A Look at Transgenderism and the Giv’at Shmuel Affair (Column 504)

With God’s help

Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.

In recent years the phenomenon of transgender people has swelled and become a burning political issue. In general society a growing consensus is forming that they should be treated according to the way they define themselves. In response, the religious community (and also some strands of feminism, parts of which oppose recognizing trans people) sometimes radicalizes the discourse, as it senses an ideological and social threat posed by this phenomenon and by the legitimacy it is receiving (that dreadful “progressivism”).

In recent weeks the case of a girl[1] at a religious school in Giv’at Shmuel was publicized. She feels within herself the identity of a boy, and from the age of seven received permission from her parents and from the school to dress as a boy (kippah and tzitzit, etc.) and to conduct herself at school fully as a boy. For understandable reasons, the other parents and the children in the class and in general were not informed, and therefore it is no wonder that when this came to light an uproar ensued: demonstrations by parents and children, a boycott of the school, and a demand to remove the girl or to transfer the other children whose parents so wished. Tempers around the country have been running hot for quite a few days and have still not cooled (the customary time span for such affairs is usually about one day). Only yesterday I read that indeed they had returned to routine, but the girl wanders alone in the schoolyard (boycotted). On the other hand, informed sources told me that life truly has returned to normal. The opposing parents did what they did, but now life has returned to routine for the girl as well.

The State-Religious Education Administration (חמ”ד) in the Ministry of Education is very embarrassed by this affair, since it was closely involved and the decisions were made at its guidance and with its consent. Moreover, in recent days a letter by rabbis was publicized demanding that the phenomenon not be recognized and that the girl be forced to return to identifying and functioning as a girl. Public discourse is heating up, and of course demagoguery is in full swing. The media and various politicians are meddling in the affair and see in it an expression of religious rigidity and intolerance and their price. Many speak of demonstrations held on the back of a small (!) child without consideration for his feelings and distress.[2] I already mentioned heartbreaking descriptions that the child walks alone in the schoolyard while all his friends boycott him. On the other hand, the parents and those who share their view argue that a small (!) girl and her distress have been exploited here to advance progressive agendas covertly and without informing the parents, and afterwards everyone is required to capitulate so as not to hurt the girl. Needless to say, the use of the words “boy” or “girl” usually depends on the platform in which the piece is written. Each side in this debate presents the other in a very emotional way as wicked with problematic agendas (hidden or not), while completely ignoring the considerations in favor of the opposing position. Someone already said that the difference between an argument and a quarrel is that an argument revolves around ideas whereas a quarrel revolves around people.

As noted, this is a complex situation with nontrivial considerations on both sides, and conducting a simplistic debate in which each side sees only the considerations that lead to its own position is flawed and harmful. It is possible and appropriate to formulate a stance on complex issues when one sees the full range of considerations and takes into account the costs of every decision. In the end each of us arrives at a single bottom line—and that’s perfectly fine—but this is how better and more correct decisions are made, and the discourse also becomes more rational and sane. Well, this is indeed a halakhah for the messianic era, but that’s exactly why we’re here. Before I get into the thick of it, I’ll add a note about the halakhic policy of decisors (poskim).

A brief look at esoteric halakhic policy

Among the signatories to the aforementioned letter is Rabbi Yaakov Ariel. And yet, according to the Ministry of Education he was the rabbinic authority consulted, and the previous decisions were made with his knowledge and under his guidance. Parenthetically I wonder, irrespective of my stance on this issue itself, who appointed him to be the rabbi of the State-Religious system? Why did they consult specifically with him? Remember that he is among the “senior rabbis of Religious Zionism,” who for some reason take upon themselves the crown of leadership of the entire non-Haredi public (see Column 500 and more).

In any case, for the sake of fairness it is important to note that there is not necessarily a frontal contradiction between the rabbi’s views before and after. It is possible that as long as he thought it could be kept secret and that it was a one-off case, he was willing to permit such conduct and even recommend it; but after it came into the public domain and could serve as a precedent, he holds that it is forbidden to continue to grant it legitimacy. So there is not necessarily a contradiction in his positions, and it is not necessarily dishonest. Still, the publication is rather embarrassing.

Here I only wished to comment on the policy of esoteric rulings—that is, situations in which certain instructions are given only in private and to individuals, while in public the same decisor gives the opposite instructions to the community. Sometimes this is done out of fear and lack of integrity (an unwillingness to stand behind an innovative ruling),[3] and then it is certainly reprehensible. But beyond that there is a problem here. One can perhaps accept the logic of such a policy in itself, but at the end of the day its costs are heavy and therefore in my opinion one should not adopt it. In the end everything is revealed, especially in the internet age and the flood of information, and therefore it is preferable to act transparently despite the opposite costs. One should also distinguish between hiding facts (as in this case) and hiding halakhic positions (which apparently also happened here). Concealing facts can be legitimate, since the girl need not suffer from our halakhic policy. But concealing halakhic positions is problematic—both because it will be revealed, and because if a person has a halakhic position he should stand behind it. Moreover, concealment does not allow such a position to be discussed and argued for and against. Furthermore, if one adopts a policy of concealment, a situation is created in which nothing can be trusted. One cannot know, regarding any ruling by any decisor, whether he is practicing an esoteric policy or whether this is truly his opinion.

An analogy is the well-known ruling of the Magen Avraham, which I have cited here more than once (see for example Columns 21, 63, 304, 362, 386 and others), to say things in the name of a great person so that people will accept them from him. I explained there well the logic of this permission, but it is important to note that practically, this permission carries a heavy price and should not be used (indeed, it should not have been granted at all, because even if one does not use the permission, its very existence undermines trust). If indeed such a policy is accepted, one cannot believe any testimony about any halakhic ruling by any decisor. This is a heavy price—and in my view it precludes using this permission. Incidentally, it may be that the Talmud and the Magen Avraham themselves did not intend to instruct us to actually do this in practice but only ruled that, in principle, such an action is not forbidden.

In the previous column I presented a dispute between Rav and Shmuel about whether it is permissible to cause someone to stumble in a matter that the one causing the stumbling believes is permitted while the one being caused to stumble believes is forbidden, without telling the latter that this is the situation. In note 5 there, I pointed out that such a policy is very problematic even if it is permitted, since if the one being caused to stumble thinks it is forbidden to cause another to stumble in such a case (and that was the situation there), then by its nature he is not supposed to suspect that this is an act of entrapment and will not be sufficiently cautious; in such a case the entrapment is deeper and more severe. This is similar to what I am describing here.

Moderate queerness: the factual plane

In recent years the term “progressivism” has enjoyed a renaissance. It was conjured up from the dusty basements of the communist discourse of a century ago, and in the religious and conservative society it is of course a pejorative. The discourse around the trans phenomenon—and the Giv’at Shmuel case is no exception—is always accompanied by a debate about progressivism. Conservatives attribute support for this phenomenon to a (negative) progressive approach. Here I wish to explain why this attribution is somewhat hasty.

In Column 497 I explained that the basis for all this discourse is the distinction between sex and gender. A person’s sex is determined objectively by physiological and genetic criteria, but gender is something else that does not depend on sex. So on what does it depend? In that column I brought Matt Walsh’s brilliant critique of queerness. But it is important to understand that the queer conception he criticizes there is radical. It is a view that holds that there is no essential definition of “man” or “woman,” and therefore we must accept what a person says about themself without any possibility of critique. In this view, a person’s definition as a man, a woman, or whatever else is completely arbitrary, and the person’s declaration has a constitutive status with respect to it. If he perceives himself as a man, that is what determines that he is one, and similarly for a woman. This is not a matter of politeness or not wanting to hurt him; rather, because if he declares it, then he truly is a man. No wonder Walsh goes around the world in a red dress with two braids and seeks a definition for the term “woman”—that is, when a person says he feels like a woman, what exactly should he feel in order to say that? Needless to say, he does not find an answer. I explained that the crux of his claim is that in this radical conception, concepts like “man” or “woman” are empty—words that say nothing.

But this is not the only conception. There is a more moderate (old-fashioned) view, according to which these terms (sex and gender) do have objective meaning, yet they are different. According to moderate queerness, someone who belongs to the female gender is a person who possesses certain tendencies and abilities (those commonly attributed to women), and likewise for a man. Here the concepts “man” and “woman” are indeed defined and distinct, even if not sharply and precisely. One might perhaps propose definitions (or diagnoses) based on fulfilling several characteristics out of a given set, as is common in medical and psychiatric diagnostics. If a person possesses four out of the following set of traits: tends from childhood to play with dolls; does not like soccer and does not idolize athletes; is gentle; likes to wear dresses and put on makeup; is weak in the exact sciences; does not know how to back up a car, and the like—then he is probably a girl. And vice versa for a boy. This is a certain definition of male or female gender and, in this sense, it is different from the radical view that grants the person’s declaration a constitutive status. Moderate queers preserve the definitions of the concepts and do not regard them as empty. They simply claim that gender does not always align with sex. There is a dissonance now termed “gender dysphoria,” in which a person’s gender does not identify with their sex. This is a person whose sex is male but who feels as a woman gender-wise, or the reverse.

Some transgender people undergo sex-reassignment surgery to align sex with gender (apparently the ways to align gender to sex are more difficult, if they exist at all; here we are already in the realms of psychology or psychiatry), thus resolving their dysphoria. After surgery, ostensibly we have a match between sex and gender, but even that is not so simple, since the person’s chromosomal composition does not actually change. The question that arises in such a case is whether external signs determine sex or genetics does, and that question can remain. In any case, at least psychologically, such surgery is presumably supposed to do the job—that is, to resolve the person’s distress (though even about this there are claims that in many cases it does not really succeed)—but philosophically the discussion can remain as is.

To complete the LGBTQ picture, I note that beyond sex and gender there is also sexual orientation. The claim is that it too is independent of the first two (at least not absolutely; correlations certainly exist). That is, the gender map consists of at least three components: sex, gender, and sexual orientation. One might have physiological male sex, a gender identity as a woman, and an orientation either to men or to women. Thus, fascinating phenomena arise of men who became lesbian women and therefore prefer sexual partnership with women. In essence, originally they are straight men, and the equation here becomes more complex: a transgender lesbian is, in a certain sense, equivalent to a straight man. The difference between them is only in sex (at least if he has not had surgery), but they are identical in gender and sexual orientation. This is practically a model for group theory, and one could formulate various theorems about symmetry and permutations among the elements of the group. You can think through all the possible variations and you will discover that all of them exist. Reality surpasses all imagination.

What matters for our purposes is that, at the factual level, it is hard to deny the very existence of the phenomenon. One can argue whether its source is genetic or environmental (I think there is still no scientific conclusion on the matter), and it is very plausible that there are cultural influences and influences from the legitimacy granted to this dysphoria nowadays. But one cannot deny that, factually, the phenomenon surely exists. I note that ostensibly materialists should have greater difficulty accepting this fact, since for them physiology determines everything. But even with respect to the body’s physical data there is not always a correlation between the theoretical definition and its actual manifestations (the idea and its instantiations). Sometimes people are born with three arms, without half a leg, with six fingers, with a crooked ear, and so forth. The fact that we are all human does not mean there cannot be people who are born different in certain respects, physical or mental. So why should gender identity be rigid and necessarily match sex in all people?! From the point of view of one who is not a materialist (and religious people are usually not), such claims ought to be accepted more easily. There is no obstacle to tensions between our genetics and physiology and our mental dimensions (feelings, traits, and the like). Physiology and genetics do not necessarily determine everything, and it is certainly not true that genetics determines our mental dimension unequivocally. So why should gender identity be rigid in all people?!

The conclusion is that, factually, dissonances can certainly exist between a person’s gendered sense and their sex—and it is even likely that such dissonances exist. Their source may itself be genetic or physiological, and may also be cultural-environmental, or the result of choice, and more likely a combination of all these. In any case, denying the very existence of the phenomenon seems unreasonable.

On moderate queerness and progressivism: the value dimension

Those who fight against progressivism often do so because of the conceptual vacuum it expresses, induces, and promotes. Denial of facts and of values (postmodern narrativism) can lead to very problematic results—and of course is also untrue. No wonder such radical conceptions provoke antibodies, and many see them as a threat to our civilization (I too am an active participant in this struggle, though I would not define it in such apocalyptic terms).

But even someone who fights vigorously against the relativist progressivism I described need not necessarily fight against moderate queerness. As stated, it does not deny the existence of facts and values; it also does not deny the differences between men and women and the psychological and physiological facts. On the contrary, it proposes that we recognize the facts and not impose on them our desires and preconceptions. Moderate queerness points to an existing factual situation, which I described above, and merely proposes that we recognize it. In its view, a person’s testimony about themself does not have a constitutive status as in the radical conception. In its view, a person who declares that he is a man is worthy of such treatment not because the declaration constitutes his manhood. He is a man because those are his feelings, and that reflects his gender. The declaration has evidentiary status, not constitutive status. I believe his declaration that these are indeed his feelings, and of course one must also assume that feelings are the determining factor. But the very definition of gender as opposed to sex is a cluster of feminine or masculine tendencies and feelings. For moderate queerness, we are engaged in rules of evidence, not in a detached discourse about constitutive definitions and not even in a discourse about rights. A woman who declares herself to be a man (assuming I know that the declaration does not reflect her feelings) is still a woman. But a woman who has a man’s feelings is truly a man in terms of gender, even if not in terms of sex.

To allow a balanced and rational discussion, it is very important to understand that this is a different position from the extreme progressive stance (which one may of course also call “progressive”—see below) that Matt Walsh addressed and ridiculed.

As noted, at the factual level the moderate queer claim is very plausible. Denying the facts and the studies that point to it is burying one’s head in the sand. In fact, this is not just about studies but also about direct encounters with people who report their experiences. Even without in-depth investigation, and although I am well aware of the severe bias in the discourse and in the facts presented by research in these fields (on both sides), it is still clear to me that factually this is true. There is such a phenomenon, and I see no reason to think otherwise.

However, this is still not the full picture. Facts themselves are not the main focus of the discussion (though they tend to be presented as such). Moderate queerness has social-value implications, and these require their own discussion. I will touch on these shortly.

Is it an illness?

In debates around these phenomena, the question of whether such dysphoria (as well as any LGBTQ phenomenon) should be defined as an illness crops up from time to time. Conservatives, especially religious ones, tend to say yes, while liberals tend to protest and claim that this is stigmatizing.

More than once I have pointed out that this debate is semantics devoid of substantive content (see for example Column 146 and the columns cited there). If one defines illness as deviation from the norm, then of course it is an illness. But by that definition, height above or below average is also an illness. If one defines illness as a phenomenon with an organic source, then again unusual height would also be defined as such (height depends on genes). If one defines illness as something life-threatening, then many illnesses are not an illness. And if we define illness as a phenomenon that requires treatment, then transness is an illness only for someone who wants treatment (e.g., whoever goes to surgery or to a psychologist). In those columns I explained that the only way, as I understand it, to define this concept in a non-empty or non-arbitrary way is: something in the body or mind that bothers me and requires treatment (even if not always treatable; it could be an incurable illness).

This is of course a subjective definition, since the answer to whether some phenomenon requires treatment depends on whom you ask. Some people are unhappy being overweight and others live with it at peace. Likewise, some people live at peace with transness and some do not. Ultimately, an illness is something that bothers me and I would like to treat and eliminate. By this definition, for someone who wants to die—cancer is not an illness. Foucault, who argued this with respect to psychiatric symptoms, was right (even a stopped clock is right twice a day. Actually, only a stopped clock). I go a step further and argue that this is also true for organic illnesses. Cancer is an illness only for a person who does not want to suffer or die. There is no other non-arbitrary way to define even organic phenomena as illness.

One can broaden the definition and make it a little more objective, and say that an illness is something a reasonable person would want to treat (and then cancer is indeed an illness; most of us do not want to die). But then the question remains: who is the reasonable person? Religious people think homosexuality should be treated, but liberals think not (unless it bothers someone—and even then most think treatment is impossible).[4] Needless to say, regarding transness the matter depends on worldviews. The very fact that such people are in distress and some require surgery means that at least for them this is an illness by every accepted definition (unlike homosexuality—a dysphoria of sexual orientation—which is not, if only because there is as yet no relevant surgery). Conservatives think it should be treated and changed and therefore, in their view, it is an illness. Liberals think not—and therefore, in their view, it is not an illness. People think that if some phenomenon is an illness then it must be treated, but the truth is the reverse: if it needs treatment then, and only then, is it defined as an illness.

In short, the question of whether this is an illness or not reflects at most the speaker’s stance regarding the phenomenon in question. It contains nothing beyond that, and therefore there is no point wasting words on it. These debates are mainly a means of mutual bludgeoning.

Between semantics and values

In any case, let us now assume that the phenomenon of dysphoria does indeed exist factually. What does that mean? Moderate queerness argues that we must recognize this, and if we encounter a male who feels like a woman we should treat him as a woman. Again, not only to respect him or not hurt him, but because he really is a woman. The definition of him as a woman is based on the feminine features in his personality.

This is ostensibly a demand from the realm of manners and consideration for another’s feelings. But is that all? The moderate queer approach also assumes that gendered feelings are indeed what should define our social status. That is, they assume that addressing a person as a woman or as a man is determined by their gender (i.e., their feelings) and not by their sex (or sexual orientation). In principle, one could argue about this as well. One could claim that even if I accept the factual claim of moderate queerness, still in my view a male (in sex) with feminine feelings (indicating his gender) is a man. This view holds that a person’s characterization is not determined by gender but by sex, regardless of his gendered feelings (although I believe him that he feels so).

Yet here too it seems that this debate is superfluous, since it is mere semantics. If we all agree that this person is male in sex and female in gender, then the question of how to address the person (according to sex or gender) is just a social convention. So if it is very important to him that we address him thus, why should that bother anyone? Again, this is not a question of truth and falsehood but a normative determination. It is not even a matter of good and bad, but a norm that is a mere social convention.

A conservative can claim in response that it is important to him to relate to people according to their sex, exactly as it is important to them that we relate according to their gender. So why should we consider them and not him? That is a good claim—if I am truly convinced that it really matters to him. But if it is a claim raised only for the sake of argument, then it is indeed unworthy. I estimate that in most cases conservatives are not actually hurt by the demand to address a trans person according to their gender, especially if they internalize the factual agreement that underlies matters. If this does not reflect problematic values (and we have seen that it does not), why should I care? Why quarrel about it? Of course one can direct the same question to trans people (and their supporters). My sense is that in many—and perhaps most—cases, people entrench themselves in these claims because of their ideology (or what they believe is ideology, because they do not understand that it is mere convention), and their sense of hurt arises because of that. It is not the hurt that determines the attitude, but the attitude that determines the hurt.

It emerges that it is not the ideological dispute that creates the debate; rather, the debate is what turns this issue from semantics into ideology. Hence, we could have simply not argued (just flip a coin and thus decide on the relevant lexicon), and then the problem would not have arisen.

My main claim is that the fight is waged against progressivism—that is, the discourse that empties concepts of meaning—and people do not notice that moderate queerness is essentially an agreed factual claim, and that the debate is nothing but semantics. The fervor accompanying the entire debate is drawn from radical queerness, and if we are wise enough to distinguish between the phenomena, it will neutralize all the hostility and fervor, the extremism and mutual slanders, and it will return this foolish issue to its true proportions.

In our present situation, all sides already carry heavy baggage burdening them, and history has already created its residues within all of us. Therefore both sides feel hurt by these demands. Trans people (indeed the entire LGBTQ community) feel hurt by long years of discrimination against them—and they are of course right about that. But the violent and silencing discourse that they themselves have conducted in recent years, in particular the extremism toward radical queerness, arouses justifiably harsh feelings on the other side (=the sitra achra), which identifies the entire LGBTQ phenomenon with a value vacuum and which leads to feelings of threat and to waging war against the phenomena and against the people—and in particular against their rights. Thus a social limbo without an exit is created. If we were all healthy-minded Aspies (see Column 218) who do not fall for fantasies and emotions born of arbitrary conventions, then we could easily leave the progressives in their bizarre corner to talk to themselves, return to the starting point, and reopen a rational discussion (which almost never happens, certainly not on these topics). I think it would be quite easy to reach semantic agreement, and thus this debate would evaporate. As long as the facts are clear to all, why wrestle over mere terminology? Well, that is unlikely to happen soon, but at least we have reached the point where it is clear to us that this is psychology and agenda, not a truly value-laden debate.

As I explained, in my view there is no real value dispute here. It is only a matter of shifting the cheese. Everyone ought to agree about the facts, except that conservatives feel discomfort from changing the terminology and liberals demand to change it because of that same discomfort. This is simply infantile skirmishing on both sides: one wants to move the cheese and the other is bothered by the cheese being moved. In this sense we have returned to progressivism. If indeed there is nothing important here except semantics, is this not precisely the fight against progressive emptying? True—and therefore there is no point in fighting.

The connotations that have accumulated around these debates cause the feeling that this is a struggle over the society’s value character. In my opinion, absolutely not (so long as we are not dealing with radical queerness).

Moderate queerness: the halakhic plane

After I have dismissed the value dimension, what remains is the halakhic level. Homosexuality is halakhically forbidden, and this is a fact that is hard to dispute or change. But the trans phenomenon does not present such a difficulty. Think of a person whose sex is male and is straight, but whose gender is female. Suppose he behaves as a woman and has a partnership with another woman. In the conservative conception, there should be no prohibition of lesbian relations here, since this is a relationship between a man and a woman (though LGBTQ folk prefer to treat this as a relationship between a woman and a woman. But that is mere semantics). If it is a situation that reaches same-sex relations, that can indeed raise issues of arayot (forbidden relations), but that is not connected to transness but to homosexuality.

We still have the prohibition of a woman wearing a man’s clothing (and vice versa), or the performance or non-performance of commandments imposed on men or on women, and the like. Here the situation is more complex. Indeed, there is room for a halakhic claim that one whose gender is female is a woman also at the halakhic level, and therefore all the laws that apply to women apply to such a person. If we do not accept that, then the person must observe the laws of their sex and not of their gender—but even this need not arouse special problems. So let them observe those laws.

Of course, in the Talmud and halakhic literature it is standard to hang the definitions of male and female on sex and not on gender (as in the sugyot of signs of maturity, and of a tumtum and androgynos), but one might argue that this is only because Hazal did not yet have the conceptual framework and knowledge we have today. Therefore there is room to argue that the definition in our day could change and be based on gender and not on sex (this of course touches on the question of changes in halakhah, which I will not enter here). Add to this the question of whether Hazal viewed the physiological signs as indicators or as causes (at least regarding the latter signs of maturity this is explicitly discussed).[5] If they are only indicators, then it is possible that gender is the essential definer and the physical signs were only indicators of it, and now this could change.

In short, one can agree on all the halakhic rules, and the question that remains is the application. Everyone agrees that it is forbidden for a man to wear women’s clothing; the debate is over who is a man. But this is a debate like any other. I do not see why people treat this as a war against halakhah. It is a halakhic position with which not everyone agrees. In this sense, the halakhic status of a trans person is certainly easier than homosexuality, which of course is not reflected in public discourse. I presume that a gay child would not have aroused a demand to expel him from school—simply because we are used to that already. I do not see a difference between that and a trans child, and if there is a difference it is clearly in favor of the trans child.

I do not intend to claim that recognizing gender as the basis for the halakhic definition of man and woman is simple. Clearly it is not agreed upon and there will be a (sane and legitimate) debate about it, but in my eyes it is at least a claim that can be made, and the debate over it is no different from any other halakhic debate (again, if we manage to ignore the sediment that has accumulated here due to the public struggles). There is also sensitivity regarding joint activities. What will those do who think the definition is based on genitalia when alongside them there is a transgender person who thinks the definition is based on gender? It will be hard for them to function together. Still, this is not altogether different from other halakhic disputes that we must learn to live with (though I agree that practically there is a nontrivial difficulty here). In any case, it is clear that the fundamental problem is human and emotional rather than halakhic. We live in peace and proximity with Sabbath desecrators and with those who sleep with a niddah, and it does not seem to me that the halakhic aspects of the trans phenomenon are more severe than those. As for psychological and social sensitivities, these are things that one can and should overcome. These are certainly not values or ideology worth fighting over.

Sex-reassignment surgery

Even regarding sex-reassignment surgery, it is not clear whether there is a prohibition. One can regard the outcome of the surgery as male or as female, but either conception is a legitimate halakhic claim. The surgery itself could be forbidden, since for a male, for example, it involves castration, which is forbidden by halakhah. It also prevents him from fulfilling the commandment of procreation. But that assumes we are indeed dealing with a male. If this is a woman, then there is room to claim that there is no prohibition.

Think, for example, of someone who undergoes surgery due to some medical problem and as a result loses the ability to have children. We will treat that far more leniently. Likewise, if we see a person suffering from unremitting (physical) pain, would we not permit them to have such surgery to treat their pain? By logic it seems to me that persistent and unremitting mental pain is no different in this regard, and therefore there is room to compromise the ability to procreate in order to resolve the trans person’s distress (dysphoria). One who does not find a suitable partner and thus decrees upon himself not to have children and to fulfill the commandment of procreation—there too we do not see a major prohibition. Note that a person suffering from dysphoria might not find a partner for this reason, and therefore in any case he will not fulfill procreation.

Well, I will not expand here because this is not the place. In any case, regarding these surgeries, see Tzitz Eliezer vol. 10 §25 ch. 26 (note that he deals only with physical changes—that is, it is clear to him that the definition depends on sexual organs, and he does not deal with gender. So too in vol. 11 §8 and §78 and vol. 22 §2).[6] To conclude, I will only note that in the heat of argument people can interpret sources and bend them in their direction freely out of complete misunderstanding. For example, some time ago I was sent a post by a man named Ariel Horowitz, who brings a story in which Rabbi Waldenberg, author of Tzitz Eliezer, seemingly recognizes a trans identity:

In the 1950s, Rabbi Eliezer Yehuda Waldenberg, author of the responsa “Tzitz Eliezer,” was the rabbi of Shaare Zedek Hospital in Jerusalem. One day Rabbi Waldenberg was asked about a person who entered the men’s section of the synagogue and wanted to join the quorum, but the other worshipers suspected that he was a woman. Rabbi Waldenberg—who did not need videos from the Liba Center, incitement from Bezalel Smotrich, or other rabbis to preach to him about the healthy institution of the family—ruled explicitly that one should follow the person’s self-definition and external indicators. In other words: a person’s gender status can change according to surgery or external changes.

He brings this story in the context of the case of the trans girl in Giv’at Shmuel. What does he learn from this? That a person’s gender status can change according to self-definition? Whether his intention is the radical approach (that a person constitutes their gender) or the more moderate approach (that a person is credible in testifying about their gender), this is nonsense that does not approach Rabbi Waldenberg’s words. All he wrote there was that a person is credible in saying he is a man (in particular if his external signs match his description), and there is no need to check his “fringes.” On the contrary, it follows from his words that if the external signs do not match, his declaration that he is a man will not help. In any case, there is not even a hint here of relating to gender identity detached from sex; on the contrary, as we saw above, Rabbi Waldenberg explicitly writes in several places in his responsa the exact opposite. Sadly, even if you are a liberal, the arguments and sources you bring must hold water.

Back to the Giv’at Shmuel case

In the discourse around the Giv’at Shmuel case, the common assumption among conservatives is that this is a progressive event. See, for example, the announcement of the conference to be held in Giv’at Shmuel (the crime scene) on the evening after the Fast of Gedaliah, where the public will be presented with objective information by world-renowned experts (including a city council member, a yeshiva head, a forum chairwoman, and a newspaper editor), in which diverse positions from different angles on the issue of children with worrying progressive tendencies will be presented, and thus everyone will be able to understand their roots and receive tools with which to cook up all the tough questions:

Before you run to the conference, note that in this announcement there is an identification—as if self-evident—between the issue under discussion here and progressivism (attendees are expected to arrive with the appropriate feelings and connotations).

If we look a bit more closely at our case, we should first remember the basic groundwork of the discussion: moderate queerness is a very reasonable position, at least at the factual level, and the debate over terminology is primarily semantics. The phenomenon exists and cannot be denied. I add here the assumption that the parents likely hold the moderate view. It is reasonable that they are not demanding a principled right for the girl to define herself just because she feels like it, but are making a factual claim: her feelings and tendencies seem male, even though at the sexual level she is a girl. It is very unlikely, in my opinion, that without significant reasons reasonable religious parents (from Giv’at Shmuel) would embark on such an adventure merely to advance a progressive agenda (unless they received a fat grant from the New Israel Fund and the European Union). If we accept these two plausible assumptions, then at the first stage we must recognize that the story begins with a real problem with which the girl and her parents grappled. Now we must ask ourselves what they ought to have done under these circumstances—or rather, what we ourselves would have done (the conference will surely provide all the answers, but in the meantime I shall try to guess).

As noted, I fully agree that the source of the girl’s feelings could certainly be influenced by the liberal environment and by LGBTQ discourse. Still, these are her feelings, and she came with them to her parents. I assume they did not find a reasonable way to cope with this difficulty and distress, and surely turned to a psychologist and afterwards to the school administration, and through it to the State-Religious Education Administration (which, as noted, consulted with Rabbi Yaakov Ariel), and this is the solution they found.

We must remember that we are dealing here with a minor, and therefore it is reasonable to expect the parents and the therapist to take into account that this may be an adolescent caprice, gender confusion (it is known that there is sexual confusion among teenagers, but here it is gender and not sexual orientation). They should have examined whether there is information about the reliability of these feelings—that is, what will remain of them in adulthood. To what extent do the feelings of a seven-year-old girl reflect real dysphoria or temporary confusion? With regard to surgery (which did not occur here), it is clear that such concerns are much weightier, since it carries risks and irreversible outcomes. But here no surgery was done; rather, it was decided to allow her to “dress up” as a boy and function as such at school. I allow myself to surmise that this was done after consideration in which they took into account and examined all that I noted above and more, and in the end saw no other way out. In any case, it is plausible that even the conservative critics have no information different from what I have regarding the process and the decision-making. If so, let us adopt these plausible assumptions, all at the factual level. So far there are still no values. In that case, everything seems fine, and one can understand this family’s decision-making according to their own lights.

I must reiterate what I explained above: that the value aspects do not truly exist in such a case, and the halakhic aspects also carry limited weight—and for a girl of seven or nine (long before bat mitzvah) the weight is even lower. Yet another question arises: these actions were not done in a vacuum. There are other children in the school, and this may cause them problems. Such a step can have ramifications for the environment, and therefore it seems it cannot be decided in a closed forum without informing the other stakeholders. The paternalism of the school and the Ministry of Education is problematic. Indeed, we should remember that in a sense this paternalism is embedded in the very fact that our education is centrally managed by the Ministry of Education. Still, there is room to argue that in such an exceptional matter they ought to have included the parents.

Now we must ask ourselves two final questions, which of course are related:

1. What could the girl’s parents have done in the face of their daughter’s distress? Revealing to everyone that this is the situation could have confused the children even more, and it is doubtful they would have agreed to cooperate (we see what happened in the end). Perhaps they could have included only the parents without the children—but it is doubtful how much such a thing can be kept secret (we see it was not kept even when no one was told).
2. What harm was caused to the other children? I assume the teachers are not truly harmed, and therefore their claims do not seem serious to me. I am referring here only to the claims of the other children and their parents.

I think the expected harm to the other children in this case is very limited—at least at such a young age. What could really happen? The sexual aspects do not yet exist. Perhaps the surprise of the discovery itself could create problems. But apart from that, the fact that there was a girl in costume who participated in activities as if she were a boy—whom does that harm and why should it bother anyone? There may be aspects I have not considered, and in practice some harms may occur, but it seems to me that in principle these harms are not truly significant. This is a decent reason why the parents are not necessarily required to involve the entire environment in this matter.

But even after this came to light and the children were surprised, one can explain to them that this is a girl with a special distress, like the many distresses of other children (today they are called “children with disabilities”), and this is the way chosen to treat it. I think children can accept such a thing, and the younger they are the easier it is, because for them it becomes part of the world they know—period. In fact, if I understand correctly, that is exactly the situation right now. Everyone knows that this is actually a girl in costume, and at present she is there in the school and things are more or less proceeding as they should. Many children with disabilities participate in regular classes and the children must learn to live with them.

It is true that for these same reasons it seems it could have been done from the outset—that is, to include and coordinate everything with the children and their parents at the time of the decision, and to preempt matters. They could have explained the problem and then everyone would have understood the distress and participated in the effort to solve it. Things could have been allowed to proceed openly, as is now happening in practice after the disclosure. The surprise created part of the rupture and the anger, and that could have been avoided. I think that if there is any lesson I would draw from this case, it is the reverse of what the rabbis who signed the letter above concluded. One can do what is necessary (if there is no other way to cope with the distress), but do so in coordination with the environment.

After accruing experience in dealing with new challenges, in the future we will know how to do this better. In practice, the parents and the administration did not do so in this case because they did not yet have experience. This was probably also a mistake, and in this sense the parents’ protest may be understandable (not about the very step the girl’s parents took, but about the fact that the environment was not included). So what? Everyone there made mistakes. Does that justify demonstrations and anti-progressive noise? In my opinion—absolutely not. Again, progressives do deserve condemnation and struggle against them, but what do moderate queers and those who truly suffer from this dysphoria have to do with it? This is a fact, not a value. Facts must be confronted. Denying them does not help. On the contrary, if there is another way to cope, it is worth discussing it openly and deciding accordingly. All through substantive discussion. The baggage that this issue has absorbed causes the whole matter to grow far beyond reasonable proportions and prevents substantive discussion.

I must nevertheless add a note to the other side. The righteous liberal claims that protest the abuse of a child and the raucous demonstrations of adults that ignore a child’s suffering are disingenuous. If there is indeed an ideological problem here—and that is apparently what some parents thought (though I personally do not see it that way)—then this may justify demonstrations even facing a suffering child. When an ideological struggle is underway, whether justified or not, this child is caught up in it. I do not think people must abandon their conceptions and pay any educational and value price merely out of fear of hurting a child. It is indeed painful when a child suffers, but the question is the broader price of capitulation in this struggle. Sometimes an individual, even a child, must pay a price for struggles occurring in the background. If they had not acceded to the girl’s request and had left her as a girl, she would have suffered because of the educational agenda. Now she has become a boy (or a girl in costume), and she is again suffering. By acceding to her request, perhaps the other children are also suffering. Therefore there is no schoolbook answer; but considerations of a child’s distress are not everything. They are one component among a wider set of considerations, and focusing on them alone is demagoguery.

And still, after noting this, I return to what I wrote above. Since in my opinion the costs here are not very significant (if at all), there was no need to spark such a high-intensity struggle. An inquiry could have been conducted and a decision reached. Moreover, the question of whether to allow the girl to dress up is separate from the question of what we demand of the other children. It may be possible to tell the other children to address her as a girl, and to tell her that the way they perceive her is different (for she is a girl by sex, even if not by gender), and that she too should consider them. Just as the other children are supposed to accept unusual conduct and get used to it, so could this girl accept such an arrangement and get used to it for their sake. She will be a boy who is addressed in the feminine because that is how the other children think of her, and they too deserve consideration.

In conclusion

I am not sure this is the optimal course of conduct, and I did not intend here to offer a prescription for a solution but only to illustrate a way of thinking. I am sure there are other problems I have not considered, and perhaps there are better and more effective solutions. What is more important to me is that the picture I presented here suffices to dissipate the artificial and harmful tension that envelops this issue and thus can lead to reasonable understandings that both sides can accept sensibly.

I think we at least owe this to all the parties who suffered in this case, and no less to the children and to the next cases in line. We must learn how to conduct ourselves henceforth rationally, coolly, and soberly—without emotions and without unnecessary outbursts. It is also more pleasant, also less harmful, and also leads to better results. I think that all sides there paid the tuition, especially the girl and her parents. If we draw the lesson, then we can say that at least it was not in vain.

[1] I use the feminine for her because that is her sex. Below I will address the relation between sex and gender.

[2] The masculine here is because I am describing the stance sympathetic to the phenomenon, of course.

[3] A blatant example is R. Z. N. Goldberg, who came out against the heter (permit) of get delivery in absentia in the Safed rabbinical court, while the judges there claimed they had received his consent for their ruling (see for example here). It seems plausible to me that this was not deceit by the judges but fear on R. Goldberg’s part of the criticism that arose there.

[4] It turns out that even by their view we apparently have rigid characteristics that cannot be changed.

[5] See for example here and here. With regard to signs of maturity, however, the discussion is whether they are signs of mental maturity, for halakhic adulthood concerns legal responsibility and obligation in commandments. Therefore there it is reasonable to see them as a sign of mental maturity rather than a cause.

[6] See also the comprehensive article by Shmuel Shimoni, “Legal Recognition of Sex Change,” Mekhkarai Mishpat 28 (2013), p. 311.