The Attitude toward LGBTQ: Between Facts and Values (Column 579)

With God’s help

Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.

A few days ago I was sent a column written by Rabbi Elai Ofran on LGBTQ issues and conversion therapy. I’ve already written here that I usually identify with what he writes and value him very much (see for example column 569), and precisely because of that it’s important for me to point out problematic aspects in his current piece. I’ll begin with the general picture of the discussion as I see it.

Between facts and norms

In the past I have dealt quite a bit with LGBTQ questions (see for example an interview on the “Kamocha” site). First and foremost there arises here the question of the halakhic prohibition (whether it can be updated or changed), but beyond that there is also the question of one’s personal and public attitude toward the people themselves (which is mainly a moral rather than a halakhic question). Underpinning these discussions lies the question of the relationship between facts and values (this came up mainly in the debate with Prof. Yoram Yovell, Rabbi Ofran’s cousin, in columns 25 – 26). Here I wish to focus on this third plane.

As I’ve explained, the normative question is entirely disconnected from the factual questions. Factually, one may discuss the source of this inclination (genetic, environmental, culture-dependent, agendas and social influence, and so forth). One may also discuss whether it is or isn’t possible to change it and how (and what are the benefits and harms of the various treatments), and more. All these questions are subject to scientific research, and it is that research which ought to answer them. Of course this doesn’t mean that we already have the information (as far as I know, certainly not in full), but in principle they belong to the realm of scientific inquiry.

Beyond these questions there is the normative discussion: is it permitted or forbidden, halakhically and morally. We are not speaking about a prohibition on having such an inclination, of course, but on the act itself. On the halakhic plane, it is accepted that this is forbidden, as part of the severe sexual prohibitions (arayot). The matter is explicit in the Torah, and therefore it appears on its face very difficult to challenge this even within my own approach, which sees many possibilities for changes and updates in halakha. Most of the third book of my trilogy, Walking Among the Standing, is devoted to this topic, and I devoted chapter 35 specifically to LGBTQ.

In that chapter I proposed an interpretive possibility to limit the prohibition, which is strengthened in light of the words of R. Moshe Feinstein. He argued that it cannot be a natural-genetic inclination and that necessarily it is social construction and an evil impulse, since the Torah does not place before a person a challenge he cannot withstand (I don’t know what he would say about kleptomania, for instance). From this I inferred that if we reach the conclusion that R. Feinstein is mistaken and that it is indeed a natural and perhaps even genetic inclination (as far as I know, the role of genetics here has not yet been clarified scientifically), then from his own words the opposite conclusion follows: it cannot be that the Torah forbids this, for it does not present a person with a challenge he cannot overcome. If this argument is correct, then the prohibition would apply only to one who does so out of lust (or to a bisexual), but not to one for whom this is his inclination and he has no other option. But as I wrote there, this is a very forced interpretation, and even in my opinion it is hard to base a halakhic leniency upon it.

There is another charged question that many greatly enjoy brawling over: is this a disease? I’ve explained more than once that this question is meaningless. To my surprise I repeatedly find that even doctors and psychiatrists don’t understand this (see the debate mentioned above with Yovell, and I’ve had others). Contrary to what many think, the concept of “disease” is not well defined, and it cannot be assigned to the factual-scientific plane. It is a normative, not a factual, category, and as such it is not given over to science and scientists, since there is no reasonable way to define “disease” scientifically. One can of course adopt various definitions for professional convenience, but this carries no evaluative content. One can define LGBTQ identity as a disease or not a disease on the professional plane according to different criteria, but that has nothing whatsoever to do with whether it is genetic or not, or with the question of the phenomenon’s origin. This definition reflects only a value attitude of the person himself (who doesn’t want it or does want it) or of society (which rejects or mandates the phenomenon). The American Psychiatric Association removed homosexuality from its manual of symptoms (the DSM) back in the 1970s, but that was clearly part of a process rooted in a normative attitude and not in any scientific determination. One who thinks it’s a negative phenomenon tends to define it as a disease, and one who affirms it—denies that definition. In short, the question whether it is a disease, if it has any meaning at all, reflects a normative stance. As such, medicine and psychiatry have nothing to say about it. They can explain the scientific facts about the phenomenon (at least what is already known), but not determine a value attitude toward it. That is given to each person and to society at large. Professional expertise doesn’t add much with respect to this question (see also in my article “Halakha and Reality”).

The process psychiatry underwent regarding the phenomenon parallels the social process it underwent. Society has changed its attitude to it—from a negative attitude that at times included criminal sanctions, to full legitimacy that is now accepted in most Western countries. It’s hard to determine what’s cause and what’s effect, but it’s clear that the scientific and social processes are intertwined inseparably. This reflects what I wrote here—that we are not dealing with a scientific question, and clothing one’s stances regarding it in a scientific mantle is usually demagoguery. This is true both of the public discourse among laypeople and of the discourse among experts (who also generally do not understand well the complex relation between facts and norms in this debate; see again my exchange with Yoram Yovell, who ultimately admits as much).

In general, there is no point in insisting on this terminology (disease or not) and arguing about it, since it has no important meaning. You can say you oppose the phenomenon without defining it as a disease, or that you don’t oppose it even if it is defined as a disease. Even if we assume for the sake of discussion that there exists an effective treatment to change sexual orientation or perhaps to make living with it easier, it would still be appropriate for a doctor or psychologist to treat a person who has such an inclination even if we don’t define it as a disease, as long as it bothers the patient and he wishes to change his state. And likewise, the doctor and psychologist will of course not treat it even if it is defined as a disease, if their patient does not wish such treatment. So why is it important to brawl over the irrelevant and undefined question of whether this is a disease?!

The social situation

It is important to note that all sides in these polemics suffer from the same fallacies. The conservative-religious side assumes scientific and factual premises in light of its value premises (see R. Feinstein above), and so does the liberal side. There too one tends to tie the value attitude to the facts and the science, again without justification. Needless to say, in recent years this has become a religion in every respect (sometimes dubbed “the progress,” a term I don’t like). They fight against any expression of opinion contrary to the principles of the LGBTQ religion, against books that present other positions, facts, and arguments; demonstrations of a religious-fanatic character are held calling to boycott books, authors, and libraries—just like in the Middle Ages. It seems to me that nowadays we hear mainly about two great fanatical religions in our world that ban books and opinions and treat them with violence (to varying degrees, of course): the extreme wing of Muslim believers and the fanatical wing of the ‘liberal’ sect.

In just the past few days there has been an uproar surrounding the book Irreversible Damage and the publisher Sella Meir. It is impossible to hold a book-launch event because of ‘liberal’ demonstrations and threats. Its insertion into the Bar-Ilan University library stirred commotion and wild slander against the university (see for example here, here, here and many more), which evokes book burnings and the banning of people and opinions on religious grounds that were common in the past. Welcome to the age of progress. Lest there be misunderstandings: conservatives do not conduct a more open discourse either, of course. There too there are assumptions, boycotts, and plenty of prejudices. They don’t even accept findings of scientific research, since in their (not implausible) view everything there is tainted and biased.

Be that as it may, the discourse is far from free. When there are restrictions, silencing, legal prohibitions on various actions (except that now the direction has changed: if once homosexuality was prohibited by law, today the trend is to legally ban conversion therapy to straightness), biased publications, and the like—it’s hard to receive a reasoned position from either side. In such a situation, even what is presented as scientific findings is suspected of bias (and not without basis). It is no wonder that in our world many doubt scientific findings, since one cannot say there is scientific freedom and freedom of research on these topics. Try to conduct a systematic study of conversion therapy today, and I suppose that if you manage at all, the restrictions will be draconian. Whoever tries to obtain funding from EU foundations for a balanced and open study on this issue—good luck to them. So what is the meaning of the claim (which in itself is probably correct) that there are no findings supporting the efficacy of conversion therapy? It is almost impossible to try to collect such findings, and even if there are such, it will be quite difficult to publish them; suspicions will immediately be raised and the matter dismissed out of hand.

There are sporadic yet rather persistent reports of successes of such treatments of various kinds. They usually come from conservative, rabbinic, or Catholic directions, and therefore justified suspicion arises regarding them. Of course the ‘liberal’ attackers are happy to point to this and see in it proof of their claims. Yet under current conditions this is no wonder. Almost no one else is willing to seriously examine such treatments, and certainly not to speak about them openly in the public sphere. It has become a religious (and today at times legal) prohibition, and few will dare go against it. In fact, anyone conducting such research or treatment is automatically portrayed as a conservative, and thus biased. That is, the bias and agenda here are not even a claim but simply a definition. I too have no idea how much truth there is in these reports, and I am not a professional. But I must say that even I—who certainly hold science to be the best tool for clarifying factual questions and do not like anti-scientific fundamentalism—have rather limited trust in the brutal attacks waged against them. My sense is that indeed those reports appear agenda-driven, but many of the attacks against them are rooted more in values and less in science.

I am quite sure there were serious problems in many of these treatments, but that does not mean that such treatment is impossible, or that it is necessarily always harmful. Many treatments in medicine and psychiatry have caused harm and can be harmful. To examine this scientifically requires systematic research and free discourse aimed at examining the state of the proposed treatment, and assessing whether the technique can be improved or must be replaced or even abandoned. Wild agenda-driven attacks do not allow for this today. This is no way to conduct free and rational discourse—neither about values nor about science. And certainly this cannot justify claims that tie values to facts.

And I haven’t yet spoken about the very strong pressures today not to allow adults to decide whether they want to try this treatment. This is already a real infringement of their rights—befitting the militant ‘liberal’ religion. It is possible and proper to require the therapist to present opinions and findings to his client so that the latter can make an informed decision. But for society to decide for him and in his stead and to forbid a therapist and patient from doing what in their view is the appropriate and necessary treatment—that is a policy about which the last thing I can say is that it is liberal.

All this I wrote regarding adults. And what about children? Everyone is horrified by parents deciding on conversion therapy for their child (me too). But even here it’s worth recalling that with respect to gender-reassignment surgeries for children, the wind blows in precisely the opposite direction. There, liberalism pushes strongly against social paternalism and in favor of granting parents the freedom to decide for their children and not to wait until they are adults. And needless to say, the conservatives’ attitudes flip in the two cases (conservatives are for freedom regarding conversion therapy but against it when it comes to gender-reassignment surgery). There are differences between the cases, of course, but this lack of symmetry cries out.

In general, it is very strange to me that in our queer age, in which both values and science go in the exact opposite direction, we try to limit them and even label this ‘liberalism’ and ‘progress.’ Regarding values, in our day the prevailing assumption is that everything is flexible and fluid and can be changed. Regarding science, we live in an era in which genetic surgery and manipulation can change many things, and research examines far more dramatic changes. And despite these assumptions and facts, the devout queers are so insistent on the assumption that sexual orientation (and also inborn gender) cannot and will not be changeable and that people must be forbidden to try to do so. At long last, there is one thing that is essential and unchangeable in our anti-essentialist and technological age. Is this not an indication that we’re dealing with an agenda rather than science?! I, for example, am quite convinced that scientifically we will eventually reach effective techniques to change everything (unless the ‘liberals’ succeed in imposing a ban on scientific research in these directions). Perhaps I’m wrong, but I certainly cannot justify the kind of certitude we find in current discourse, as if it were clear that such treatment is impossible. In light of today’s scientific achievements, I would expect that even if current techniques do not succeed in changing sexual orientation and their use causes harm, there would be extensive scientific research for the sake of those who nonetheless desire this—and I estimate there is a decent chance that this effort would succeed. I certainly would not expect that all attempts to conduct such research be suppressed by force and that despair regarding its chances of success be dictated in advance.

Of course I completely agree that the decision should be that of the individual and not of society, and certainly that this should not be forced on anyone. But that is true in both directions. Value stances and social agendas are not supposed to dictate our attitude to research, and certainly not to supply scientific predictions. It is appropriate to allow those who wish (for example for religious reasons, or simply because it bothers them) to try to change their inclinations, and to allow researchers and therapists to assist them in this. What’s wrong with that? And whence the confidence that there is no chance to find such a technique? It is true that if we don’t look, we certainly won’t find.

In short, the mutual distrust has been built by all of us; both sides earned it honestly with their own hands. Now we stand before a broken trough, since facts and studies can no longer decide what the truth is. In Appendix E of my book God Plays Dice, I pointed to a similar phenomenon with respect to evolution (another charged field that does not allow free expression and research) and with respect to the question of the effect of prayer on medical condition. I always thought it was hard to talk to the religious, but over the years it has become clear to me that in these matters everyone on all sides is religious—hence it’s hard to talk to anyone. A similar state prevails in the discourse between right and left, or between supporters and opponents of the judicial reform. In those debates too there are two ‘religious’ sides, and therefore it is impossible to conduct a discourse. There too there is silencing, boycotts, lack of listening, and a mixing of facts and values that prevents advancing and clarifying the issue—and of course from reaching agreements. See also in column 439 on emotions in our public discourse and their effect upon it.

So much for the background. I now come to Rabbi Ofran’s column, and from here on I will present it in full with my comments interwoven throughout.

What is psychology: between science and treatment

Rabbi Ofran opens his column with a few sentences about the study of psychology and what psychology is:

When I went to study psychology, I thought I would mainly learn theories about personality development, how to diagnose mental disorders and how to treat them, and I was very surprised to discover that this was very much not the case. The subject we studied, both in the bachelor’s and master’s degrees, more than any other area, was statistics. It turns out that to say any meaningful insight about the most complex phenomenon in the world, namely the human psyche, one needs to understand a bit about the analysis of large numbers and research data. The aspiration of psychological research, presumptuous as it may be, is to build theories based on reality, or at least on statistical findings.

I don’t know the undergraduate and graduate curricula in psychology, but I must say that from my acquaintance with psychologists, I have not been very impressed by their deep grasp of statistical thinking. On the contrary, I’ve heard grumbling about the field, a hysterical search for help in doing assignments, and statements about its lack of importance. My impression is that the main expertise (to the extent there is such expertise) of psychologists is indeed in mental disorders and methods of treatment, and much less in statistics. I think among some academic psychology researchers the situation may be a bit different. But of course this is only my general impression. This dissonance between theory and treatment is inherent to psychology and is very important to our discussion here.

I have already described my view of psychology in detail in column 405. I won’t repeat everything here; I’ll just recall one point that is very important for our discussion. The connection between the general theory and the individual methods of treatment is rather tenuous. Psychological treatment is more art than science, and therefore methods of treatment are varied and rely to a large extent on the therapist’s intuitions and perceptions. Some differ from each other, and in some measure are even the opposite. Go and see how many institutes and methods and therapists and psychological theories exist in the marketplace. All claim the crown of wondrous successes (which I find rather dubious), and it doesn’t seem plausible to me that all are based on systematic research and statistically supported.

Psychological theory is for the most part a conceptual framework that stands in the background of treatment, but it is certainly not a specific instruction for the therapist. Why is that important here? Because drawing statistical conclusions at the theoretical level doesn’t say very much about what happens or will happen in the specific treatment of a particular therapist with a particular patient. As Rabbi Ofran writes, people are complex beings. This isn’t only due to inter-individual variability—which statistics does address—but also because of great difficulty defining the relevant parameters (what counts as a successful treatment, how similar the baseline states of people in the study are, and more). And I’m not even talking about psychoanalysis—i.e., the metaphysical fantasies of Jung and Freud that have no connection to science, which many therapists use as the basis of their treatment methods (perhaps successfully).

Statistics can say something about correlations between variables (which in psychology are usually ill-defined and of course rely mainly on self-reports rather than objective measurement). But from there to determinations about a course of treatment, predictions of treatment success, and measurement of success in practice for a specific person—the distance is very great. It is no wonder that many of the techniques used by therapists have not undergone systematic statistical studies but are based on the therapist’s intuitions and experience (and also his worldview).

It is important to clarify that I am not dealing here with the question of whether psychology or psychological treatment succeeds. In my personal view, generally not very much (certainly if we compare the successes to those of rabbis and other charismatic figures to whom people turn; and my impression is that this is not necessarily just placebo—but perhaps real successes). But the question I am dealing with here is different: not whether it succeeds, but whether it is scientific. Even if some treatment succeeds, my impression is that it is mainly because the therapist is an artist (or craftsman), knows how to understand the patient, and to fit a proper treatment to him—less because he is an outstanding scientist.

Psychological treatment (as distinct from research) is decidedly unscientific, since there is much that is subjective in it. Specific techniques and their tailoring to specific people bring about personal successes or failures; what succeeds here fails there, and vice versa. The connection between successes and failures of treatment in a given person and the findings of statistical studies is rather limited. Dismissing a particular therapist’s technique based on psychological theory has quite a bit of speculation in it. If a given therapist chooses a technique that suits the state and personality of a given person, it will be very hard to test this with a critical study on large groups, since it is difficult to isolate variables and to identify groups similar to the case at hand. Even in areas where statistics is more meaningful, where variation between cases is large, it is not correct to infer for a particular case conclusions from statistical findings. By the way, this itself is a very important insight that emerges from studying statistics.

I don’t know how much of all this one hears in the first two degrees in psychology. I hope so, but even if not—I am sure that when the student goes out into practical work he is sadly confronted with the situation I described. Not a few therapists I spoke with told me these things unequivocally. When they went into the field, they threw the theories they had studied at the university behind their backs. Even if these are extreme formulations, it’s clear that these theories have rather limited implications for specific treatment of a specific person.

Historical description

Rabbi Ofran then moves on to a historical description:

For thousands of years humanity tried to make homosexuals change their sexual orientation—up to 40 years ago it was a criminal offense in Israel punishable by imprisonment, and until 35 years ago it was considered a psychiatric disorder requiring treatment. To tell the truth, at least half of humanity thinks so even today (a billion Muslims, a billion and a quarter Catholics, and so on). What has changed in recent years is that we simply discovered that it doesn’t work.

I think this description is tendentious and very exaggerated. I do not know of attempts over thousands of years to make people change their sexual orientation. Indeed there were societies that had prohibitions on male homosexual intercourse and there were societies that very much did not. Since until the last hundred years there was no medical and psychiatric science in the modern sense, it is reasonable that there were no systematic attempts to change people’s sexual orientation. The fact that it was a criminal offense is irrelevant. Perhaps defining the matter as an offense assumed that it can be changed, but that is by no means necessary. They thought it was reprehensible. Whether you agree or not, that doesn’t necessarily relate to the factual-scientific question.

The claim that this is a psychiatric disorder (a disease?) and the contemporary views of Muslims and Catholics can also stand. I already explained above that scientific understanding, even when fully achieved, may relate to whether it is innate and whether it can be changed—but certainly not to whether it is permitted or worthy (contrary to the consensus between R. Feinstein and the liberals). Now we move to the concluding sentence, namely to the question of what we have discovered in recent years:

Decades of attempts at treatments to change orientation have not produced statistically significant results in any meaningful study. All the theories about the mother’s personality and the father’s presence, about the effect of birth order or sexual abuse as causes of homosexual orientation, have been refuted again and again in simple statistical tests. To everyone’s chagrin (including millions of gay people who would be happy to change), in the statistical test—which must be carried out under strict rules and pass the threshold of significance—it turned out that as a method it simply doesn’t work.

I don’t know how many conversion techniques have been seriously tested with scientific tools (critical, systematic, double-blind study on groups that constitute a representative sample), and I have already pointed out above the severe limitations of such tests in psychiatry and psychology. I assume there were a few, and even for those the strict rules of significance thresholds are usually applied only in one direction. One must understand that determining that “it does not work” is not identical to determining that “it did not pass the strict rules of scientific research,” particularly in such a highly versatile field with such high variability as human beings and their psychology. It is certainly possible to say that to date no scientific technique has been proven effective, but that is very far from the sweeping, general claim that “it does not work” (which implicitly assumes that it also will not work and cannot work—an utterly unfounded a priori assumption, as I explained above). As noted above, a similar statement can be made about various treatment techniques that psychologists employ day in and day out, and they nonetheless claim success without anyone protesting.

It is important to emphasize: I am fully in favor of strict rules, and I very much agree that science must meet standards of systematic testing under those rules. Anything that did not meet them is not worthy of the mantle of science. But does that mean it is not true, or “doesn’t work”? There are fields in which I would be more willing to accept such a statement—fields in which variability and complexity are lower than in our field. But precisely in psychology it is very hard for me to accept such decisive and sweeping statements.

Even the theories about the effects of birth order and parenting that were tested scientifically—I doubt those tests. It is very hard to quantify such parameters, and therefore the findings have rather dubious validity. Again: one may say that no scientific evidence was found for these effects, but one cannot assert decisively that they do not exist. And even if these do not exist, can other theories also not exist? Is Rabbi Ofran trying to claim that there is no theory that explains these phenomena? As far as we know, no theory has yet been found that clearly pins this on genetics either. Does sexual orientation, in his view, skip over the principle of causality? Whence does he know the cause if no theory has yet withstood rigorous scientific testing? This smacks of the same deterministic skepticism I described above regarding future successes of such treatments.

Now we get to me:

In certain circles they like to accuse modern psychological research of being dictated by a “progressive agenda.” They do not understand that it’s exactly the opposite—the agenda is the result of decades of research. It’s not that someone decided gays shouldn’t change and then bent all the studies accordingly, but rather that all the studies showed that no method makes gays change, and thus the “agenda” was born.

This, by the way, doesn’t characterize only the crazies in Berkeley. Even in the psychology departments of the universities of Tehran, Moscow, or Manila, they have not succeeded in developing a treatment to change sexual orientation that would pass any convincing statistical test. It turns out that even when the agenda is purely Catholic or Muslim, reality is still reality. This doesn’t mean there aren’t isolated cases and exceptional stories of change, but treatment methods in the modern world are based on comprehensive and orderly studies, not on testimonies of a lone professional—even if he happens to be “one of us.” Reality is not always what we would like it to be.

Again he mixes facts and values. An agenda does not deal with science but with values. Science deals with the phenomenon, its sources, and how to treat or change it. Values, by contrast, deal with whether it is worthy or not, and as noted there is no necessary connection between the two. Tying them together is a philosophical-logical fallacy (David Hume’s is-ought fallacy).

So let us assume for the sake of discussion that he is right—namely, that there is no technique that shows that it works (above I explained the meaning of that determination even if it is correct), not only scientifically-theoretically but also clinically-individually. Does this mean that one must change a value agenda about it? Not necessarily. This fallacy characterizes both sides in the debate: conservatives like R. Feinstein who infer facts (that it’s not innate but a desire) from the value (halakhic) prohibition, and liberals who infer values from facts (that it cannot be changed). Even if I discover that kleptomania is common and cannot be changed in any way, theft will still be forbidden in my opinion. I assume—and hope—in Rabbi Ofran’s as well.

Even if the agenda was born of scientific studies—by no means a clear claim in my view (though there is something to it)—one can still argue with it. Especially since one can also argue on the factual plane, as I explained above. But even if not—the agenda is independent of it. I wonder whether Rabbi Ofran claims that it should not be forbidden halakhically? He does not write this and does not explain the halakhic basis for such a claim. Assuming not, then he himself separates agenda from facts and science; it is unclear to me why he demands that others not do so.

I don’t know whence he draws his information about the universities of Tehran or Manila, and I attribute this to the odd determinism I described above. There is an assumption not only that to date no effective scientific technique exists, but also that none can exist. Therefore a priori it is clear to him that Tehran University did not find it. Perhaps he’s right, but this decisiveness seems to me to bespeak tendentiousness. And I have not even asked what will happen if results of a study in Tehran are ever published on this topic. What reception would they receive in the Western-liberal scientific world? Again, I am not arguing about Tehran’s academic level (though in nuclear physics they are apparently not bad at all), but only against Rabbi Ofran’s tendentious claims.

Scientific research is indeed influenced by value agendas, and denying this is like claiming that the world is flat (see below). Every child sees this every day. As I explained above, this can also explain the absence of orderly reports of successes in such treatments. Even if there are such successes (and I do not know this first-hand), it is very hard to publish such things; people are very reluctant to conduct experiments and research and to publish results that go in the “wrong” direction. In quite a few “progressive” and fashionable places in the West (see the “crazies in Berkeley”) they may lose their livelihoods. And even if such results are published, there will immediately be a boom of denials and challenges which, as noted, need not meet the strict tests that Rabbi Ofran repeats again and again. By the way, in my view quite rightly, since the scientific burden of proof is indeed on the one who claims to have an effective technique and not on the one who challenges it. But this asymmetry works against Rabbi Ofran’s own argument. I have no quarrel with him about scientific method, only about the conclusions he draws from it. It seems to me that today only at Tehran University would they dare conduct such research and publish its findings.

None of this means that such an effective technique exists, or even that there are individual clinical successes—but it certainly pulls the rug out from under Rabbi Ofran’s categorical “doesn’t work” arguments.

At the end of the passage we reach the following key sentences:

This doesn’t mean there aren’t isolated cases and exceptional stories of change, but treatment methods in the modern world are based on comprehensive and orderly studies, not on testimonies of a lone professional—even if he happens to be one of our own. Reality is not always what we would like it to be.

Let’s leave aside his statement about the dependence of treatment methods on studies and statistics. I am not a psychologist, but I decidedly disagree, and I already mentioned that in conversations with several psychologists (completely random, most if not all of whom, I estimate, agree with Rabbi Ofran regarding LGBTQ) this was also their view.

In any case, in this passage he himself distinguishes between scientifically valid theory and clinical success. So what is his claim? This is precisely what I wrote above. How does this align with the categorical “doesn’t work”? “Not scientifically valid” and “doesn’t work” are two different statements—certainly in psychology. How did we move from the absence of a scientifically valid technique to a recalcitrant “reality”? Why do the theoretical findings, even if we fully accept them, preclude the possibility of success in an individual treatment (tested or untested) by a particular therapist with a particular patient?

In his concluding passage, which, ironically, comes right after the apparent admission of the distinction between theory/statistics and individual treatment, he arrives at an especially absolute and total formulation:

This story isn’t even complex. There aren’t two sides here, and the truth is not somewhere in the middle. It’s strikingly similar to Copernicus and Galileo, who were denounced by the Church because their scientific findings did not fit the belief of the Holy Council of Bishops. With all due regret, the findings of decades of research have been unequivocal—the harm of these treatments is vastly greater than the benefit. To claim that therapists’ mouths are being shut or that treatment is being denied to those who want it is about like claiming that the earth is flat, or that pertussis vaccines are unnecessary. Such an opinion exists in the world, but those who care about their children’s lives don’t take it seriously.

Indeed there has been harm from treatments that were done, and it is proper to prevent these and to supervise therapists’ conduct. But this is true on the scientific plane, and it is true for those treatments that were examined. From here to saying that this is akin to claiming the earth is flat—the distance is vast. I will again note that in my view his statements about the lack of dependence of findings on agenda are the ones that smack of “flat earth.” My assessment is that even his own article is a clear product of an agenda that leads to problematic and tendentious conclusions.

When examining such a categorical statement, it is worth noting that the earth’s flatness (i.e., spherical earth) is a known, unchanging fact (at least for now), and there indeed one can criticize the Church for denying it. But in our case we are dealing with a value, not with facts—especially since the facts can indeed be discovered to be changeable. This comparison itself seems to me somewhat demagogic. With all the (meager) respect I have for psychology, it is hard for me to accept the claim that we are dealing with a field similar to physics with its direct visual observations.

His ending about those who care for their children’s lives is also part of that demagoguery. The discussion concerns first of all adults and leaving the autonomy over their fate in their own hands and not in the hands of liberal political commissars. And even regarding children—where I agree more—I will recall what I described above about the strange asymmetry of liberals’ (and conservatives’) attitudes between statements about sexual orientation and their attitude toward children’s transgenderism.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it is important to note that I write these things precisely from a liberal and anti-fundamentalist point of view (i.e., pro-science). On the factual plane, in my eyes science is the best tool we have to examine factual issues, and I really dislike disparaging it and rejecting proven scientific findings—certainly not in religious discourse. But precisely because of this I do not like taking the name of science in vain. It is not only wrong but also harmful, because it plays into the hands of fundamentalists who, on the basis of such statements, cast doubt on science’s truly valid findings and on claims that are genuinely based upon them.

On the value plane I also agree with Rabbi Ofran’s starting point. It is very important in my view to protect LGBTQ people from violations of their rights, and certainly not to force on them treatments they do not want—though it is indeed proper to restrain their excesses in the public discourse (even though it is understandable, as a justified result of long-term frustration). I also think it is proper to impose reasonable regulation on treatments that may cause harm. I also think that values should not be mixed with facts, and certainly facts should not be subordinated to values. So far, the agreements.

But to bury one’s head in the sand and say there is no such mixing on the liberal side (only on the conservative side) is itself ignoring facts. One could defend the liberal thesis in a more moderate way: say that the facts aren’t clear, and for now we do not know of scientific support for the effectiveness of any treatment. Without guessing what will be in the future and without dismissing individual, personal reports—and without comparing this to believers in a flat earth. All this can be done without enlisting science and statistics into realms where they do not really belong—and certainly without throwing at only one side of the map a blame that exists on both sides. It is also advisable not to take the name of science in vain, and not to issue decisive predictions about the future—particularly those that are, on their face, implausible (such as the prediction that an effective conversion technique will never be found), which in my assessment do not really align with the facts and values known to us today, according to which almost everything can be changed—if not now, then in the future. Soon they will clone us all genetically; thinking machines already replace us; they will perform brain surgery to make a person more intelligent; there is talk of machine consciousness; turning people blond, dark-skinned, or pink; stingy, believers or atheists—everything, truly everything, will be. Only changing sexual orientation—this will never happen, and this can be said with certainty already now. Strange.

Conclusions about the discourse

Rashi on Genesis 3:3–4 writes:

(3) “Nor shall you touch it”—she added to the command; therefore she came to detriment, as it is said (Proverbs 30:6) “Do not add to His words.” “You shall not surely die”—he pushed her until she touched it; he said to her: just as there is no death in touching, so there is no death in eating.

Eve added to God’s command not to eat from the tree an additional prohibition—not to touch the tree. The serpent used this to show her that there is no prohibition to eat from it (incidentally, he only proved there is no harm from touching, not that there is no prohibition—again, mixing norms with facts). This is what our cousins the jurists call “broadening the front.” When you defend a thesis that is too strong, your defense is usually weaker rather than stronger—because it is easier to attack and topple a strong thesis. One who wants to defend the Talmud by claiming that its sages were supernal beings endowed with divine inspiration will soon find himself collapsing before simple facts. It is better to defend modest theses that are closer to the truth. It may be less flashy, but it is far more effective.

In our case as well, it turns out that an overly strong and ardent defense of a correct idea—“broadening the front”—can shoot that idea and its supporters in their own foot. When you tell conservatives that they are not discriminated against, that public and scientific discourse is open and unbiased, that there are no agenda effects on the liberal side, and that science determines they are wrong, etc., etc.—this is not a recommended recipe for persuading any of them. On the contrary: such implausible claims will only arouse frustration and an overreaction (a conservative backlash), just as on the liberal side we see an overreaction against long-standing conservative suppression (this article, in my view, is part of that). As I explained, one can defend the liberal thesis on a narrower and more reasonable front. Here you have a claim in psychology that I fully accept (though I don’t know if it has scientific and statistical validation).