Including Women for the Wedding Blessings (Column 598)
A Look at Halakhic Ruling in a Changing Reality
With God’s help
Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.
As a bit of the escapism called for in these turbulent days, I thought to share a question that reached me this morning from a rabbi who officiates weddings. Here is its wording:
| …
In your opinion, can women be included in the quorum of ten required for the wedding blessings (Birkat Ḥatanim) under the ḥuppah—at least in wartime, when some weddings are very small? At first I thought it was obvious that a minyan is required—that is, ten men. But I found the attached piece by Rabbi Tzvika Reisman, and the truth is that after reading it, it seems to me there is room to be lenient. What is your view? … |
Rabbi Reisman’s article was attached to the email, but it can also be read online here. In my reply I addressed several points raised in his article, but I thought it worthwhile to spell them out further and look at this question from a more principled angle that bears on halakhic ruling in changing times more generally.
By way of preface, it is clear to me that in the background stand the broader issues of attitudes toward women in general and in the modern era in particular, and no less the attitude toward change in halakhah and fears of “Reform.” This raises the question of whether, how, and to what extent one may employ the consideration of changed circumstances as part of halakhic decision-making. Rabbi Reisman is a businessman and a Haredi talmid ḥakham, yet very open-minded, with original and fascinating thinking. In his responsum he does not seem to rely on that consideration (see especially his concluding remarks, quoted toward the end of the column), but I find it hard to shake the feeling that it nevertheless hovers somewhere behind his words. Like many others who are uneasy with the spirit of the times (Reform and the like), he may have relied on such a consideration but wrapped it in classic halakhic-analytical arguments (which, in themselves, are sound; I have no criticism of the arguments). But that is only my impression, of course.
The Requirement of Ten for the Wedding Blessings
The source for the requirement of a quorum of ten for Birkat Ḥatanim is the Mishnah, Megillah 4:3:
We do not recite the introductory blessing to Shema, we do not pass before the ark, we do not lift hands [for the priestly blessing], we do not read from the Torah, we do not read the haftarah from the Prophets, we do not perform “standing and sitting” [for mourners], we do not say the mourner’s blessing and words of comfort, nor the blessing of bridegrooms, and we do not make a zimun with God’s Name with fewer than ten; and with valuations of land—nine and a priest—and similar cases with people like these.
So it is ruled by all the poskim. The amoraim disagree in Ketubot 7b about the verse that serves as the source:
Rav Naḥman said: Huna bar Natan told me: “From where do we know that Birkat Ḥatanim requires ten? As it is said: ‘And he took ten men of the elders of the city and said: Sit here’” [Ruth 4:2]. And Rabbi Abbahu said: From here—“In assemblies bless God, the Lord, from the fountain of Israel” [Psalms 68:27].
According to Rav Naḥman, the source is in the Book of Ruth in Boaz’s action, and on the face of it this was done to publicize the matter (marriage should be performed publicly). Rabbi Abbahu, by contrast, learns it from a verse in Psalms, as Rashi explains there:
“In assemblies bless God, the Lord, from the fountain of Israel”—for the blessing of the ‘fountain’ [i.e., marriage] one needs an assembly (qahal), and that is ten, as in “assemble the congregation” (Num. 20), and ‘congregation’ is not fewer than ten, as we learn (Berakhot 21b) from the congregation of the spies—“How long shall I bear with this evil congregation?”—Joshua and Caleb are excluded.
It seems that, due to the importance of the matter, it should be performed “in the presence of the many” (a qahal or an edah).
Note that, plainly, this is a rabbinic law; however, in Massekhet Kallah other sources are brought from Rebecca, and Boaz’s verse is cited only to teach that the obligation applies also to a widow. There is lengthy discussion in the Shitah Mekubbetzet on the Ketubot sugya (see s.v. “u-beMassekhet Kallah”). It is not clear whether the sources in Ketubot are mere asmakhtot or actual sources. But even if they are asmakhtot, one can still try to infer the contours of the law from them.
The Meaning of “Ten” in Birkat Ḥatanim
Rabbi Reisman cites a distinction between two different sources for requiring ten: (1) as a davar she-biqedushah (“a matter of sanctity”), and (2) as an act of praise and thanksgiving that should be performed before a public.
The aforementioned Shitah Mekubbetzet on Ketubot writes:
“From where [do we know] that Birkat Ḥatanim requires ten? As it is said: ‘Boaz took ten men.’” Explanation: As a matter of course, he gathered them only for Birkat Ḥatanim—for witnesses or for a kinyan, two would suffice—so he gathered ten only for the blessing; and because blessing God is a davar she-biqedushah, he gathered ten. (Language of the Geonim.)
We see he understood that the requirement of ten for Birkat Ḥatanim is as a davar she-biqedushah. Interestingly, Maimonides in his Commentary on the Mishnah to Megillah writes:
“[Scripture says:] ‘I shall be sanctified in the midst of the children of Israel,’ and it was received as a tradition that any davar she-biqedushah is not [recited] with fewer than ten. ‘Porsin al Shema’ is the preface recited before the Shema…”
He then discusses the list of practices mentioned in the Mishnah. It would seem that he, too, ties everything to the rule of davar she-biqedushah.
But this is very difficult to accept, for, plainly, Birkat Ḥatanim is not a davar she-biqedushah. In fact, looking at the entire list in the Mishnah, it does not seem to consist of matters of sanctity. There is no Kaddish (of course, as it is Geonic), nor Kedushah, etc. By contrast, valuation of land and comforting mourners do appear there, and it seems obvious that they are not devarim she-biqedushah.
A closer look at Maimonides’ wording suggests the opposite reading: he opens by noting that devarim she-biqedushah require ten; then he proceeds to the other items in the Mishnah, which also require ten, although all—or at least some—are not devarim she-biqedushah.
In Mishneh Torah, Ishut 10:5, Maimonides writes:
We recite Birkat Ḥatanim only in the presence of ten adults who are free men, and the groom counts toward the ten.
He excludes slaves (who are not free men) and minors. But he does not exclude women.
The Maggid Mishneh on that halakhah writes:
What he wrote—that it is only with ten and that the groom counts toward the ten—is explicit in the Gemara. And what he wrote—“adults and free men”—is to say that a slave and a minor do not combine [for a quorum], [as ruled] in Berakhot 47b, at the conclusion of “Three who ate,” and so is his view in ch. 8 of the laws of prayer; and the same applies to any matter that requires ten—that they do not combine.
He, too, mentions only the exclusion of a slave and a minor—not of a woman—but he links this to the general rule regarding prayers that require ten, and, plainly, that is the rule of davar she-biqedushah (from which women would also be excluded). But, as noted, this is not compelled either by Maimonides’ phrasing or in general.
Rabbi Reisman notes that this also seems to be the view of the Tosafot Rid on Ketubot, namely, that this is not a davar she-biqedushah but requires ten because praise should be offered before the many. And this is explicit in the Arukh ha-Shulchan, Even ha-Ezer 62:11, who writes:
We recite Birkat Ḥatanim only with ten adults who are free men, not slaves, and the groom counts among the ten. Since they are blessings of joy and he is in a state of joy, why should he not be counted, whether recited at the time of the marriage or at the feast after Birkat ha-Mazon? And even though this is not a davar she-biqedushah like Kaddish and Kedushah, which may not be said with fewer than ten, nevertheless, since we say “He created all for His glory,” for the honor of those assembled and we mention the building of Jerusalem, it is not respectful to say them with fewer than ten.
Likewise, in Sha’ar ha-Tziyyun 219:7 he compares this to Birkat ha-Gomel, which is to be recited before ten; clearly that is a specific rule unrelated to davar she-biqedushah, implying that Birkat Ḥatanim is also not a davar she-biqedushah. In Ma’atikey Shemu’ah, p. 11, it is cited that the Griz disagreed, holding that it is because of davar she-biqedushah.
So far, we have seen a dispute about whether Birkat Ḥatanim is a davar she-biqedushah or not. But even for those who maintain that it is, since that position seems quite implausible, it may be that their intention was only that the requirement of ten for Birkat Ḥatanim is derived from the rule of davar she-biqedushah, not that the blessings themselves are such a matter. We find something similar in Sukkah 30b, where the sanctity of the sukkah wood is derived from the festival offering (“Just as the festival is ‘for the Lord,’ so, too, the sukkah is ‘for the Lord’”). Yet, according to most commentators, the wood does not possess sanctity; the derivation from the ḥagigah only teaches that use and benefit are prohibited, akin to a korban, though not for the same reason.[1] According to this, all may agree that the nature of Birkat Ḥatanim is not that of a davar she-biqedushah, and the dispute concerns only the source. Admittedly, the above-quoted Shitah Mekubbetzet seems to take it as literally a davar she-biqedushah, which is difficult.
One might have tried to uphold that position by arguing that kiddushin (betrothal) is, in fact, a davar she-biqedushah, based on Kiddushin 7a, which compares kiddushin to consecration (regarding “the leg of this animal is an olah” vs. consecrating “half a woman”—see the outstanding opening shiur of Rav Gustman in Kuntresei Shi’urim to Kiddushin). But this does not fit the Shitah Mekubbetzet, which claims that any blessing is a davar she-biqedushah (regardless of marriage). Moreover, the argument itself seems strained: if that were the rationale, the comparison to consecration concerns kiddushin rather than nissuin (marriage), and then we should require ten for kiddushin, not for nissuin. Indeed, in בש”ג, Ketubot fol. 2, letter g, a dispute is cited:
Rav Aḥai wrote that the blessing of erusin [betrothal] requires ten, and R. Shmuel ha-Nagid disagreed, saying that ten are needed only for Birkat Ḥatanim, which alone is mentioned [in the sources]. Moreover, kiddushin is before two, and you require ten! And the Rosh wrote that Rav Aḥai’s words do not seem correct to me: according to what we derive from Boaz, Boaz also recited the blessing of erusin with ten; and according to what we derive from “In assemblies,” the blessing of erusin too, since it concerns the “fountain [of Israel],” requires ten… Yet two suffice for kiddushin, whereas for the blessings one needs ten.
In practice, it is accepted that kiddushin does not require ten, certainly not as a davar she-biqedushah.
Between “Community/Assembly” and “The Many/Public”
In sum, it is hard, on logical grounds, to accept that Birkat Ḥatanim is a davar she-biqedushah. The view of the Mishnah Berurah and the Arukh ha-Shulchan—that ten are needed so that many people are present—seems more persuasive. This is important for our topic, since it is accepted in halakhah that devarim she-biqedushah require ten men specifically. Thus, whether women are included in the ten for Birkat Ḥatanim hinges on the foregoing: if the requirement there is because of davar she-biqedushah, women are not included; but if for a different reason—i.e., it is not a davar she-biqedushah—then women may well be included. Indeed, we saw above that Maimonides excludes slaves and minors but not women, and, as I noted, it seems that this blessing is not a davar she-biqedushah. This further supports my claim that, even according to Maimonides, Birkat Ḥatanim is not a davar she-biqedushah. Incidentally, regarding who may recite Birkat Ḥatanim, Maimonides (Berakhot 2:9) excludes a slave and a minor but not a woman.
True, we find something similar with Torah reading, which also requires ten; it is accepted that women do not combine to the ten, and yet, in principle, women may be counted among the seven called to the Torah (were it not for considerations of communal dignity). Thus, we see a case where women may read but do not count for the quorum. Therefore, even if, for Maimonides, women may recite Birkat Ḥatanim, it does not necessarily follow that they combine to the ten. However, as we saw, Maimonides is precise in excluding a slave and a minor but not a woman—both regarding reading and regarding combining to ten; and the same regarding combining to a minyan of ten. Although it is accepted among the poskim that women are not counted, with respect to the Megillah—since women are obligated in its reading—the Rema (OḤ 690:18) is uncertain whether they combine to ten hearers (see also Responsa Rav Pe’alim, OḤ II 62).
In any case, for our purposes we see that there are halakhic contexts that require ten and can include women. Plainly this is because the requirement there is not on account of davar she-biqedushah but for some other reason. This leads to one of the interesting distinctions Rabbi Reisman brings (ch. 2 §3 of his article; it is not original to him) between tzibbur (community/assembly) and rabim (the many/public). His claim is that, in halakhah, some contexts require ten as a tzibbur—there, women are not part of the tzibbur and do not combine—and others require ten as rabim (publicity), where women can combine. I assume that davar she-biqedushah requires a tzibbur, not merely ten, and therefore women do not combine there.
For example, R. Yosef Engel (Gilyonei ha-Shas, Sanhedrin 74b s.v. “mah le-halan”) challenges the Rokeach, who wrote that sanctifying God’s Name must be done before ten male adults, and writes that, in his view, wherever ten are required for the sake of publicity, all persons count and women combine as well. Similarly in Responsa Rav Pe’alim (OḤ II 62) regarding asking forgiveness from one’s fellow before ten, as well as in the aforementioned Rema regarding Megillah (OḤ 690:18 and its commentaries), and more. The difference is that, in all these contexts, what is required is the many, not a tzibbur, and thus women are included.
This might also be tied to the interpretive question regarding the term “ezraḥ” (“citizen/native”) in the Torah (discussed, inter alia, in a Q&A here). Plainly, “ezraḥ” denotes membership in the tzibbur, and therefore does not include women. By contrast, “adam” or “ish” includes both women and men—anyone who is part of a multitude (and the derashah in Shevuot, “and the two men shall stand,” excluding women, is puzzling in any case; see, for example, columns 70 and 476). True, there are also contradictions in the Talmud regarding “ezraḥ” (see the Q&A there), but the conclusion of the sugya in Sukkah 28 seems plainly to concern men only.
The Relevance of This Distinction to Our Case
Thus far we assumed that women are certainly not part of a tzibbur but are included within the rabim. I would go further and question even that assumption: whence do we know that women are excluded from the tzibbur? (See also column 510.) There is definitely room to argue that this was the case in the past, but today it has changed. This is a factual change in women’s social status, and there is no reason not to take it into account halakhically. Understand that even if there were some derashah that excluded women (and there is none anywhere), there would still be room for such a halakhic shift, since derashot always rest on the reasoning of the expositor and the circumstances in which he acts (I have addressed this in several places; see, e.g., column 370 and more). But as for including women in a minyan and in devarim she-biqedushah, there is no clear source for exclusion anywhere—not in either Talmud and not in Maimonides. Moreover, according to most poskim, women are obligated in prayer like men; why, then, should they not combine for a minyan?! (See the aforementioned Rema regarding Megillah.) It therefore seems that, in our case, it is obvious that one can make this depend on the norms accepted in a given place and time. For a comprehensive survey, see here (a responsum by Rabbi David Golinkin from the Conservative movement; please consider the arguments and sources rather than the author’s affiliation), especially from p. 15 onward.
If that is indeed the case, then women can be included for a minyan in prayer and for all devarim she-biqedushah, for they, too, are ezraḥiyyot (citizens). Even if, in the past, the practice was to exclude them, that was based on their social status. Now that this has changed, there is no impediment to changing that practice—and it would seem that one ought to do so (this is not a “leniency” to include them; it is the halakhic truth, and consequently whoever does not do so is a “conservative offender.” See columns 263, 570, and more). It follows that, regarding Birkat Ḥatanim as well, there is no reason not to include them—even according to the Shitah Mekubbetzet that the requirement of ten is on account of davar she-biqedushah. True, Ḥazal excluded women from “ezraḥ” in some matters, and indeed, until now, poskim have ruled not to include them for devarim she-biqedushah, but that is only because, in their day, women had a different social standing. Today, I see no reason not to change this.
Needless to say, even today poskim are very reluctant here. It is clear that the issue is not purely one of halakhic interpretation—for on that one can disagree with reasons and arguments, each according to his path. The firm stance here (see in Rabbi Reisman the citations from Rabbi Ariel and others) is apparently rooted mainly in fear of the winds of the time (“Reform”). This can also be seen from what Rabbi Reisman writes at the end of his article:
Let it be known that these words were written as a halakhic analysis; in practice, the ruling in this matter is in the hands of those who sit in judgment, who stand guard over the bounds of modesty and weigh the path they should take in additional respects, among them the concern not to introduce practices that were not practiced for generations, in order to protect and fortify the walls of religion and halakhah.
It is clear to him that the considerations here are not only halakhic but also of halakhic and public policy. Or, in free translation: it is true that I am halakhically correct, but the leading decisors must decide according to the correct meta-halakhic policy.
I cannot refrain from commenting on this point. Unlike him, in my view no halakhah is “entrusted” to any “sitter in judgment.” If we have reached the conclusion that the halakhah is that women combine for Birkat Ḥatanim, no one—whether “one who sits in judgment” or “a rider of white donkeys”—can change that, unless he brings arguments showing error in this ruling. The mere fact that it seems to him immodest or harmful for one reason or another (such as fear of Reform) is neither here nor there. Note well: not because the concern is necessarily unfounded, but because even if it is well-founded, a contemporary posek has nothing he can do about it. A Sanhedrin could enact a rabbinic decree that uproots the law for various reasons (like a slippery slope). But a posek in our day can, at most, say that although it is permitted, he nevertheless recommends not to do so in practice. To rule that this is the halakhah is simply false, for he thereby forbids the permitted.[2]
A Note on Davar she-biqedushah
In column 510 I wondered about the rule of davar she-biqedushah in general, which has puzzled me for a long time. For blessings, one might claim there is a prohibition to recite them in circumstances lacking ten—lest they be blessings in vain. But regarding Kaddish and Kedushah, how can there be a prohibition to say them with fewer than ten?! Is there a prohibition to utter statements that are true in themselves, privately to oneself?! Especially Kaddish, which has no Talmudic source and is a Geonic practice—what could prohibit saying it in any case? Perhaps it is considered a slight to the honor of Heaven; the matter requires further study.
Be that as it may, this is accepted de facto by all poskim, and therefore my wonder remains unresolved. Beyond that, in our case we are speaking of a blessing, not merely of saying a davar she-biqedushah. I shall therefore not enter this topic here, nor will I use it as an additional factor for leniency.
Summary—Practical Ruling
In conclusion, gathering my remarks, in my view there is definitely room to be lenient and include women (and perhaps this should be called stringency rather than leniency). For several reasons (even setting aside my doubts about davar she-biqedushah in general):
- If the requirement of ten for Birkat Ḥatanim is not a davar she-biqedushah—then women are certainly included in the ten.
- Even according to those who say it is a davar she-biqedushah, perhaps that concerns only the source of the law, not its nature.
- Even if it is truly a davar she-biqedushah, it seems that today women are indeed part of the tzibbur and can combine even for devarim she-biqedushah.
- Finally, Birkat Ḥatanim is, plainly, rabbinic; and in a rabbinic doubt we are lenient. True, in matters of blessings we are stringent (lest it be a blessing in vain), but here there is more than one doubt.
To conclude, I would add that perhaps a dispensation in such a time of exigency (see above that the question was premised on the current situation—“Swords of Iron”—where attendance at the ceremony would be small) could catalyze a welcome change in the status of women that would then expand to ordinary circumstances as well—certainly regarding Birkat Ḥatanim, where there is room to permit even without the consideration of changing circumstances, and thereafter even regarding devarim she-biqedushah and counting women for a minyan for prayer due to the change in circumstances. We saw that, halakhically, there is no impediment to this even for prayer and devarim she-biqedushah; it seems that what stands in the way are purely conservative obstacles (see also the previous column). Of course, that is precisely the slippery slope feared by the poskim, and in their view that is itself a major reason to forbid. But, as noted, even if their fear is justified, one cannot forbid what is permitted.
Practically, I advised the rabbi who asked to assess the character of the audience present, so as not to trigger an uproar at the ḥuppah. The damage might outweigh the benefit. But if it would be accepted, this is an excellent opportunity to begin this welcome process.
[1] Admittedly, the Rashba there seems to understand this as literal sanctity, but that is a singular view.
[2] See Nadav Shnerb’s essay, “The Jewish Ark of Lies,” in part ten of my book Walking Among the Standers (especially ch. 33), and columns 275, 444, 453, 590, and more.
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Shalom Rabbi,
You wrote that in the time of the crisis, in the current situation there is room for leniency because it is difficult to gather ten men for the blessing of grooms. Although you did not explain why not to kiss the chuppah and postpone the blessing to another time.
The Rem’a ruled in Even HaEzer 6:11; 6:11 that if it is not possible to say the blessing at the time of the chuppah, they should say it another time after a few days, that the blessings do not delay (there is no prohibition on a bride without a blessing being forbidden to her husband as a bride, according to the opinion of the Rambam and his supporters that the prohibition applies to a bride without a chuppah, and not to a bride without a chuppah, and not to Karshî and his supporters).
In any case, in times of stress, there is a place to say that they should have a wedding without a blessing, and postpone the blessings until another time, when there will be ten men.
There are drawbacks to the advice I suggested. It is possible that it will upset the family's feelings, as if the wedding was not done perfectly. It is possible that the couple will not be careful and gather ten men, and the blessing will be completely canceled.
In any case, the advice to have a wedding and postpone the blessings is advice that appears in the Rama, and in any case it requires consideration.
I did not deal with the cliff of times. The questioner dealt with that. I discussed the question of whether it is permissible in the first place, and my argument is that it is. In any case, I am not looking for other advice.
.Never let a good crisis go to waste. Everyone with their own agenda. Maybe we'll also make tassels for female soldiers.
And on behalf of what agenda is your honor speaking? And regarding your proposal, I am in favor of abolishing the tzitzit institution.
Why not? I was told that my father's grandmother used to wear a tzitzit.
Regarding the difference between the source and the boundary of the law. You brought up the trees of the Sukkah and the celebration, which is comparable to the matter of the prohibition of pleasure, but the boundary is different, and there is no sanctity in the trees of the Sukkah. And you suggested that even in the blessing of groomsmen, there is a comparison to the matter of the law of adding ten, but the boundary is different, and there is nothing sanctified here. From this it seems that you continued that if the boundary is different, then perhaps the comparison with the matter of the laws that hang from it is to the halves, that is, only to the main law of adding ten, and in the blessing of groomsmen, women do join in. Can you explain the logic of this additional step of continuation? [It seems that ”okay in situ” is only relevant when in situ there is a source, and the teaching of Mina enters as an interpretive explanation of the Torah, which is only from the Torah, but when the entire main law comes from the teacher, then it is apparently clear that everything in it is taken from it].
I don't know why you assume that Oki in the Itra only belongs when there is a source. Beyond that, here it is simply the law of the rabbis, so in general the rules of propriety don't really belong. The argument is that ten are required, as in the matter of sanctity, but for a different reason. And the theory is that the reason is publicity and praise and public acknowledgment. Only when you want to know how many there are do you learn this from the matter of sanctity.
That is, there is only a revelation of the word in the word "Kedushah" that says what plural is. This is even less understandable than I understood before. Because we did not know that "plural" was needed, and why there would be a connection between "plural" in the matter of publication and "plural" in the matter of Kedushah, and that this connection would only be with regard to the number and not with regard to the gender. [I am digging into this point, which is reason 2, because it seems to be the one repeated in the column. Reason 1 is Rabbi Reisman's words, reason 3, which is sweeping in its generality, and reason 4 needs its companions]
There is no difference in the matter of which are plural, except that in certain contexts the plural also needs to be public. This is perhaps where gender comes in.
Regarding the question of the problem of reciting Kaddish and Kedushah in less than ten, why not accept the suggestion (that you mentioned) that it is an insult to God? From a man who turns to his friend in private and says to him, "Peace to you too, distinguished audience," it is clear that this is nothing but a joke and a joke.
In column 501, you said, "Whoever hates existence and is sanctified by killing and does not pass by in the singular," and I did not understand the question: there is no choice, but here, who forced him to say Kaddish and Kedushah in a ceremonial and important manner without ten.
And in fact, this explanation is explained in the Gemara there regarding the mention of the name of God in the summons: In the summons of the tenth, there is no special event.
In simple terms, it has nothing to do with holiness. Even in the Agilah blessing, his name is mentioned and the ten are mentioned.
It sounds very strange that telling myself that God is holy is an insult to Him.
Another note: You wrote at the beginning of the column that it is unclear whether the sources regarding the need for a minyan are references. It is explicitly stated in the Megillah there (regarding Kaddish and Kedushah): “And who is he, he is the source of all the rabbis, and he is the order of prayer for the body of the rabbis.”
Do you mean the need for ten in the groom's blessing? I only cited an example from the Shtamk and Tractate Kala. It is clear that there is more. Regarding something sacred, it is also not clear. It can be said that this is a Torah law even if it is a rabbinical prayer order.
And regarding the question of whether the matters of the Mishnah in Megillah 23 are a matter of sanctity or not, a public duty or an individual duty, the words of the Ramban in the Wars of Megillah are clear: “All that is mentioned in our Mishnah are public duties.” If so (ignoring the meta-halakhic move regarding considering women as “public”), in the opinion of the Ramban there is no place to consider a woman as a minyan for the blessing of the grooms.
Although according to the Witiri Machzor in the name of Rashi, it is possible to perform the recitation of the Shatz for one who has not heard, it is apparently proven that the shal that passes before the ark It is an individual obligation (and the ten is only a condition for its fulfillment, and here you can investigate whether the boundary of the law is public or public and not considered a woman), and so it is possible that it is the law for the blessing of grooms.
But in the body of the explanation that the blessing of grooms is not something in the holy order, I agree: after all, this blessing is a regulation of the Sages, and was not established except in public, meaning that the presence of the public is a law for the obligation of the blessing (and ignoring the innovations of the ”Mata”, a woman is not considered a public).
Who said it was only installed in public? Maybe it was installed in public and not in public, and then that includes women? That's my diva.
Two specific comments:
A. You wrote that Kaddish is from the Ge'onim, but that is not accurate. The statement "Yaha Shemya Rabbah, etc." appears several times in Shas (Berakhot 3:21, Shabbat 14:, Sukkah 33: and more). Apparently, only "TikTekTelThon" is an addition by the Ge'onim.
B. If women today are "civilians," they are also legally obligated to observe the mitzvot of Sukkah (see Sukkah 28:). Am I wrong?
A. Kaddish in its familiar form. I am not clear exactly what the ”Amen Yaha Shemiya Rabbah” is that mentioned in the Talmud. But for our purposes, it really doesn't matter. Incidentally, the fact that the Kaddish is not mentioned as something in the Kedushah also implies that there was no such thing in the Talmud.
B. Simply put, it is a matter of law, and therefore it depends on the question of whether the exemption of the ”Asehazm”G has also disappeared in our day. I have no indication of that. Although there are two reasons why the verse is required, and the first is certainly irrelevant because it is the reason that the woman will be obligated only by virtue of her husband. It certainly doesn't matter to a woman today. The second reason is more relevant (the Hikash for Passover), and it is still not reasonable to be obligated by virtue of this.
A. I don't really understand what you wrote, because apparently “Amen yâhe shemiya rabba” in the Talmud is a word of sanctity (there is a Hove Amina that is enough in the middle of eighteen to answer, and it is more important than sanctity) even though it is not explicitly written.
B. I didn't understand you here either. The first Hove Amina is that since a married couple usually live in the same house (a fact that is still true today), if the man is obligated to live in the sukkah, then the woman is obligated too. And how is it “not reasonable” to require it if the Gemara says that we would be obligated if it were not for the sermon from the ”citizen”?
A. You are repeating yourself. I addressed it.
B. When there is a hu”a, it does not mean that we would obligate the woman, but that we had such a party. What would have happened without the verse? It is not clear. It is possible that we would have been exempted from it even by reason of the explanation. But even if we had been obligate, the obligation was by the power of the husband (this is the husband's residence, which he will have with his wife) and not an obligation of the woman herself.
In the margins of my remarks, there is room to discuss whether after we abolished the hu”a and exempted veiled women, they are now again exempt from the law of the mahesh z”g, or is this another specific exemption. According to the first possibility, it is even more likely that we would have been exempted even without this teaching.
Side note: The issue of 'holy washing' in Kiddushin appears in Deuteronomy 7:1 and not Deuteronomy 6:1.
Indeed. Correct. Thank you.
I won't go into the actual discussion (it seems too innovative for me), but we can add the opinions that bless the groom's blessing even in retrospect (Nachalat Shiva, Rav Pealim Resul). We will find out if there is a male wedding (groom + two witnesses) – Kil Tefi…
I read the article while sitting and waiting for the tenth of the minyan to arrive, which I join and say Kaddish over my mother… I hope someone will grasp the necessary change.
There is another source of Kiddushin and Kedesh in the Ketubot Chapter 5 (page 77: as I think) where Kiddushin and Kedesh prove that Rabbi Meir dedicates a person something that never came to the world..
Rabbi, I do not understand the statement that these laws and commandments are only for men based on my status, (from the language of the citizen as it were?) and therefore today it is different, (why not say that women are exempt from the law because it is on the same basis, because of the source of the teaching?) Maybe we should say that we do not know why the Lord commanded like this. (Because it's a Toshabah? The studies there are Daoriat appropriate, right?)
This reminds me of a ruling (of the Levite tribe, I think) regarding the prohibition of touching a step-sister, which ruled that it was not, because the permission from the main law to touch a biological sister is that they were raised together, etc., and this law also applies to a step-sister anyway (who is probably younger there), so what's the harm? But maybe the permission is a "scriptural decree" like that? And not for social reasons?
I would appreciate a comment on whether there is a "taar" for understanding such things, thank you!
Noach A.B. I don't see any comparison between Kiddushin and Kedesh in the issue.
And to your question, because the exemption of women from mitzvot that are not time-limited does not seem to be related to their status or anything else. In any case, there is no basis for the claim that their situation is different today.
You talk about not requiring a reason for the ritual, but that is not always true. In fact, it is usually not true. You assume that something is gezia only if you have no other way out, and even then it is quite clear that there is a reason for it, but you do not know it. There is no reason to reject a reasonable explanation because of concern that there may be an unknown explanation that we have not thought of. See my article on this in the fifth root.
mikyab responded:
11/21/2021 at 06:56
I will add here another safdon from Rabbi Shibi Froman that was sent to me this morning:
I once married a sweet couple and the bride insisted that a woman recite seven blessings at the wedding. I am not allergic to revolutions in this field, but I also did not feel that I had a role in leading them, so I tried to remove her from the story and sent her to talk about it with her grandfather.
“Her grandfather” was one of the most important halachic arbiters in the haredi world, Rabbi Shlomo Fischer, a great scholar and a well-known figure in the Lithuanian haredi Torah world who will certainly be at the wedding.
After two days, the lady returns and surprises: “Grandpa says there is no problem”
I did not believe it. That day I took myself to his yeshiva in Jerusalem, entered the underground study room, which was crammed with books in every direction on old, yellowing shelves, and he stood there bent over, leaning on the stand, beaming from studying Torah with his “young” companion (about 80 years old), just like in the stories I heard about him as a child.
After I dared to interrupt with the strange question about his granddaughter, he began to shower me with quotes and references like a cyber program cracking a code. I couldn’t really follow, only understood the bottom line that there was no problem, because it was all about public respect, and we are talking about a public that respects itself that way.
And so it was, the first and second blessings were given by the eldest generation of Haredi society, the seventh blessing by a woman. It’s that simple. Despite the infinite distance from the social world from which he came and even leads, he had loyalty to simple halakha, without its politics. And certainly loyalty to his family, with all its complexity…
The ‘greatest generation of Haredi society’ about the Rash”p is a description that can only come from a Mizrohnik. They are mistaken in thinking that greatness among Haredim is determined by greatness in the Torah. That is why they are convinced that people like the Gerz”n and R”sh Fisher and the like are the great Haredi generation. So I have something new for you, even Rash”z Auerbach is not considered a great generation among the Haredim (certainly in Bnei Brak). During my time in Bnei Brak, the average Havrach never heard of the Rash”p and the Gerz”n. They heard more about the Rash”p, but it was really marginal. In Jerusalem, the situation was a bit different, but I am bringing the Bnei Brak angle here and we can learn from it.
By the way, the fact that this description is presented as praise is shocking to me. So simple and basic that one must stick to the law and not be impressed by the other brain fog. This is of course also the reason why he is not considered a great generation in the Haredi world. He was not politically correct because the truth was a candle to his feet. As we know, truth is a dirty word in the Haredi world.
Rabbi Reisman is a businessman and a Haredi scholar, but very open and has an original and fascinating thought.
I wondered, “but” this is what I heard.
That a Haredi scholar can have an open mind and an original thought? We already heard in his obituary
about Rabbi Shlomo Fisher, the late.
That businessmen can have an open mind? We have already found such.
And perhaps because it is not common.
In my humble opinion, there is no need for all the above-mentioned lengths. In this week's parashah it is proven that when it comes to a covenant - even 7 sheep set apart for this purpose, join and complete the number of Abraham, Abimelech, and Phichel, the commander of his army - "For you shall be a witness to me."