Q&A: The Authority of Moral Communal Ordinances in the Talmudic Sages
The Authority of Moral Communal Ordinances in the Talmudic Sages
Question
Hello Rabbi!
In Friday’s class, the Rabbi spoke about how among the Sages there are moral ordinances that they enacted not by virtue of their halakhic authority, but out of governmental authority (because in the absence of a king, that role passed to them).
How can we know exactly where the line runs in the words of the Sages between a halakhic consideration that binds us and a moral consideration that is open to discussion? Did the Sages themselves make this distinction, or did they discuss the two planes in a mixed way? How can we know that the law regarding coercion to enforce public ordinances (what the Rabbi criticized in the rulings of the Shulchan Arukh on this issue and in Rabbi Lichtenstein’s article) is moral or halakhic?
Answer
First, any Jewish law established after the Talmud has no binding force even in the halakhic sphere. Only if it is an accepted interpretation of a Talmudic source. Otherwise, it is at most a custom.
In these laws, it is certainly a matter of setting rules of governance, and that is not a halakhic domain but a social one. Laws that appear in the Talmud are harder to change, even if they belong to that category. Although, in my opinion, if the public agrees to change them, there is a possibility of doing so.