So That Judaism Is Not Lost: The Time Has Come for Change in Jewish Law

Originally published: May 12, 2026

This is an English translation (via GPT-5.4). Read the original Hebrew version.

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So That Judaism Is Not Lost: The Time Has Come for Change in Jewish Law

The status of women, the attitude toward non-Jews, homosexuality, religious coercion, liberalism: there are those who want to preserve the sectoral distinction between Hardalim, who are committed to Jewish law, and the “lite” observant, who merely play with it, supposedly. But this is a mistaken distinction, one that ignores the phenomenon of Modern Orthodoxy and the religious need for change in Jewish law, in which lies the hope for preserving Judaism.

In recent years, a distinction has increasingly taken shape between two sectors within the religious public: Hardalim and lites. This terminology is used in the political division between parties and publics (roughly speaking, “Tkuma” represents the Hardalim, and Bennett and “Yamina” the lites). Even the breakdown of survey results is based on it.

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Here is an example: a survey that examined the attitudes of the religious public on the question of whether there is a deliberate trend against religious influence and the presence of religious people in the army found different results among three components of that public: among the Hardal public, 78% agreed with this statement; among the classic religious public, 69% thought so; and among the liberal Religious-Zionist public, only 55% endorsed it. Even the headline of the article in “Srugim” made the point clear: “Hardalim versus the lites…”

Read more on the Judaism Channel:

– “Don’t look for us at the ballot box”: the Haredim who have no home / Eliezer Hayun and Tali Farkash

– Chabad House in China: “We are in crisis”

– Israelis in New York: “We feel less welcome here”

The dichotomous terminology of Hardalim versus lites implicitly assumes a division according to the degree of commitment and fidelity to Jewish law: the Hardalim are those who take their religious commitment seriously (like the Haredim, except that they recite Hallel on Independence Day), and do not yield to every passing moral fashion — while the others are essentially not fully committed to Jewish law. They are religious on the sociological plane, but are not prepared to pay a price for their religious commitment. Some would go so far as to call them “secular people with a kippah.”

The sector for which Israelis have not yet invented a label

The flaw is clear: those who stand opposite the Hardalim are not only lites, but also religious people who are fully and absolutely committed to Jewish law, even if not in the Haredi sense. The name of this group is Modern Orthodoxy (modern Orthodox). It is no accident that in Israel a dichotomous distinction is customary between Haredi Judaism and Religious Zionism, and we have no label for the category of Modern Orthodoxy.

This dichotomous distinction pushes all of us, without noticing it, into the arms of this error. The identification of all the subgroups with the “lite” phenomenon, together with the erasure of the category of Modern Orthodoxy, does them and reality an injustice (and it seems to me that this itself is the product of a Hardal framing). This is also reflected in the Modern Orthodox voter’s perplexity upon arriving at the ballot box, faced with the question of which of the existing parties truly reflects his religious positions.

But an error so widespread does not arise and spread for nothing. It has good reasons, and anyone who wants to change this description cannot avoid dealing with them. For several generations now, מאז the Enlightenment and Reform movements, proposals have been raised to change Jewish law and adapt it to the spirit of the times and to contemporary values and circumstances. Today this mainly concerns the status of women, the attitude toward non-Jews, homosexuality, religious coercion, the value of equality, liberalism, and more.

Naturally, opinions on these proposals divide between conservatives and the more open. Conservatives argue that Jewish law was not handed down to us as clay in the potter’s hands, and that we must preserve it even if this has a price. External influences are, in their eyes, the “evil inclination,” or at most a trial that we must withstand. They rely on one of the principles of faith, namely the eternity of the Torah (“this Torah shall not be replaced”).

A recipe for religious ruin

Accordingly, those who support proposals for change are usually perceived as “lites,” or as Reform Jews — that is, as people who are not faithful to Jewish law. It seems to me that this is the root of the error I described above. Seemingly, fidelity to Jewish law requires conservatism and opposition to change, and from this there naturally grows the feeling that the demand for change is necessarily Reform or lite, since it expresses a lack of commitment. In the eyes of many, this is a recipe for religious ruin.

But it is hard to deny that Jewish law has undergone various changes throughout the generations, and the greatest decisors and commentators took part in them. Within Jewish law itself there are various mechanisms of change and adaptation to circumstances. These are changes that do not necessarily conflict with the principle of the Torah’s eternity, and to a great extent it is precisely they that realize it.

So why do so many feel that complete fidelity to Jewish law means conservatism? It seems to me that one of the main reasons is that the advocates of change do not present a coherent legal conception of change within Jewish law that remains faithful to the spirit of the law and its eternity. That makes it easy for any conservative to portray the demand for change as “Reform,” and thus to dismiss it out of hand and present it as irrelevant to anyone committed to Jewish law. Hence, anyone who demands change is a lite.

Creating a toolbox for the modern decisor

The way to deal with this error — that is, to establish a stable and distinct Modern Orthodox outlook — begins with creating a full and systematic theory of Orthodox change within Jewish law. This may sound alarming to ears attuned to Jewish law, but as noted, no one disputes that such mechanisms exist. These are not steps whose implementation is a privilege reserved for the divine inspiration of the great sages of the generation. There are legal mechanisms that can be studied just as one studies any other subject.

To arrive at such a theory, one must map and conceptualize the mechanisms that underlay the changes made throughout the generations, see where, when, how, and by whom they should and can be applied, and create a toolbox to serve the believer and the decisor in practical use.

This is theoretical and legal work (and meta-legal), and on the face of it, it is not clear what connection it has to the reality of our lives. Seemingly, this is a matter for those who sit in the study hall, not for those wandering in the political wilderness or for what interests the broader public. But I firmly believe that sociological and social processes are driven by deep philosophical and theoretical currents.

Therefore, in my view, the first step toward social change must begin with theoretical work. Once such a theory is developed and presented, demands for change can be grounded on a solid legal basis. In that situation, even if these demands are not accepted, it becomes difficult to dismiss all of them out of hand, and it is certainly difficult and unjustified to call those who raise them “Reform” or “lite.” And lo and behold, even the political map — and certainly our public and ideological discourse — can change בעקבות such theoretical work.

Who is afraid of non-Jews?

In my book “Walking Among Those Who Stand,” the third in the trilogy that recently appeared, I sketch a systematic and comprehensive picture of the theory of change in Jewish law, and show its compatibility with the rules of Jewish law. There is an inbuilt possibility of change within Jewish law, one that places it on stable foundations, even if not Haredi ones.

The toolbox I propose, beyond its obvious benefits, creates a buffer zone between the dichotomous poles — that is, it wedges a foot between the Haredi doorpost and the lite door. Space does not permit elaboration here, but perhaps the example I will give can make the point clearer: Rabbi Menachem HaMeiri was one of the great commentators on the Talmud and sages of Provence, a thirteenth-century figure. His revolutionary claim regarding a change in the required attitude toward the non-Jews of his day is a foundational model for such a theory.

Contrary to what is stated in Talmudic literature, HaMeiri argued that because the non-Jews of his time conducted themselves in a reasonably moral manner, all the Talmudic laws that discriminate against them are nullified (thus, for example, he permits violating the Sabbath in order to save their lives, in complete contradiction to the Talmudic ruling). When one examines the logic underlying his claim, he understands the Torah’s directive to be that one should treat people who behave immorally in a discriminatory way. But when circumstances change — that is, when non-Jews behave morally — there is no reason to preserve the Talmudic attitude toward them. It follows that sometimes preserving the legal ruling under changed circumstances actually constitutes a deviation from the values of Jewish law, whereas changing the legal ruling is precisely what enables us to preserve Jewish law.

– A conference marking the publication of the trilogy written by Rabbi Michael Abraham will be held tomorrow (Wed., 4/3), at the Institute for Higher Torah Studies, Bar-Ilan University, from 15:45-18:30. The conference is open to the public.

Source (ynet): https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5688118,00.html

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