Talmudic logic

1. It is clear that any demand for conduct according to the laws of logic is trivial, but raising awareness of this in the field of halacha has a new and refreshing approach, and also enormous benefit, in light of the blessed number of young men and women who are engaged in Torah study, and all their conduct is indeed according to the laws of logic – but not consciously – and therefore many errors usually arise among them, along with a lack of exhaustion of the material being studied, and they would be avoided, if the learners were familiar with and aware of the laws of logic. (I would send you a large selection of examples of logical errors also from famous rabbis and judges, but I trust that you are familiar with the phenomenon).

2. Moreover, I am confident that if you do a small experiment and go around among new and experienced learners, who are engaged in studying some issue in the Gemara, and ask them how to study, what they are ‘looking for’ In studying them and what their purpose is, you will be surprised to discover that you will have difficulty finding an organized work plan like the one I presented (recognition that the arguments of halakhah in their original form, not only do not appear in their final and precise form, with clear definitions for all concepts, but there are many hidden arguments of halakhah, which must be discovered through deduction, and all of this must be worked on. How trivial). Of course, everyone has vague knowledge of all of this, hence the chatter, discussions, and debates, but when the goal is blurred, the path seems appropriate.

3. I have no doubt that there is much of the novelty in this approach even for those familiar with the laws of logic, and instead of exaggerating, I will turn to writing the first chapter on the ’concept’, and I will send it to you when I finish it.

(I will only mention two of the main points in this chapter: 1. The need to seek the precise definition of all halachic concepts, that is, if we have no prior acquaintance with concepts such as “sukkah” or “chametz”, with which we have no prior acquaintance from everyday life, we will naturally be required to seek a definition for them, as with any encounter with a new concept. With concepts such as “ketan”, “chaim”, “yarak”, “lechem”, and the like, which also exist in our ordinary world, we tend to attribute to them the meaning if not the definition accepted by us, without noticing that it is a halachic concept, and therefore its halachic definition must be clarified. (Like the words of the blessing of Shmuel, which are cited in the introduction to his novellas on Bava Metzia, ‘An ox that has no owner is not an ox’, which was certainly intended to mean that our normal definition of the concept of ‘ox’, does not include the concept of ‘ownership’, but in the halachic context of the harmful ox, the concept of ‘ownership’ is indeed part of it, [although for the sake of precision in tort law the exact concept is not ‘ox’ but ‘owner of an animal’, but the principle is the same, with us the concept of ‘ownership’ is not part of the definition of the concept of ‘owner of an animal’, but in the context of tort law it is an inseparable part]).
See Rambamࢭs Laws of Marriage P”2”7: “There were found all the names whose subject matter we explained in these two chapters, twenty names. And these are. Kiddushin. Arva. Second. Prohibitions against hatred. Prohibitions against good. Small. Girl. Mature. Elonit. Large. Lower sign. Upper sign. Small. Hot eunuch. Human eunuch. Large. Agadroginus. Dumb. Deaf. Intelligent. Keep all these names before you always and do not lose sight of all their matters so that we will not have to explain each name of them wherever we mention it”.

2. There are many halakhic concepts that appear in more than one context, and it is necessary to bear in mind that it is not always a concept with the same definition. In fact, although the natural tendency is to think that in such concepts the definition is always the same, the correct approach in my opinion is to start from the fact that it is a separate concept everywhere, whose definition must be clarified, and only if there is evidence or A strong assumption is that it is the same definition.
For example, the concept of “bread” appears in the context of “the obligation to recite the blessing of food after eating it,” and in the context of “the obligation to separate from challah bread,” and it is necessary to clarify whether this is a concept with the same definition. Only assuming that it is, is it possible, in cases where a definition (or a diagnosis of a definition) is given in one place, to copy it to the second place. (See the Chiddus of HaGarh HaLevi on Maimonides, Laws of Leaven and Matzah, p. 65, which states the ruling on dog mash, which, while the shepherds are not eating it, is exempt from disease, and therefore your cradles, and not dogs, And in his opinion, there is a definition of the concept of “bread,” and therefore it will also be valid in other contexts, such as the obligation to recite the blessing of food, or to go out on Passover (since even in “metz” there is a law of “bread,” although of course not in the same definition as in other places, since “bread” that has been left unleavened is not “metz,” and this is another of the innovations of the Rabbi there, that part of the definition of the concept of “metz” is the concept of “bread.”)

Another example, fundamental and comprehensive. We are familiar with the concept of “property” with regard to property such as land and movables, within which there is Sub-concepts such as 'money purchase', 'deed of purchase', 'purchaser's knowledge and understanding', and more, which of course all need to be defined. On the other hand, we see that the Torah defines 'act of purchase' as 'act of purchase', and above all, the acts of purchase 'money' and 'deed of purchase' in purchase are those that also exist in the purchase of 'land'. And here the question arises, are these concepts defined the same? The blessing of Shmuel on purchase discusses this in many aspects (half of the book 'Yoshuv' is devoted to this point), one by one he proves that the concepts of 'buyer's knowledge' and 'purchaser's knowledge' are not the same, Similarly, the concept of money (for many systems, the purchase of barter is a matter of money, and yet it is not useful in Kiddushin, because it was not at all a matter of exchange, according to the Barak), in another place he shows that the concept of the purchase of a bill is different in Kiddushin, because its application is not based on a “monetary gain” in the form of a bill like the purchase of money (or the purchase of a bill in land), but rather depends on the “act of giving”.
I will not dwell on this any longer, but I think the point is clear. Although the concept of the purchase of money in finance overlaps in many ways with the concept of the purchase of money in Kiddushin, each of them has a separate definition, which must be addressed.)

It is difficult for me to accept that these things do not constitute an innovation or at least a refinement and emphasis of the correct approach in learning, and what about those who observe a little It will be revealed that these ideas are the essence of the unique method of Rabbi HaLevi Soloveitchik, and after him his student Rav Baruch Ber Leibowitz in his books Birkat Shmuel.

I would love to hear your opinion.

I'm sorry, but I still don't see the novelty, nor do I see what you won't find in systematic (not reckless) scholars without any education in logic.
If you have one example where you can show me a mistake made by a good scholar (I won't bless those who say "wort"), and that you can correct it using a logical tool that was unfamiliar to him, that will show me the meaning of your words. Otherwise, I don't see any connection to logic here for now. Everything you've shown here, at least as far as I understand it, is done by any good scholar, without any connection to logic. This is just a call for mental caution, but not the use of logic.

1. It sounds like you expect me to invent new laws of logic, as far as I know, none have been found for several years.

2. My goal is to use the good old laws of logic, which are (as far as I know), a. The existence of concepts, and the necessity of defining them. b. The ability to formulate and understand arguments, with recognition of the different types of argument (distinguishing between assumption and forced knowledge, positive and negative argument, analytic and synthetic, general and particular). c. The ability and understanding of inferences, with recognition of the types of inference (valid and invalid, necessary and evident).
All of this while adhering to the laws of logic, which are the law of agreement, the law of contradiction (overt and covert contradictions), and the law of the avoided third.
In addition, refinement and guidance on how to avoid informal errors originating from emotion and imagination in all of these.

I will emphasize again that I do not intend to invent new laws of logic, but only to show the application of all of the above in the fields of Halacha. (If you know of any more universal laws of logic, I would be happy for you to inform me of their existence)

3. In addition, there is the internal conduct of Halachaic laws of logic, geza (assumption), innovation, pishita, supposition, question, excuse, evidence (absolute, probable), doubt, dispute, error in judgment, error in a mishnah, and so on and so forth. And it is necessary to define and clarify the precise content of all of these.

4. In any case, if this does not seem to you to be using logical concepts in Halacha, what other logical tools do you know?

5. Regarding the examples, there are so many, I will send them to you when I have the opportunity, but they are all ones whose error is known by the above tools (vague definition, invalid inference, etc.). There are also those that are errors in the form of deviations from the internal laws of logic of the Torah, such as inexplicable innovations, and I will deal with them in the future.

6. You don't have to answer, all I wrote was to let off steam, but I am convinced of the importance and application of this approach, and I will act in that direction.

There is a lack of understanding in your words of what I wrote. What I wrote is that if you want to interest me, you must show me that the existing laws of logic (!) are indeed useful to the Talmudic scholar who does not know them. This is not the same as inventing new laws of logic. The background to the matter is that I have already seen quite a few essays and articles that make similar claims and in the end I did not see any useful innovation there, that is, nothing that an ordinary scholar cannot do. Instead of talking about the things, one should bring one example that demonstrates the benefit to the skilled Talmudic scholar who does not know logic.

By the way, there are definitely new laws of logic. Although not basic logic, logic today is much more branched and developed. In our essays on Talmudic logic, to the best of my judgment, we found new logics in this sense.

Good luck.

1. Now you've completely confused me. This seems like an attempt to hold the rope at both ends. On the one hand, you claim that 'the need to define concepts and maintain rules of inference are trivial,' and 'any systematic scholar will maintain this mental caution,' and on the other hand, you want to test whether the 'systematic scholar who does not know logic,' will be able to use the laws of logic. Well, let's agree that exactly who we're talking about, 'that scholar who does not know logic,' is saying that he is unaware of the laws of logic, including, for example, the necessity to define every concept (as in the examples I mentioned above), and also, according to our assumptions, he is unaware of the other basic laws of logic mentioned above. Such a person, although he will seek to understand concepts, will not seek to enclose them in a fixed definition, will not bother to clarify the precise formulation of arguments, or at least to imagine all the possibilities of formulation, and when he has to draw conclusions, he will sometimes fail both in invalid inferences, in the lack of distinction between a necessary inference and an obvious inference, and in the lack of exhaustion of conclusions from a given argument.

And although in general even the ‘scholar who does not know logic’ will proceed according to the laws of logic, he will do so unconsciously, and therefore not professionally and not to the end (and he will also fail with many informal errors).

2. You asked for an example of a logical fallacy, and an example of this (in my opinion) is from things I found in one of your posts.

“.. But this is only in the realm of assumptions, because we have no way to judge them and distinguish between rationality and non-rationality. But logical inference, that is, the process from assumptions to conclusions, can be characterized in terms of rationality and irrationality. If a person draws his conclusions consistently from his assumptions and maintains consistency and methodicality in his way, he can be said to be a rational person. On the other hand, a person who acts from the gut based on emotions and does not maintain consistency is irrational. Therefore, rationality characterizes primarily the logical derivation of the conclusion from the premises, and not the premises themselves.
An interesting end quote in this context is found in the Responsa to the Letters of Moshe Abba Zechariah, 1912, where Rabbi Moshe Feinstein discusses a fool for one thing (i.e. a person who has one folly and in other contexts behaves logically):

‘And here, apart from this exception, it should also be discussed that one should not be considered a fool at all who holds himself to be the Messiah, just as one who worships wood and stone is not considered a fool, even though it is certainly great folly to believe in wood and stone, but rather that he is clever and wicked and deserves death. And so one who holds himself to be the Messiah, even though he is great folly, should not be considered a fool, but rather his excessive arrogance, his delusion that he deserves to be the Messiah. And in any case, it is possible to discuss even further that all his foolish actions that stem from his mistake that he is the Messiah, who, according to his evil opinion, is the correction of the world, are not He is considered a fool. Everything a person does on the basis of some method and method that he holds in his mind, even though it is great folly, is not considered a fool in this, as is clear from the workers of the Law of Moses who have done many foolish things, and all the ways of the Amoraic texts that were said on Shabbat, page 67, are foolish acts and have the laws of the rabbinate.

He states here that if that person acts in a way that is consistent with his assumptions (=rational), he is not a fool, whatever his assumptions may be. He identifies foolishness here with irrationality in the sense defined above, that is, with inconsistency (by the way, I disagree with him on this).

From what I understand, you claim that in the opinion of Rabbi Moshe, a fool is a person whose behavior is inconsistent (irrationality as you defined it earlier), and you disagree with this.
As I understand it, this was not Rabbi Moshe's claim, but he argued the other side of the coin, saying, according to him, in the definition of the concept ‘Fool’ (as such, exempt from commandments and punishment), does not include a person with an absurd opinion (that he thinks of himself as the Messiah, or that he attributes divinity to wood and stone), and even if in addition to this he commits other foolish acts that all stem from and consistently assist that absurd opinion, he is still not considered a fool, since all his actions are directed towards that opinion.

It is found that Rabbi Moshe does not claim that someone who acts inconsistently is a fool, but on the contrary, someone who holds an absurd opinion and acts in a foolish manner (which is supposed to make him a fool), since he acts consistently with that opinion, he is not considered a fool (and he proves this by practicing idolatry), and he does not imply that everyone who acts inconsistently (as you wrote before that an irrational person is someone who acts inconsistently) is also considered a fool. What can be deduced from his words is that someone who does 1. Acts of folly 2. Inconsistency with some opinion, one can say that he is a fool.
Is this definition of a fool also unacceptable to you? What could be worse than a person who does foolish acts inconsistently? (It is possible to argue whether idolatry and messianism are foolish acts on the same level as other foolish acts, but that is another argument).

Well, the discussion has become delusional. So I suggest we stop here.
Two reasons: 1. Even if you found an error in my thinking (and you didn't), what does that prove? Where is the logical knowledge lacking? I also happen to be very familiar with the rules of logic (although it is certainly possible that I was wrong. It happens to everyone). Of course, this doesn't prove anything. I didn't claim that scholars don't make mistakes, but that knowledge of logic won't necessarily prevent it. So here my knowledge of logic didn't prevent the error (which is present in my words according to you). 2. There is no error in my words. You offer two equivalent formulations and insist that they are different.
But as I said, I'm done with the discussion. It is unfocused and unhelpful.
All the best.