Q&A: The Attitude Toward the Torah’s Laws in Plain-Sense Interpretation
The Attitude Toward the Torah’s Laws in Plain-Sense Interpretation
Question
Hello Rabbi,
In many places there is a gap between the plain sense of the Torah’s verses and the way the interpretive methods of derash expound them, and the effect this has on practical Jewish law as presented by the Sages. And when I use the term “plain sense,” I do not mean the way I or any other reader sees the text, but even the way the medieval authorities (Rishonim) explain the verse according to its straightforward meaning. For example, in Exodus 21:33–34: “If a man opens a pit, or if a man digs a pit and does not cover it, and an ox or a donkey falls into it, the owner of the pit shall pay; he shall return money to its owner, and the dead animal shall be his.” Rashbam explains: “And the dead animal shall be his — according to the plain sense, since he pays its full value, it is only right that the carcass should belong to the damager. But the Sages explained that it belongs to the injured party, because the depreciation of the carcass is the injured party’s loss.” End quote. And we find this sort of thing many times over.
It therefore emerges that there is room for the plain-sense interpretation even when it does not match the derash, yet the Jewish law always follows the derash interpretation (even if in this particular case the difference is not between plain-sense and derash interpretation but between different plain-sense interpretations). If so, the rules of conduct — that is, the Jewish law — are not determined by the simple plain meaning. So the question is: what should one’s attitude be toward the Torah according to the plain-sense interpretation? The Torah is apparently not a law book or a set of behavioral rules by which a person is meant to act. And in the example above, where according to the plain sense the Torah states a rule that the owner of the pit is entitled to take the carcass of the injured ox — what is the reader supposed to do with that rule once the Jewish law tells him not to act that way? And what is the meaning of the Torah’s laws according to their plain sense?
Thank you in advance
Answer
There is a beautiful series of articles about this by David Henshke in HaMa’ayan 5737–38. Take a look there. In short, he argues that the plain sense always has meaning too, not only the derash.
Discussion on Answer
As for “and the dead animal shall be his,” the Mekhilta explicitly raises this very question and explains:
“And the dead animal shall be his” — his, meaning the injured party’s? Or perhaps the damager’s? You say: if so, what is the meaning of “and the dead animal shall be his”? Rather, it teaches that they assess the value of the carcass and deduct it from his damages [Mekhilta].
It seems that this is not even a derash-based consideration but a plain-sense one. If that is the plain meaning, then there is no need for the plain sense also to take part in shaping the Jewish law. (And perhaps this is what Rabbi Aaron of Kinon meant in Sefer HaKeritut when he spoke about interpretive principles of derash that were not included in Rabbi Ishmael’s count, because they actually teach the plain sense.)
See also Malbim and Torah Temimah there.
Beyond that, the plain sense still has significance, because they derive from it that the damager must lift the carcass out of the pit (Bava Kamma 11a), and also regarding an ox of disqualified consecrated animals — excluding this case, where the dead animal is not his (51a).
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Abraham Aharon,
I wrote an article about this. Mainly in chapters 6 and 7.
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1mK1MZ7j0Y0fB5ljZpVqSw5beZZwIYuN6/view
Many greetings,
I saw your article at the link above. Needless to say, it is a masterpiece worthy of praise.
However, I did not find a clear answer to my question in it. That is, in your article you defended the authority of the Sages as interpreters of the biblical “received law,” and you established the rabbinic halakhic tradition over against the Karaite approach. But even in their interpretation, the Sages did not prevent the study of Scripture according to its plain meaning, as they said, “A verse does not depart from its plain sense.” They simply added another layer of derash and determined the Jewish law according to the derash interpretation, while the reader can continue reading the Torah in its plain sense. So now the question is this: if I open the Torah and read it in the most straightforward way, and I encounter a certain command that tells me, “Go do act X,” while the halakhic derash interpretation tells me, “Do not do X but rather W,” then I cannot hold on to the rule that “a verse does not depart from its plain sense,” because in its plain sense the Torah is a book of commands — but I cannot fulfill those commands, since the Oral Torah restricts me. So once again, the verse has in fact departed from its plain sense.
Abraham Aharon,
Thanks for the compliment.
If I remember correctly, I did bring in the article several possible ways to understand the logical place of the plain sense once there is a derash.
For example, that derash is a halakhic change that occurred in some generation (perhaps even in Moses’ own generation), while the plain sense really represented the earlier law. Several sages wrote this.
See for example page 72, one possibility among several that I brought. I’ll quote it here:
At times, the gap between the plain sense and the halakhah of the Sages stems from the fact that the plain sense is the law that was practiced at a certain time, whereas the halakhah of the Sages is the law for later generations. Thus, for example, Rabbi Sherki suggests, based on a close reading of Maimonides, that in Moses’ generation the law of “an eye for an eye” was practiced literally, and that it changed to monetary compensation already in the time of Joshua; see his words here and here. He also noted that the Netziv had already raised the possibility that changes took place in the Torah from Moses’ time in the wilderness to the Israelites’ entry into the Land. These changes caused certain verses to appear superfluous, but in truth, according to the time when they were written, they were necessary. See for example his commentary on Leviticus 7:24 (brought here on page 10), on the possibility that in Moses’ time the prohibitions of carcasses and torn animals were not practiced: “And it seems that according to the plain sense it refers to a carcass slaughtered in the wilderness, which they were permitted to eat.”
Likewise, the approach of Meshekh Chokhmah on the Torah is to explain certain plain meanings of verses as arising from the different halakhic reality that existed in the wilderness generation, and from that comes their contradiction with the accepted halakhah in our hands. See Rabbi Yehuda Cooperman’s article, “Introduction to the Commentary Meshekh Chokhmah on the Torah,” especially chapters 8–9 (pp. 42–54).
Usually the Sages come to explain the current halakhah through the verses, even though in truth they do not fit them and were not supposed to fit them. This is the way of the Sages in many places: to portray the ancient reality as though it matches the present one. They do this even in aggadic matters (for example: “The Patriarchs observed the entire Torah,” or regarding “and he baked matzot” said about Lot — “it was Passover”). Therefore, of course there is no contradiction between this verse and the halakhah of the Sages, who obligate the damager in money and not in putting out his eye (and from this it follows that “an eye for an eye” is a current practical interpretation, not the original literal interpretation).
It is possible that over the generations the fact was forgotten that practical halakhah is not a literal interpretation of the plain sense of the text, but a practical interpretation that arises for one reason or another and is anchored in the text. This leads to unnecessary attempts to reconcile the plain sense of the verse with practical halakhah (for example, this may have happened with “the day after the Sabbath”; see Smad’s article).
Hello,
According to what you wrote above, does interpreting the Torah in its plain sense not accord with the value of the “eternity of the Torah,” and is the whole basis of the obligation to believe in its eternity only at the level of derash, while the reader focused on the plain sense has to view the obligations as a historical command and not as a practical one for the time in which he is reading that command?
Indeed, at least in some cases. The eternity of the Torah in its common and radical sense is untenable and improbable regardless.
Hello again.
Thank you for referring me to Professor David Henshke’s articles on this topic. It is indeed a beautiful collection of articles, worthy of a king’s table. Still, although in many cases it makes sense to say that the simple plain meaning also has significance within the framework of the derash, as Henshke nicely demonstrates with examples in his articles — for instance, “and he shall serve him forever,” said about the pierced slave after six years, where one can say that in principle the slavery is what makes him serve forever, and the Jubilee release is an external factor that uproots the perpetual slavery (although Rashi in tractate Kiddushin 15a, s.v. “this teaches us,” wrote: “something significant is called ‘forever,’” which implies that release in the Jubilee is not an uprooting of the “forever” but a definition of what “forever” means) — and likewise with all six examples Henshke brings there, in any case there are situations where the derash completely uproots the plain sense. That is like the example I gave in my question, where the plain sense of the verse grants the carcass of the ox to the damager, while the derash grants it to the injured party. In that case, it cannot really be said that the fact that the injured party receives the carcass somehow preserves some aspect of the rule that the damager should receive it.