The Return of the Hostages: On Contradictions, Politics, and Lies (Column 611)

With God’s help

Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.

Beloved is Plato, beloved is Socrates, but truth is most beloved of all

(An ancient adage, appearing in Chavot Ya’ir and in the responsa of the Rid, among others)

I apologize in advance that in this column, too, I will try to write the truth (as I see it), in a realm where everyone is lying to themselves and to others (many of them justifiably, from their perspective). This truth is painful and hurts quite a few people, but in my view truth is always the preferred option (see: just in recent days I was asked about this several times in the Q&A, for example here).

The Oxymoron

In column 607 (written toward the end of the pause for the exchange of hostages) I already noted that the three war aims constitute a system with an internal contradiction. The government set for itself and for the army three goals: destroying Hamas, creating a situation in which there is no threat to the Gaza envelope, and returning the hostages. A simple calculation shows that it is impossible to achieve all three of these goals together. Hamas holds the hostages as a winning card (see what pressure this creates here), and I see no reasonable possibility that they will be willing to return them for anything less than a cessation of fighting with effective international guarantees that it will not resume afterwards (meaning that we will not destroy them). They, too, know that after a deal we can always return to fighting. Just so they have no misunderstandings, we also declare very clearly that nothing will stop us until we destroy Hamas and kill Sinwar. So how could the hostages be returned to us? It cannot be.

Perhaps it is possible to reach the destruction of Hamas (and even about this I am very doubtful), but then we will have at most the bodies of the hostages—if at all. Maybe we will manage to free a few individuals in a successful case (like the escape of the three last Friday who, were it not for the soldiers’ tragic mistake, would have gotten out), but as a rule under such a policy we will end up only with bodies. Alternatively, one can try to make a deal and get the hostages back, but that would be without toppling Hamas. In the end, a simple calculation shows there is no way to achieve all three war aims together. Beyond that, as noted, I also very much doubt whether Hamas can truly be toppled, which all the more raises the question of whether it is right to forgo the hostages if those other aims will not be achieved. It is not reasonable to be left with none of the three; therefore at least we should consider trying to obtain the hostages (see column 607).

Just today I have already started to see such voices in the discourse. See, for example, Einav Schiff, “Time to Climb Down from the Tree” (Yedioth 18.12, p. 10), and similar points by Ofer Shelach, “Move to Phase C Now.” The question is when this will reach the official discourse and the facts will be laid on the table.

The Lies

The government and the army repeatedly declare that the return of the hostages is a central objective, and immediately add that the fighting will not stop until the destruction of Hamas and its leadership. In other words, the three goals still stand. They also keep explaining to us that the fighting creates pressure on Hamas without which the hostages will not be returned. This is nonsense, of course, since that pressure can at most lead to a prisoner exchange (without which there will be no hostages returned; they will not be liberated in a military operation), and by definition such an exchange will be conditioned on a complete halt to the fighting. That means that if we receive the hostages there will be no destruction of Hamas, and vice versa.

I assume that even our government and army understand this simple contradiction, and if they understand it then Hamas certainly does (they, unlike us, have intelligent leadership). So why is this repeated all the time? Because it is very convenient to lie in such a situation. The leadership (political and military) that failed cannot face the families of the hostages who have borne the fruits of this terrible fiasco. They are rightly seen as culpable, and the guilty cannot tell them that they have decided to sacrifice their loved ones on the altar of correcting this failure. Therefore they tell them—and all of us—a lie to placate the families, while in fact intending to continue the fighting and give up on the hostages (alternatively, to give up on toppling Hamas, and then perhaps there is a chance to get the hostages—rather slim). All the players in the arena know this is a lie: the speakers themselves, the families of the hostages, and Hamas. But it is a convenient lie, because, as noted, it is very hard to tell the families that we have given up on the hostages. There are situations in which a person lies to his friend, the friend knows he is lying and he knows that the friend knows, and nevertheless that is what is done.

None of this is meant as criticism. Bibi is indeed a consummate liar, and he surely feels like a fish in water telling these lies. It is his undisputed specialty. But in this case the lie is justified, at least under these circumstances, because one cannot forgo the other war aims and it is very hard to tell the families the truth to their faces.

“Families of the Hostages” or the families of the hostages

The spokespeople on behalf of the families of the hostages also talk about a deal at the price of a halt to the fighting, and add that we can always eliminate Hamas afterwards. Hamas, of course, knows this as well, and therefore there is no chance they will agree to a deal without a complete cessation of fighting with clear guarantees that it will not be renewed. Again, a consensual lie—this time on behalf of the families of the hostages and their PR reps. This lie is wrapped in quite a few arguments, almost all of which are unfounded. I heard, for instance, someone claim that it is very important to preserve national unity and therefore the hostages must be returned (implicitly, even at the price of stopping the fighting). That is, if we give up the other goals and bring back the hostages, there will be unity; if not, then they will not unite with us. It reminds me of the “unity of the people” of Smotrich and the Har HaMor folks. In another interview I heard the claim that the pause yielded 100 freed hostages while the fighting yielded not even one; therefore we must make a deal (and then we can return to fighting). That argument is foolish for so many reasons that I do not have the strength even to list them.

But the families are understandable. There are two ways to explain their clinging to this oxymoron. One possibility is that, due to their distress, they are biased and repress the fact that this is an oxymoron. Another possibility is that they know it full well but are also lying (justifiably, from their perspective). They are trying to sell us on making a deal and then eliminating Hamas (for it is unpleasant to say that they want their loved ones at the expense of the security of the rest of the country’s residents), but it is possible that they, too, know perfectly well that this will not happen (because such a deal would necessarily entail a complete cessation of the fighting).

It is important to note that there are also families who think otherwise (almost all of them from the religious right, of course. See the end of column 605 and columns 607–608). They argue that one must not concede and make a deal or a pause even at the price of their loved ones’ lives. These families at least honestly put the facts on the table and do not whitewash them; they are unwilling to lie or bury their heads in the sand, and even set—admirably—an appropriate and non-biased order of priorities. See, for example, the statements of the Mor and Libman families. And of course one cannot ignore the impressive final testament of the soldier Ben Zussman, of blessed memory.

Now a riddle: look at the report here about that very testament, and think: what is missing? You guessed right: the instruction not to make a prisoner exchange. It is an inseparable and very impressive part of the testament, yet it is not mentioned even by hint in an entire article devoted to this testament. The most impressive part was omitted.[1] Quite amazing, no? And this is not the only article that did so. This is a crude expression of the media agenda enveloping us. What the media calls “the families of the hostages” are only those who speak in the first register, namely those who call for a deal at any price. The others are not considered part of “the families of the hostages,” and their voices are hardly heard. The media has crowned who is entitled to be called “families of hostages” (in quotation marks) and who is not; the fact that there is a hostage in your family is only a necessary but not sufficient condition to be included in that definition. I will return to this point below and explain it.

[1] My brother Dani shlit”a pointed out to me that there is a boxed segment there in which this is indeed brought. But such boxed segments are illustrations added by the editors (like titles and subtitles). In the article itself there is no hint of it.

To be clear, I have no complaint against the families themselves. They hire PR agents to promote their cause, which is only natural and fitting. My complaint is toward the media—and in fact the entire world of entertainment—which mobilize and cooperate with this emotional brainwashing. It seems as if all these people work for the PR agents of the “families” (but not for the families). From these quarters I would expect a bit more critical sense, some awareness that there are other views, and no less an awareness that the thesis they are promoting is an oxymoronic lie. But apparently my expectations are excessive for our emotional age (see column 605).

Yair Lapid: Did It Happen or Did I Dream?

But after all the whitewashers, tilters, and liars (justifiably) I mentioned until now, there is someone who seems to be the only one who truly does not understand what I have written here: the former prime minister, Yair Lapid (שליט״א, honorific). This morning I read his following gem (which is what prompted me to write this column):

Opposition leader Yair Lapid referred to the calls to promote an Israeli outline for a hostages deal, and said in an interview to ynet Live that “a new outline must be placed on the table, because the moment there is a paper on the table it generates action, even if it is not accepted.” According to him, “Netanyahu cannot continue to serve as prime minister. Elections can be held during war.” Lapid noted that he made clear to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that the opposition will provide backing “even for painful prices in the hostages deal, but Israel cannot stop the fighting because Hamas will return at the first opportunity it has.”

He simultaneously speaks about freeing the hostages for painful prices, but of course this must be done without stopping the fighting until Hamas is destroyed. Wonderful. He is essentially proposing that we square the circle. He is indeed saying exactly what the government and the army say and what the “families of the hostages” (in quotation marks) say, but I already explained that all these are lying—knowingly or unknowingly—and justifiably from their perspectives. By contrast, Lapid seems like someone who does not understand that there is an oxymoron here. His words are akin to proposing to sign a peace agreement with the Palestinians and give them a state while leaving the whole Land of Israel to us. His next proposal will presumably be to solve the climate crisis without changing anything in our behavior. Admit it: these are perfect proposals, and it is unclear how we did not think of them ourselves. I must say that, assuming we are dealing with a person who proposes, as an operative suggestion, to square the circle, appointing him prime minister fills me with gloomy thoughts about our fate. It turns out the current government is not the bottom of the pit.

Another Interpretation

Well, perhaps we can judge Lapid favorably. It may be that he, too, understands the oxymoron here and is simply lying as well. But it is important to understand that for him this is not really a point in his favor. Unlike the government and the families of the hostages, whose lies are justified—each for their own reasons—his lie is not justified. He lies (assuming he is not an idiot) in order to enlist the electorate of the families of the hostages and, together with them, the protest forces against the government. That is his natural electorate, and if he is not lying then he is apparently speaking to them. These are the things they are saying and presumably what they also want to hear from a prime minister.

This brings me to the coalition that has been taking shape in recent weeks between the “families of the hostages” (in quotation marks—i.e., those among them who are oppositional to the government) and the protest forces that fell somewhat silent when the muses began to thunder here. Lately the Kaplan demonstrations are slowly returning, and again they are directed mainly against the government and in particular its head—but this time everything is done under the guise of concern for the hostages. The portrayal is that the government has it within its power to bring them back but chooses a different order of priorities. The punctilious add that it is indifferent to their fate, unintelligent, or corrupt. No wonder that Brothers in Arms and the various protest groups are gleefully riding this wave. It gives them legitimacy to return to the streets and continue the anti-government protests that had ceased in recent months due to events. It may be that Lapid’s words were aimed at the ears of this audience.

The Politicization of the Protest: the Kaplanists and the “Families of the Hostages”

These days there are many displays around the country and the world to remind people of the hostages. On the face of it there is nothing wrong with this, as it is proper to keep the issue on the public table and to identify with their suffering and that of their families. Yet it is hard to ignore the tone with which these displays are conducted. They are perceived as a protest against the government—the military arm of the “families of the hostages” (with quotation marks). It is no wonder that the protest forces (the various Kaplanists) and, of course, the media, join in. Despite the pretense that there is nothing political about this and it is only a moral and ethical matter, one cannot ignore the oppositional political context of this protest. It is perceived—and not for nothing—as a continuation of the previous protest under a different guise. Therefore the main struggle is conducted against the government, not just globally. Again and again one hears the demand to bring them back now, unconditionally and regardless of the price. The various excuses (most of them rather flimsy) come only afterwards. Somehow one gets the impression that anyone who does not aspire to their return at any price is a heartless traitor. People hardly dare to express a more measured view (see what happens to the families of the hostages—without quotation marks—who try to do so).

It is not for nothing that in public discourse the blame for the fiasco is pinned mainly on the government, and very few are willing to point an accusing finger at the army, although it is clear that it bears the chief responsibility. The army’s conceptions failed here, and in my assessment when the army has a clear position it usually succeeds in causing the government to act in its spirit. If the army had wanted to act more actively and proactively, I am sure the government would not have stopped it for long. These days warnings by the army supposedly ignored by the government are published every other day. I am sure such warnings exist all the time, there are quite a few officers and factors in the army, and one can always find, after the fact, warnings pointing in every direction. The prevailing spirit in the army was entirely in tune with Bibi’s and the government’s conception, but the public is unwilling to blame it and put it on the spot. The reason, I think, is the desire to hang the blame on the government (Bibi). In order to do that, the contribution of every other factor to the horrific outcome is blurred. This is yet another indication of the link between the protests about the hostages and the war and the protests that preceded Simchat Torah. We are told, with signs and wonders, the reasons for this in the government’s conduct, and at least to me—as someone who, as is known, is not counted among the government’s great admirers—this is not at all convincing. There is obvious tendentiousness here, and the factors stirring the pot prove it. The claims about government dysfunction, which certainly have some substance, are also greatly exaggerated, and seem to be a product of that same tendency. The impression is that the enormous contribution of “Brothers in Arms” to the functioning of the country and the army in the days after Simchat Torah is also a tool in their previous protest in order to hasten the government’s fall. The events and the hostages are merely the new tool to do so. Therefore I am unimpressed by the favorable media echo that the “families of the hostages” and protest actors receive. In my assessment, the credit they receive among the public itself (and also with me)—which their actions would have deserved on the merits—is diminishing. The politicization of ethical issues is not particularly beloved by the public. The media, as usual, does not reflect reality (especially from the right).

Precisely as someone who would very much like this government and this horrific coalition to disappear to the four winds, I view this trend with great concern. Beyond the tendentious lie involved and the usual debasement of discourse among us, this politicization and these positions are a shot to the protest’s own leg. Before the war I wrote that the demagoguery accompanying the protest against the reform (threats of democratic collapse; Hungary and Poland), which was entirely exaggerated and baseless, ultimately harmed it. It aroused camp-mindedness, and as is known the right-wing camp has a majority. This did not allow the sane right (the non-Bibi-ist) to come out against Bibi, as they felt attacked. In recent days I have begun to feel that the processes I have described here are returning us to the polarization before the war, and as then so now, Bibi supporters will back him all the more (due to the oppositional camp-mindedness). I must say that even I am already passing thoughts of voting for him just to send these harmful actors and this irritating propaganda packing.

We are told that Bibi is not acting to bring back the hostages. That is truly bizarre. He does lie, but we all know that. Moreover, I have already shown that everyone is lying, each for his reasons (most of which are justified). But why would he act against the hostages? After all, his interest—especially as someone perceived (not entirely justly, and certainly not exclusively) as responsible for the failure—is to emerge from it as well and as popular as possible. If anything, I suspect him of a bias in favor of the hostages and against the long-term interests, simply because as the one responsible for the fiasco it is surely hard for him to stand up to the families’ pressure. I fear he will forgo the long-term interests in order to look popular in the short term, by paying excessive prices for the hostages’ release. If he has a bias, in my opinion it is in their favor, not against them. But that does not stop them from going after him and suspecting him and the government, without any basis. In my eyes this is part of that same propaganda campaign whose goal is to create this harmful pressure on the government (if you are told you are not doing enough, it may push you to do more—even if that is not right and even if doing more will harm us all). That is as for the “families of the hostages” (with quotation marks). But the forces joining them—the media and the protest actors—are doing so out of the same position of continuing the previous protest and toppling the government.

Thus, for example, I do not share the criticism about Bibi’s failure to “take responsibility.” That is nonsense. I see no value in empty words with nothing behind them (“the responsibility is all mine”). The criticism about this joins all the baseless criticisms in previous periods (“the Arabs are heading to the polls in droves,” and the like) that were nothing but cheap and groundless propaganda. I certainly do fear that Bibi will not draw the conclusions he needs to draw and will not go home. That is the assumption of responsibility I would expect (at least as ministerial responsibility), and we are all hearing these days (indeed from that same enlisted media) how Bibi is preparing for the day after to prevent that from happening. The problem is that the tendentiousness and politicization of the processes I have described—whose aim is to ensure that he goes—are precisely what will allow him not to go.

The Substantive Context

Beyond the political context and the positions, these events also have a substantive-ideological context. In several columns I have noted the link between the approach to returning the hostages and the dispute between right and left. The left (liberal, not communist) regards the human being as an individual and the collective as something that exists to serve him. Therefore, for it, the fate of the individual stands at the center. The right sees, in the background, the nation—the collective—and is therefore willing to make more “cruel” considerations regarding individuals in order to benefit the collective in the long term. Hence the “families of the hostages” protest fits here very inherently with the left. It is not only because of the oppositional stance toward the government but also because of the ideology they express. Families that do not hold a left-wing worldview (and I assume that in the Gaza-envelope kibbutzim most are not, though there are also hostages from Sderot and Ofakim and from the party at Re’im), due to their personal bias adopt a left-wing narrative here. That, too, creates oppositional dynamics, for the government is made up of right-wing actors who, by virtue of being such, tend to a different course of action (the Haredim are not in the game—you do not hear them, not for nothing—and they are also not in the left-right game. They act for their own interest).

Remember, for example, Smotrich’s and Ben-Gvir’s statements at the beginning of the war that advocated an active and resolute course of action that ignores the hostages. Today they do not dare say that, although the operation proceeds in a manner that indeed ignores them (that is the lie from above). Moreover, within the declared war aims at the outset, the return of the hostages was entirely minor. After about two weeks the tune changed, and returning the hostages became the top mission (first among equals). That is the result of the pressure I have described. But, as noted, this is only at the declarative level, which is a collection of lies. Operationally, everyone understands that such an option does not exist, and at the substantive-ideological level a right-wing government, by virtue of being such, is also unwilling to forgo subduing Hamas (although, as noted, I very much doubt this is feasible) in favor of releasing the hostages.