Another Look at Greatness in Torah and the Attitude to Halakhah (Column 684)
With God’s help
Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.
In column 682 I discussed the essence of greatness in Torah. I noted there that beyond knowledge and skill and beyond analytical abilities, what are also required are common sense and familiarity with the world and its other fields of knowledge. A few days ago someone posted to a WhatsApp group a ruling by the late Rabbi Elyashiv that had been published in Yated Ne’eman. Beyond the content of the ruling, the very fact that this ruling is circulated and even viewed as an indicator of greatness in Torah and as a model for a proper way of life for the public is itself quite telling. It reflects the fact that not only are large parts of the Haredi Torah and rabbinic leadership detached from the world and therefore distort halakhah, but that with the generous help of the apparatchiks at Yated Ne’eman they are creating an entire public that grows up on these distortions, in their image and likeness. Precisely as someone who identifies with the picture and model described here and certainly does not reject them out of hand, it is important to me to sharpen and clarify the problems they contain.
The ruling
I will quote here the words as they appeared there:[1]
Rabbi Elyashiv was asked:
A young kollel scholar who devoted his entire day to Torah study in kollel and therefore was necessarily absent from home, and he also wants to study in the evening—what about helping at home? How far does his obligation extend?
Answer:
The husband’s commitments to his wife in the ketubah do not include help at home. There is an obligation to provide livelihood, but not an obligation to assist with household chores. However, there is here a matter of kindness—of bestowing kindness upon one’s wife—but this is not a “binding obligation” among the ketubah obligations.
But it is possible that there is an obligation here from another angle, derived from the Ritva’s words in a different sugya: If a man wishes to marry a second wife in addition to his current wife, the Ritva rules that he must stipulate this as a condition at the time of marriage. And why is a stipulation necessary? For essentially—before the ban of Rabbeinu Gershom—there is no prohibition against marrying a second wife! Why, then, is a stipulation necessary? The Ritva explains: since it is customary that a man does not take a second wife in addition to his first, this is tantamount to an implicit undertaking not to take another wife. If he wishes to deviate from this, he must stipulate it at the time of marriage. It may be that the same applies to a husband’s obligation to provide help at home. One must ascertain what the accepted reality is. If it is customary that in a defined and known situation, or at certain times of the year, the husband helps, if that is the reality, the woman can claim that she married him on that understanding—and this requires deliberation.
And another question:
When the husband sits and studies all day and even in the evening hours he toils in Torah, can the wife claim that she finds it difficult to cope with the loneliness?
Answer:
Loneliness in and of itself is not a claim—unless we judge according to the Ritva’s principle: if it is customary that the husband also attends to his wife’s loneliness, then this would be considered his obligation. And only a stipulation at the time of marriage—that he will not cease from his study—would be effective.
You will not be surprised to hear that people in that group objected to these words. They did not even bother to explain what the problem was, since it seemed self-evident to them. There is a sense that these statements are squarely opposed to common sense, and that it is inconceivable that a halakhic authority would rule this way in practice.
I must say that sometimes such outcries contain a measure of the am ha’aretz’s hatred for the talmid chacham, and in order to clarify matters we must examine them on the merits, in both directions—neither out of hatred nor out of the kind of love (for Torah and its greats) that distorts judgment. On the substantive plane I have very many comments about these rulings, and I will present them one by one.
Is this halakhah?
One can debate whether this is even a halakhic question. On the face of it, very much so. The question addresses mutual obligations between spouses (in effect, the husband’s obligations to his wife), and these obligations are anchored in the ketubah and in the laws of the Torah (food, clothing, and conjugal duty). Therefore, it makes sense to turn to a halakhic authority and clarify whether such an obligation exists. This is a fully legitimate halakhic question. Moreover, sometimes halakhic clarification does not dictate how one should actually behave. Beyond halakhah there is common sense, there is morality, and there are understandings between human beings. This is especially true according to my view, which separates halakhah and morality; but it seems to me that even if one does not accept my picture of halakhah and morality, in practice this is how halakhic decisors who are rooted among their people conduct themselves. The fact that there is no halakhic obligation to ease one’s wife’s loneliness or to help her with housework does not mean that one should not do so. The absence of an obligation is not a counter-obligation. And even if this involves bitul Torah (time away from study), the halakhic authorities have already written (see my article here, part II) that the mitzvah of Torah study pertains to times free from other necessary engagements; and the question is what counts as those necessary engagements (livelihood, helping at home, easing one’s wife’s loneliness, spending time with the family, rest, and the like).
However, if this is merely a technical halakhic clarification, when the halakhic authority is asked such a question he should clarify that he is analyzing the issue through a halakhic prism and is not issuing a practical ruling. No hint of such a caveat appears here. In such a case I would expect an addendum after the analysis, stating that up to this point was the halakhic clarification, but in practice it is certainly proper to act thus and so. All the more so when addressing a public for whom halakhah is everything and when a “halakhic ruling” is understood as practical instruction.
Two rabbinic types
Within his words, Rabbi Elyashiv discusses what is customary in the world. Is it customary for a man to help his wife or to ease her loneliness or not? I get the sense that he truly did not know and was unfamiliar with the situation. Rabbi Elyashiv himself was secluded in his room, studying Torah day and night, and it is doubtful to what extent he was familiar with the norms among ordinary people. In many cases the impression was that he did not know them. Incidentally, if the factual situation was truly unclear to him, I would expect that he would instruct people to make a stipulation in the kiddushin or in the ketubah, to the effect that the husband will ease his wife’s loneliness or help with housework—or a stipulation that establishes that the spouses agree there are no such obligations.
In column 139, written as an obituary for Rabbi Elyashiv Knohl (rabbi of Kfar Etzion), I drew a comparison between two types of halakhic decisors, represented (in my presentation) by Rabbi Elyashiv Knohl and Rabbi Yosef Shalom Elyashiv (and later by the Rogatchover and the Or Sameach, the two rabbis of Dvinsk—Danzig). There I pointed out the advantages of each of these types as a model for serving God, and I compared them with respect to learning and to halakhic decision-making. I said that the secluded figure, like Rabbi Y.S. Elyashiv, is a paragon of devotion to Torah and of immense Torah knowledge, and it is very important to have such paragons by whose light the public can be educated (to provide an aspiration). But at the same time I argued that this is not the only way to grow in Torah and that such a figure cannot issue practical halakhic rulings and certainly cannot lead a community (see also column 682).
The Gauguin dilemma
In that column I described what is known as the “Gauguin dilemma.” Gauguin was a brilliant painter who neglected his family, claiming that he must devote his life to art, otherwise the world would be lacking. I explained there that in my view there is certainly room for such a claim, but it must be done with the consent of his spouse. If she truly agrees, that is very worthy of great esteem. She is sacrificing herself for the advancement of art in the world. Such an agreement should not be made—even with consent—unless the person is an exceptional genius. But if he indeed possesses special abilities (persistence and intellectual talent), it is indeed proper to make such an agreement. Such a genius seeks a partner who will help him grow and develop the art—for his sake, for hers, and for the world’s—and if there is a woman who is willing to do this, may she be blessed.
The same applies to someone who devotes himself to growth in Torah. Here too there is room for it, if two conditions are met: the person has exceptional abilities, and his spouse agrees—either initially or retroactively—to such a way of life. In such a case there is nothing wrong with it. On the contrary, both are worthy of great esteem. Moreover, even if the couple has reached an agreement and the husband is indeed deserving, if he sees that in practice his wife cannot cope, he must back away from the stipulated condition and behave as a mensch. And not because there is a mitzvah of kindness or an implied condition, but because one must be a mensch and have common sense. This is your life partner, as your own self. Your commitment toward her is not exhausted by the contract you signed and its legal hairsplitting.
There is something to the protests I heard against this ruling. It smacks of a shocking halakhic detachment, very far from common sense. A layman looking at this ruling immediately sees that it does not hold water. And this is not because “the layman’s view is the opposite of the Torah’s view,” but on the contrary: because “the Torah’s view” (in its distorted sense) is in many cases far from common sense (see more on this below).
The ideal model: how should one relate to such a figure?
Therefore I do not accept the automatic outcry against such an instruction. Derekh eretz may precede Torah, but nonetheless Torah is also important, not only derekh eretz. There is room for sacrifice for the sake of Torah. Yet despite this, note that Rabbi Elyashiv gave this instruction to a kollel fellow who was apparently anonymous, and it was also published in a newspaper as a paragon to which every kollel fellow should aspire. It appears he also did not check whether such an agreement existed between them, and he did not check the state of the questioner’s wife and the extent of her distress.
Therefore, even if I am mistaken and Rabbi Elyashiv was addressing a particular fellow whom he knew (this does not seem to be the case from the answer, as there is no clarity that the wife agreed, nor are there conditions mentioned regarding the abilities of the questioner), still, the publication of the answer and the regard for it as an ideal path for the many point to a very deep distortion in Haredi-kollel thinking.
Looking at the world of Torah as a whole, in my opinion it is indeed important and proper that there be such couples, where one of them (it could also be the wife) devotes all their days to Torah while the other bears the burden of the home. Such devotion produces paragons and Torah knowledge for which there is no substitute and which is very necessary (even if the weight of knowledge declines in an age of databases). Devotion to Torah and developing scholarship are values that the entire public ought to be educated toward. But this is a path for the few, and it should remain so. It is not right to present such a model to the many.
Our forefather Abraham was the pillar of kindness. This is the figure by which we are educated. Is it proper that each of us, when three Arabs come to visit him, slaughter three calves in order to serve them tongue in mustard? Absolutely not. That is neither reasonable nor right to do. It may be that Abraham himself did not actually do so and that we are dealing with an educational myth (Maimonides interpreted it as a dream). Sometimes education requires unrealistic models that are not practiced in proper proportion—an ideal utopia. But it is important to understand that these are not figures to be imitated, but only ones that chart a general value-laden direction, no more.
I am sure that even within Haredi thought there will be those who accept my words, arguing that many will attempt this and not succeed (in Berakhot 35b this expression appears in precisely such a context). They too understand that this is a path for the few. But my claim here is much more radical: ab initio it is not right to act this way. The Torah’s true scale of values is the opposite. This is not the way of Torah, and one must not live like this. It is not prohibited because we will not succeed; rather, we will not succeed because this is not the right path. Granted, because of the needs of the public there is room for a few Ben-Azzai-types or Rashbi-types who will nonetheless live this way, but this is a dispensation after the fact, a case of “It is a time to act for the Lord; they have voided Your Torah.” It is a distorted path, but public needs can lead to permitting living this way.
The Torah was not given to monks, nor was it given to ministering angels. Nor is there any interest that human beings become ministering angels. True, society will benefit from the presence of a few such “angels” in its midst; therefore, there is room to permit—after the fact—someone whose heart compels him and who has found a spouse willing to bear the burden, to live and act thus.
I think that such an approach is more balanced and reasonable. It greatly honors devotion to Torah and the partnership of the two spouses on this difficult path, but it puts it in the right proportion. This has implications for the life of the average person. The Haredi way presents such a model as an ideal before every kollel fellow, even if it concedes that some cannot fully adhere to it. But that is a distortion. It is not the right way. The world was created so that we should live within it, not to be ascetics of learning. That is the ideal, le-khatchilah path. Being a kollel fellow is a special dispensation for the few.
A new light on Maimonides’ words
Famous are Maimonides’ words in Hilkhot Talmud Torah 3:10 (and in more detail in his Peirush haMishnah to Avot, chap. 4):
“Anyone who sets his heart to engage in Torah and not work, and to be supported by charity, profanes the Name, disgraces the Torah, extinguishes the light of religion, brings evil upon himself, and forfeits his share in the World to Come; for it is forbidden to derive benefit from words of Torah in this world. The Sages said: ‘Whoever benefits from words of Torah forfeits his life from the world.’ They further commanded: ‘Do not make them a crown to magnify yourself with, nor a spade to dig with.’ And they further commanded: ‘Love work and hate authority.’ Any Torah that is not accompanied by work will in the end cease and lead to sin, and the end of such a person will be that he will rob people.”
On the surface he is speaking of concerns: if a person only studies and does not earn a livelihood except from his learning, he is liable to end up robbing others. But I do not understand this as a technical, consequentialist claim. It is not because of the problem that he will end up robbing people; rather, because it is not proper to live this way. Such a path reflects a mistaken conception of Torah itself. A person must live in the world, learn, and apply the Torah within it, and not view the world as some obstacle, a stormy sea whose whole purpose is to test the ascetics within it as to whether they will persist in their asceticism. Asceticism is the after-the-fact state—not the world.
The Kesef Mishneh on the spot takes pains to reject Maimonides’ proofs in his Peirush haMishnah, and at the end he writes:
“After God has informed us of all this, one can say that our master’s intent here is that a person should not throw off the yoke of labor in order to be supported by others so as to study; rather, he should learn a trade that supports him, and if it suffices him—so much the better; and if it does not suffice, he may take his subsistence from the community, and there is no problem with that. And this is what he wrote: ‘Anyone who sets his heart,’ etc. And he brought several mishnayot indicating that one ought to learn a trade. And even if we say that this is not our master’s view, as would appear from his words in his commentary to the Mishnah, we hold that wherever the halakhah is uncertain, follow the common practice. And we have seen all the sages of Israel before our master’s time and after it accustomed to take their wages from the community. And even if we concede that the halakhah is like our master in his commentary to the Mishnah, it is possible that all the sages of the generations agreed thus on the basis of ‘It is a time to act for the Lord; they have voided Your Torah’—for if the livelihood of students and teachers were not available, they could not toil in Torah properly and the Torah would be forgotten, God forbid; and with it available, they can engage [in Torah] and ‘magnify Torah and glorify it.’”
Ironically, he sees specifically Maimonides’ approach (Torah together with work) as the path for the few, which “many attempted and did not succeed,” and he argues that there is a dispensation to study Torah only and not earn a livelihood on the basis of “It is a time to act for the Lord” (this is also the reverse of what we saw in the Talmud, Berakhot 35b, where it is presented as a consideration against Rashbi’s path). That is, according to his view, being a kollel fellow supported by charity is an after-the-fact dispensation. This is exactly the opposite of the Haredi approach, which sees the dispensation to engage in other things as an after-the-fact allowance based on “It is a time to act for the Lord.”
Incidentally, Maimonides’ argument—that one will end up robbing people—is being fulfilled before our eyes. A society that educates all its members to sacrifice themselves for Torah study even at the cost of harming their livelihood indeed comes to rob the public (see for example here, here, here, and here). Note that the “robber” here is not the individual but the Haredi society as a whole. Maimonides’ prophecy is coming true before our eyes. It seems that this path is incorrect in itself and also leads to terrible consequences of theft and desecration of God’s name (and we have not even spoken about sharing the burden of military service, of course).
Conclusion
It seems to me that this example from Rabbi Elyashiv well reflects the problems I discussed in column 682. A halakhic decisor who is detached from the world and does not truly understand it cannot issue practical rulings for people and certainly not for the public. The halakhic instructions of such a decisor lead to halakhic and Torah distortions, not just to distress. They are simply incorrect rulings. I wrote something similar in the past (see columns 62, 277, and 655 and in my article here) about a decree that did not spread throughout the public. The common understanding is that although this is a worthy conduct, halakhah tells us to refrain from it because the public will not withstand it. The assumption is that the public is weak and one must take it into consideration. In my view the explanation is the reverse: if most of the public cannot stand up to it, then this is an unworthy halakhic conduct even for people of stature. The Torah was not given to ministering angels but to the public at large, and therefore this decree is void. This is not an after-the-fact accommodation to the public’s weakness but an indication of the divine will and of the Torah. The Torah was given to be implemented by a reasonable person in the world, and ascetic models are a distortion that runs counter to its will. “The layman’s view is the opposite of the Torah’s view,” but contrary to what is taught in Bnei Brak, in many cases it is precisely the laymen who are right, for the “Torah view” is far from common sense. This is what halakhic decision-making looks like when it does not take common sense into account.
Accordingly, it is clear that those who address Rabbi Elyashiv and similar figures must understand that they can turn to him with scholarly, conceptual questions, but not with practical ones. If one wants to clarify the halakhic parameters of a husband’s obligations toward his wife, it is certainly proper and good to turn to Rabbi Elyashiv. But if one wants to know what to do in practice, he is very much not the address. And, as noted, he is certainly not the address to chart a path for the many.
One must understand that a society that conducts itself according to such models is a society that distorts the Torah and is not only immoral and inhuman—the halakhah and Torah it produces are incorrect. This does not mean there is no place to value the devotion of such people to Torah, but it is certainly important alongside that to understand that such a life is a distortion and at most has an after-the-fact dispensation, and certainly is not a proper path for the many. This is a distorted self-sacrifice which—even if it is worthy of esteem—must be placed in context and in proportion to the truth.[2]
[1] Taken from the Shabbat supplement of Yated Ne’eman 35a (5768), p. 4.
[2] I wrote something similar in the past about Roi Klein (see for example here). In my opinion his act was halakhically prohibited, but that does not mean he does not deserve very great admiration for his self-sacrifice. But it is not right to educate people to imitate him. It is a wonderful educational model as an ideal utopia whose point is commitment to others and to the people of Israel, but not as a model for imitation.
The problem is less with Rabbi Elyashiv who answered the question than with this type of question. Haredi society has completely lost the ability to use common sense, and people there run to the rabbi with completely stupid questions that any truck driver can answer. Starting with letters from rabbis explaining that it is mandatory to observe traffic laws and ending with questions like how are we supposed to feel about soldiers? What is the attitude towards doctors? And so on, every rabbi who presents a common sense position is presented there as some kind of minimal discovery of America.
The blame lies with the Ministry of Education, which subsidizes Haredi institutions despite not meeting all the criteria, one of which is to develop tools for independent thinking and the other is to acquire the skills necessary to integrate into the country's economy and social life. Haredi society uses arguments of cultural uniqueness to subsidize its institutions, which make them a sect or, at best, like the Druze or the Arabs. It is very sad that every Haredi doctor is definitely a convert or a former Mazruhnik.
As a graduate of the Haredi society that educates to be a berech and to specialize in Torah. And if you are no longer a berech, you are a kind of second-class - and this is a big problem in itself. But I think there is an equally big problem - that a guy decides that he is leaving the world of berech-Haredi, then he has taken into consideration that he missed his part in Torah, so in any case there is no longer any interest in him studying or investing in Torah outside of work hours/academic studies.
(From a personal experience that I am dealing with).
It should be remembered that the ultra-Orthodox did not invent this isolation from external studies, it already started in Volozin with the government's obligation to study Russian and they closed the yeshiva, the fear was of further interference in the content, in religious matters.
The thing is that today there is no fear that they will be required to study the New Testament, Rachel, and therefore there is no reason to prevent the child from learning English, etc.; All the fear of secularization within the Talmud Torah and yeshiva is in my opinion delusional, [in the army it is a different matter]
If secularization is already present in the style of the institutions and the management itself, in not accepting students on unjustified sectarian grounds, or in favoring the "connected" and wealthy.
First of all, even if they didn't invent it, they adopted it. Why does it matter who invented it? Second, the 'ultra-Orthodox'; this also includes the Volozhin yeshiva itself. So for the purposes of our discussion here, they did invent it. And finally, reality has changed in many ways (not just the ones you mentioned). Among other things, we see the results of that isolation. It is worth drawing lessons.
By the way, I remember that Stampfer, in his book (I think in the second and revised edition), refuted this Haredi myth about Volozhin.
Anyone who tries to excuse the Maimonides should read his words in the commentary on the Mishnah on Tractate Avot PD:
Know that he said that the Torah should not be made a pit for digging in, meaning that it should not be considered a tool for living in. He explained and said that whoever enjoys the honor of the Torah in this world takes his life from this world, meaning from the life of the world to come. And people have become distorted by this revealed language and have thrown it behind the curtain and have become attached to the simplicity of things that they will not understand and I will interpret them and have established for them laws for individuals and communities and have led people to think with utter foolishness that it is obligatory and appropriate for them to help the sages and the students and the people who deal with the Torah and their Torah is their art. And this is all a mistake and there is nothing in the Torah or in the words of the sages to confirm it or any basis on which we can rely. When we examine the words of the sages, we do not find among them that they asked for money from people or collected money for the honorable and expensive yeshivahs, nor for the heads of the exiles, nor for their judges, nor for the Torah scholars, nor for the Not among the great ones, nor among the rest of the people, but it is found in every generation and in all their congregations that there was a poor man in the utmost poverty and a rich man in the utmost wealth. And God forbid I should suspect that those generations were not kind and charitable, for indeed if that poor man had stretched out his hand to take, his house would have been filled with gold and pearls, but he would not have wanted to, but he would have been content with his work, which he would have made a living from, whether in luxury or in hardship, and he would have despised what a man has, because the Torah prevented him from doing so. And you already knew that Hillel the Elder was a woodcutter and would have studied before Shemaiah and Avtalyon, and he was poor in the utmost poverty, and his virtue was as you know from his disciples who were likened to Moses, Aaron, and Joshua, and the youngest of his disciples, Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai. There is no doubt for the learned that if he had taught the people of his generation to enjoy them, they would not have allowed him to chop wood. And R. Hanina ben Dosa, who came out as a voice and said, "The whole world is not fed except for my son Hanina, and my son Hanina, he would have enough of a basket of cherubim from the land of Egypt, and he would not ask from men, and when he was a judge in the land, and he was a poor man, and when there were no litigants before him, he would say, "Give me someone to plead in my place, or give me a bowl to throw in my turban, and I will be your master." And there were no Israelites in their generation who were not cruel or unrequited in kindness, and we did not find a wise man among the wise men who would condemn the people of his generation for not enriching them, God forbid. But they themselves were pious, believing the truth for themselves, and they believed in the Lord and the Torah of Moses, by which a person will merit the life of the hereafter, and they would not allow themselves to ask for wealth from men, and they would see that taking it would be a disgrace to the name of God in the eyes of the multitude, because they would think that the Torah is a work among the works by which a person will live. And it will be despised in their eyes, and there will be someone who does this, the word of God in this. And indeed, those who are strong enough to disagree about the truth and the simple and clear verses in taking people's wealth willingly or against their will, from the deeds that they will find in the bodies of people with believing husbands or old people, until they are old enough to do a job that has no trick for them except to take wealth from others, and if they do not, what will they do? They will die. This is not commanded by the Torah, and you will find the act that they brought as evidence of it in their saying, It was like a merchant ship from afar bringing bread to a disabled man who is unable to do a job, but with the ability, the Torah did not provide a way for him: And Rabbi Yosef would carry wood from place to place and would say, "(Beautiful) [great] work that warms its owner, may God bless him with the effort of his limbs, because when he carried the heavy wood, his body would warm itself without a doubt, and he would praise it and be happy in it, and he would enjoy what God had divided for him. What he has in the virtues of contentment, and I have heard the terrified madmen who are hung up on the evidence they have brought, saying that he who wants to enjoy will enjoy like Elisha and he who wants not to enjoy will not enjoy like Samuel, I have taken him up on this, and this is not similar to what is brought at all, but this is a greater error than the one who brought evidence from him, because it is explained and there is no place where the person errs in it, because Elisha would not have accepted money from people, since he would not have asked them and set rules for them, God forbid, for that, indeed he would have received honor alone when he hosted that person in the past, he would have been in his house and would have eaten his bread that night or that day and would have returned to his business, and Samuel would not have entered a person's house and would not have eaten from anyone, and so on, the wise men of Zedekiah said that when a scholar wants to imitate this until he does not enter a person's house, he has the authority, and if he wants to host a person in the past, he has the authority, and if he wants to host a person in the past, he has the authority, because they have already warned against eating with any person unnecessarily, and they said, "Truly, the one who frequents his meal everywhere" Etc. They said that any meal that is not a mitzvah is forbidden to be enjoyed by the Tahsihah, and why should I prolong this matter? I will indeed mention the incident that was explained in the Book of Genesis, and that is that Adam A had a vineyard and thieves would enter it, and every time he saw them every day, he would find that his fruits were diminishing and disappearing. There was no doubt in his mind that one of the thieves had set his eyes on it, and he was sad about it all the days of the harvest, until he had gathered what was scarce and shrunk until they withered, and he gathered the raisins. And it is the custom of people, when they gather the raisins, that berries fall from the figs and grapes, and it is permissible to eat them because they are unfruitful, and the owner has already given them to their owners to find out, and R. Tarpon came by chance on a Sunday. He went to that vineyard and sat down and picked some of the raisins that had fallen and would eat them. The owner of the vineyard came and thought that it was the thief who had stolen from him all year and did not know him. But he heard about it and they immediately took him and took him seriously and put him in a sack and put him on his back to throw him in the river. When Rabbi Tarfon saw this, he shouted and said, "Woe to Tarfon, for they killed him." When the owner of the vineyard heard this, he let him go and ran away, thinking that he had committed a great sin. Rabbi Tarfon was sorry from that day on and mourned for what had happened to him. He saved himself by honoring the Torah. He was very rich and could say, "Let me go and I will give you so and so gold," and he would give them to him and he would not have to announce that he was Rabbi Tarfon. He would save himself with his wealth and not with the Torah. And they said that all the days of that righteous man he would regret this and say, "Woe to me that I have used the crown of Torah. Anyone who uses the crown of Torah has no share in the world and is uprooted from the world." And they said that this was because of Dr. Tarfon was a great rich man and went to atonement by blood. Likewise, our holy Rabbi, may God have mercy on him, opened the treasures during the year of famine and said that anyone who wants to come and take his livelihood may come and earn his livelihood, provided that he is a wealthy man and comes to the Lord. Jonathan ben Amram stood before him and he did not recognize him. Rabbi Farnesni of Kiryat said to him, "No, not again, but how can I provide for you?" Farnesni said to him, "As a dog and as a raven, the Rebbe, even though I have no wisdom, as if he would provide for the Lord with an unclean animal and an unclean bird, which are no less than them." And he gave it to him. Then he regretted what he had said and said, "Woe to me, who has enjoyed my property." And those who heard him said to him, "What happened to him? Perhaps Jonathan ben Amram, your disciple, does not want to enjoy the honor of the Torah when he can avoid it, and even by trickery and investigation, and he found that the matter is so, and these actions will silence anyone who disagrees with this matter." And indeed, the things that the Torah permitted the Tahsildar are that they should give their wealth to a person to make merchandise of his choosing, and the entire reward would be theirs if he wished, and whoever does this has a great reward for it, and this is putting stock into the Tahsildar's pocket, and that their merchandise should be sold before any merchandise, and that they should buy it for them at the beginning of the market. These are laws that the Tahsildar established for them, just as it established the gifts to the priest and the tithes to the Levite, according to what comes in the Kabbalah, because these two actions are to be done by those merchants, some with some in a way of honor, and yet there is no wisdom in it for the Tahsildar to be such an honorable one. And so the Torah made it easy for the scholars of Torah to consider the laws of municipal taxes and the inns of the army, and the special laws for each and every person, and they are what are called the money of the roll, and the building of the walls, and the like, and even if the Tahsildar were wealthy, none of this would be required, and it has already been ordered. Rabbi Yosef Halevi, the late, told a man in one place who had gardens and orchards for which he owed thousands of gold coins, and he said that he would be exempted from all that we mentioned because he was a tax collector, and yet he would give that tax even to a poor person in Israel, and this is the law of the Torah, just as the Torah exempted half a shekel from the priests, as we explained in its place, and what is similar to this:
Correction: Dovinsk and Danzig are two different cities.
Indeed. I was wrong.
I think you'll like it
https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=7315696268443257&id=100000088698333
A central point in the column is that an individual must follow this path of asceticism on the condition that the world would lack such a role model, that is, a true and enduring genius, — but in the education in which many grew up, they heard about mediocre minds who became geniuses through hard work and prayer, — and therefore he wants to be one of those individuals because the achievements are guaranteed to be sharp to the point that the world is going to lose.
Moreover, in order to be a monk of those individuals, Maimonides [elsewhere] does not set merit as a condition, but rather one who has freed himself from the burden of many accounts, etc.
I agree with the assumption that this is a teaching for individuals only, but the only condition for this is that it be true, as Maimonides says, that he has freed himself from the burden of many accounts, and not swept along by the herd, but Torah for its own sake alone, and this is a rare commodity.
[This is apparently the dispute in the blessings whether someone who is not already inside should enter the Beit Midrash or not, – but there it is not necessarily about studying 24/7]
The Haredi joke says that a Baal Teshuvah stops being a Baal Teshuvah and becomes a regular Haredi when he starts talking about the recitation of the Shatz.
In this way, a person who claims to express opinions on matters of Haredi “great ones” must first understand basic first principles, one of which is that quotes in the press in the name of the “great ones” are mostly distorted and a minority are outright lies.
And if we were talking about common sense, I am sure that almost every average Haredi avrech who sees this quote will react with complete disbelief.
And by the way, your entire description of Rabbi Elyashiv as a recluse who does not understand worldly affairs is a description that is completely far from reality, and celebrities do not need evidence.
I wrote that even if Rabbi Elyashiv did not instruct in this way or if he knew the young man before him and knew that this was an instruction that was appropriate for him, the fact that such an instruction is presented in public and educated in its light indicates a distortion in society. When examining a society's ways of thinking and relating, lies teach no less than the truth.
I see here a rabbi who is aware of the limitations of his knowledge of the world, and therefore he teaches halakhah according to the accepted practice. He says, “I will tell you the halakhic ruling and you will act on it according to what is accepted in the world.” My question is, where do you see a distortion here? In the end, people really won’t go to the evening kollel because they didn’t stipulate it in the ketubah and because it is not accepted in the world not to help a woman at all. That is his halakhic ruling.
It seems to me that most of the great poskim of the last hundred years or even more were not aware of the daily life of the average person. Someone who is in court most of the day has a hard time knowing the challenges of people and norms, etc.
But we still have a lot of responsa books with practical halakhic rulings. Is it possible?
It is interesting whether in claims like this, between a man and his wife, the normal rule of property law applies. Kim Lee and the husband would say that Kim has no legal basis for a ritva.
The content of the post is logical and correct
Regarding Rabbi Elyashiv, it is less accurate
It is also famous among us how he would go to women's clothing stores in Geula
store after store
to inquire about the prices of dresses in order to know the amount of child support laws today
and also for a living – he was a judge and received a good salary. Relative to the old settlement, he lived quite comfortably
and above all, for a man who is very far from mysticism
even in the rulings of the court
over 1000 padres”m, and was never in a minority position
and we grew up on the stories that talked about his special wife who agreed to devote herself to him after a year and a year of perseverance
and not the other way around.
What is less accurate? Stories are stories, but you can see his instructions. He certainly understands that he can go find out to find out the amount of child support. That doesn't mean that he was involved in the public and the environment.
And who talked about mysticism?
And the fact that he was never in the minority opinion, what does that prove? First, maybe the others overruled their opinions in his face. Second, even if that's the case, what does that mean?
Once again, it is repeated: the Haredim want to live like abroad without a social burden, a type of Torah study that is impractical and focuses on idle chatter that gives them the illusion that they understand what the "God" wants. The social and socio-political challenge in Israel emphasizes this extremism that needs real instructions and not chatter, going to war or shutting oneself up in the Beit Midrash, solidarity or verticality, and unfortunately, chatter can justify any action.