On the Right, Hostages, and Populism (Column 627)

With God’s help

Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.

A few days ago I saw a column by my friend Prof. Meni Mautner, in the opinion section of Haaretz, in which he discusses the root of the dispute over bringing the hostages home. Precisely because I agree with his main thesis—and have written it here on the site more than once—and precisely because I usually value his views, the breadth of his treatment, his intellectual honesty, and his analytic ability, I was taken aback by some of the additional assumptions and claims he made there. I sent him several reservations about points he raised, and I wanted to comment on them here as well.

First, I will quote his words in full:

And now, my responses.

Agreement on the Basic Point: Collectivism

As is well known, our debates tend to split into right and left. Often the public is swept to these poles regardless of substantive arguments (mainly as a result of rhetoric), and this creates spurious correlations and mistaken categorizations (for example, that anyone who opposes Bibi is “left,” or that all leftists are progressive, and so on). Nonetheless, there are cases where the distribution of views between right and left is not accidental. It really is a right–left dispute, even if that is not apparent at first glance.

I enjoyed reading Mautner’s comments about the difference between a national, collectivist conception and liberal conceptions. I have written more than once that the basis for several debates—debates that are tied, seemingly oddly, to right and left—is the question of collectivism. The right tends to view individuals as organs of a collective, whereas the liberal left sees them as individuals (and the collective as a fiction, or at most a useful definition). This distinction explains several debates and their connection to right and left.

For example, I have explained more than once (see, for instance, in my essay here, in column 168, and more) that the debate over targeted killings (with harm to non-combatants) depends on this: the right views the enemy it faces as a collective, and therefore the non-combatants are, from its perspective, part of the enemy; it is therefore permissible to harm them if required for victory in war. By contrast, the left sees its enemies as a collection of individuals, and therefore from its perspective there is no justification to harm someone who is not involved. One may not save oneself with another’s life.

At the end of column 607 (see also the references there) I also wrote that the debate over the hostages depends on this as well. There, too, one sees a very strong correlation to right versus left. There are right-wingers who support various deals and see the return of the hostages as the central goal, but there are hardly any on the left who do not think so. Opposition to hostage deals and to making their return the central goal is distinctly right-wing. The reason is that only the right is prepared to waive the rights and endure the suffering of individuals for the sake of the common good. The liberal left is not prepared to do that. One can show this regarding several other debates in the public discourse and better understand why they are fought between right and left.

Mautner thus explains the debate over hostage deals, and as noted, there is merit in his words. But precisely because I agree with his principled argument, I was troubled by his argument for several reasons. I have a few comments that, in my view, he should not have ignored.

“Harassment”

I will begin with a side point. To the best of my judgment, no one is harassing the hostages or their families. Many oppose their path and their preferences (in particular, bringing the hostages home now and at any price). Opposition is not harassment, and using that term is tendentious and infuriating. A tendentious description that paints the debate in the negative color of “harassment” is harmful and unnecessary, and is basically meant to exempt us from presenting substantive arguments—as if the pain of the families and the suffering of the hostages preclude a real debate about the proposed deals.

I should add that, to the same degree, one could say that the hostages’ families (those who call themselves that, as if they speak for all the hostages and families—just today I saw another article, one of several, about the political hijacking done in the hostages’ name; as a rule, you will see such articles only on Arutz 7, “Srugim,” or “Kipa”) and their like-minded allies harass those who think differently. That segment of the hostages’ families that thinks differently—those unwilling to accept deals that will cost us dearly—is ostracized by them and receives no consideration. And again, one may certainly criticize and oppose, but here I do indeed see harassment, not merely opposition. If there are non-substantive harassments, they mostly come from supporters of the deals—i.e., the organization that speaks in the hostages’ families’ name (led by Ronen Tzur)—and from the vast majority of journalists in the mainstream channels who support them (as distinct from the sectoral channels I mentioned). They insist on speaking in the name of all hostages’ families and of the entire public, placing full responsibility on the government as if there were no other side and no army, crudely ignoring the costs, and silencing the real and legitimate public debate on this issue. It seems to me that if there is harassment from one side, this is the real harassment.

Is This a Matter of Religious Zionism vs. Liberalism?

Mautner presents this as if it were a confrontation between Religious Zionism and the liberal left. But our society includes other groups and other positions and ideologies. What about the secular right (the national camp), for example? A large part of it also opposes problematic hostage deals (“reckless,” in their terminology). The debate over the hostages is not conducted between Religious Zionism and the liberal left, but between the right and the liberal left. Religious Zionism is part of the right, and indeed the most prominent voices opposing deals come from it. But it is a mistake to attribute this to religious ideas.

We should remember that traditionally the right was considered liberal, with socialism and communism—hardly liberal ideas—standing at the opposite pole with the left. The liberalism in question is not only economic (low government intervention) but also personal and ideological in terms of broad individual and civil rights and reduced governmental powers. It is true that at least today, the right is liberal in economic terms and also in terms of civil rights, but it also tends toward national and collectivist conceptions. That does not negate its liberalism; it only qualifies it. In its toolbox there is, beyond liberalism, also nationalism, and when these two values clash, the right is sometimes willing to pay a price for the national interest in the coin of harm to individuals. There is nothing inherently illiberal here—only a commitment to additional values.

Therefore, I do not think it is correct to depict the present dispute as centering on liberalism. Both sides can be liberal. The dispute is whether there is something beyond individualist liberalism. The liberal left thinks not; the liberal right thinks yes. As noted, you can be an upstanding liberal and still care about the collective interest—and, when there is a clash, sometimes prefer the collective interest. Just as I can oppose murder yet qualify that opposition when someone rises to kill me. I can be a lover of peace yet be ready to fight my enemies. The caricature that whoever cares about national values is indifferent to individual suffering and rights is tendentious demagoguery. One who opposes prisoner/hostage exchanges is not indifferent to their suffering or to that of their families. The desire to return them and to fulfill the state’s obligation to its citizens (a slogan repeated over and over by those who demand deals at any price) is no less important to him. But he understands there are additional considerations, constraints, and interests. One who thinks there are none—simply thinks like a child.

As an aside, I will note that specifically Religious Zionism (especially its political representatives) is, for the most part, not liberal but merely national. So it is easy to see it as the pole opposite to liberalism. But as noted, in our case it joins with the secular right, and the dispute is not only with it. It is a dispute between right and left, not between Religious Zionism and the liberal left. Hence my description is, I believe, more accurate than Mautner’s. For example, I personally consider myself a thoroughgoing liberal—no less than those labeled liberals on the left—yet I tend to oppose some of the emerging deals regarding the hostages’ return, and certainly to the hostages’ families’ demands to do this now and at any price. Does that mean I’m not a liberal or that I don’t care about human life and suffering? Absolutely not. See more on this below.

Is It Really Collectivism?

Up to this point I agreed that the issue is collectivism, but even that is not entirely precise. At times one can translate this ostensibly collectivist conception into thoroughly individualist terms. The right’s concern for the general interest and security is not necessarily concern for some abstract collective value. Many argue there is also prevention of future harm to other individuals. Releasing terrorists now, or a prolonged pause in the fighting, may cost us dearly in human lives in the future. Is concern for those future victims unimportant in the eyes of a liberal? Why are only the present hostages considered, from his perspective, as individuals entitled to protection?

I am not claiming this is beyond dispute. For example, one can argue that the future harm is uncertain and perhaps we can cope with it and try to minimize it, whereas there is certain current harm to the hostages about which we can do little. The examples of the grim results of releasing Sinwar himself in the Shalit deal (the entire event we are now inside is the result of that release), in my view, are demagoguery on the other side, since Sinwar’s success was the result of our failure and not only of his motivations. If we learn the lessons and cope better with future threats, then release does not necessarily lead to such heavy damage. At least it is not beyond doubt, and there is room to argue that the uncertain does not override the certain.

This is a legitimate debate with weighty arguments on both sides. But in any case, the automatic identification of the debate over returning the hostages with a debate over collectivism is neither accurate nor necessary. There is such a facet to the debate, but a dichotomous translation misses the truth and much of the issue’s complexity. If someone were to oppose returning hostages out of considerations of national honor or some abstract general interest, then Mautner’s debate with him would indeed be a debate of collectivism versus liberalism. But concern for future victims can also come from a liberal-individualist direction—concern for the lives and suffering of individual people.

Wars of Choice

Mautner’s definition that the right supports wars of choice is incorrect, at least with respect to the current dispute. Indeed, in collectivist conceptions there will be a stronger tendency to fight and a reduced aspiration for peace. The reason is that the national interest itself is a sufficient justification for war in their eyes. Clearly, peace and preventing suffering for individuals is not the only consideration in their world, though it certainly exists (as shown above). But that is a general claim. When applied to the discussion of “Swords of Iron” and the hostages, it seems to me completely unmoored. I do not think anyone on the right is currently speaking of a war of choice in that sense. As noted, the right’s opposition to deals is not necessarily due to collectivist or other considerations but rather to security considerations and preventing future harm to people. Thus, even by Mautner’s own definition, this is a war of necessity—at least in the assessment of that right-winger (and not for nothing, many on the left share that assessment, even if in practice they generally prefer the goal of bringing the hostages home). In this particular war, the goal is clearly not national honor or any nebulous collective interests, but protecting the lives of people—peaceful citizens who have for years been under constant threats to their safety, property, and lives. So how did this discussion, for Mautner, arrive at the question of wars of choice?

If Mautner had shown that these concerns are illusory—that there is no danger to people in the future and that war is unnecessary to prevent it—then he could have argued this is a war of choice. But he did not show that and did not even really claim it. It seems to me no one truly claims it. So on what basis does he move to a discussion of wars of choice in this context? Again, this is using a correct distinction between right and left and applying it irrelevantly to the present discussion.

Mautner identifies concern for future security problems with a war of choice because he speaks of a utilitarian calculus on the right that differs from that of the liberal left. But that is not so. If the debate (entirely legitimate) is over future lives versus present lives, then the question in dispute is how to minimize the total number of casualties. In that sense, the utility function of both sides is based on the same (liberal) principles: preventing the suffering and death of as many individual people as possible. The only question at issue is how to maximize that function, not what the function is.

From that perspective, one could say that it is actually the left—which supports returning the hostages at any price—that suffers from shortsightedness and an inability to account for future states merely because they are not now before our eyes. According to Mautner’s own analysis, we should refrain from a deal by their lights, because that is the way to maximize the utility function—even by their own method of calculation. Either way, this is not a debate over utility or over how to calculate it, but over what the correct calculation is. A debate conducted entirely within a value framework accepted by all sides.

Psychologizing

Mautner’s analysis psychologizes the opposing position. He attributes right-wing views to populism nourished by the frustration of the (supposedly) disadvantaged. This is an unfair and even malicious argument. By the same token I could attribute support for the hostages to the left’s frustration over right-wing rule, or to a childish inability to see future dangers before their eyes and a fixation on the current, visible problems. The easiest thing is to attribute your opponent’s position to psychological motives instead of to substantive arguments that require engagement. This is an illness that contemporary anthropology tries to avoid. In the past, the researched were always the “others”: remote tribes, esoteric societies, etc. The Western academy is not a population; it is the objective researcher. It is not driven by the same motives as the “savages.”

As a rule, my way is to avoid deflecting the debate from the substantive level—arguments on the merits—toward psychological and sociological motives (such as these frustrations, and the like). I suggest that we all address arguments and raise counter-arguments, rather than conveniently and superficially psychologize the ideological opponent merely because he thinks differently. At most, after you have shown with substantive arguments that his thinking is foolish, you may propose a socio-psychological explanation. But sociology and psychology are not arguments in themselves, nor are they a substitute for substantive arguments. In our case, the right’s arguments are far from foolish (it is actually some of the far-left arguments that demand an immediate, at-any-price deal that seem to me rather foolish in this context. Now I am indeed entitled to think about the deep psychological reasons that bring them to this).

On Populism

Many today speak about right-wing populism (see about it in column 554). It is on the rise in Trump’s America and elsewhere in the world, and of course also here. The recurring voices after every event that demand extreme responses as an outlet for frustration and anger, without weighing them on their merits—as if a magic solution—are indeed populist. The dismissal of the entire left and its blaming as progressive is also right-wing populism. Clinging to empty slogans that appeal to national feeling and to rage against enemies is right-wing populism. I too am often irritated by this right-wing populism. But it is hard to deny that there is also a great deal of populism (no less than on the right) on the left.

Calling everything you oppose—without any distinction—by epithets like “religionization,” “racism,” “chauvinism,” or “exclusion” is populism par excellence. The holy indignation with which similar voices awaken after every event on the right is just as populist as their right-wing counterparts. The voices that “prove” with signs and wonders after “Swords of Iron” and declare that the question of women in combat no longer exists—this is pure populism. The common denominator is that they appeal to emotion while ignoring rational arguments and a systematic, reasoned examination of the issues.

And despite all this, for some reason populism is always ascribed to the right. Just as “piggishness” is seen as the sole domain of capitalism. In our public discourse one hears only of “piggish capitalism,” but never of “piggish socialism.” It is well known that communism is noble and not piggish (at least until age 23). Moreover, for some reason, for many people capitalism is always piggish (see here—a brilliant column, as always, by David Frankel). There are those from whom you will never hear the word “capitalism,” only “piggish capitalism.” In exactly the same way, there are people who tend to see all right-wingers as right-wing populists. But the truth is that not everyone who opposes hostage deals is populist. Indeed, he is usually right-wing—and that is also (but not only) because of the collectivism in his thinking. But is all collectivist thinking, as such, necessarily populist?

It is certainly not true that everyone who calls for returning the hostages is a populist. But one who calls to do so immediately and at any price is thoroughly populist. If you now examine our public discourse map, I think you will quickly discover where there is more populism—among the opponents or among the supporters. I do not know a single person on the right who opposes every hostage deal whatsoever, but I certainly know and hear many on the left who support any deal—immediately. So who spoke here about “liberal populism” and didn’t get it?

Unfortunately, by the end of this column you can understand why, in my view, Mautner’s column is a clear example of liberal populism. It is often adopted by intellectuals from the liberal left, and the most frustrating thing is that it appears in them even—and perhaps mainly—when they criticize populism on the right.

The “Impossibility” of Living Together

Mautner ends his column with the impossibility of dialogue and shared life because of the value and ideological gap he describes. I wrote to him that, in my opinion, the gap is not so large, and if there were attentiveness on both sides and the extreme populism were neutralized, everyone would understand that there is a legitimate debate under fairly agreed principles. In such a situation, we can live together and also make reasonably consensual decisions—that is, accept the democratic decision of the majority. The inability to live together stems mainly from the flaws of the populist mode of argument on both left and right, and from a non-substantive attitude toward ideological adversaries, as I have shown here. This appears in liberal populism no less than in right-wing populism.

If each of us addresses his opponent’s arguments rather than his repressed libido, the discussion will be more substantive, and in my view it will sometimes even be possible to be persuaded—and of course to live together even when we disagree. But when one belittles the other, treats him as an anthropological population driven by frustrations rather than by substantive arguments and conceptions, then one portrays him as a populist who does not care about human life—one who is willing to sacrifice people for vague, tasteless interests he invents out of frustration. Presenting the debate as a war between the sons of light and the sons of darkness is a tried-and-true recipe for contempt that leads to an inability to listen and to the impossibility of living together (and it is, of course, also untrue, as I have explained).

This is true for the great majority of public debates in Israel (such as the debate over the “reform”). In my opinion, in most of them there is very broad agreement on a large part of the issues, and the disputes are rather marginal—certainly those disputes that cannot be bridged and that do not lead to agreement to accept the decision democratically. But there are extreme groups on both sides that present these disputes as if there were a gaping chasm between the sides that makes shared life impossible. We must not let them succeed, for two reasons: (a) It is not true. (b) It harms the debate and the ability to live and make decisions together. There are cases where a position really is delusional, and one must oppose it—and I am the first to support that. But in many cases this is done for tactical reasons, and the arguments presented are tendentious and baseless (if they exist at all).