Kant’s philosophy (as a criterion that tries to mark the boundary between legitimate “critical” philosophy and philosophy that is not), you can give an example from classical philosophy of language in the mid-twentieth century (the focus of philosophical inquiry must be language), and of course there is—as I have argued many times in the past—such a methodological norm in “non-philosophical” bodies of knowledge as well (such as Torah).

But my main concern is the methodological norm of the philosophy you call analytic.

I argued before, and here too it seems to me that you agree, that the analytic position always rejects—even if only implicitly—dualist tendencies.
My claim here is that the rejection of dualism (and this can be dualism in various senses) is accompanied by a methodological norm directed against all non-analytic bodies of knowledge. In other words: analytic philosophy “guides” the person engaged in it not only to accept its way, but to actively negate competing synthetic bodies of knowledge (and later, other analytic positions as well).

You may respond and say that this claim is trivial. Even if so, it has further implications that I would like to discuss later, if you accept my analysis up to this point.

What do you think?

I’ll say again: if “you can give examples,” then please give them. It’s hard for me to discuss this in general terms.
I didn’t understand what you meant about dualism. Maybe you mean what I’ve written several times: that there is a spillover between analytic philosophy as a methodology and an analytic position as a worldview. If so, then I certainly agree. I discussed this at length in Two Carts.

I already gave examples (Kant, etc.), but now I’ll spell them out more.

A small note regarding “dualism”: I simply mean something you probably agree with completely, namely: the synthetic position assumes a duality between our knowledge and/or our claims and the objects of those claims. From its perspective, claims have content (in Frege’s language: claims have, or can have, “reference” and not only “sense”).

As for the “spillover between analytic philosophy as a methodology and an analytic position as a worldview.”

Here I see a serious difficulty in your position, and I’ve argued this before in several ways.

The concept of “spillover” that you use suggests a partial and even incidental transition from methodology to worldview. To my mind that is an inaccurate, inconsistent, and actually incomplete description of the analytic position. The analytic position is much more than that. My claim is that the “movement” from methodology to worldview is necessary and sweeping from the standpoint of analytic philosophy.

I’ll bring an example from Wittgenstein’s Tractatus:

In the bottom line (at the end of the work, that disgusting one… in my opinion) Wittgenstein sets before us a decisive, sweeping, and necessary methodological “norm” for how one should philosophize—one must remain silent…
In his view, silence alone “shows” us what he calls “logical form” (or by another name—“the mystical”). Therefore, in his opinion, the main—and perhaps only—“tool” of philosophy is silence (it is clear that in this idea he is engaging with a common motif in the history of religion and mysticism).

In my opinion, to characterize a methodological norm like Wittgenstein’s as “spillover” does it an injustice.

What do you think?

Doron, I’m sorry. I’m not with you. I don’t understand what you want.

1. Your characterization of the transition from analytic methodology to an analytic worldview is described as “spillover.”
In my opinion, the concept of spillover does not faithfully express that process; that is, I think your description is simply not accurate.

I hope you understood that point.

2. This is not “spillover” because the “agenda” (norm) guiding analytic methodology strives to ground all philosophy in logic, and in practice to ground it in tautologies empty of content. From here also, by the way, comes the analytic conception’s pretension to attain certainty.

3. Therefore I argue that the transition from methodology to worldview bears the character of a severe and necessary logical derivation, not of “spillover.”

I understood that. But I didn’t understand what it has to do with our discussion. What I wrote in Two Carts is that analytic philosophy can be seen as merely a method of philosophizing. A person can accept the existence of fairies, demons, gods, and more, and still discuss them using analytic tools. In my opinion, that is the gist of Wittgenstein’s saying at the end of his Tractatus that you mentioned. His claim is that one should be silent about it, but he does not deny the existence of that dimension in reality. But many analytic philosophers also adopted a conception that I called analytic. You can call it something else and not spillover; I don’t see a principled difference.
Now I think maybe I understand the connection to the matter at hand. In opening the thread, you claim that at the foundation of every philosophy there is a certain methodology. Here that is of course correct, since the use of analytic methodology is explicit. But as stated, it also characterizes philosophers who do not hold an analytic position (such as the early Wittgenstein we mentioned, and in my opinion also the later Wittgenstein). Beyond that, I don’t think it is necessarily true of every philosophy and every philosopher.

Okay, we’re making progress, but I insist that behind the word “spillover” that you used stands a mistaken assumption about the nature of the analytic position and method. A consistent analytic philosopher must be faithful to the methodological norm guiding him, and such faithfulness has one main meaning: since in his view the relation among all bodies of knowledge is ultimately grounded in necessary logical derivation, all bodies of knowledge are therefore required to be interpreted as tautologies. If you don’t see this conclusion, then in my opinion you’re missing quite a bit.
Even your claim above (that Wittgenstein is not an analytic thinker) is mistaken precisely because you ignore this point. Wittgenstein completely denies the possibility of pouring content into our claims about reality (at least philosophical claims). But because he understands that this conclusion must also be applied to his own philosophy, he concludes that his own argument too defeats itself—that is, that his own claims are also empty of content (which is why he brings the ladder parable)—and therefore all that remains for us, on his view, is “silence.” This silence is the methodological norm he is trying to instill in us.
To sum up, the connection between form and content (method and truth) is much tighter within the analytic position than you describe.

Read: tighter in the last line.

As I said, I disagree. It is completely consistent to hold an analytic toolbox together with a synthetic philosophy. As I said, Wittgenstein was such a case.
As for bodies of knowledge, it depends how you define knowledge. Unformulated knowledge can be synthetic (not the result of analytic inferences). You can of course argue that this is not knowledge, but that’s semantics.
Moreover, on your approach the analytic thinker has no knowledge at all. After all, by your definition the premises of an inference are not knowledge. I should remind you that in my view this indeed characterizes those who hold the analytic position, but not necessarily analytic philosophers (for whom it is only a method).

Allow me to claim that you are very mistaken: both in the example of Wittgenstein and regarding the principle behind it.
The basic assumption of every “synthetic” thinker is the existence of an intuitive capacity, but Wittgenstein denies this completely. On his view, the sources of cognition, knowledge, and meaning are limited to language.
As for the general principle: your claim that one can hold an analytic toolbox focuses on the “tools” but ignores the “toolbox.” Indeed, we all make use of the tools of logic, and there is really nothing wrong with that claim. But behind this collection of tools stands a sweeping norm that directs us to make exclusive use of them. That is more or less what I’ve been talking about from the beginning. Do you deny the existence of such a norm at the foundation of the analytic position?

Permission granted. 🙂
I’m admittedly not an expert on Wittgenstein, but in my opinion you are mistaken. The things about which we are silent are not discussed in language, but they do exist. But that is not really important for the principled discussion.
I’m not ignoring the toolbox; I’m claiming that it does not necessarily exist. An analytic position is indeed bound by this methodological constraint, but analytic philosophy (which is only a method) definitely is not. And the other side of the coin: analytic philosophy indeed assumes that the way of philosophizing must be analytic, but that does not mean there are no other ways to arrive at knowledge and insights (even if not formulated, as with Wittgenstein). An analytic position holds that there are not. I already explained that too.

Fortunately for me, I’m also not an expert on Wittgenstein (and in general I’m suspicious of experts…), and I can only quote myself from the previous comment:

The basic assumption of every “synthetic” thinker is the existence of an intuitive capacity, but Wittgenstein denies this completely. On his view, the sources of cognition, knowledge, and meaning are limited to language.

You didn’t answer me on that…

Therefore it is also beyond me how one can claim that from his point of view:

“The things about which we are silent are not discussed in language, but they do exist.”

You agree, I think, that on his view the only toolbox we have is logic (operating through language), and therefore it is impossible to go beyond it. Which means: it makes no sense at all to claim in Wittgenstein’s name that things “exist” outside language.

And regarding the principled issue:

According to you, the “toolbox” (= the methodological norm) does not necessarily exist according to the “analytic” philosopher.

How can that be?! After all, you agree with me that an “analytic” philosopher strives to ground everything in logic, that is, in tautologies? And if you agree with me on that, then you must also agree that from this point of view there is also a necessary and sweeping derivation of this norm. Surely you are not going to claim that we have some kind of “elastic” logic that works on “roughly,” and that logical derivation sometimes “gets tired”… To assume that is just inconsistency.

I keep “pointing out” this issue to you again and again because I think there is a principled flaw here that appears in many of the things you write (at least in arguments with me).

Doron, as usual between us, we are approaching the finish line in giant strides.
I answered your question explicitly and clearly. You may disagree, but you cannot deny facts. Among other things, the following sentence that you quoted from me is an answer to the question that just before that you claimed had not been answered.
When one says that one must be silent about something, the meaning is that that something exists, but there is no way to speak about it. That is my feeble interpretation of the words of the light of our eyes, our teacher and rabbi Rabbi Wittgenstein. If so, there are components in the world that are not discussed by means of logic. Wittgenstein thought there is no point in discussing them (not that they do not exist), and I, the very small one, dust at his feet, disagree with him on that.
I definitely do not agree that there is only logic in our world, and I also do not think that Wittgenstein agreed with that.
Again and again you are conflating an analytic position with analytic philosophy (which is only a way of philosophizing). That is the fundamental distinction I made in the book Two Carts; that is where we started, and I see no point in repeating it again and again.

Well, we are condemned to yet another unfortunate case of “let the reader judge.”
I’m starting to pity whoever has to devote so much time to judging instead of reading.
All the best.