On Divine Involvement Within the Framework of Nature and on Faith Declarations in General (Column 691)

With God’s help

Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.

I have devoted quite a few columns in the past to the matter of divine involvement in the world. Among other things, I argued there for two claims: 1) A conceptual claim—there cannot be divine involvement within the framework of the laws of nature. Any divine involvement, by definition, deviates from those laws. 2) A scientific-empirical claim—there is no ongoing divine involvement in the world (not even as a deviation from the laws of nature), perhaps aside from sporadic cases. This past Shabbat (Parashat Bo) I spoke in the synagogue about the first claim in light of the Ramban’s well-known comments on the parashah, and I arrived at several new points I wished to present here.

“That we should believe concerning all our words and occurrences that they are all miracles; there is no [such thing as] nature or the customary order of the world.”

At the end of Parashat Bo there is a verse commanding the mitzvah of tefillin. In his commentary there, the Ramban elaborates on why the Torah finds it important to recount the miracles God performed in Egypt and in general, and why it is important that we remember them (among other ways, by donning tefillin):

“And now I shall tell you a general principle regarding the rationale for many mitzvot. From the time idolatry existed in the world, from the days of Enosh, opinions began to become confused regarding faith: some denied the basic principle and said that the world is primordial; they denied the Lord and said, ‘It is not He.’ Some denied His particular knowledge and said, ‘How does God know? Is there knowledge in the Most High?’ (Psalms 73:11). Some admitted His knowledge but denied providence, rendering man like the fish of the sea, over whom God does not watch and with whom there is neither punishment nor reward; they would say, ‘The Lord has abandoned the earth.’ And when God desires, regarding a community or an individual, and performs for them a sign that changes the customary order of the world and its nature, all of these opinions are nullified, for the wondrous sign indicates that the world has a God who created it, who knows and watches and is able. And when that sign was decreed beforehand by the mouth of a prophet, it further confirms the truth of prophecy—that God speaks to man and reveals His secret to His servants the prophets—and with this the entire Torah is upheld.”

The miracles (visible to all) teach us that the Holy One, blessed be He, is the Master who created the world and its laws, and the proof is that He can also deviate from those laws. At the end of his comments there, the Ramban broadens the discussion to concealed miracles and writes:

“And from the great and publicized miracles a person comes to acknowledge the concealed miracles, which are the foundation of the entire Torah—that a person has no share in the Torah of Moses our teacher until he believes that in all our words and occurrences, all are miracles: there is no nature and the customary order of the world, whether among the public or the individual; rather, if one performs the commandments, his reward will cause him to prosper, and if he transgresses them, his punishment will cut him off. All is by the decree of the Most High, as I have already mentioned (Genesis 17:1, and above 6:2). And the concealed miracles will be publicized in matters of the community, as will come in the Torah’s promises regarding the blessings and the curses, as Scripture says (Deuteronomy 29:23–24): ‘And all the nations shall say, Why has the Lord done thus to this land? … And they shall say, Because they forsook the covenant of the Lord, the God of their fathers,’ such that the matter will be publicized to all the nations that it is from the Lord in their punishment. And concerning the fulfillment [of the commandments], it is said, ‘And all the peoples of the earth shall see that the name of the Lord is called upon you, and they shall fear you.’ I shall further explain this with God’s help (Leviticus 26:11).”

In essence, according to him the core of faith is in concealed miracles. The visible miracles merely remind us that all our occurrences are nothing but miracles in which there is no nature and no customary order—that is, that everything that happens to us depends solely on performing the commandments and not on nature. The Ramban emphasizes that his words concern everything that happens to every individual or to the public at large (“whether in public or in private”); all of this results solely from their spiritual state and not from the laws of nature. He sees this as such a clear and fundamental principle that he declares that anyone who does not believe this has no share in the Torah of Moses our teacher.

As I have mentioned more than once, to my shame I have no share in this belief, and although perhaps I therefore have no share in the Torah of “Moses ben Nachman,” I hope I still have a share in the Torah of Moses (ben Amram) our teacher. Here I wish to clarify the picture and its ramifications, and why it seems utterly implausible to me. In the end I will also arrive, from here, at a prevalent phenomenon of claims I shall call “faith declarations.”

Involvement Within the Framework of Nature

On its face, the Ramban here writes that there are no laws of nature in the world at all. Everything proceeds miraculously. It is hard to believe that this is truly his intent. The Ramban was a physician who treated the ill, and in various places in his commentaries it is clear that he was a rational person who accepted the existence of natural laws. If we are precise in his language, he speaks about “our occurrences,” namely what happens to human beings, and not necessarily about everything that happens in the world. So perhaps he indeed accepts natural law, but specifically regarding human beings he claims that what happens to them is a result of their deeds. But that too is implausible, for as a physician he treated human beings’ illnesses. If his intent were that all human occurrences are miracles and not dependent on nature at all, he ought to have sent his patients to pray or repent instead of prescribing medications or medical procedures. In other words, his function as a physician would have been superfluous; he could have done the same as a rabbi or a good friend.

If indeed the Ramban accepts the existence of natural laws, it raises the possibility that perhaps he intends to identify the actions of nature with the action of God. This claim can be read in two different ways:

• One could say that nature operates regularly according to its laws, but the One who operates them is God. That is, there is in fact no force of gravity, only a law of gravity. The law of gravity describes the manner in which God operates, and the One who brings about the phenomena is God and not natural forces (such as the force of gravity). Still, God acts according to fixed rules, and the laws of nature describe them. This picture seems to assume a correlation between our physiological state and our spiritual state: what is supposed to occur given our spiritual state in fact occurs via the laws of physiology as well.
• Alternatively, one could say that God created the laws of nature and through them He Himself acts. That is, everything takes place exactly as the atheist conceives it (attraction between masses is caused by gravitational force), except that the laws (and the forces) themselves are the work of God’s hands; therefore it is considered that He is the One who brings about all that happens in our world.

It is very hard to read either of these formulations into his wording. As for the second formulation, the Ramban says there is no nature—not merely that God created natural law. But even the first is implausible. The first formulation also says that there is nature and that everything happens in a natural and regular way—only that God is the One operating it. That is, my recovery is a function of physiology, not of my prayers or good and bad deeds. Under this picture, one can predict whether I will recover or not, even if the ultimate mover is God. The Ramban explicitly writes that events in the world do not occur with natural regularity and are not dependent on the natural state but on our commandments and deeds. The description I suggested says that the laws of nature indeed describe what happens to us, but that is not what he wrote. Even if we say that the laws of nature themselves take into account our spiritual state, this is still implausible. The natural laws we know do not depend on spiritual state; if so, it follows that at least they are incorrect. Is it reasonable that he really thought this?

It therefore seems that the Ramban’s intention was to say that the world indeed operates according to the laws of nature, and the healing of the sick is also governed by those laws. But he claims that this does not contradict the belief that everything that happens to us is in God’s hands according to our deeds and spiritual level. The assumption here is that God can be involved in the world even within the framework of the laws of nature, without violating them. In essence, he claims that not all divine involvement is a miracle, for there are “gaps” within natural law that allow for divine involvement. Thus, what happens to human beings does not contradict natural law. Within the possibilities that nature presents, God succeeds in inserting His policy, healing those who are worthy of healing and the reverse.

Why This Cannot Be Correct

In column 280 I explained why this cannot be correct. I shall present it here in two ways (the distinction between them will be important later).

The first formulation is that there is no freedom or “gaps” within natural law. The laws are deterministic (I will get to quantum theory below), meaning they determine that given a particular natural state (assuming it includes all relevant data, even if unknown to us) the outcome must be X and nothing else. Therefore, if God decides to change that and do Y, He has deviated from the laws of nature. The laws of nature establish causal relations in which the cause is at least a sufficient condition for the effect. This means that given a particular (complete) state of affairs—namely, all the data in the world are fixed—the outcome according to the laws of nature is unique and necessary. Any change in that outcome constitutes a deviation from natural law.

I emphasize that I do not mean to claim that God cannot do this. Certainly He can, for He created the laws of nature and He can suspend them or deviate from them (“the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permits”). I am only claiming that if He chooses to intervene, that necessarily deviates from natural law—that is, it is a miracle. My claim is that there is no divine involvement within the laws of nature (claim 1 above), not that there is no involvement at all (claim 2 above, which I am not addressing here).

The second formulation is as follows. Suppose I am ill and pray to God to heal me, and He answers my prayer. If by nature I would have recovered anyway, then there is no divine involvement here; God simply let nature operate, and the “answer” to my prayer is meaningless. Conversely, if without the prayer I would not have recovered and only thanks to God’s intervention did I recover, then that intervention necessarily constitutes a deviation from natural law. Something occurred that was not supposed to occur according to the laws. Again: there is no situation in which both possibilities fit natural law.

To understand why this confuses people so much, we must consider the topic of the concealed miracle.

Between a Concealed Miracle and Involvement Within Nature

Think of a person who is ill with a disease from which we know the chance of recovery is 10%, while the rest die. Now I learn I have that disease, and I pray to God to heal me. He answers my prayer, intervenes, and heals me. Can we say that this is involvement within the framework of natural law? After all, 10% recover, so there is no deviation from natural law. These are statistical laws, so it seems that there really are “gaps” in nature, i.e., situations in which the very same circumstances can yield two different outcomes.

But at least according to the accepted scientific view, this is a mistake. The statistics of recovery concern all people who suffer from that disease. Among them, 10% recover and 90% die. But for any given individual patient, the outcome is deterministic. If we knew all the relevant medical information about him precisely, and we knew all the theoretical medical information about such a disease, we could predict with certainty whether he would recover or die. Our inability to do so does not stem from the fact that truly, from the same state two different results can come forth; rather, it stems from our lack of information (both about the patient and about the theoretical information concerning the disease). Therefore some people will recover and some will not (for each person the result follows deterministically from his condition).

According to the information we have today, curing disease is part of the natural sciences and is entirely deterministic. The use of probability and statistics here stems from a lack of information—that is, it is an epistemic and not an ontic matter. Just as our use of probability to describe the outcome of a coin toss or a die roll does not mean that there is something truly random there. The coin toss or die roll is entirely deterministic, and our resort to probability is only due to partial information and computational difficulty, not because there is a real “gap” in nature itself. It is epistemic rather than ontic (see the series of columns 322–327). It is important to understand that our lack of information changes nothing regarding whether nature is deterministic. Nature itself is deterministic; we simply do not know the laws or the data in full.

Let us return to our patient. Suppose he was supposed to die of this illness (he belongs to those 90% who die), and God intervened and saved him. Now he becomes part of those 10% who survive this disease. Did a miracle occur here? Was there a deviation from natural law? Most certainly. If that person was supposed to die (even though we cannot know that), then God intervened and altered the natural course and healed him. Therefore, here too we are dealing with involvement that deviates from natural law. Of course, if that person was supposed to be among the 10% who survive, then God did not intervene at all. We will naturally never know which of the two possibilities is correct: whether God intervened and deviated from natural law, or whether the person recovered naturally. In any case, if God intervened, it is a miracle that deviates from nature. It is, however, a concealed miracle, since we have no way to perceive that a miracle occurred. Even so, that miracle deviates from natural law; it is simply done without our knowing it.

It is important to understand that “involvement within nature” and “concealed miracle” are not synonymous expressions. A concealed miracle is an act that deviates from nature, but we are unable to notice it (an epistemic rather than an ontic issue). Involvement within the framework of nature is divine involvement that does not deviate from natural law at all (which, as we saw, is impossible). A concealed miracle is certainly an option God can employ, but involvement within the laws of nature is not. A conceptual analysis shows that any involvement on His part constitutes a deviation.

Back to the Ramban

What, then, did the Ramban mean? One might say that his intention is that God intervenes in what happens to us, but as we have seen, in doing so He necessarily deviates from natural law. This is of course possible in itself, and perhaps this is what the Ramban means when he says that all our occurrences are miracles. But this possibility exists in his words only if, in his view, this happens from time to time and not always. Otherwise there is no nature at all and everything is miraculous. Yet it seems clear that he did not mean that, for he writes that “all our words and occurrences are all miracles; there is no nature and the customary order of the world, whether in private or in public.” That is, he claims this about every single thing that happens to each of us. Could it be that everything that happens to us is not the result of natural law but of divine involvement? If that were the case, there would be no physiology regarding human beings. Acetaminophen would reduce fever only for those who “deserve” it; antibiotics would work only for those whose spiritual level warrants healing; surgeries would fail for wicked people, and so forth. A physician (of human beings—excluding veterinarians), like the Ramban himself, would have no role, and his knowledge would have no significance.

In short, I have no share in the Torah of Moses ben Nachman, for his words are not acceptable to reason and contradict the scientific knowledge we possess. I hope nonetheless to have a share in the Torah of Moses ben Amram. I take comfort that I am in good company, for as I showed in column 659 (and many others), it appears that even the Ra’ah (and indeed the Gemara itself) has no share in the Torah of Moses (ben Nachman), for in Chagigah 5a he explains the Gemara’s statement “there are those who perish without justice” as referring to cases in which a person kills his fellow. That is, in his view (and in the Gemara itself), a person can die without deserving to die—so too, certainly, become ill or be injured. True, the Ra’ah there discusses an act that is the choice of another person (Reuven who murders Shimon), and perhaps natural death, in his view, is not possible without justice (so it seems from his words, since he explains that “there are those who perish without justice” as in the case of one who kills his fellow—apparently coming to exclude natural death). Still, this smells like some distance from the Torah of Moses ben Nachman. And of course there is also “everything is in the hands of Heaven except for cold and heat.” But even if there were no sources supporting my view, it would not change anything. Scientific and logical analysis compel the conclusion that the Ramban is mistaken here.

Gaps in Nature

It seems the Ramban assumed that there really are gaps in nature. In other words, in his view, given a particular state of affairs two different outcomes are possible; therefore divine involvement does not contradict the existence of natural law. Moreover, it seems that, in his view, this is essentially the case with regard to human beings, and thus he can say that all our occurrences are nothing but miracles and contain no nature whatsoever. As for the role of a physician according to him—I truly do not know how to answer. But this appears to be the assumption in his words here.

We saw a similar assumption in column 280 regarding the issue of praying about the past. We saw there that the distinction between a fetus under forty days (for whose change of sex one may pray) and one older than that (for whose change of sex one may not pray) does not fit the assumption that it is forbidden to pray for an open miracle but permissible to pray for a concealed miracle, since changing the sex of a hundred-day-old fetus is also a concealed miracle (in a world without ultrasound). Why, then, is it forbidden to pray for that? Moreover, in such a case there is, in fact, no miracle at all, for God could intervene and perform gender-affirming surgery in the mother’s womb. This is a medical act that, in principle, a human surgeon either already can do or will be able to do shortly; therefore one can view this as a request for intervention that is not a miracle at all. I explained there that the distinction between the ages of the fetus must be based on the assumption that before forty days the fetus’s sex is an open question, and therefore even if God intervenes and changes the sex, this is done within the laws of nature. Not so in later stages, when the fetus’s sex has already been determined; then the request is for a miracle—i.e., a deviation from natural law—and that is forbidden. The conclusion that emerges is that it is forbidden to pray for a miracle, whether concealed or open. It is permitted to pray only regarding open situations (“gaps” in natural law) in which divine involvement is not a miracle at all. Behold, then, that in the past the Sages thought that natural law is not deterministic, and there could be cases of divine involvement that are not miracles—that is, that are not deviations from natural law. So, it seems, the Ramban also assumed.

A Note About Our Time

In that column I noted that today we know this is not the case. The sex of the fetus is fixed in the very first days of pregnancy (and in my estimation, there is nothing truly random in the differentiation process; there is simply a mechanism we do not yet fully understand). This, of course, raises a serious question regarding the conclusions that would follow from that sugya. One possibility is that we must reject the Talmud’s mistaken factual assumption and understand that there are no gaps in nature; therefore today we are forbidden to pray for anything at all (not even for changing the sex of a one-week-old fetus), for any involvement is a deviation from natural law, that is, a miracle. A second possibility is to reject the halachic ruling that forbids praying and requesting a miracle, for every request is a request for a miracle; therefore it would be permissible to pray for a change in the fetus’s sex at any age (at least when ultrasound is absent).

The view of sages in those generations is certainly understandable. Scientific knowledge at the time was not what ours is, so they assumed that nature is not deterministic. They were not angels; contrary to popular belief, they had no scientific knowledge beyond what existed in their days. What is harder to accept is that later sages keep repeating this nonsense of involvement within the laws of nature, as though their scientific knowledge remained stuck in the Middle Ages. Their commitment to the views of the early sages (and fear that they might not have a share in the Torah of Moses) forces them to hold either to logically absurd claims (that divine involvement could occur within deterministic natural law) or to scientifically absurd claims (that natural law is not deterministic). This is a conservatism deserving of censure. Critical thinking must also be applied to basic beliefs. As we learned: “Plato is beloved and Socrates is beloved, but truth is most beloved of all” (see column 215 and many more).

Further Puzzles

In the last sentence I hinted that my critique of the Ramban’s position rests on two pillars: science, which posits that the laws are deterministic; and logic, which says there is no divine involvement that can take place within deterministic laws. Logic is not up for debate. It turns out that the weak point that must be examined is the scientific one: are the laws of nature really deterministic? The Ramban—like several Talmudic sugyot—apparently thought so, but our scientific knowledge today says otherwise.

This can be questioned on at least two planes:

• How confident can we be that natural law is truly deterministic? Take recovery from disease as an example, as discussed above. The fact is that patients sometimes do recover from almost every disease. That is, in this area outcomes are not dictated deterministically by the current state. In standard scientific thinking, this is attributed to lack of information (theoretical or about the particular patient) and is considered merely an epistemic problem; but who says that’s right? Perhaps there is truly an ontic gap here and not merely an epistemic one? The reductionism of medicine and the life sciences to chemistry and physics is a standard scientific assumption, but there is no necessity to adopt it. Let me already note here that the Ramban’s claim is that all our occurrences are miracles—meaning there are no natural laws regarding human beings. This is an extremely far-reaching conjecture, and I think the facts quite clearly say otherwise.
• Quantum theory (in the standard interpretation) teaches us that there are non-deterministic processes in nature. Given one state, two different outcomes are possible, and quantum theory even gives us the probability for each of them. If so, there is room to argue that in some situations God can take either of two courses, neither of which would deviate from natural law.

I shall begin with the second question.

Quantum Theory and Its Significance for Our Topic

In principle, quantum theory should not play a role in the discussion, since it deals with very small scales and very low temperatures. The events that happen to us are at large scales and very high temperatures; therefore quantum effects are not supposed to be present. Certainly, to claim that every single one of our events is governed by quantum theory is far-fetched. Beyond that, quantum theory specifies a distribution over the possible outcomes. Divine involvement in those outcomes would still violate natural law; it would change the distribution (assuming that when God heals me, He does not leave someone else—who should have recovered—ill in my place. If that were so, it is hard to accept that it is permissible to pray such a prayer). In effect, it can be said that God changed the laws of quantum theory, which are the relevant natural laws for our case: quantum theory dictates a particular distribution, and God imposed a different one.

This answers the quantum-based question. Still, the question remains regarding the determinism of natural law itself. We raised the possibility that this assumption may be mistaken even if science adopts it. Assumptions are assumptions; they carry no necessity. If so, perhaps divine involvement within the framework of natural law is indeed possible. The answer I shall give to this question will also address the difficulty posed by quantum theory. Before that, a methodological note.

A Methodological Note

Suppose we could find a possible explanation for the Ramban’s view—whether this requires saying that our scientific picture is wrong or some other explanation. Perhaps it would be a forced explanation, perhaps even a spacious one. My question is entirely different: why assume from the outset that there must be an explanation? Why look for one? Why is there a difficulty here that compels us to re-examine our scientific (and other) worldview and seek explanations? Does the Ramban have alternative sources of information regarding science or thought that we can assume are not mistaken? On the face of it, the simple avenue is that the Ramban erred because he drew on ancient and outdated scientific knowledge—and thus there is no need to be troubled by this question.

I claim that the very search for some explanation of his words—even if we find one—is based on the assumption that they are supposed to be compatible with the modern scientific picture (or, more precisely, with the truth). This assumption itself is misguided; therefore the search as a whole seems unnecessary and based on a methodological error. I nonetheless engage in it here mainly because many people do not share my methodological understanding, and I wish to clarify it.

What Would Have Happened Without the Involvement?

Above I presented two formulations of the claim against involvement within the framework of natural law. One was based on the determinism of those laws; the other examined what would have happened without divine intervention. Now I wish to argue that the second formulation topples the Ramban’s words even if we assume that natural law is not deterministic (whether due to quantum theory or simply because the existing scientific conclusion regarding determinism is mistaken).

Let us assume, for the sake of discussion, that in a given patient with a given disease two outcomes are indeed possible—i.e., in his state natural law does not dictate whether he will recover or not. The distribution of 10% recovery versus 90% death reflects ontic indeterminacy in reality itself and not merely partial knowledge (epistemic uncertainty). At first glance, in such a case divine involvement does not contradict natural law.

Even so, one can raise an argument similar to what I raised above regarding quantum theory. If we assume that the distribution of the chances of recovery is X (only this time it is not due to our ignorance but to indeterminacy in reality itself—note that this is also the accepted view in quantum theory), God’s involvement changes that distribution. A statistical law is still a law; changing the distribution is a change in natural law. From another angle: the distribution of chances of recovery itself stems from some structure of the world. The structure is not deterministic but statistical, so it does not dictate one outcome but a certain distribution; still, divine involvement changes that distribution. After the involvement, the situation is that the only possible outcome is recovery, with probability 1. If so, here too we have a change in natural law. This is very similar to what we saw above regarding the implications of quantum theory for our discussion.

Here I wish to argue something even more far-reaching. Suppose, for the sake of discussion, that there is no natural law here at all, not even a statistical law—that is, we assume that nature says nothing about the chance of recovery and anything can happen. The matter is truly open, with not even an average distribution. Still, it is clear that if we waited and God did not intervene, something would in fact have happened. What would have happened? One of two possible outcomes: either the patient would have recovered, or he would not have. If we assume he would have recovered, then there is no need for divine intervention. If he would not have recovered, then God’s intervention changed what would have occurred in the natural course. Is that not a deviation from nature (even if not from natural law)? Nature itself would have gone in direction A, and God caused it to go in direction B. My claim here is that even if there are gaps in nature and its laws are not deterministic—and even if there are no laws at all, neither deterministic nor statistical—divine involvement still constitutes a deviation from the natural course.

This is, of course, a matter of definition. One can claim that indeed there is a deviation from the natural course that would have happened, but not a deviation from natural law (for there are no laws). Thus, for example, one may claim that it is permissible to pray for a deviation from the natural course so long as there is no deviation from natural law (deterministic or statistical). If there is a law, then perhaps God wants the world to operate that way; therefore His involvement that violates those laws is problematic (and perhaps we are forbidden to pray that it occur). But when there is no law at all, this is not truly a deviation from nature, even though it is still a different course than what would have happened without the involvement.

To my mind, this too is involvement. In any case, nothing in this offers a way to reconcile the Ramban’s words. To claim that, we would have to assert that there are no natural laws—even statistical ones—regarding human beings. Physiology would not exist as a scientific discipline. As noted, even the Ramban himself (who was a physician) likely did not think so.

Faith Declarations and Making It Up As We Go

Bottom line: not only is the Ramban incorrect, I do not even have a possible explanation of what he could have meant. If we adopt the final model above—that regarding human beings there are no laws, neither deterministic nor statistical—then his words imply there is no physiology at all. It is not reasonable that he meant to say that.

But beyond the Ramban’s intent, we can wonder what those who quote him with such enthusiasm to this day mean. Before asking whether the Ramban is correct, and even before asking whether they themselves believe it, the first question is: what are they even saying? Do they themselves understand what they are saying? Do they mean there is no physiology? That there are statistical laws and that involvement does not deviate from them? That there are deterministic laws and divine involvement does not deviate from them? None of these options is plausible; some are not even possible. I think none of the speakers truly knows which of these he intends with such statements.

In my impression, people make such declarations only because they exude the aroma of deep piety, and that alone suffices to wave around these sentences—even if they are absurd, and even if they have no meaning at all. Well, we can always call it “learning Chassidut,” and then we are exempt from giving any coherent meaning to the sentences under discussion. The feeling of depth covers the substantive vacuum. One can leap into the “empty space” and grasp the twelfth hair of the dikna kadisha (“holy beard”), and thereby resolve all the difficulties of Dawkins and the rest of the skeptics (see, for example, my lecture here).

Think about claims concerning bitachon (trust in God) and hishtadlut (human effort), about divine providence over His world, claims that everything is found in the Torah, claims about the special virtue of Israel, claims about tzimtzum not to be taken literally, claims that anyone killed for his Judaism is a saint (what is sometimes called “Kiddushei Ta’ut” [sanctifications by mistake]; see column 215), and many more of the sort. Many such claims merited chapters in my book Ein Adam Shalit BaRuach, and they are all declarations without real basis. Some of them have no coherent substantive meaning whatsoever—but that does not prevent many believers from asserting them emphatically as though they descended directly from Sinai, simply because they exude the aroma of piety. I call these “faith declarations,” namely, claims that have no logic and/or source, and in many cases even the proponent does not truly believe them; but through them he broadcasts his unqualified faith in our holy Torah, and therefore they are exempt from critical thought (see column 52 on the difference between derash and pilpul and on the rule “one does not object to a derash”).

Example: The Sabbatical-Year Promises

A wonderful example of this kind of absurd discourse I found in a pleasant podcast someone sent me a few days ago, in Yoav Rabinovich’s series “The Rhinoceros.” I highly recommend listening. Note that in this example we are dealing with a principle that actually has a clear source, and yet I still regard such claims as “faith declarations.”

His topic is the proposal by Shas ministers to establish a training fund for farmers who observe the Sabbatical year (as far as I know, the law has meanwhile passed a preliminary reading). Yoav Rabinovich presents explanations from Shas MKs for the bill. They explain, quite nicely, that it is incumbent upon us to ease the burden on those righteous people who let their fields lie fallow in the Sabbatical year. Rabinovich notes there that they also have the options of heter mechirah or otzar beit din, but they chose to be righteous; if so, why not at the public’s expense?! After all, the state treasury currently has a surplus. There hasn’t been a war in the past year and a half (a fact—none of their neighbors in Bnei Brak was harmed; what are they even talking about?!), no regions of the country have been devastated (the holy city of Bnei Brak stands intact, thanks to the promise of the righteous R. Chaim Kanievsky), and of course the Haredi sector’s contribution to the GDP covers any deficit that could arise even if there had been a war (thankfully there was not), so there is no problem with funding sources. But the morality of this band of robbers is well-known and is not our topic here. Here is the point relevant to us.

Immediately afterward, Yoav Rabinovich brings a series of fervent quotes from Shas MKs explaining that observing the Sabbatical year actually benefits the economy. How so? Because we have a promise and a blessing of double and triple yield for those who observe Shemitah. And, of course, there are innumerable stories (who has not heard of miraculous rescues from locusts and the like) that prove this clearly and absolutely. True, some halachic authorities have already written that nowadays Shemitah is rabbinic, and such a divine promise does not apply; but the honorable MKs apparently have not heard of this—and besides, the facts prove them right. Fortunate are we who have merited.

But then Rabinovich rightly points out that these statements do not quite fit the earlier explanations for the bill. If we are truly promised by the Almighty Himself triple yield to those who let their fields lie fallow, turning them into wealthy men, why does such a farmer need a publicly funded training fund to help with his difficulties? He is not in distress—on the contrary, thanks to Shemitah his situation will only improve. Perhaps their intent is only a loan until the enormous yield arrives (which, as we know, is already supposed to sprout in the sixth year)?

It seems many of us would pass over such statements and the like without batting an eye. We have become so accustomed to these “faith declarations” that, as noted, their aroma of piety obviates any examination of content (recall, “one does not object to a derash”). If the one saying it is a righteous man, then surely he is right, no? He is above logic and reason, and one can demand human effort while simultaneously preaching trust in God—and many more wondrous contradictions along the way.

On the margins, I wonder what this collection of liars (and robbers) actually believes. In my estimation none of them truly believes this promise, and none would stake a single coin of his own on the divine promise in whose name he swears. Well, he prefers to stake our coins on it. Perhaps that itself is the fulfillment of the divine promise, like the well-known story of Moshke and the squire. Likewise, I think those who quote the Ramban with such enthusiasm about all our occurrences being miraculous do not believe it and would not bet a worn-out coin on it. But piety requires declaring these holy declarations and not examining them.

Not for nothing are scientific experiments on the effectiveness of prayer conducted only by Christians. They actually believe their beliefs; we merely declare “faith declarations” without truly believing them. On the contrary, anyone who would actually act upon them would be labeled even by the religious as “messianic” and “delusional.” But the declarations we must maintain.

Oops, how did I forget that it is forbidden to test God—except with tithes (“Test Me now in this,” see Ta’anit 9a)?! If so, fear not—theories like these are unfalsifiable. Oh, there’s more: God is above logic—did you forget?! By the way, has anyone here ever checked the matter of tithing? That one we are indeed permitted to test! I assume not. And what do you think about long life for those who honor parents and send away the mother bird? It would be interesting to see what would come out of (forbidden) tests of these as well—and even more interesting why none of the fervent faith-declarers conducts them in an orderly, systematic, statistically significant way (aside from grandma tales about miracles and wonders for those who tithe and honor parents). Why don’t the Shas MKs conduct a proper survey of the state of the Shemitah observers (before receiving the unnecessary money from the training fund)? That way they could bring facts and persuade us (of what? To make or not make the fund?).

If you ask me, even regarding promises that have a source—such as “Test Me now in this” (at least a source in Hazal) or long life for those who honor parents and send away the mother bird, and the wealth in store for those who let their fields lie fallow in the seventh year—no one here truly believes. It’s good for agenda-driven radio interviews, but not a single one of our coins would we invest in it…

So why is it written? And what do the verses mean? There are several possibilities, and the question is an excellent one. But a question is no substitute for factual examination, and if someone does not believe this, then he does not believe it—even if it is written, even if he is wrong, and even if he declares it with boundless enthusiasm.