Q&A: Between a Rabbi and an Expert
Between a Rabbi and an Expert
Question
(To avoid confusion in the question I’ll address the honored Rabbi as “you”; my apologies in advance.)
At one point you distinguished between a rabbi and an expert; I’ll summarize somewhat superficially. You argued that whereas the expert provides data such as a graph (for example, a graph about the relationship between speed on the road and mortality rates), the rabbi makes the evaluative, normative judgment of where the line of danger to life is crossed.
On this case I have a few questions and comments:
A) How does the rabbi choose the expert? Here too, seemingly, the rabbi has to exercise judgment that he is not necessarily qualified to exercise. Is someone who writes an article on Ynet about the topic enough? After all, it is well known that nowadays there is an abundance of articles and opinions. It takes skill to filter them and stick with the serious articles.
B) Even assuming that the rabbi really does receive data, the rabbi’s ability to draw correct conclusions from it is not necessarily especially great. Knowing how to analyze graphs and how to make simple distinctions between correlation and causation is knowledge that most rabbis do not possess, all the more so in complicated subjects where there can easily be additional factors complicating the equation. By this claim I am not disqualifying every graph analysis out of fear of unexpected factors, but rather raising doubt about rabbis’ ability to analyze data properly without suitable training in the subject.
C) It seems to me that there will always be an element of judgment that is not necessarily connected to the moral determination the rabbi has to make, whether in choosing which expert or choosing which article to rely on. Aren’t you basically falling into a certain circularity? You too, in effect, recognize the rabbi’s ability to operate in non-halakhic fields; you just decided on a certain point on the graph of the rabbi’s ability to decide (in this case he is “only” allowed to choose an expert) and for you that is where the boundary lies. But there is no essential reason for your choice; it is just at a different place on the graph from the other decisions. (It may be that the advantage of your approach is that it is minimalist, but it still permits the most important decision of all—and from what I presented above, perhaps also the hardest one—to choose an expert or, usually without education, to infer from data.)
Thanks,
A
Answer
First of all, this is not a distinction between a rabbi and an expert but between a value-decider and an expert. A rabbi is one type of value-decider. If a rabbi has difficulty deciphering the facts, he should use an expert. He may choose an expert as he sees fit. He is בהחלט qualified to choose an expert, not because he understands the field but because that is his mandate, and there is also no one else who can do it (since I am speaking about a case where there is disagreement among the experts). In any case, I made a principled distinction, and if there is a rabbi who cannot do his job, then he should not do it.
I was not trying to optimize anything or produce a better result, and therefore pointing out flaws in my approach is irrelevant. I presented a distinction that concerns truth and not practical efficiency.
Discussion on Answer
I’m not trying to criticize rabbis (although maybe there is room for that); I’m trying to show that you can’t really divide between a value-decider and someone who states facts. It’s true that one can state facts without making a value judgment. But a value judgment will always involve a process of analyzing different facts. According to my approach, a rabbi also has the duty to try to be an expert. It isn’t right to try to divide between them. (You can see this with the great rabbis: part of what made them great was their involvement and expertise in various fields. You don’t have to derive anything from that, but it’s a pattern that I think is worth noting.)
In my opinion, you certainly can, especially on the theoretical plane. I have a series of lectures on Jewish law and reality, and there I deal with this in great detail.
Despite the nice and convenient distinction between a value-decider and an expert, in my opinion it is too simplistic.
I think a good case is whether conversion therapy should be used or not. Seemingly, the researcher is supposed to present its effectiveness as well as its costs, and then the value-decider will decide. But the thing is, the researcher himself is the value-decider. Meaning, as long as there is no one who believes in conversion therapy, there will be no research on the subject. (That is exactly what Shmuel is trying to do—to prohibit research on the subject.)
I don’t think it is easy to separate the expert from the value-decider.
I would even say that this is exactly Maimonides’ intention in Guide for the Perplexed, chapter 2.
After the sin of Adam, there is no longer any separation between truth and falsehood, good and evil; rather, they become mixed together. There is no longer any separation between expert and value-decider; rather, everything is mixed together.
You can even see this in the books of Sam Harris, where he argues that there is no value-decider at all, and rather science itself brings the correct decision, with no room for an ethical expert outside science.
For the avoidance of doubt, as of today conversion therapy is either not effective and even harmful—and personally I am against it.
You keep returning again and again to the same point, and I can only return again and again to my answer. It is certainly possible to separate them, and in most cases it is not even very difficult. There are situations in which it is more difficult, and there are people who do not know how to do it. So what?
And Sam Harris is proof of nothing. One does not bring proof from fools.
I enjoyed the answer, nice!