Q&A: Authority and Expertise Regarding Values
Authority and Expertise Regarding Values
Question
You talk a lot about values,
but their definition is not entirely clear to me.
You wrote something along the lines of: conceptions that come from moral intuition, conclusions reached after deep clarification.
If that is the definition—then why claim that there is no advantage to experts whose process of clarification is more precise and deeper, or why say that there is no essential authority of any kind in this area?
Take for example a value like the claim that Torah scholars / yeshiva students should be exempted from military service.
If my value-based conclusion is that they should be exempted,
is it really impossible to say that an expert like Rabbi Dr. Michael Abraham has an advantage over me?
After all, he has more knowledge than I do in halakhic topics like an obligatory war, the exemption of the tribe of Levi,
he is very familiar with the data about the shortage of soldiers in the IDF,
he has a deep understanding of the concept of equality and the moral commitment to it even as a mitzvah-observant Jew,
he analyzes the issue with cool logical tools, with deep judgment,
and brings a wide range of relevant facts, data, and contexts—as he does as an expert in his columns.
If we compare the value conclusion reached by the average Haredi—
a conclusion that is sometimes based on errors, distortion of data, misunderstanding, disregard, and ignorance of the halakhic spirit—
as against the value conclusion of Michael Abraham, which is based on all the relevant data,
couldn’t one say that there is expertise here?
Just as a doctor who thoroughly understands the components of a medicine earns professional trust in his conclusion about the prescription—
so too an expert in the area of values, who has carefully researched and examined the facts, arguments, and data on which the value conception is based, deserves a certain degree of trust. No?
Am I missing something?
Answer
Are you talking about information or about skill? As for information, if the discussion is halakhic, then of course there is halakhic expertise. If the discussion is moral, then we are dealing with intellectual skill and not expertise. There are certainly people who are more or less skilled in philosophical analysis, but in the end each person has to examine the arguments and formulate a position for himself. If I persuade him, then fine. But I have no added value when it comes to the decision itself. I may be able to raise better arguments, or arguments that are more properly constructed, than someone else. But the decision about which arguments to follow is entrusted to each individual, and there is no expertise regarding that. By the way, in the halakhic context I think there is expertise regarding skill as well. See my article on halakhic expertise.
Discussion on Answer
Indeed, a value cannot be rationalized. It is not derived from facts and not even from arguments. It is an evident truth from within itself. Therefore expertise is not relevant to values. And so too regarding the scale of values, meaning the hierarchy among them.
So is this basically a definition of values?
Anything that does not require justification? (Is it possible that Leibowitz related to it this way? I vaguely remember something, maybe in your book Two Carts.)
Meaning, a value can be based on information that is a matter of expertise, and on skill, where there is also a hierarchy.
But the resulting conclusion is subjective and independent. And there is no expertise in it, nor is it more or less precise/correct.
Am I getting your view right?