The authority of the Talmud

Receiving the Torah at Mount Sinai requires that we received it in person. How can we (as only one party to the contract) “accept” the Talmud when it contradicts the “true” halacha? If we made an agreement that I owe you 100 shekels, I can’t accept not giving it to you, can I?

It also seems strange to me that the acceptance at Mount Sinai is similar in its validity to the acceptance of the Talmud. A few points of difference:

1) The acceptance of the Torah was due to the demand of God, while the acceptance of the Talmud was seemingly voluntary without any legitimate demand from any party.
2) In the past, I remember you saying that it would be possible to replace the acceptance of the Talmud with another institution that the people would accept. Regarding the acceptance of the Torah, I do not think that this acceptance can be canceled.
3) In the series of lessons on authority, you mentioned that for certain systems, the authority of the sages stems from full tessur, while for other systems it does not stem from full tessur, and apparently according to what you wrote above, both systems ultimately stem from the acceptance of the audience, so what is the difference?

Oren, the answer is simple: As long as he is right, even if he is left - listen to their voice... That is why we need a Sanhedrin to make the Kabbalah more suitable for the "Rosh of the Torah" and to change everything that is no longer relevant and does not suit our time at all. It is similar to when a boy grows up and is expected to remain in his small clothes until "certified seamstresses, witty in their wisdom and power", come and renew his suit and clothes according to his current measurements. And the halakha sometimes remains old even though the reasons for things in the halakha have changed beyond recognition. Just as the boy's body dimensions have changed. And the sages of the generation do not notice this and this brings shame on all of us - and I do not know until when?

And if I use the example of A”H, it goes like this:
If we made an agreement that I owe you 100 shekels and under certain conditions I will owe you more, say if more time has passed than the time you were supposed to repay (and the interest has increased), can't I take it upon myself not to give more? We see from this that the agreement changes depending on time. And we set the condition. The answer is that if we made such an agreement and wrote that in any case I will only pay you 100 shekels, then it really must be 100 shekels, but let's say a "new" law was passed in halakhic law at the time of the loan, which states that I borrow so and so much money must pay according to some condition, say 110 shekels at the end of the time. Now let's say that this condition has been canceled and time has passed, will I still be obligated to pay 110 shekels? No and no. But in Halacha they say and wait that in order to change the condition, a new Sanhedrin must be brought in with a minyan. Why complicate things? Where have we seen such a thing? And this is despite the fact that Dor Dor and Francis Dor Dor and his sages said!

A.H. and Oren,
1. Acceptance of the Torah was at the discretion of the sages (as the Ramban wrote in several places). After all, the Torah was given to us without interpretation, and the assumption of the Giver of the Torah was that we would interpret it and that whatever we did was acceptable to Him. Especially if we take into account the “not in the heavens”, which leaves everything to us. Therefore, we have the right to accept any interpretation, as long as we do so in good faith.
2. In accepting the Torah, the Sages say that there is room for the claim of a great deal of agreement. But it is true that today it is probably no longer valid (the generation accepted it). But there it is a contract that was signed without conditions and without a remainder (at least after the generation accepted it in the days of Ahasuerus). On the other hand, accepting the Talmud is our decision and therefore depends on us. The mouth that forbade it is the one that permitted. In other words, accepting the Talmud is not a contract with the Almighty, but our decision.
3. It is the argument itself: Both things stem from the acceptance of the community. And yet when the community accepts something, it is binding but does not enter the bounds of the Torah. But when the community accepted a commitment to the Torah, and the Torah commands “do not deviate,” it became a law of the Torah. We discussed in the last lesson or the one before it the question of what happens to someone who deviates from the custom of his community (like a Sephardi who practices as a rabbi), whether he has violated “do not leave” or a Sabbath prohibition. Similarly, someone who violates a rabbinic prohibition has violated the acceptance of the community or the law of “do not deviate.”

So accepting the Talmud is mandatory both because it is like the Knesset and because it is the interpretation we have chosen for the Torah? If it is because it is like the Knesset, most of the Jewish people today do not see themselves as obligated to the Talmud, why continue to listen to it? (And it is clear that there is no need to do a “ceremony of removing the Kabbalah” because there was no special ceremony of acceptance either) If it is because it is our interpretation of the Torah, if we know that the Talmud is wrong, it is really not “in good faith”. What is the difference between this and the Sanhedrin, which, when it is wrong, is forbidden to listen to it (until they tell you right, right, and left, left)?

I ask a fundamental follow-up question (please forgive me for not having yet looked at the sources you sent): It is not clear to me. Why does accepting a certain normative source create such an obligation that it even outweighs the value of truth. And if this is the test – why is the Torah more “true” than the American Constitution. And also – why do you stop only at the halakhic aspect? If the Talmud as a single piece was accepted as a binding source – why is only the halakhic part of it binding and not the aggadic part (insofar as it speaks of facts, for example). Also – Knesset laws can be changed in the event of an error or incompatibility with their purpose. This may also be the reason why they are accepted by the public.

Because the Torah itself (in “Do not deviate”) says that authority trumps truth. Likewise, the value of autonomy sometimes trumps truth. See here:
https://mikyab.net/%d7%9b%d7%aa%d7%91%d7%99%d7%9d/%d7%9e%d7%90%d7%9e%d7%a8%d7%99%d7%9d/%d7%94%d7%90%d7%9d-%d7%94%d7%94%d7%9c%d7%9b%d7%94-%d7%94%d7%99%d7%90-%d7%a4%d7%9c%d7%95%d7%a8%d7%9c%d7%99%d7%a1%d7%98%d7%99%d7%aa/

The Torah is more true than the American Constitution because it is an expression of God's will (as mentioned, God's will in interpretation human. But that is what he wants).
The legendary part of the Talmud was not accepted as binding, if only because it says nothing (it is all a question of interpretation).
The laws of the Talmud can also be changed when a Sanhedrin is established. And in fact there are mechanisms that allow for change even today (through interpretations or freezes or the use of the principles of the basket, etc.).

Rabbi,

You once told me that if I know that the Sages were wrong, I am not obligated to listen to them. And now you say that the Torah allows that authority should prevail over the truth - so why am I not obligated to listen to something if I know that the Sages were wrong about it?

The Babylonian Talmud was accepted as a primary halachic source because it is the last sagely source at the time that summarizes all the sagely interpretations and halachic interpretations as they appear, on the assumption that they were familiar with all the halachic sources that preceded them, and because the Gemara was compiled in a manner that included all the interpretations needed for future generations and was signed with the participation of the majority of the sages of Israel, and because after the signing of the Gemara, the sages of Israel undertook not to disagree with the Amoraim, just as after the signing of the Mishnah, the Amoraim undertook not to disagree with the Tannaim, knowing that their understanding was limited and the truth was not with them in relation to their predecessors.

From 80, the question is why are we *allowed* to decide not to disagree with the Amoraim? Even the Sanhedrin is forbidden to listen when they know they are wrong, and so is the Gemara. It is all right, according to your opinion, that it is because our minds are short, etc., but the Rabbi claims that there is no generational descent and it is clear that there are many errors in the Gemara.

Rabbi Yosef Migash, of whom the Rabbi said that even in the generation of Moses our Lord, there was no one as wise and intelligent as him, and the Maimonides wrote about him that the level of that man in the Talmud was terrifying to anyone who would look at his words and the depth of his intellect in detail, wrote: “A person who has never read Halacha with a Rabbi and does not know its path, but has seen many of the responsa of the late Ge’onim is more worthy of instruction than one who relies on his own opinion and wants to derive a law from the Talmud by studying Halacha. And that in our time there is no one who can derive laws from the Talmud without relying on the words of the Ge’onim.” The Amoraim relied on the Tannaim, the Ge’onim on the Amoraim, the Rishonim on the Ge’onim, and the Rishonim on the Rishonim. The division into titles is not simply a consequence of the descent of generations, but rather indicates different essences in knowledge of the Torah and the authority of the Sages in ruling on Halacha. Rabbi Reuven Levin, who was considered the sharpest genius of his generation, would say: "I have no way of saying new things, only necessarily in the Gemara or from the words of the Rishonim."

A”H,
I compared the acceptance of the Talmud to the Knesset in the sense that acceptance is binding regardless of the question of truth. You are right that if the majority of the public today does not accept the authority of the Talmud, then from the perspective of reason it seems to have expired. I just do not agree that the fact that the majority of the public is secular is relevant. It does not accept the halakhah or the Talmud. It does not play the game at all. When there is agreement that there is no authority for the Talmud, its authority will expire. But a private individual cannot decide this just as he cannot change the law.
It is not at all simple with regard to the Sanhedrin either. As is known, there were many systems in law “it is wrong to listen to the words of the sages”, and it also depends on who can deviate from their teaching (only an elder who has reached the teaching, or anyone?) and what errors are involved (dispute in reason? Not likely).

Moshe,
I was talking about factual-scientific errors. Halakhic errors (which are errors in your opinion) do bind. There is no authority over facts.

If the Reforms become the majority of the people, then in your opinion will we move the Talmud from the reference shelf to the history shelf?

Of course, for this purpose I am referring to the Reform faction that believes in God and Sinai

An undefined question. I don't think there is such a reform faction that is committed to the halakha received at Sinai. But if the majority of the sages of Israel who are committed to the halakha decide that the authority of the Talmud is null and void, then it will be nullified, because the one who forbade it is the one who permitted it.

And if they decide to regret accepting the Torah, the acceptance will be nullified, and only a mountain will remain like a basin and a large amount of knowledge, since the mouth that permitted it was forbidden. And a person who made a vow and after a while decided to cancel it, the vow will be nullified since the mouth that permitted it was forbidden. And so on, in the case of the value of an soul that is a sin, and in the confession of a litigant, if he retracts it after the time of his retraction, he retracts it. And so on, until the witness returns and testifies to the contrary and takes the last word. And a judge in the Sanhedrin also retracts it from a right to an obligation. And it is simple.

Despite your firmness (and perhaps because of it), you have brought here a collection of irrelevant examples. Within the system of halakhah, what determines is the boundaries of halakhah. A vow is permitted by way of the dissolution of vows. But if a person has accepted something that is not part of a vow, he can of course withdraw it. Here we are talking about acceptance that is not part of the boundaries of halakhah but something external (if it is a vow, it can be dissolved, like a vow of many upon the consent of many). What remains from all your examples is only acceptance of the Torah, which is not part of the halakhah but something at its core. But this is an agreement with God, blessed be He, and it has a second side. Therefore, it cannot be revoked simply on the basis of the will of one of the parties, and the mouth that forbade does not belong here. This is what is called in the world of law “reliance.” This does not exist in accepting the authority of the Talmud. Beyond that, even if we revoke our consent, God, blessed be He, can still demand that we comply because it is right and because He wants it that way. The fact that he preferred consent does not mean that there is no obligation without consent. This does not exist with respect to the authority of the Talmud.