Regarding ’emotion’ in determining morality
Greetings to the Rabbi, first let’s start with the honor of Aksania and say that I listen to the Rabbi’s introductory course to philosophy with great eagerness. Like a camel thirsting for water, a pleasure.
And to the point, yesterday I asked in the response at the end, is it possible to say that emotion can also be tuned to morality (beyond an indication that can happen “accidentally”) in addition to reason .
And my intention was perhaps to try to challenge the approach that claims that there is a naturalistic fallacy in psychological things (like rejection).
And that ‘the only justification for morality is reason’ . (In Bergman’s book I saw that Kant defines only reason as the moral imperative, and everything else is called the “hypothetical imperative”, i.e. conditional on something else, and therefore immoral).
As I said yesterday, we can make a leap – just as we have given reason the authority to determine what is moral and what is not.
There is no such thing as a moral emotion . Emotions are given the power to show us what is moral and what is not (even if there is no intellectual justification for this. Let’s say that every reasonable person is disgusted by slaughtered blood. [At least in the first slaughter], even if there was no intellectual justification for not bleeding animals, it is still claimed that bleeding is immoral *and the evidence* for this is – that it disgusts me).
And just as in the categorical imperative I don’t consider emotion, here too I won’t consider reason.
And the truth is that this is a reflection that I say, under the influence of the rabbi’s great method of explaining Kant’s synthetic a priori. Just as there are “the eyes of reason .”
Thus, we can say that there are “eyes of the heart “.
And just as the mind (apparently) sees the principle of causality in the mind, the same mind sees in its core (feels) what is moral and what is not.
Therefore, psychological emotion is also a ‘loaded burden’ , and not empty.
(There is much more to expand on here, I of course reject blind evolution, and claim that it was completely controlled. Therefore, human psychology has validity.
I intuitively feel that there is a position here that needs to be well defined, but I hope I managed to convey the general idea.
It is indeed an argument that claims to be ‘revealing’ and not ‘concluding’. But I don’t feel that it would detract from the justification for emotion, rather than the justification for reason. (They seem to me to be equivalent, both logically and intuitively).
Good day to the rabbi
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A question of refinement, Rabbi Yamin Namseh puts the “(psychological) rejection” in which category? Emotion or intellect?
Of course, this is an emotion, but sometimes it expresses a value judgment made with reason.
So this is not a pun, Rabbi, this is exactly the argument I was trying to make, that psychological rejection (i.e., emotion) stems from a moral source.
“The Eyes of the Heart”
So you repeat what I write and paint it as a different position. What is the question?
The Rabbi claims that ’rejection’ belongs to emotion, and one cannot learn from emotion.
I said the opposite, that rejection belongs to emotion, and one can learn from emotion. I repeat the Rabbi's idea in the synthetic a priori solution, but I extend it to emotion as well (this is also intuition).
In principle, there is no question, I simply wanted to see if the Rabbi accepts this position. I understand that
Reason-based moral teachings are designed for emotionless psychopaths so they can disguise themselves as good people.
I explained that if emotion is an expression of an intellectual or volitional decision, then we can learn from it, but only as an indication. Emotion in itself is meaningless.
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