Failures in the cosmological argument

Hello Rabbi!
I read your second booklet on the cosmological argument, and I must say that I encountered two problems with the argument.

1. To avoid infinite regression by claiming that everything that exists has a cause, you raised the argument that everything that we know has a cause, which we may or may not know. But in my opinion, this argument is not real. The whole point of the argument is our basic intuition that everything that exists has a cause. The moment we realized that this intuition leads to failure, then the argument itself is no longer valid. There are two claims that I am willing to accept as intuitive – everything that exists has a cause, or a second, more cautious option, everything in our experience has a cause in our experience. The moment we leave the basic intuition contained in these two claims because they cause infinite regression, then all kinds of arguments can be raised, but they will have no basis. Just as it can be said that everything that exists in our experience has a cause either in our experience or not in our experience, it can also be said that everything that exists in our experience has a cause in our experience, unless we are no longer able to identify the next cause as something in our experience, and then we no longer need a cause (meaning that the singular point does not need a cause because we are unable to identify the cause of the singular point). Since the second option allows me to see reality with fewer ‘entities’, according to Occam’s razor the most reasonable thing would be to take the second and not the first. Mainly what I came to say here is that you did not explain why the argument ‘everything in our experience has a cause that is either in our experience or not’ is valid, and I showed that in my opinion it is not an intuitive proposition. In your debate with Aviv Franco head to head you said that according to David Hume, and you agreed with him there, ‘the principle of circumstantiality is not derived from experience, but from reason’ (57:15). According to this, the statement that everything that exists in our experience has a cause in our experience or not is fundamentally wrong because the principle of circumstantiality always applies, not even to things in our experience. I really recommend listening again in the video, you actually said there that everything needs a cause regardless of experience. (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LVTmRwitEUI)
2. What does it mean that something is in our experience and something is not? I feel that you did not explain this well in the booklet. In my opinion, a point that is so dense to such a degree that talking about its time is factually incorrect because it does not have the concepts of before and after is not in our experience enough to define it as one that does not require a reason, even according to the argument you raised. So what is the definition of something that is in our experience and what is not? After all, God is also in our experience according to the theory of the Torah from Heaven, since the Israelites experienced Him, in contrast to the singular point that no one experienced. Everything has a side that is in my experience and a side that is not. You also identify God as good and as the cause of the universe. (And perhaps also the greatest being imaginable? In different places I understood from you different methods of yours on the ontological argument, especially since you do not come up with a conclusion in booklet 1, so it is confusing at all.)

And in any case, thank you very much for your hard work on behalf of rational faith, I really appreciate and love your writing and conversations!