Policy considerations
Hello Rabbi!
You have written against mixing policy considerations into halakhic rulings in several places. Can’t we say that just as human dignity, sorrow, loss, etc. are considerations that must be weighed in halakhic rulings, so too are considerations of ‘what they will say’ or ‘what will happen’ bound to enter into considerations of the law? (I emphasize the law, meaning that this is literally what the law says, and then it also dulls the problem of lying a bit). And perhaps I should divide my words between Torah and rabbinic?
In other words, do you categorically reject the ‘what will they say’ or ‘what will happen’ considerations and believe that they are not halachically valid, or do you believe that their use is only correct in extreme cases (especially today)?
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Another question: In your words about changing halakhah following a change in reality, which in your opinion is not a change at all (midrashic conservatism), it is possible to say that the Sanhedrin determined (or to say so from an explanation) that even when reality changes, only an authorized court can change the law, and thus not prevent halakhic chaos (because in such a situation, it is possible that a hundred Jews will act in a hundred ways, because they assessed reality differently).
Thank you very much.
I didn’t write against this anywhere. What I wrote is that it should be put on the table that this is a policy and not a pure ruling.
Respect for human beings is not a policy but a halakhic rule.
Preventing chaos is a policy consideration and cannot change the law, unless the Sanhedrin determines so. And even if it does, it must be said that the reason for the ruling is preventing chaos and not a pure halakhic consideration. This way, everyone will have the discretion to accept or not.
A. According to you, someone who, let's say, accepts the rationale of halakhic policy, but acts in the opposite way, is he violating halakhic law or something more general? (The will of the Torah or something like that, meaning that it is only proper not to do so).
B. If we believe that he is actually violating halakhic law, then it appears that a policy consideration is a halakhic consideration for all intents and purposes. In other words, it appears that there is no difference between ‘what would happen if’ and ‘respect for human beings’, meaning that both are halakhic considerations. Why even make the distinction between them?
C. Indeed, policy considerations are subject to interpretation according to the case and do not necessarily have proof from the sources, but this does not detract from saying that they are a halakhic consideration for the one who adopts them. The use of ’respect for human beings’ is also subjective.
This also does not contradict your statement that a teacher of teaching should present things to the questioner as they are.
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D. I think you missed my second question. It is not related to the first question at all.
A question occurred to me regarding your statement that a change in halakha following a change in reality is not a change at all and happens automatically without the need for the approval of the Sanhedrin. On the face of it, can it be said (and this sounds reasonable) that the Sanhedrin limited this mechanism, and reserved it only for itself? The explanation is – If everyone changes the law according to reality, every Jew will maintain a different halakha. Therefore, it is said that any change in reality that supposedly entails a change in law will require a determination by the Sanhedrin.
A-C. He does not violate the halacha, otherwise it would be halacha.
D. I completely agree, if the understanding of reality was fundamentally wrong, there is no need for annulment. It is as self-evidently invalid as accepting a mistake. But if reality has changed, then it is a change in halacha and in principle it requires a Sanhedrin. However, in practice, it often happens without a Sanhedrin, apparently when the need is great enough.
Regarding D:
1. According to the explanation I presented, why would there be a difference between an error in reading reality and a reality that has changed? After all, in both cases the Sanhedrin established a law based on a certain reality (as it understood it) and today the reality is different (and in any case we are acting incorrectly). And in both cases there is a fear of chaos.
2. How does this fit in with the mechanism of midrashic conservatism? Ostensibly, according to this, the mechanism cannot be used. Should we add the assumption that the absolute authority of the Sanhedrin is only valid in a situation where there is no Sanhedrin and not when we have been without a great court for 2000 years?
I explained this in the book. When the original decision is based on an error, it is automatically null and void. When reality changed, the original Halacha was valid and now they want to cancel or change it. This requires a decision by the court.
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