Logical Loops and Self-Reference – Continued (Column 407)
With God’s help
Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.
In the previous column I discussed self-reference. We saw there that such a situation sometimes creates a paradoxical loop, but in many cases it is entirely legitimate. As we saw, it is used both in mathematics and in halakhah. Among other things, we saw the use of such loops to prove or reject claims in various ways, and I wondered, in certain cases, how those who make use of such self-reference stop the loop. In this column I will examine a possible solution.
Three Examples from the Previous Column
There are three examples on which I focused in this context: the Red Heifer, pesik reisha de-lo nicha lei, and migo.
- The Red Heifer is invalidated if a yoke is placed on it with the owner’s consent. The claim was that the owner will never consent, because such consent disqualifies his cow and lowers its value. But that empties of content the disqualification in a case where the owner consents, since he will never consent and the heifer will never be invalidated. The Ran resolved this by saying that if, because of this, we do not invalidate the heifer, then once again the owner will consent, and again we will have to invalidate it. I asked why he stops the loop here and does not continue it ad infinitum. How does such an argument explain the heifer’s disqualification? The conclusion is that at most we cannot determine whether the heifer is invalidated or not. Perhaps the laws of doubt should be applied here.
- So too regarding pesik reisha de-lo nicha lei, which according to the Arukh is exempt. It was objected (in the comments, Sandomilof cited this from Rabbi Ovadia) that a person is never pleased to be liable to stoning; and some answered, like the Ran above, that if we exempt him, then again it will be pleasing to him and he will be liable. Here too I found it difficult: why stop the loop precisely here and not continue it ad infinitum? Why is this an explanation of the exemption according to the Arukh? At most, the laws of doubt apply.
- And regarding migo, we saw that if we adopt the evidentiary force of migo, it undermines itself, for the alternative claim is then no longer better. And there too some argued that if we accept that this undermines it and we do not recognize migo as a consideration, then the other claim again becomes better than this one, and the migo revives. Again, it is difficult: why stop the loop and not continue it forever? Under the laws of doubt, the money will remain in its current presumption. [1]
I thought it may be possible to explain the difficulties regarding these examples through a well-known foundation formulated by R. Shimon Shkop in his Sha’arei Yosher, widely circulated in the yeshiva world, in the following wording: “Any legal status such that if it takes effect it will thereby not take effect—then it does not take effect.” [2] In this column I will try to examine this.
Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s Consistency Principle
R. Shimon discusses a statement of Tosafot in Gittin. By way of introduction: a condition phrased “on condition that (ʿal menat)” is one where the legal effect under discussion operates retroactively if the condition is fulfilled. If a man gives a bill of divorce to a woman in 1980 on the condition “on condition that you not drink wine for ten years,” then if she does not drink wine throughout those ten years (until 1990), the get takes effect retroactively from the moment it was given (in 1980). In Gittin 83a the Gemara discusses one who gave his wife a get on the condition “on condition that you not marry so-and-so,” and states as follows:
R. Akiva responded and said: Suppose she went and married a man from the marketplace and had children, and was widowed or divorced, and then rose and married the one to whom she was prohibited—does it not follow that the get is annulled and her children [from the second husband] are mamzerim?!
That woman, who received a get conditioned on “on condition that you not marry so-and-so,” married another man (which of course does not contradict the condition). After her second husband died or divorced her, she went and married that so-and-so to whom the condition referred. R. Akiva assumes that in such a case the condition uproots the get retroactively. Consequently, the children who had already been born to the second husband earlier become retroactively mamzerim.
On this, Tosafot (s.v. “ve-ʿamdah ve-nisset”) remark there:
“And she rose and married the one to whom she was prohibited—does it not follow that the get is annulled?” And if you will say: But the marriage cannot take effect, since she is prohibited to him as a married woman. In what way is this different from what was taught in the Tosefta: ‘On condition that you not marry my father or your father—this is a get. On condition that you not have relations with my father or your father—this is not a get; we are concerned lest she have relations with them’? This implies that ‘on condition that you not marry them,’ even if she married them, this is a get. So here, why is the get annulled?
Tosafot ask: Why does R. Akiva assume that if she married him the get is annulled? For if the get from the first husband is annulled, then she is still married to the first husband, and therefore her marriage to the second and also to so-and-so (the third) cannot take effect, since she is a married woman. But if she is not married to so-and-so, it turns out that she in fact did not violate the condition of the divorce, and therefore the divorce is valid. [3] Tosafot answer that the case is that she married after the death of the divorcer, but that is not important for our purposes. Their reasoning in the question is that in a case where she married the one prohibited to her (and not after the divorcer died), the divorce is valid—contrary to the simple reading of the sugya. For some reason, Tosafot decided to stop the loop after the first step; and you can already see the analogy to our cases. Here too the obvious question is why stop precisely here and not continue to infinity.
R. Shimon Shkop, in Sha’arei Yosher (Shaʿar 7, ch. 16, p. 258), addresses this question on Tosafot’s words and writes:
“Because such a marriage cannot take effect, for if it were to take effect it would be annulled retroactively due to the condition. And likewise, something that has no possibility of taking effect does not take effect at all; therefore the get stands and the marriage is void.”
His claim is that there is a general meta-halakhic principle stating that any legal effect such that, if it were to take effect, it would uproot itself from the outset—already now it does not take effect. A status whose very existence would uproot itself cannot be effected.
This seems to be a method with the potential to solve our problems as well. It provides a general criterion for stopping loops. To apply it to our cases, we must examine this principle more closely.
The Difficulty with R. Shimon’s Proposal
R. Shimon argues that if there is a marriage whose taking effect would uproot itself from the outset, it cannot take effect. Therefore, Tosafot stop the loop by saying that the marriage to the second [so-and-so] did not take effect, and therefore the get is valid. But one may ask: why not say the same about the divorce from the first husband? If those divorce effects take effect, they are uprooted retroactively; so seemingly they too should not take effect. If so, even after Tosafot’s innovation, the loop resumes. Why do Tosafot choose to say this only about the marriage to the third party and not about the divorce from the first? Apparently, R. Shimon’s words still do not explain the breaking of the loop’s symmetry.
The answer is that there is a difference between the divorce from the first husband and the marriage to the third. The legal effect of the divorce from the first does not, by its very nature, uproot itself. That happens only because afterward she went and married so-and-so (the third) and thus violated the condition—and only then are the divorce effects uprooted. Had she not done this, the divorce would have remained valid. That is, those divorce effects do not inherently include their own uprooting; this happens only because of later events (which, in particular, need not have happened). By contrast, the marriage to so-and-so (the third), by its very definition, uproots itself without any addition beyond that. The marriage to so-and-so occurs after she was already divorced conditionally (without that divorce she could not have married him at all). Therefore, there it is considered an act which, at the very moment it is performed, severs the branch on which it seeks to sit. R. Shimon claims that such a halakhic act cannot create the legal effect it attempts to create.
This is what we called in our fifth book “R. Shimon Shkop’s consistency principle”: an act that effects a legal status must have consistent results (i.e., must not be uprooted by that very act itself). If they are not, the act cannot effect the status in the first place.
An Additional Assumption Regarding the Causal Order of Events
To better understand what this means, we must return to clarify what would happen absent this principle. Without the consistency principle, we would say that when she married so-and-so, the marriage takes effect, and only afterward its taking effect uproots the divorce; now she becomes the wife of the first husband, and the chain continues. Absent R. Shimon’s rule, there would be a loop with its tail in its mouth—very much like the liar paradox.
What changed after R. Shimon’s (and Tosafot’s) innovation? The consistency principle alone is insufficient to solve the problem, since as we saw it could have been applied both to the initial divorce and to the marriage to so-and-so. Our ability to apply it specifically to the marriage to so-and-so and not to the divorce stems from the fact that Tosafot and R. Shimon implicitly add another innovation (which we discussed at length in the fourth book of the series, on halakhah’s relation to the time axis): that this set of uprootings and counter-uprootings—which all occur simultaneously (at the moment of her betrothal to the third party)—is nevertheless viewed as a chain of successive events, as if they occur one after another along a time axis. True, their succession is not on real time but on a causal axis. Each one causes the next, even though they occur simultaneously. R. Shimon’s innovation is that halakhah views the axis of causal production as if it were an internal time axis of the event. Therefore, even if all the events occur at the same instant on the real timeline, we still view them as events appearing successively on that internal timeline (the causal axis), reflecting the fact that each depends on its predecessors.
Only because we treat these events as successive events that appear one after another and not all at once can we use R. Shimon’s principle and evaluate each stage in the chain on its own, at the moment (i.e., at the logical-causal stage) when it attempts to operate. We examine each stage separately at its “occurrence,” and only if the stage under discussion passes the consistency test does it successfully effect the relevant legal status; then we proceed to the next causal stage. Let us now describe this in more detail using Tosafot’s example.
At the first stage on the causal axis, the get is given. When we examine this act, there is no problem with it (for it does not inherently uproot itself, so long as she does not marry so-and-so), hence the conclusion is that now the get takes effect. Afterwards she goes and marries a second man (which is, of course, permitted), and that too takes effect because there is still no contradiction to the condition of the divorce from the first. Afterwards the second dies or divorces her, and she goes and marries so-and-so (the third, to whom she is prohibited by the condition of the first). Here the evaluation already reveals a problem, for if these betrothals take effect, they immediately uproot themselves then and there (without dependence on anything else; everything has already happened in the “past,” i.e., earlier on the causal axis). Therefore, at this stage we stop the loop and declare that the betrothal to so-and-so, the third, does not take effect from the outset (not that it takes effect and is annulled, as the simple reading of the Gemara suggests). It is important to understand that these nuptials are not annulled by the condition or its consequences—i.e., they do not take effect and then the condition that nullifies the divorce to the first husband returns and nullifies them. Rather, they do not take effect at all due to R. Shimon’s consistency principle, by which a legal effect that uproots itself cannot take effect. Thus the loop stops. It is important to see that there is now no reason to return and discuss the divorce, for if she did not marry the third, then the condition of the divorce was not violated, and everything remains as it was: she is not married to the first (because she divorced him) and not to the third (because the attempted marriage to him is a self-uprooting legal effect, which therefore does not take effect).
R. Shimon’s principle created here a state that, from the ordinary perspective, is impossible: she is not married to the first and also not to the third. [4] This is why Tosafot stop the loop with the conclusion that the divorce from the first remains in force. Thus, R. Shimon holds that in the end the divorce is valid and the marriage to the third is not—because of his special principle that any legal effect which uproots itself does not take effect from the very first moment.
Another Example
In the fifth book we analyzed in this manner a whole series of paradoxical halakhic loops, and we saw that in almost all of them the consistency principle solves the problem and provides a criterion to stop the loop. However, we found at least one case where the loop can be stopped using assumption 1 alone, without invoking the consistency principle (assumption 2). First I will illustrate the standard analysis with one more example—concerning the validity of a get written on Shabbat—which requires both of R. Shimon’s assumptions.
The loop here is based on the following premises: Halakhah prohibits writing on Shabbat. However, if one writes over existing writing, that is not considered writing—unless the upper writing corrects something lacking in the lower writing. In addition, a get must be written by a qualified person. One who writes something on Shabbat is considered a mumar (apostate), and therefore is not qualified. Furthermore, a get must be written lishmah (for the sake of the divorced woman). If a get was not written lishmah, it can be corrected by tracing over that word with the quill while intending lishmah.
In light of all of these premises, the author of Minḥat Ḥinukh (commandment 32, “Mussach HaShabbat,” sec. 34) raises the following question:
“A get that had been written not for her sake, and on Shabbat he traced over it for her sake intentionally—what is the law? Now, if he wrote a get intentionally on Shabbat he is a mumar and it is not a valid get; but here, if we say it is not a get because he is a mumar—in truth, if it is not a get then he did not desecrate Shabbat at all, since writing over writing is permitted on Shabbat unless it corrects, and if it is not a get then it was not a correction. If so, he is not a mumar and the get is valid. But if the get is valid, then he becomes a mumar and it is invalid. This depends on that. How are we to judge this matter? If the get is valid it is invalid because of mumar; and if we say it is invalid because of mumar, then he is not a mumar, for he did not desecrate Shabbat. This requires further inquiry.”
A man wrote a get for his wife not lishmah. The get is invalid, so he wishes to fix it and traces over it with lishmah to render it valid. But he does this on Shabbat. If indeed the second writing succeeds in validating the get, then it is considered writing prohibited on Shabbat, since it corrected something that was lacking in the lower writing. But if this is prohibited writing on Shabbat, then the writer is deemed a mumar (a Shabbat violator is considered an apostate for the entire Torah) and therefore disqualified from writing a get. Consequently, the upper writing added nothing, and again it is not considered prohibited writing; then he is not a mumar, and the get is valid. But if it is valid, then the writing is prohibited and he is a mumar, and so on ad infinitum.
This is a causal-normative loop, and it can be analyzed according to R. Shimon’s method: posit an order of events as if temporal (according to causal sequence), and at each stage apply the consistency principle. Let us follow this process. Initially he writes a get not lishmah; the get is invalid. Now he traces over it again on Shabbat. Does the get become valid? This is a normative, not factual, question, and the answer is negative. If the get were to become valid, then the writer would thereby become a mumar, and then the get would revert to being invalid (for it was written by a mumar). In other words, this is a legal effect that severs the branch on which it seeks to sit; by the consistency principle, it does not take effect at all.
Therefore, in the end this get remains invalid, since the legal effect that would validate it does not succeed in taking effect. Hence, clearly, the person also does not become a mumar. It is important to understand that the invalidity of the get does not stem from the fact that the upper tracing was done by a mumar, for ultimately we determined that he is not a mumar. The invalidity is due to the consistency principle, which prevents a legal effect that uproots the branch on which it sits from taking effect.
Interim Summary: Two Distinct Assumptions Underlying the Application of the Consistency Principle
As we saw in this example, the application of R. Shimon’s consistency principle rests on two different assumptions:
- Causal order. Despite the simultaneity of the entire occurrence, we initially ignore the consistency principle and arrange the events along the axis of causation as if it were a timeline on which the events appear in sequence, each leading to the next.
- Consistency principle. We then examine each such event: does its validity neutralize itself at the stage of its performance (i.e., at the point where it is placed in the causal chain)? Once we reach an event that neutralizes itself, the chain stops, since the result of such an event cannot take effect. Here the process ends.
I note that the consistency principle seems somewhat ad hoc, akin to Russell’s theory of types. R. Shimon adds an assumption whose justification is only that it offers a systematic way to stop loops. Can it be justified on its own terms? There is an intuition that it can. It is reasonable for a normative system to declare that it will not recognize a legal effect whose taking effect uproots itself. We are not dealing with facts but with norms; as such, they are entrusted to the normative system, which can decide whether or not to grant them force. Russell’s theory, by contrast, deals with facts and propositions about them, and there it appears entirely ad hoc.
On Halakhah and Logic: Can Logical Paradoxes Be Solved Similarly?
How did R. Shimon manage to solve a problem that seems equivalent to the liar paradox? Can all self-referential logical paradoxes be solved in a similar fashion? Take, for example, the “barber of Seville” paradox: a barber whose policy is to shave all those who do not shave themselves. Does he shave himself or not? If he shaves himself, then he belongs to the group of people he does not shave (those who shave themselves). But if he does not shave himself, then he is included among those whom he does shave (those who do not shave themselves). Can we apply R. Shimon’s consistency principle here too?
Apparently not. There are two main differences between the get paradox—halakhic—and the analogous logical paradoxes, which consist of factual propositions:
A. In a logical paradox, like the barber paradox, we cannot declare one of the statements false, for we assume they describe facts. This differs from the get paradox, which concerns normative-legal determinations (of divorce or betrothal taking effect). Regarding such determinations, we always have the option to rule that the legal act did not produce a status that took effect (in legal terms: it did not “crystallize”), i.e., that the woman is not divorced or not betrothed (though indeed we cannot say that a document was not given or that a condition was not stipulated—those are physical facts).
This difference is not relevant to the liar paradox, for there we are not dealing with statements that describe facts but with a statement about the truth values of statements (in particular, of itself). There, ostensibly, we can declare any of the statements false, since there are no factual premises but rather a judgment (albeit a logical one, not a legal one). But that is not correct, for even for such statements we are not the ones to decide their truth values. These are not normative claims. Their truth values begin in facts and are not subject to our decision. A claim is true if it corresponds to the fact it describes, and false if it does not. Therefore, this too is not in our hands.
B. Logic, by its nature, is atemporal. Therefore, a logical paradox is, by definition, atemporal. Let us use the liar paradox formulation, where this is easier to see.
(a) Statement (b) is true.
(b) Statement (a) is false.
This is the same loop as the paradox formulated in the previous column, but here there are two statements, each referring to the other. The enumeration a/b is arbitrary and could have been reversed. On the logical level, they must be treated as simultaneous—or atemporal. Therefore, one cannot perform an analysis like that of R. Shimon (for, as we saw, his analysis is based on viewing the events as if they were successive and causally linked).
True, even in normative paradoxes we are not dealing with real time, but with a causal axis (an internal time). However, the notion of “causation” we used can only appear in contexts involving relations between events in factual reality, whether physical or legal. The ability of a condition to operate forward and backward in time creates the paradox, but also enables its resolution. By contrast, logical relations are atemporal (as we demonstrated at length in the first part of the fourth book of the Talmudic Logic series). It is therefore incorrect to speak of a causal relation between statements logically related to one another; for this reason, R. Shimon’s analysis does not apply to them. As I showed in column 301 (in the discussion of logical determinism), the falsity of a sentence does not “cause” its truth value to be false. There is no causation here but rather a description of the same thing in other words. This is a logical dependence, not a causal relation, and on such a basis one cannot define a fictitious time axis as R. Shimon did.
For the liar paradox this is obvious. Clearly, the relation between the two statements comprising it is logical (one is true if the other is false, not because the other is false), and there is no causal relation between them. [5] And what about the barber paradox, which “shaves everyone who does not shave himself”? There, ostensibly, we are dealing with empirical facts and not abstract logic (like truth and falsity of statements). Yet even there the relation between the two links that create the paradox is not causal but logical. To see this, let us present this paradox in a three-line structure:
- X shaves every Y who does not shave himself.
- Y shaves himself.
- X shaves Y. [6]
It is easy to see that the relation between these statements is not one of causation, unlike the relation between conditional divorce and the fulfillment/violation of the condition. It is a logical relation between propositions, not a causal relation between facts. Once there is no causation, the events cannot be viewed as successive links on the causal axis. Consequently, R. Shimon’s consistency principle does not apply to these problems. Because of the symmetry in the relations between the statements, it cannot determine which of them is void and which remains valid.
Of course, one could artificially define such an axis even for logical paradoxes and arbitrarily decide that there is some order of succession between the statements, and then apply R. Shimon’s consistency principle. But that would not yield a real solution to the paradox; at best it would propose a formulation in which the paradox cannot be presented (i.e., it prevents its formulation). That is an ad hoc solution, much like Russell’s theory of types.
A Loop that Stops without the Consistency Principle
In analyzing the previous loops, we needed both components of R. Shimon’s method: arranging matters along the causal axis and the consistency principle. As noted, in our book we identified one case where assumption 1 suffices to stop the loop, even without assumption 2 (the consistency principle). This loop consists of a conditional divorce and the annulment of vows.
According to halakhah, one who vows not to eat something is prohibited from eating it. In addition, a husband can annul his wife’s vows (on the day he hears them), but only if he is indeed her husband. In light of these premises, R. Ḥayyim Berlin, in the journal Yagdil Torah (cited in responsa Menachem Meshev §1), raises the following question:
“A man divorces his wife on condition, effective from now and after thirty days, that during those thirty days if she refrains from eating any prohibited item the get shall be valid, but if she tastes any prohibited item the get shall not be valid. Within the thirty days she vows a loaf as konam, and her husband annuls her vow; she then eats the loaf relying on his annulment—Is she divorced or not? If we say she is retroactively divorced, then his annulment was no annulment, and she ate a prohibited item and is not divorced. But if we say she is not divorced, then his annulment is effective, and she ate a permitted item, and consequently she is divorced.”
A man divorces his wife on condition that during the month following the divorce she not eat anything halakhically prohibited. After ten days the woman vows not to eat a certain loaf of bread, rendering that loaf prohibited to her. But on that same day the former husband comes and annuls her vow. She then eats the loaf, since it is no longer prohibited to her, for her husband annulled it. What is the law in such a case? If the eating of the loaf was indeed permitted, then she is divorced from the moment the get was given; but in that case he is no longer her husband and cannot annul her vows. If, however, the vow was not annulled, then she ate a prohibited item, which cancels the divorce retroactively, so that he is indeed her husband and can annul it. To analyze this situation, we proceed in causal order and apply R. Shimon’s consistency principle at each stage.
At the first stage she divorces, and there is no impediment to that, for it is possible she will not eat any prohibited item in the coming month. Therefore, this act passes the consistency test. Next she vows, and of course that too takes effect, for she may vow and such a vow does not inherently neutralize itself. Next, the husband annuls it, and here the discussion begins. Does such an annulment fail to take effect? At this point he is not her husband, since the divorce took effect; hence the annulment has no meaning. Now she eats the loaf, and at this stage the loaf is prohibited. If so, the divorce now lapses retroactively. Crucially, this happens by virtue of an act and a condition. We did not need to invoke R. Shimon’s consistency principle (assumption 2). We now return to examine the husband’s annulment, and this time it turns out his annulment is valid, for he is her husband (the divorce lapsed). Now she eats the loaf, and it is permitted; consequently, the divorce should return and be established. But this is the stage at which the loop stops, for the divorce has already lapsed. A lapsed divorce cannot simply “re-establish” itself. For that to happen, the husband would have to give her a new get. Therefore, it seems that in such a case she remains the wife of the first husband.
Note that here we used only R. Shimon’s assumption 1, namely that such a chain of events should be treated as if they follow one another along the causal axis (as if there were a timeline), but we did not need to use the consistency principle at any stage. Every legal step taken here could have remained valid (depending on what she chooses to do—eat or not), and thus no step could be voided by the consistency principle as such. The reason is that here everything depends on a physical act (eating) and not on a legal status (betrothal or vow). When the matter depends on a legal status, we examine the validity of that status in light of the consistency principle. But eating a loaf is a physical act, and there is no room to say that it “does not take effect” due to the consistency principle. This is an example of a loop that can be resolved without R. Shimon’s consistency principle, relying only on his assumption 1.
We now come to the three loops from the previous column.
Application to the Three Halakhic Loops from the Previous Column
Our three loops are ostensibly similar to a logical, not a normative, paradox; thus, at first glance, the consistency principle would seem inapplicable. There is no legal effect entrusted to us such that we can decide whether it takes effect or not. Yet we must note that we are dealing with laws and not bare facts, and this allows us to formulate a principle similar to R. Shimon’s to stop such loops. In particular, nothing prevents us from assuming assumption 1 regarding them—i.e., to present the loops as if there were an internal temporal order between the stages, with the events arranged along it. Let us analyze the three examples.
In the Red Heifer loop, everything begins when a yoke is placed upon it with the owner’s consent. Now the heifer becomes invalid. But when it becomes invalid to the owner, that causes it to again become not pleasing to the owner, and therefore it becomes valid again, and so on. Here too, we arranged the events according to the internal causal order. One can say that the Ran stops the chain by noting that the owner’s pleasure cannot be voided, for that is a fact. What can be voided is the heifer’s invalidity or validity, because that is halakhah (a norm, not a fact, and therefore dependent on a halakhic decision rather than reality itself). The claim is that once the owner’s pleasure arose at the first stage, the heifer was invalidated. Halakhah fixes that legal state. Afterwards we no longer revisit the owner’s mindset, for that is already a factual state and we are at a stage where the owner’s mindset is fixed; therefore, the loop stops here. If at a later point the owner again becomes displeased, that occurs later on the (real) time axis, but the heifer has already been invalidated.
This analysis is similar to what we saw regarding R. Shimon’s consistency principle, but note that we are using only his assumption 1 (that the events have an internal temporal order along the causal axis). We did not use his consistency principle (assumption 2), since we are not dealing here with legal effects we ourselves generate, but with rules that the Torah sets. The consistency principle is not relevant to a halakhic status that is not the product of human legal action. Only because of the above analysis—which showed that at the foundation of R. Shimon’s method lies assumption 1 as well—could we apply these ideas to our case, which does not involve legal effects.
A similar analysis can be made for the pesik reisha loop according to the Arukh. A person performs a labor on Shabbat for another purpose (e.g., he drags a bench and makes a furrow, but this is done only in order to move the bench from place to place, not in order to furrow the ground). If it is a case where the furrow’s formation is inevitable (pesik reisha) and also pleasing to him (he needs the furrow in his yard), then he has desecrated Shabbat. But once there is Shabbat desecration, this becomes displeasing to him because he becomes liable to stoning, and according to the Arukh, pesik reisha de-lo nicha lei is exempt. Again, we have a chain that interweaves halakhic statuses with the person’s factual mental states. And again, we say that mental states are not in our hands, for they are facts. The halakhic status is a norm, and as such it is determined by halakhic judgment. Therefore, once it was pleasing to the person at the first stage, he is liable; even if that liability then renders it displeasing to him, his mental state at that stage is already fixed and not in our hands, and hence the loop stops there. Any change that occurs takes place later along the (real) time axis and can no longer alter the state already established.
However, regarding the migo example, it seems difficult to offer a similar analysis. True, there is a similarity to the previous cases, in that the claim that migo provides evidence is indeed a halakhic determination, whereas what the person thinks are facts. But if he truly thinks that one claim is worse than the other, then in practice there is evidence; it does not matter that the factual existence of evidence subsequently changes his mind. Here the important question is whether there is indeed evidence, and that is not a halakhic state subject to our determination. The question of whether there is evidence is a factual question, and factually it is hard to say there is evidence (perhaps there is a doubtful indication). Therefore, with respect to the migo case, it seems the question is a good one, and the answer that invokes the loop cannot work. In the previous column I pointed to various solutions to this difficulty.
[1] In particular, according to most of the Rishonim we do not say migo to extract money (migo le-hotzi lo amrinan), i.e., migo supports the claim of the one in possession. If so, even a doubtful migo could help him maintain possession.
[2] See about this in the fourth book of the Talmudic Logic series, ch. 13, and in greater detail in the fifth book of the same series, ch. 8.
[3] The same point is raised in Tosafot s.v. “hacha,” Gittin 84a; compare the Rashba there. See also in M.M. and in R. Ḥayyim on the Rambam, Hilkhot Gerushin 8:13.
[4] From the ordinary perspective, if she is not married to the first, then she is married to the third; and if she is married to the third, then she is married to the first (for she was not divorced from him). This odd combination can arise because her not being married to the third is not due to the condition or because she is married to the first. She is not married to the third because of R. Shimon’s consistency principle. It is simply an invalid legal act.
[5] An “if” relation can also be presented as directional. But here we are dealing with an “iff” relation, or with an “if” relation without direction. Proof: the second statement is related to the first in the same way. There is no precedence relation between them in any sense.
[6] One could of course replace in (b) and/or (c) the word “shaves” with “does not shave.”
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A. Cypresses from Mishner, you built all the boards for yourself, cedar from Lebanon, you took to make a column for us. Milli demizdbenan in Dinari!
B. In the red cow and the Risha pesik, if we do not need the halachic tips torah (which is an acceptable idea) and come to stopping loops, then perhaps we should simply say that they stop the loop to the homura. As in the inference from the homura, even though it is possible to the kol. And I remember, as I think, that the more agreed upon way among the achronim is that it is in the Torah of certainty (this is how the measure was given) and not in the Torah of doubt. Therefore, such an inference to the homura requires beatings, and does not join the doubt to the spicah, and its consequences to the kol are indeed condemned to the kol (for the issue of removal from the homura, one should look at the definition of the homura and the kol). And if this is the measure in the Torah, then we are discussing a kind of building father even for loops. What do you think?
C. Your explanation in R’ Shimon is very beautiful in my opinion and complete and strong and it would be a shame to undermine him, but what can I do and I understand the R”S in a slightly different way. What bothers me a little about your explanation is the reference to the causal axis as if it were a temporary axis. And the explanation I will offer seems simpler to me, although also weaker. And maybe I will talk about it later from the perspective of my understanding of Maimonides' wonderful point (I understand that he is saying something like that the causal axis is discussed in stages. But you understand the point differently).
In the Tosafot Begitin, there are a priori four possible situations: (1) an invalid divorce and married to another. (2) an existing divorce and married to another. (3) an invalid divorce and not married to another, (4) an existing divorce and not married to another. Well, situation 1 is not halachically correct to be married to two people. Situation 2 is not halachically correct to hold an existing divorce contrary to the conditions (it is impossible to accept the divorce for half-wives). There are 3-4 situations that are halachically correct before us (to choose whether to annul the get and annul the marriage or to uphold the get and annul the marriage). In both cases, she is not married to another person. Therefore, marriage to another person is out of the question and this is an act that is fundamentally forbidden. And such an act detracts from the sanctification that is not dedicated to the bride and is an act that is not dedicated to the sick. It remains to discuss whether a get exists or not, that is, whether it is situation 3 or situation 4. But since we concluded that she is not married to another person, there is no reason for the get to be annulled. Therefore, a get exists and she is not married to another person.
And this is exactly what happens in the other example of R’ Shimon there. The one who sells his daughter so that she will not be designated and a master comes and designates her, for Rabbi Meir a sale applies and a designation does not apply. Just as for the Tosafots a get applies and a marriage does not apply. Here too, a priori, there are four possible situations: (1) A void sale and a designation exists. (2) Existing sale and existing designation. (3) Existing sale and void designation. (4) Void sale and void designation. Well, situation 1 is not proper because designation does not belong without a sale. Situation 2 is not halachically proper, as an existing sale is held contrary to its terms (it is impossible to accept the sale to the half-wit). There are 3-4 halachically proper situations left before us (choosing whether to cancel the sale and cancel the designation or to uphold the sale and cancel the designation) and in both cases the designation is not intended for the master. Therefore, the designation is essentially null and void because it is an act that was not conveyed to the master (perhaps we can also look at this as a ‘simplification’ of the constraints). And now that the designation is void, there is no reason for the sale to be canceled. Therefore, the sale exists and is not intended for the master. [And according to your understanding, a sale exists because at the time of sale it was delivered to the husband if the master did not designate, and the designation does not apply because at the time of designation it was not delivered to the husband, since designation after sale nullifies the sale and thus the designation.]
We have thereby achieved the breaking of the symmetry between get and marriage – the breaking is that for get there is a halakhically correct situation in which the get is not nullified (this is like your explanation). And there is no need to resort to the order of time on the axis of causality or the actual order of time, meaning that the fact that the acts of get or sale came into the world before marriage or designation and seem to follow some order is of no importance.
To tell the truth, this is a business that confuses me. The proposed explanation is a question of whether I have not missed a fundamental flaw (which forces us to reach your explanation, or which itself is also at the foundation of “my explanation”). And if I am right in R”S, then your more complex explanation in R”S is an original addition of yours.
[By the way, in R”S, too, they come to a correct and consistent conclusion without discussing the exact process. But that is beyond the scope of this article, because it is known that the donor who threw a deed of ownership into the yard did not himself acquire it. In any case, there is a similarity].
D. The difference between your explanation in R”S and the explanation I proposed is the continuation of your words, which only goes according to your method (how surprising). In the paradox of the get and the convert, you resolve that the get is invalid and the Jew is not converted (and the get is invalid ‘without reason’), even though there is an internal contradiction in this, because if the Jew is not converted, why is the get invalid, even though it was written by a kosher Jew? In the paradox of the woman and the square, you resolve that the get is invalid and the vow was not broken (and the violation does not violate ‘without a reason’), even though there is an internal contradiction in this, that if the get is invalid why was the vow not broken even though it was broken by a faithful husband.
But according to Mishkan, in section C there is no solution to these paradoxes. In both of these, unlike the case of additions to the get and the designation of the mother-in-law, there is no consistent situation (and I hope I didn't miss anything here) so that we are not required to choose one of several possible consistent situations, but rather are faced with a broken trough and a heavy stone according to the well. Therefore, these two are paradoxes that have no solution. There is no reason to think that the halakha is a consistent system. If there is no solution, then we probably need, as you suggested in a few words, to discuss “doubtful law”.
E. Regarding the assumption that Halacha is a consistent system, it seems that the relationship between revelation and creation in Halacha should be discussed. In my opinion, even if everything is revelation, there is still no reason to think that it is a consistent system, because in the end, one reaches a practical decision with meta rules (like the law of doubt). Moreover, I am also not entirely sure that a monistic view of Halacha means that everything is revelation (but in this I only have reflections that are far from being formalized). I do not know the full extent of your approach regarding revelation and creation in Halacha and its connection to monism, and if there is a reference, I would be happy to read it. The easiest thing to say is that all the correct things in Halacha – whether they have a halachic implication or not – are a revelation of the monistic truth that was in the mind of the Almighty at the time of the giving of the Torah. And that is really how I thought I once understood your words. But I am not sure that is what you are saying, so I ask if you could clarify.
From the top of Nir and Hermon I will utter words, to the owner of Debbi, who builds dens for lions and mountains for leopards.
B. You assume that there are laws of spikit here, and then perhaps there is room to go to the homrah (certainly). But even though I commented so in the column, in fact I am not at all sure that the laws of spikit are relevant to a situation where the two directions are mixed, the tail of one in the mouth of the other. Beyond that, the measure in the Torah to tap the homrah was stated only in the Torah commentary. And there it is indeed in the category of certain. And the logic is that the Torah itself must have understood that there are two directions here and assumed that we would go to the homrah, and since it left this in doubt and did not clarify it, it is a sign that it indeed intended that we would go to the homrah. I remember that something like this was written in Barach in the name of R. H. Barish B. K. on the Iron Horns. But here we are not dealing with the rules of Torah interpretation and there is no reason to believe that this would be in the category of certain. And let us not judge a person on the basis of such doubt.
C-D. Your suggestion is interesting, but in the language of the Rabbi it seems that he simply meant what I said. After all, according to you, this is a calculation made between the possibilities. You claim that marriage to a third party cannot apply because they create an inconsistent situation between the possibilities. But he speaks of a halachah that nullifies itself cannot apply, and that is exactly like my explanation.
Beyond that, you speak of the possibility that a sale exists and a designation is void, but assuming that he made a designation and the sale exists, the claim that the designation is void is also a contradiction. If a person does an act of designation, the act exists unless there is a reason that nullifies it. Of necessity, you have to get to the essence of the halachah that nullifies itself.
E. Whether the halakha is a consistent system depends on the question of what is meant by “halachah”. The collection of halakhic rules that I myself rule (or am supposed to rule when it reaches me) should be consistent, otherwise you have not left a son to our forefather Abraham. Any ruling you make can be in your halakhic. It is possible to deduce everything. And the laws of spikot do not touch this question in any way. If I have a doubt between X and Y, and the laws of spikot instruct me to do X, but it contradicts another halakhic rule of mine, then there is simply no doubt here. If X contradicts any other halakhic rule or rule, then there is no such side in the doubt and we have decided that the halakhic rule is Y.
My monism means that there is a certain intention of God (at the time of giving the Torah or in general). This does not have to be the case in every halakhic question, but it is present in some of the questions (not everything goes), and in my opinion in the vast majority. Therefore, halakhic law is fundamentally a revelation and not a creation. Of course, this does not mean that the revelation is always right and hits the original intention. But why is this related to the consistency of halakhic law?
By the way, I already wrote here once that the idea that everything can be deduced from something hidden (the principle of explosion) can also be found in the Torah: “The opposite of it and the opposite of it are contained within it.” In other words, if something contains two opposites, then it contains everything. But here we do not hold two contradictory principles, but rather are in a paradoxical situation that the halakha does not know how to resolve. From this, it is impossible to deduce everything, at least to the best of my understanding.
Your words in the second message repeat what I wrote about why I am not sure that the law of sufficiency can be applied here. But I explained why it is a contradiction. The contradiction is not between the two sides of the paradox (after all, the truth value of a paradox is ‘false’, and here the claim has no truth value at all), but between the decision you propose and another law that contradicts it.
C. You can revoke any halachah you want. You can also, in principle, revoke the get. But situations 1-2 are an internal contradiction in what we have decided. Not because of the past but because of the present. Canceling the get and maintaining the marriage brings us to a contradictory halakhic situation of being the wife of two people. Maintaining the get and maintaining the marriage brings us to accept a get and the condition that cancels it. In situations 3-4 there is no internal contradiction because we are permitted to revoke (the get and the marriage or just the marriage) and then we reach a stable situation.
To choose between 3 and 4, we need the principle of R’ Shimon. He says that after judging the situations, we simplify according to components. And because in the end the marriage cannot take place, we decide that the marriage does not take place, and then we can choose between 3-4 the option that the get exists.
Therefore, the principle that is expressed in the words of R’ Shimon on the issue of halacha that does not apply is of course a necessary element. Only the component that is not written in R. Shimon and was born from your analysis – the issue of analysis according to times – which can be avoided.
I really enjoyed this column and did not come to argue about the idea itself (I am still preoccupied with thoughts about it). It is only because Dr. Sh–sh thinks that he meant something less complex.
E. In matters where halacha is a creation, then it is clear that there is no reason to assume a priori that it is consistent. They invented a system and there is no consistency in it that is inescapable. What is the reason to think that halacha is consistent if not from the assumption of revelation? The argument that holding to an inconsistent system will not leave a son to Abraham our father is pragmatism.
C. I disagree. The Rabbi explicitly says that this is a halakhah that if it is halakhah then it is not halakhah (=uprooted). In your opinion, there is no process of halakhah and then uprooting here, but rather a logical calculation that says that this halakhah is inconsistent and therefore cannot be halakhah. Therefore, in my opinion, his words imply that the Hadith is a causal-temporal process as I described.
E. The argument is not pragmatic but substantive. I proved in the previous message that this cannot be, after all, if there is a contradiction in your system, then one of your rulings is rejected by virtue of proof and this is not your halakhah. You cannot create halakhah X if in the rest of the rulings you advocate there is a halakhah “not X” that contradicts it. This is evidence against your ruling. If you mean that this is a free creation that is not subject to anything, then there is no halakha at all, and here you have left no son for Abraham our father (if there is no halakha, there is no one who observes the halakha. Alternatively, everyone observes it, including the Hindus and Shintos).
I am glad that you enjoy it, although it seems, as always in such columns, that you are almost the only one in this (he is a devout person). But I write columns for quality, not quantity, and I will uphold in my soul the teaching of the Rema”a not to be dried up by the mockers… 🙂
C. This is not just logical calculation. Because there is a rule here that after logical judgment of entire situations, components can be isolated. Logical calculation does not know how to separate situation 3 from situation 4. This rule is reiterated by Rabbi Shimon: “A thing that has no reality for a case does not apply at all.”
Do you mean to agree that the idea itself is a matter of interpretation and that we are only discussing Rabbi Shimon’s interpretation? Or is there also a flaw in the idea.
You jump to the last sentence and ignore the first. Reminds me of his language:
Because of these danshou, it is impossible for them to apply, and if they do, they will be annulled retroactively due to the condition. And something that does not exist to apply does not apply at all, and because of the fact that the divorce exists and the marriages are invalid.
The idea seems to me to be certainly reasonable and possible. But in the language of the R”sh, I think what I wrote is more correct.
Maybe you know of other places that are dealing with this idea? I don't have a way to search.
I don't remember such a place.
Suddenly, my memory struck me. You already explained this understanding to me once in a chapter, that I did not understand in his words why the get does not cancel itself (as you argued here in the column) and you gave me the gist of the explanation here that the get is treated as prior to marriage and it is possible that it will be valid and the marriage begins the self-termination. And you also explained there that the reason that a halal that terminates itself does not apply is because self-referencing is illegal (for some reason this was not emphasized here in this column. Here the emphasis is different, that an act that is not communicated to the halal in any way is then an invalid act, and the normative system does not establish it just to create problems for us). And I also tried to bring up the wonderful point there and also explained there that there is no connection. And this happened in a thread that started with the paradoxes of the cow and the horse. Everything is the same. Illusionary.
In any case, I mention this because it turns out that there is a link to another source in the words of the R”S, and it is in the Chiddushim for Kiddushin, section 21
https://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=40915&st=&pgnum=137.
There the subject is one who gave a slave a portion so that his master would not have permission to use it. According to Rabbi Meir A”A, the slave bought it and his master did not buy it, and therefore the condition is null and void and the ownership to his master exists. According to the R”S, the slave bought it and the master did not buy it (and in this case the slave was redeemed). And the R”S explained according to the rabbis that from a portion there is no benefit to the master because if he does, then the gift is essentially null and void and he did not earn it, and therefore there is no benefit to the master, but the slave does buy it and they only cancel the ownership rights of the master.
But we need to clarify the opinion of Rabbi Meir here. In the case of a person selling his house so that there is no designation in it and a master comes and designates it, Rabbi Meir said (Kiddushin 19: quoted in the commentary by R. Ranach, cited in the column) that the sale exists and the designation is void. Whereas in the case of a person giving a slave so that his rabbi does not have authority over him, Rabbi Meir says (Kiddushin 23: cited in the Chiddushei of Rabbi Meir above) that the gift exists and the condition is void and the master is entitled. And what is the meaning of this matter? Why doesn't Rabbi Meir say that because of the condition, it is impossible for there to be a right to the master because it uproots itself, and therefore the gift exists and the condition exists and the master's right is void. Seemingly, this is a serious contradiction in related issues. And if Rabbi Meir Meir explains this sale and assignment only because of the local sermon there, so why did the Rabbi bother to explain in it the principle that a self-defeating lease is invalid.
Perhaps there is a difference between the property of the master and the designation of the master. The property of the master is in the nature of the property of the slave, and the property of the slave did not have the right to exist without the property of the master, therefore it is impossible to own a slave without the property of the master, and it is a condition for what is written in the Torah, and its contract is void. But the designation of the master is not in the nature of the seller of the daughter, and the seller of the daughter had the right to exist without designation to the master (only with an option to designate), and in this, according to Rabbi Meir, it is not a condition for what is written in the Torah, and therefore its contract exists, but the designation of the master from the owner does not apply because it cancels itself, whereas the sale of the daughter can apply, and therefore the sale of the daughter is valid and the designation is void. And according to the Rabbis, the property of the master is also condemned like the master's designation and is something separate in nature from the property of the slave, and therefore the property of the master is void (according to the R”sh's explanation, since he uproots himself) but the property of the slave is not.
If you have another excuse, I would love to hear it.
I don't have time to go into it now, and I'm not sure I understood what you meant. Two possibilities come to mind, and perhaps you meant one of them (there are expressions in your language that tend to indicate either of them).
1. It should be discussed whether the condition in the designation is that he will not have a designation in it (the condition on what is written in the Torah) or so that the master will not designate it (the condition on the master). The second condition is not a gift in the Torah. This is a logical distinction regarding the connection between the condition and the fact.
The transfer to the master is by the very law of giving to a slave, but the designation is only a permission and is not a consequence of the sale of the daughter. This is of course a continuation of the perception that here the condition was on the master and not on the Torah, because if this is the condition on the Torah (that is, on the possibility of designation) then it is the same thing.
2. But it is possible, according to my way of speaking of R”sh, a distinction that speaks of the time gap and not the logical connection. In a designation, the designation comes after the sale, and therefore the sale must be valid because it is not disestablished by the fact of its making. But in a sale in order that the Rabbi may not have permission, this is a sale that cannot be valid from the time it is made.
Thank you. (I tried to say 2)
I also enjoy it very much, but I don't have Sandomilov's wisdom to comment and ask questions like him. Thanks for the great column.
Taking a screenshot and sending it to mom 🙂
Although I think I've just gotten used to understanding (or trying to understand) what Rabbi Michi says, so that things in his form of processing and simplification really "fit" in with me. Rabbi Zvin also had a knack for writing simply and clearly (except that Rabbi Zvin usually simplified the ideas of others).
Take a picture of this too and send it to my mom. 🙂
You said that even within a legal reason and a legal cause, we discuss as if they were one after the other and not all at once. The idea itself is interesting and there is no ri'utah in it (only that it is a meta-legal innovation). I want to present a parallel to it for assistance, and it is from the words of the Maimonides on the wonderful point. And although I remember that you study the wonderful point differently from the Maimonides, I think it can also be understood in the way I will suggest.
Meat in milk is forbidden in enjoyment (and especially in eating). Boiled milk is permitted in enjoyment and forbidden in eating. Fatty milk cooked in runny milk remains permitted in enjoyment. And the prohibition of meat in milk does not apply to the prohibition of fatty milk, even though meat in milk apparently adds a prohibition of enjoyment to fatty milk. Why?
Maimonides' words: “And the answer to the fact that meat in milk is forbidden in enjoyment is because the scripture forbade it in eating, just as we said earlier that every prohibition of eating is forbidden in enjoyment until the scripture details it for you. And it is not written there that it is forbidden to eat it and it is written that it is forbidden to enjoy it, only the two matters together are the prohibition of meat in milk. Therefore, when we say that there is no prohibition that applies to a prohibition, the prohibition of meat in milk will not apply to the prohibition of carrion, and it was not forbidden in enjoyment. (I copied from the Sefaria and slightly corrected it.)
And I understand it this way: In meat in milk there is a prohibition of eating, and from that comes the prohibition of enjoyment, because that is the rule in the Torah. This is causal causation for everything. We can now look at the legal consequence that meat in milk is forbidden in enjoyment (and eating), and we can continue to remember that there is a logical structure here in the foundation, and it is a causal structure that the prohibition of eating meat in milk causes the prohibition of enjoyment of meat in milk. Then the Rambam says that meat in milk begins with the prohibition of eating only, and if this prohibition of eating applies, then it causes the prohibition of enjoyment. But if the prohibition of eating does not apply, it does not cause the prohibition of enjoyment. Therefore, in cooking fatty milk with runny milk, the prohibition of meat in milk comes and with it only the prohibition of eating, and this does not apply because no prohibition applies to a prohibition, and therefore the prohibition of enjoying meat in milk that stems from the prohibition of eating cannot apply.
In my opinion, this is identical to your idea in that even within legal causes and consequences, we still remember the logical structure and treat it as if it comes one after the other, and not as if the result is already laid out before us.
By the way, it seems to me that the phrase "a wonderful point" does not mean a beautiful point but a vanishing point ("a matter that deceives everyone", meaning wonderful and far from the eyes of many who did not know it). This is also a translation phrase and we need to find out if Maimonides writes something like this in Hebrew as well.
That's how I learned his words (although they should be read in light of what he said in Leo Kig and others, etc.).
Regarding the question of whether this is parallel to my idea regarding R. Shkop, I'm not sure. In the absence of the cause, there would be no revolver. There's no need here for the innovation of seeing it as an internal timeline. I think everyone agrees on this.
Incidentally, Greek philosophers already insisted that there is no time difference between the cause and the revolver, otherwise there would have been a moment when the cause was there and the revolver was not (this needs to be peppered with, of course). Therefore, according to their view, the claim that in the absence of a cause, there is no revolver is already some kind of fictitious timeline. I don't see anything special about the wonderful point. In my opinion, the wonderful point is not the innovation that in the absence of a cause, there is no revolver (which, as mentioned, is simple), but that it is indeed the relationship between the prohibition of eating and pleasure (a relationship of cause and revolver, not two parallel prohibitions).
Regarding your linguistic comment, I don't see a difference between the two possibilities. An idea is wonderful where others have not thought of it or are mistaken about it. A wonder is a statement in the mouth, a revelation. Wonderful is hidden and unknown. According to the way of the sacred language, in some things two opposites receive the same root (You are much more knowledgeable about these matters than I am).
Without an internal timeline, I don't understand Maimonides. There is a prohibition on pleasure in meat and milk, and this adds to the prohibition on eating milk. What difference does it make that this prohibition on pleasure was originally caused by a prohibition on eating. Only if we continue to maintain order, then we first discuss the prohibition on eating alone.
By the way, if the idea of a timeline is truly renewed in the wonderful point as a logical consequence, then it is truly an idea that many people find wonderful until you found it in the R”sh.
Well, actually I didn't add anything.
It is not in its ancient origin, but the specific prohibition of enjoyment on this object is caused by the prohibition of eating that applies to it. This is not about where the general prohibition of enjoyment from aral or chametz is learned from, but how the prohibition of enjoyment was created and applied to this specific object. This is the very innovation of the Maimonides that there is a causal relationship, the prohibition of eating was created and from it the prohibition of enjoyment. The fact that without a cause there is no rotation is a simple idea as stated and does not imply an assumption about a fictitious internal timeline. In any case, in my opinion, this is also the wonderfulness of his point.
Now I understand.
I also enjoy topics like this, but here they write at too high a level of language. They need to simplify things more for intellectually weak people like us, especially in the debate between the responses.
This section is repeated because of a matter that was obscured.
A. In the paradox of the get and the convert, you resolved that the get is invalid and the Jew is not converted, because the kashrut of the get cancels itself and therefore does not apply.
When does the get become kosher and when does the Jew become a convert? Ostensibly, it is at the same moment, as soon as he makes the entire get kosher, then he commits a correction and becomes a convert. Both results occur at the same moment, but the kashrut of the get logically precedes the conversions. In such a situation, it is ostensibly simple to say that the get is kosher from here to here and the Jew is a convert from here to here. Because at the moment before the kashrut of the get, the Jewish person was a kosher Jew, and the correction of the get produces two separate results (the kashrut of the get and the disqualification of the Jew).
And even if this is not true and the paradox remains, I would expect, based on your words, the solution that the get is kosher and the Jew is kosher, because the kashrut of the get logically precedes the disqualification of the Jew, and therefore the disqualification of the Jew is the later one that cancels itself. Although here the kashrut of the get is worse than the ’get so that you don't marry someone’, because in a get in order there was a chance at the moment of giving that the get would be truly valid, whereas in a get here that was amended for its sake, its kashrut *immediately* cancels itself and is the first in the chain to uproot itself, but still according to your words why wasn't it said that the get is valid and the Jewish invalidity is not. The truth is that I think I understood what you mean, but Solomon gave the Torah on the mountain and not in the valley, to inform us that everything should be clear and not deep.
B. What do we do if the halakha sets two principles and they lead in a certain scenario to a contradiction and we have no idea how to resolve it. Let's say we know that the R”sh's idea is incorrect. What do we do? Does this mean that we were wrong about at least one of the two principles? From your words I understood that it was. And I think that apparently not.
If the contradiction is revealed in a particular case, then all that happened is that in this case we don't know what to do and need a voiceover or something. As far as I'm concerned, Shabbos Kol will say like Alexander the Great to kill all the troublemakers and their property will be dedicated to the house inspection. There are always possible solutions in the canon and the problem is that we just don't know what the solution is in practice.
It is agreed that in a contradiction in principle it is impossible to hold. If we believe that carnal pleasure is permitted and carnal pleasure is forbidden then it is meaningless, and anything can be deduced from it. But in a casual contradiction it is possible to hold, and those who hold that simply don't know what the halacha is in this case. That is, they don't know what the law of the get is and what the Jewish law that wrote it is can be deduced from it. And it is impossible to deduce ‘anything’ because we don't hold a contradiction in practice, but from the contradiction it is revealed that in this case there is a new law that unfortunately was not revealed to us. Apparently it was forgotten during the days of mourning for Moses and Othniel ben Kenaz was unable to restore this new law.
A. It is difficult for me to go into the whole matter again now. Makofia says that there is no obstacle to retroactively changing a situation that has already arisen. This is not a consideration. The question is at each stage whether this stage stands on its own two feet or cancels itself out regardless of what happens next. A stage that cancels itself out will not apply and the situation will be frozen in this.
B. You present here the distinction that I have made more than once between contradiction and conflict (which you call here ‘accidental contradiction’. Not a good name). Contradiction is a logical matter, conflict is a practical problem. It is indeed possible to hold on to two principles that lead to conflict, even if you do not know what to do there in practice. On the other hand, contradiction cancels the system. For example, Pikuach Nefesh and Shabbat can lead to conflict in a certain situation (which in principle can never happen). Even if we did not have a practical solution, there is no reason here to give up either of these two principles. The problem is only that I do not know what to do, and that is it.
This is exactly the solution I proposed for the contradictions between Halacha and morality. I argued that this is a conflict, not a contradiction.
B. You are right. Now, is there a priori reason to think that there is a mechanism in halakha for resolving every conflict?
These are intra-halakhic conflicts, of course. (I am trying to say that there is no motivation in principle to find a mechanism for resolving all halakhic paradoxes. And anyone who believes that there is no such mechanism is not in a tight spot.)
That is, is it a kuriya/computational? I see no need for it. Even on a banal level (for example, for the consecration of a woman): when a woman is consecrated, provided that there is a Turing machine that checks whether every Turing machine stops. After all, the halakha refers to reality, and if reality is not a kuriya, then so is the halakha. But there may be a lack of kuriya even in the halakha itself. For example, you have two actions (or dislikes) where one is fulfilled in a ko”a (like eating matzah) and the other is canceled in a ko”a (like keeping Shabbat). Let's assume for the sake of discussion that they have the same halakhic force and the conflict between them is simultaneous. What do you do in such a situation? Who rejects whom? Here, there is no priority for anyone, and the rule that it is better not to apply, and of course, neither are the rules of doubt.
I was just thinking about matzah that is in the refrigerator and I am sitting in the refrigerator on Passover, which falls on Shabbat. What does it mean to take my mouth out of the refrigerator and eat it and put it into my stomach that is sitting in the refrigerator? Let's assume that there is no lav on Shabbat, only an act, and the act is similar in strength to the act of eating matzah (cutting and stoning on Shabbat are lav). What do we do?
Perhaps a lottery could be held between equal options and then the law might indeed be a kneeling order. But that is artificial, of course.
A1. How is it possible to have an example of halakhic indeterminacy as a result of reality? Reality is always indeterminacy. It is known that there is no machine that determines the stopping of any machine, and therefore the Temple is not sanctified under this condition. And if something does not depend on a particular system (i.e., it and its negation are consistent with the system), then the truth is that it does not depend. Therefore, it is an ordinary realistic doubt. Or I did not understand.
A2. Suppose we do not know what the ruling is on electricity on Shabbat or whether a person is an animal or a beast. Could this be an example of indeterminacy? Apparently not. If we do not think of a side to prohibit, then it is permissible. If we think of sides here and there and the posk does not know how to decide, then he is discussing the laws of spikot.
B. In the case where you drew a lack of indeterminacy within halakhic, we can say that a person can choose what to do and everything is fine. Just as if a person sees a loss to his right and left and can only return one, then he can simply arbitrarily choose which loss to return. What is the similarity to a paradoxical problem in which all decisions are bad?
Again, I understand that this is actually what you proposed with the lottery. But in another matter I expressed my opinion that where it is possible to draw lots, then it is also possible to choose without a lottery. In Siamese twins, you said that there should be equality in granting the chance to live. There too, I think that it is possible to choose arbitrarily (without a lottery), but why also in the halakhic case here do I demand a lottery and not allow an arbitrary choice. Whose rights are being violated here?
C. In any case, a new innovation in your words is that there is no a priori reason to think that the law has anything to offer in the area of resolving halakhic paradoxes (or conflicts), in other words, it would be nice to find one, but it is not guaranteed to exist.
It is not true that reality is decisive. There is only one reality, but the decision about it is our decision. We do not necessarily know everything about reality and perhaps cannot determine everything.
I was wrong about the stopping problem, but the principle remains. There are non-decisive questions (such as the consistency of a system), and if someone consecrates a woman on this condition, there is a halakhic question here that is not decisive.
Ignorance is not non-decision. It may turn out to be a fundamental non-decision, but this requires proof.
The moment you allow for a lottery or an arbitrary choice, then everything is decisive, of course. But as mentioned, it is artificial.
Indeed, in my opinion, it is not necessary for the halakhic law to be decisive. On the contrary, it seems reasonable to me that it is not.
I don't understand what a question is that is not a fundamental question. Either the system is consistent or it is not. And for every question, either only it or its negation is consistent with the system or both. What is there besides ignorance?
That's exactly what I answered you. You said that reality is a suffrage, and I argued that suffrage concerns epistemology and not ontology, that is, my understanding of reality and not reality itself.
But when it's not about physical reality but about norms, it's possible that the norm is not defined on its own, and not just that I don't know it. This is a non-suffrage of the law on its own. I also added that if you add the possibility of drawing lots (or choosing arbitrarily) in any situation that is not suffrage, then you empty the question of its content, because in this sense it is clear that the law is a suffrage by definition. Like Buridan's donkey with the possibility of drawing lots.
I understood.
A bargain came to me, how could I miss it? In the column, a paradox of the Manch appears regarding the matter of transgressing the letters of a divorce on Shabbat for its own sake. What is the law of the divorce and what is the law of the Jew who writes it? For if the divorce was made kosher by this writing, then the Jew transgressed a correction and is a convert. And a converted Jew who writes a divorce, then the divorce is not kosher. It is found that the transgression of the divorce leads to his disqualification, since it disqualifies the writer, and in any case the divorce is invalid. From the disqualification of the divorce, it follows that the Jew did not correct it and is not a convert, and therefore the divorce must be kosher. [And you solve according to your explanation in the book that the transgression of the divorce precedes and cannot apply, and therefore the divorce remains invalid and the Jew is kosher].
Above, I was puzzled because during the entire time of writing until the moment of the transgression of the divorce, the Jew did not transgress anything, since he did not write any letter (but transgressed an existing letter) and did not correct any divorce, since he must complete the required writing. And after he did everything required to fix the get, here he acted in this in one act that both fixed the get and became a convert, meaning that from now on the get is kosher and the Jew is invalid, and up to this point the get was invalid and the Jew is kosher. This is a normal action with two consequences and they apply together immediately to the end of the action and even though they do not occur one after the other at once, they exist since each matter is completely distinct to itself. And the paradox has blossomed.
Now I saw Mishnah Hulin 1:1 that a person who slaughters on Shabbat (accidentally) slaughters his slaughtering is kosher. And there in the commentary of the Mishnah: “And perhaps you will say, and why would not slaughtering intentionally on Shabbat be kosher, since he does not desecrate Shabbat and his slaughtering is not invalid until after the slaughtering is complete, if he slaughters later, then a second slaughter is forbidden. Know that if he begins to make a cut in the neck of the animal, he desecrates Shabbat before he slaughters anything from the esophagus and throat. And if you want to explain more than that, you can say that when he slaughters some of the signs before the slaughter is finished, he violates Shabbat, and when the slaughter is finished, he is invalid.
And according to this explanation, it follows that if one takes a clean piece of paper and writes a get for her sake, then certainly with the first word or before, he becomes a convert, and whatever he writes again is not a get for her sake, but one who repeats the letters of a get for her sake, then since the thing is kosher and the man is invalid, they come together, then indeed they will stand together, and no one will push his brother, a man will walk in his path, and for the sake of the man, they will fall, they will not perform it.
It is possible, but I think there is a difference. In slaughter, the act ends at the end and the offense comes first. But in committing a written divorce, what is considered is the offense, not the act. The meaning of the act is accepted at the end, but the act itself is a forbidden act throughout. When the result is accepted, it is revealed retroactively that what was written all along.
I didn't get to the bottom of your point. Can you explain further? (And maybe it's from a slaughterhouse that's old from start to finish).
When you go over a script in a get, you write from the beginning. However, this fact is only revealed at the end, when it becomes clear that all you did was writing. The argument is that the act of writing does not occur in the result that there is a kosher get, but in the action. Writing is the making of letters and not the making of a get. It is true that only when the get becomes kosher does it become clear that everything you did in the past was an act of writing, and it is still done from the beginning. Therefore, in my opinion, it is not necessarily true that writing is done only at the final moment, as you assumed in your analogy.
It is necessary to discuss whether this is a retroactive Iglai Milta or a retroactive Iglai Milta from now on.
But it passes because of a correction and not because of a writer. Throughout the writing, he made corrections, and in the last correction they join the correction of the get, and then it passes because of a correction. I fail to understand how this is different from a slaughter that slaughters and continues from beginning to end, which reaches most of the signs, and if it were not for the fact that he was violating Shabbat from the beginning, the Maimonides said that an ox that is slaughtered is kosher, and a person is invalid from this point on. What is the ruling on your words if he began before Shabbat with the correction of the get or with the slaughter and only had something left when Shabbat began, and then he completed it during Shabbat.
What's the matter? The offense in question is writing and not repairing. There is no father of repairing. It may be a blow with a hammer. But in my opinion, a blow with a hammer does not belong in a gett. This is not the training of an instrument for action.
If he completed on Shabbat, he wrote both on the Sabbath and on Shabbat. He is only liable for the part he wrote on Shabbat.
Ah. You say that in the completed writing he becomes a retroactive convert after the first two letters because he writes. But in the completed slaughtering, he does not become a retroactive convert by cutting the first sign, for example, because this is not a work but only when he takes out a soul and prepares the animal for eating [the completion of the slaughtering and the desecration of Shabbat are at once]. Therefore, in the slaughtering, the two results (the ox’s permission and the Jewish conversion) apply from here on out, but in the gett, we run into a paradox in that if the gett is corrected, then the Jew is considered a convert even before the entire writing is completed, and therefore the gett is not corrected. Now I understand and accept, thank you.
And according to this, it apparently follows that if he only has two letters left to write for Lishma and he wrote them on Shabbat, then indeed it is like the Maimonides’ question in the slaughtering and the law from here on out, the gett is kosher and the Jew is converted without a paradox. And the paradox exists in the writer on top of four letters for Lishma.
Possibly. By the way, I think three letters are enough.
I just opened the Shabbat garage there and it turns out that I went through a bunch of writings because I already brought an interesting name that slaughters on Shabbat (immediately after the passage quoted in the column. https://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=14093&st=&pgnum=110&hilite=).
However, he did not bring the words of the Mishnah commentary. And he wrote there that according to the Tosafot in Holin, one time one did not become a convert, and therefore if one wrote only the first letters of the name, then he desecrated the Sabbath, and even so, one is not a convert and the get is kosher.
That is, according to the Manach, if one time one did become a convert, then even if one wrote only the last letters of the name, then there is a paradox. And apparently according to the above and the words of the Mishnah, it turns out that this is not the case, but that one writes only the first letters of the name, There is no paradox at all in the letters themselves, and the two results are born together from the cause. Only in the four (or three) letters is there a paradox.
By the way, I was just thinking, is a minor who wrote one letter on Shabbat and increased and wrote a second letter liable to stoning? Besides the fact that you mentioned that a minor who fasted on Yom Kippur and increased and ate is liable to stoning because fasting is a pre-halachic concept (that's how I understood it anyway), then it would be fair to say that even writing a second letter separately would pass because there is writing here. And if he ate half and increased and ate another half of the Shaviah shiur, it seems even simpler that he is liable to the blessing of food from the Torah. And if he slaughtered one sign and increased and slaughtered a second sign, perhaps he is not slaughtering, since this is only a halachic concept. It seems to me that this can be developed much further.
And if the person stuck a piece of paper and it increased and did not decrease, it seems that he is simply exempt.
Only in the things you defined as I explained, meaning that the requirement is conceptual and not halakhic. Therefore, the entire connection from those you raised, to its substance.
Sure. But can you give a non-binding opinion to the rabbinic priest what the ruling is in the above examples:
He increased and wrote a second letter on Shabbat
He increased and completed eating to satisfy the blessing of food
He increased and completed slaughtering (in slaughtering I thought the requirement was halakhic and not conceptual)
He increased and completed eating as if it were an olive for eating prohibitions
He removed on Shabbat the increase and took it out to another authority
Two letters is a writing lesson, and therefore I think that only two letters are writing, and not that the second letter reveals that the first was already writing. Therefore, here it is quite clear that he will be exempt. He did not write two letters in the affirmative.
In eating, my tendency is that he must recite a blessing, because now he is full as an adult following eating. In other words: eating requires a blessing, but as a minor he is exempt from blessing. But when he is an adult he is obligated to recite a blessing also for his eating as a minor. According to this, even if he ate everything when he was a minor and he became an adult just when he finished, he must recite a blessing (if there is a time gap, then perhaps it already depends on the law of delay in the commandments. See Genesis, Chapter 11, Chapter 12, Chapter 13).
In slaughter, I agree that it is not slaughtered. One of the signs is made by someone who is not bar haivu.
Here too, it seems to me that he is exempt. When he was an adult, he ate less than a shiur. And the explanation of the latter on the prohibition of Chas Shazvi for the istropi, meaning that in any thing there is quality of eating but only a lack of quantity.
Exemption as above. Although this must be dependent on the disagreements of the Rishonim in understanding the expenditure on Shabbat. If the main thing is the transfer and assumption, and the displacement is only a condition, there may be a place to impose.
thanks
Hey, I don't know what the procedure is here regarding responses to old posts, but I'll try my luck anyway.
In the post you wrote that when a woman divorces a certain person after her husband made their divorce conditional on her not marrying a certain person, then the marriage with a certain person did not take place because of the principle of consistency. You added that it can be said that the marriage did not take place because marriage is a normative thing and not a fact.
Then you discussed a case in which a man divorces his wife on the condition that she not commit a sin, she swears not to eat bread, then the husband cancels the condition and the wife eats bread. You argued that the loop ends with the two being married without the need for the principle of consistency because eating bread (as opposed to marriage) is not a normative thing but a fact.
My question is why do you treat eating bread as a fact and not as breaking a vow (which is indeed a normative thing)? Just as in the first case the woman put a ring on her finger (fact) but this was not considered marriage (normative), here too the woman ate bread (fact), but this was not considered breaking a vow (normative). Why is there no need for consistency in this case to stop the loop? After all, if the divorce was reinstated due to eating the bread (and breaking the vow), then the bread she ate did not really cancel the divorce (it was just eating bread). How is this different from the first example?
Thank you very much!
A vow is indeed binding, but breaking a vow is not binding but a physical action (which has a halakhic meaning). If the vow is binding and the woman breaks it, she has broken the vow. There is nothing to enforce or annul here. Note that the problem is not the actual binding of the vow, but the breaking of it.