Michi’s Three New Laws: The Self-Echo Fallacy (Column 571)
With God’s help
Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.
In Column 517 I discussed the four Michi Laws (the term isn’t mine), which concern failures that surface in our judgments about positions and other people. These laws point to the (unfortunate) fact that I usually judge myself pragmatically (even if the theory is problematic, I forgive myself because practically I’m fine), whereas I usually judge the other theoretically (because his theory is bad even if his practice is fine). Needless to say, that usually works out very conveniently for me, and a bit less conveniently for him (see also Column 507). In this column I wish to add three more Michi Laws, which also deal with faulty judgments about other people and their actions, but focus on the relation between actions and the motives of the person performing them.
A WhatsApp exchange about moving Hungary’s embassy to Jerusalem
A few days ago I was sent this article about Hungary’s decision to move its embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. Beneath it someone wrote:
Birds of a feather flock together… and both graduated from your school… Shame! Shame! Shame!
The intent is, of course, the well-known friendship between Orbán, the president of Hungary, who is perceived as a nationalist who violates human rights, and our beloved, revered Bibi. This act was read as an expression of the reprehensible friendship between the two.
Someone else in the group added:
There is room to suspect that Orbán, as a populist leader who seizes independent media and appoints judges personally loyal to him, is a Hungarian starling who found an Israeli raven.
I won’t get into how reprehensible our Orbán really is, if at all—if only for the fact (here’s a disclosure) that yours truly is a devoted citizen of the Hungarian empire, one who even receives persuasion letters from Orbán before elections there. Still, I cannot help noting that my initial tendency is not to believe media portrayals of him all that much. I see the descriptions of the State of Israel’s conduct, and of various figures here (mainly from the right), in the world press (and at home) as an apartheid state and other baseless nonsense, and I understand that the value of journalistic depictions of right-wing leaders (especially if they are friends of Israel, all the more so if they are friends of Bibi the raven) is quite limited. Not for nothing are our friends in the world usually leaders from the right, since the left typically opposes us (as is known, they are always for the “weak.” For them everything is allowed—see “The Racism of Low Expectations”). But for the purposes of the present discussion I will assume that this Orbán is in fact a reprehensible person. We still need to discuss the premise underlying that message.
When I received that message I responded as follows:
What’s shameful? That there’s a country behaving normally and free of the global brainwash? A point in Orbán’s favor. Black-and-white thinkers judge acts by the actor rather than people by their acts.
The claim is that we have a tendency to judge actions by the person who performs them. If it’s an act by a person we deem reprehensible, the act will be judged strictly and perceived as reprehensible as well. Instead of judging the person by his acts, we judge the act by the person who did it. I know the author isn’t truly opposed to moving embassies to Jerusalem—on the contrary, he strongly supports it. But if Orbán does it—then it’s apparently a reprehensible act, because someone like him couldn’t do the right thing. That’s how we arrive at black-and-white judgment: there are people who are all black and people who are all white. If he’s black, then by definition all his deeds are black, and vice versa. Needless to say, within so fatalistic a framework, that person has no chance of escaping the status he holds in our eyes. He is condemned to remain black forever.
In my view, precisely because Orbán is so reprehensible in the eyes of the media and the liberal world—rightly or not—he is indifferent to their criticism and brainwashing, since in any case he will be wicked in their eyes. There you have the advantage of being presumed wicked: you can do the right thing without fearing the brainwash you’ll receive from the knights of liberal morality. Thus, the wicked—or those considered wicked—can sometimes do the right thing.
The starling and the raven: judging the act vs. judging the actor
My claim was that one should judge the act in itself and not through the actor. In response they cited the proverb (Chullin 65a): “The starling did not go to the raven for nothing, but because he is of his kind.” Both are non-kosher birds, and no wonder they connect with one another. This proverb indeed speaks to the actor and not the act, and seemingly the Talmud too evaluates actions via the actors.
To that I say that, as a starting point, this cannot be correct. Actions should be judged in themselves, and the actor can be judged in light of them—not the other way around. A person is bad if his acts are bad; it’s not that the act is bad because the person is bad. Therefore, even this rabbinic maxim will not persuade me to judge according to the actor. I infer that its intent is likely to say that if one sees a bad person doing a bad act, there is room to suspect that this didn’t happen by chance: a bad person tends to do bad acts. Therefore, when he did a bad act, his intent was probably bad. But if he does a good act—there is no necessity to assume his intent was bad. And even if so—the act itself is good.
Incidentally, in its Talmudic source the proverb speaks about animals and is not presented as a parable for humans. With animals, whose actions flow deterministically from their nature, indeed the starling doesn’t go to the raven for nothing. But with human beings it is a matter of choice, and their nature does not necessarily dictate the character of their actions. It can result from a decision they took against their nature. And even if one speaks of a bad person by choice rather than nature, even that doesn’t dictate that every one of his actions is bad.
The question of cost
Someone else remarked that Orbán didn’t really pay a price for the act and therefore doesn’t deserve appreciation for it. To this I wrote that one should appreciate a right act even if the actor didn’t pay a price for it. Moreover, he does pay a price for his actions, except that here the price for this specific act is swallowed up by the overall price (his condemnation in the media and liberal society). Again, we see the same black-and-white perspective that insists on withholding appreciation from a bad person even if he did a good deed. The truth is that bad people can do good deeds, and sometimes, as noted, being (considered) bad enables them to do good deeds.
The question of complexity: between gratitude and judgment
I have often emphasized the need to judge things or actions in a nuanced way (see, for example, Column 29, 90, 244, 372, and more). An action can be good in one respect and bad in another. So even if Orbán did what he did to curry favor with Netanyahu—so what? Do all of us perform good deeds only from pure motives? Is every charity we give devoid of interest or the desire to feel satisfied, and the like? When a person performs a good deed, he deserves credit for it, even if his motives are mixed—good and self-interested together. In Shabbat 31 there is a dispute between R. Shimon bar Yochai and R. Yehuda regarding the appreciation due to the Romans for establishing markets and bathhouses. R. Yehuda’s claim there is that we should acknowledge gratitude to them even if their motives were bad. In the end, they benefited us.
But that concerns the question of gratitude and is not necessarily relevant to the question of judging the person and the act. It may be that gratitude depends on the act and not on the motive (I owe him thanks since, after all, I benefited from what he did), but the judgment of the person certainly depends on motive. Therefore here I advance a more modest claim: motives may well be mixed, both good and bad, and in such a case our judgment should recognize both components and not erase one in favor of the other.
The question of motives and circularity
Even if Orbán’s motives were bad—which is by no means certain—there is still no reason to say that the act is bad. In Column 372 I drew a distinction between judging an act and judging a person. My claim was that the act is judged according to what it is, but the person is judged according to his motives. If so, there is room to judge Orbán the person negatively—if we concluded that his motives were bad—even if the act, in itself, is positive. But this brings us to the question of circularity.
For our conclusion about Orbán’s motives derives from our evaluation of him as a bad person—especially since the act in question is, in itself, good. So why presume a bad motive? Only because I hold that he is a bad person. But if so, there is blatant circularity here. This act is adduced as evidence for his problematic character, but that “evidence” rests on the premise that his motive for this (positive) act was bad. And how do I know they were bad? Because he is a bad person, and “as is known,” a bad person always acts from bad motives. Thus the assumption that he is bad returns to reinforce the conclusion that he is bad. Sounds circular, doesn’t it? Had I not assumed he was bad, I would have judged this act positively, and from there concluded that he is a good person. The assumption that he is bad leads to the conclusion… that he is bad. Since we are dealing with an act that, in my eyes, is positive in itself, then if I want to avoid circularity the proper conclusion is that the act actually undermines my current evaluation of him (that he is a bad person). Behold—he did a good deed.
Self-echo
This is the phenomenon of “self-echo.” A person who holds a certain view, position, or evaluation about a person or event will relate to every phenomenon connected to the object of his views in a way that recurs and reinforces them. Thus our views echo again and again, and the facts we encounter don’t change them. This echo fixes our views and renders them unchangeable and irrefutable. If, in my eyes, a person is bad, nothing he does—however positive—will help him. He will always remain bad, and his actions, even if manifestly good, will only recur to strengthen my perceptions of him.
This of course links to the echo phenomenon I discussed elsewhere, especially in the context of the media and social networks (see Column 335, 451, and more). Social networks and websites present us with data, arguments, and articles that will “please” us, connect us with people and writers in our own image, and thereby echo our positions again and again. That’s how our sense of absolute justice about our views arises. But here we’re speaking of self-echo, not echoing done to us from the outside. This echo we do to ourselves via circular judgments like the one I described here.
Alongside the Michi Laws mentioned above, I can now formulate two new Michi Laws:
- The Factual Law (Motives). When one sees a person performing an act, negative or positive—if it’s not me or my friends (i.e., if he is bad in my eyes)—then in both cases his motives are obviously dark. If it’s me or my friend (i.e., if he is good in my eyes), then the act in both cases should be attributed to noble motives.
- The Normative Law (Judgment). If it’s a positive act, then one must judge the other according to his motives (which I determined circularly under the first Michi Law), whereas I should be judged by my acts and not my motives (which in any event are, of course, always noble). For a negative act—naturally, the reverse.
But that’s still not self-echo. It is built on these two and adds another story on top of them.
The connection to confirmation bias
These failures evoke the association of confirmation bias, according to which a person tends to interpret information he encounters in a way that fits his current views. There is indeed a connection between the failures, but they are not identical. Confirmation bias exists when the information before me allows two interpretations, and I choose the one that fits my assumptions. Alternatively, from among all the information before me I choose to focus on the portion that confirms my current views. But here we are dealing with information that ostensibly contradicts my views, and I force an interpretation to confirm them. Up to this point these are the two Michi Laws presented above. Beyond this, however, there is the problem of circularity that does not exist in confirmation bias. Here I use my interpretation to return and confirm and reinforce my views. Confirmation bias is a fallacy because it is not necessary; self-echo is a fallacy because it is not true.
This brings me to the third Michi Law:
- After you have reached the conclusion that the other’s motives are dark and bad, you may, by virtue of this, further strengthen your view that he is a bad person.
This is already a step beyond confirmation bias as such (which deals only with interpreting things without the conclusions drawn from it).
Is the circularity necessarily problematic?
On second thought, the picture I drew deserves discussion. Suppose I know Orbán to be a very bad person. He has no interest in doing good. Then it makes sense to assume that his act, even if in itself positive, stemmed from dark motives (i.e., from self-interest, and certainly not from a desire to benefit or to do the right thing). If so, I truly conclude that Orbán’s act was an unworthy act. This is, to my mind, a reasonable and warranted conclusion. If so, my conclusion is that Orbán here did another bad deed. So why isn’t this further evidence that he is a bad person? In practice he did a bad deed, no? Why should it matter what led me to the conclusion that he is bad? If the bottom line of my conclusion is that a bad deed was done, then again there is additional confirmation of his being bad.
I will try to formulate this argument more precisely:
Assumption A: My certainty in judging the goodness or badness of a person and his acts depends on the number of bad deeds (i.e., deeds done from bad motives) he performs.
Assumption B: In light of what Orbán has done so far, I assume that he is probably a bad person who does bad deeds with a certainty level of 80%.
Assumption C: A bad person generally acts from bad motives.
Intermediate Conclusion 1 (from B–C): Moving the embassy to Jerusalem is a deed likely done from bad motives.
Intermediate Conclusion 2 (from A and Intermediate Conclusion 1): My certainty that Orbán is probably a bad person who does bad deeds has increased (say, to 90%).
Q.E.D.
What, exactly, is wrong with this argument? Is self-echo truly a fallacy? Perhaps it is merely a warranted and consistent inference from one’s premises?
Does a bad person always act from bad motives?
In principle one can challenge Assumption C. Consider, for example, a cruel Nazi who murders Jews in cold blood. He now sees a suffering dog, brings it home, and cares for it. Were his motives necessarily bad here? Is it not possible that he does good deeds from good motives? Likewise, when he sees a person in need of help and comes to his aid (my wife’s grandmother fled with her daughter from Germany in 1939, and the people who helped her load her suitcases onto the train were two polite S.S. officers). Such a person has a distorted conception that one may and ought to murder Jews, but in other aspects of his life he can certainly function as a good person. Therefore, even if I concluded that a person is bad, there is no necessity that all his deeds are done from bad motives. Still, I will continue the discussion assuming Assumption C is indeed correct.
Example: Becoming religious and leaving religion
I believe I have given this amusing example in the past. Suppose a person becomes religious (does teshuva). His former, secular friends tend to explain this on a psychological plane (he had a crisis, his grandmother died, he broke up with his girlfriend, etc.). His new, religious friends explain it on a philosophical plane. He discovered the “light of lights of truth” (a phrase from the letters of the Chazon Ish). What about someone who leaves religion? There the situation is reversed: his former, religious friends offer psychological explanations (he wanted to permit forbidden relationships to himself), whereas his new, secular friends explain it philosophically (he realized he had been living in error and finally decided to abandon the primitive, ridiculous notions he had held).
I have pointed out more than once the tendentiousness in such interpretations. Each of us dons the hat of psychologist or philosopher according to our stance—whatever is more convenient and suitable for us. And still one can ask: so who is right? Seemingly both sides are right. Every human action can be interpreted on a philosophical plane and on a psychological plane, and there is no contradiction between them. These are parallel layers of explanation (see at length in the fourth gate of my book, That Which Is and That Which Is Not), and both can be true at once. When one looks at psychological motives one obtains an explanation on that plane, and when one focuses on the philosophical plane one obtains philosophical explanations.
Yet there seems to be tendentiousness nonetheless: each group prefers to focus on the plane convenient to it. If a person takes a step that fits my view, I am a philosopher; if he takes a step that contradicts my views, I suddenly become a psychologist. That is, even if both interpretations are true, the choice of which to emphasize seems biased. What an objective person ought to do is discuss matters on the philosophical plane. The psychological plane is irrelevant to the debate, even if it is true. If a person takes some step and presents arguments that justify it, I should engage those arguments philosophically and ignore his psychological motives. Those are his affair alone and/or his psychologist’s.
But that is not quite accurate. Consider a religious person whose friend leaves religion. Philosophically, he thinks it’s a mistaken step, since from his perspective religiosity is the correct and rational path. He now asks himself: why is that friend taking an irrational/immoral—or, more generally, unjustified—step? The obvious answer is psychological. Apparently there was a crisis that led him to deviate from the path of reason, hence he made a mistaken decision. Likewise with a secular person looking at someone who became religious. In his view it is natural to attribute this to psychological explanations, since in his opinion there is no philosophical justification for it. The same goes for steps that accord with my view, secular or religious. When I see someone taking a step that is reasonable in my eyes, why should I seek psychological explanations? It is natural to attribute it to rational consideration (i.e., to adopt a philosophical explanation).
The conclusion is that what at first glance looks biased is, in fact, reasonable and logical. It just indicates that each person is consistent with his views. We expect a person to analyze reality in light of his assumptions and views. This is nothing but basic consistency. If so, the same would seem to apply to the case of self-echo: what appears to be a circular fallacy is merely consistent judgment, warranted inference from my assumptions and intermediate conclusions.
Why isn’t it analogous?
In the example of becoming or leaving religion, this analysis is indeed correct. There it isn’t necessarily tendentiousness, but warranted consistency. In the case of self-echo, however, the situation seems different. Why? Because there I bring “evidence” for my view that rests on begging the question. The strength of the “evidence” is the strength of the assumption. If so, it isn’t reasonable that such evidence will return and bolster the strength of that very assumption on which it is based. And yet one can still wonder where the mistake lies in the logical structure I presented above.
Surprisingly, it seems the mistake is precisely in what appears to be the most innocent premise in the argument: Assumption A. It is not true that the number of bad deeds determines my certainty about the badness of the person performing them. It depends on how I know they are bad. If I “know” they are bad only because I assess him to be a bad person, then the conclusion that this act was done from bad motives is probably correct (i.e., it follows from my assumptions), but it is not correct to infer from it that my degree of certainty about his badness should increase beyond my current assessment.
I will now offer two further examples of similar failures, where I judge the person before me by his motives and thus allow myself to ignore the arguments he raises.
First example: the soldiers who were killed in the attack
A few days ago there was a report of an attack by an Egyptian soldier in Sinai in which three of our soldiers were killed. Two of the three were a male soldier and a female soldier who guarded together at an isolated post for twelve hours. On Channel 14 there was a reporter who argued that this is an impossible situation and raised the possibility that perhaps those soldiers were engaged in other matters, and therefore the Egyptian succeeded in killing them. Predictably, the Pavlovian criticism of Channel 14 and its tendencies erupted. Setting aside whether it is appropriate to consider the families’ grief and postpone this discussion for later, shortly after the mourning period, the claim itself certainly warrants examination. It obviously has implications for the roles of female soldiers, the nature of their service, and proper integration. But the outcry against Channel 14 didn’t allow a serious discussion of this claim on its merits.
Here I wanted to focus on another criticism raised by Rotem Izak on YNET, where she explained that the criticism in question is designed to prevent the service of women and to perpetuate their military and social exclusion. Beyond the question of my view about exclusion claims, and beyond the question of whether preventing exclusion justifies deploying women in the army in a way that is not appropriate (assuming it is not appropriate), the toughest question is: even if we assume all this is true and the criticism is indeed meant to exclude women, does that mean the arguments of the criticism are wrong? If indeed the joint guard of a male and female soldier at an isolated post is improper militarily and humanly, then that requires discussion and examination. What to do about the exclusion of women that follows is a good question to be debated separately. It doesn’t sound reasonable to operate for the sake of non-exclusion of women at the price of their lives. I imagine that soldier would have preferred to live, even if somewhat excluded, rather than to die in perfect equality.
Again, the discussion of the proponent’s motives replaces engagement with the argument itself. True, if the argument is incorrect, then there is room to probe the proponent’s motives (why is he advancing incorrect arguments? Probably to exclude women—much like with becoming or leaving religion). But the author didn’t even bother to present the claim that the criticism is incorrect, much less to substantiate it. She immediately jumped to the proponent’s motives, and in her view that sufficed to exhaust the discussion.
We can formulate this in a way that fits the self-echo fallacy more closely: Rotem Izak came to prove that Channel 14 and its gang are misogynists. And behold the proof: they raise an incorrect claim only because it will help them exclude women. How does she know the claim is incorrect? Because the proponent is a misogynist and because his claim leads to misogynistic conclusions. This is precisely the circularity I described above. At the very least it is confirmation bias, if one assumes that two interpretations are equally possible. And if one chooses, for some reason, not to ignore the ordinary human urges of a 19-year-old boy and girl on duty together in an isolated post for many hours, it seems there is even self-echo here.
Second example: Haredi female apologetics
Another example of this phenomenon can be found in the many articles and interviews recently published by Haredi spokespeople explaining their position. Usually these are journalists who appear to the public as open and familiar with broader society, and time and again people are surprised to discover that they hold the full set of Haredi beliefs and dogmas with all their might, just like any yeshiva man. Here is my self-echo fallacy in a nutshell: my sense is that a Haredi person who is open to general society and familiar with its arguments cannot truly hold these foolish dogmas, and therefore I tend to interpret this as a desire to ingratiate themselves with their Haredi peers who criticize their “dissolute” lifestyle and openness to society at large. Expressing emphatically Haredi positions in the astonished ears of the general public indeed gives them satisfaction and perhaps even points among their peers. But to avoid the fallacy and the circularity entailed in it, I will leave this interpretation as is and not adduce these utterances as proof for my thesis.
A clear example is Naama Lerner’s op-ed in Haaretz: “You don’t want us to serve or to work, you want to change us. Not happening.” From the headline you can already grasp the gist. I copy here the entire article since, in my estimation, many readers may be highly impressed by it—by both its arguments and its author.
| My name is Naama. I am Haredi. My sons and grandsons do not work; they study in Talmudei Torah and kollel. My husband, too, studied Torah until about seven years ago, and for thirty years I was the sole breadwinner. At fifty he began working in a Torah position. If you ask me, I would have been happier had he continued to study Torah.
I am seventh generation in the country. My grandparents lived here and maintained a Haredi way of life long before the State of Israel was established. My grandchildren look back and see nine generations of Torah life in this place. None of us has any intention of breaking this chain of generations. I am the sector you love to hate. I am the sector that lives in a way that contradicts all the values you recently imported here and that you promote so vigorously. I don’t suit your taste—with what you see as stagnation, ignorance, laziness, fearfulness, and primitiveness. You pity me, a discriminated and oppressed woman (who doesn’t even understand that she is), channeled to bondage, inferiority, childbearing, and taking care of the family’s livelihood, instead of personal development. A handmaid. You are condescending to me, eager to educate me to what seems to you the pinnacle of enlightenment, trying to save me from myself. Give up on drafting the Haredim. The solution is shortening mandatory service. Democracy contradicts the beliefs of the Haredim. Do Haredi women want to advance at work? Yes, very much. But to tell the truth, I think your concern for my rights as a Haredi woman is not sincere. I also think that the reason you press our sector to go out to work and to enlist in the army is not concern for Israel’s economy or security. You don’t really fear the state’s economic collapse. Haredi households rely on a single breadwinner (who pays income tax like any other citizen). I know many secular families that rely on a single breadwinner. No one attributes to them the state’s future economic deterioration. Certainly no one scorns them or sees them as parasites. You also don’t really need us in the army, with the stringent kashrut, Shabbat, and modesty constraints we bring with us. So why is it important to you that we work and enlist? You want us to assimilate. You want to melt us in the melting pot you created, which runs through the army and the world of work. And above all, you are very angry when we don’t cooperate. You have learned nothing from the attempt to melt new immigrants upon the state’s establishment. That was bad then, and it’s awful now. No, we don’t want to assimilate, and we do not intend to give up our identity and a way of life entirely different from yours. Consumer culture and a life of comfort are foreign to us. We measure quality of life in a completely different way. We see value precisely in lives of modesty and contentment. We spend our best money on establishing large families and on fully paying for the education that we see as optimal. You exalt the individual’s right to freedom, equality, and a life of comfort. We exalt the individual’s duties—toward his Creator and his community. You pity me, a discriminated and oppressed woman (who doesn’t even understand that she is), channeled to bondage, inferiority, childbearing, and taking care of the family’s livelihood, instead of personal development. A handmaid. A large portion of the welfare and communal services that exist today in Israel, and that often replace the state, were founded, are managed, and are even funded with private money by Haredim. Yad Sarah, Ezer Mizion, Kav LaChaim, Ezra LaMarpeh, Meir Panim, Magen LaCholeh, Zichron Menachem, and hundreds more associations currently sustain Israel’s welfare system, and most of their money comes from donations by Haredi yeshiva men who scrimp to fund this activity. We do enough. But none of this satisfies you, because we do it out of commitment to the community and not to the state and its values. It is not our deeds that are bad in your eyes but our values. With all the pluralism and the desire to include others, you want us all to share the same value system. Thus you embrace minorities or populations with differences—when those differences exist within your value framework. Anyone who challenges those values is unworthy of inclusion. The national-religious are one example. Seemingly, people who are not a burden on the state—working, educated, serving in the army—but their enlistment and participation in the workforce cannot compensate for the great ideological chasm between you. Enlistment and going to work will not hide the vast chasm between us either. Perhaps, if you want to be the responsible adult, instead of arranging us jobs and an army, demonstrate pluralism—toward us. And still, the past few weeks taught us that it is right to try to reduce the depth of the chasm, and I am also sure it is possible. But it requires a brave, honest, open, and above all respectful, non-condescending discussion on both sides. A discussion that doesn’t try to change the other side but to understand its motives. I believe that if we try, we’ll be surprised. It may be that each side will find itself softening a red line or two due to new understanding. It may be that one side will understand why something that seems esoteric to it is so significant to the other side—and will yield. Maybe. Hopefully. I found myself demonstrating with them in Gan Sacher a few weeks ago. A Haredi woman, who has nothing to do with the judicial reform. You yourselves pushed me there. Meanwhile, the way the Haredi society copes with your hatred and condescension is by separatism and seclusion. And paradoxically, with all the difficulty of bearing the filth flung at us, it’s easier for us that way. You draw the border between us, and that serves us well. The yeshiva boys who danced a few weeks ago outside MK Aryeh Deri’s house in front of the protesters against the judicial reform may not have known what differentiates them from those demonstrating opposite them. But after the hi-tech guy sprinkled money over their heads, they understood very well why they are taught to flee anything that smells of money and to yearn for the scent of Torah. And in recent months there are plenty more examples. I myself am very left-wing in my views. On most issues I am very far from the national-religious sector. And yet I found myself demonstrating with them in Gan Sacher a few weeks ago. A Haredi woman, who has nothing to do with the judicial reform. You yourselves pushed me there. Think about it, and perhaps consider a new course. The author works to promote the human rights of people with disabilities |
From her words it is clear that the author knows secular society well and its feelings toward the Haredim. There’s no doubt she is familiar with it (an ordinary Haredi woman does not write an op-ed for Haaretz). My aim here is not to enter the collection of fallacies and demagoguery you can find in the article (and in many like it), but mainly to point out one issue connected to this column. Suppose she is right. Suppose all the critics’ motives are only to unravel the chain of generations and eradicate the Haredim and eliminate Harediness. Does that mean the critics’ arguments are incorrect? Does that mean there is equality in bearing the burden—or that equality isn’t important? What has one got to do with the other? Again we witness a focus on motives in order to flee a substantive discussion of the content.
Sometimes I wonder whether the Haredi speakers now heard under every green tree don’t themselves understand the absurdity of their arguments. Their righteousness and self-confidence (if not feigned) indicate that apparently not. How is it possible that intelligent people don’t realize they are talking nonsense? How can they truly believe there is no difference between the Haredi community’s contribution to the economy and that of other communities? How do they fail to see the problem of not sharing the burden? How do they not understand that declamations about democracy not suiting them are hardly consistent with their blatant, cynical use of democracy to advance sectoral interests and to defend against harm to those interests? In my estimation not a few readers of her article will feel discomfort in the face of the mirror set before their eyes: how are we persecuting such a perfect society that cleaves to its values? Where is our liberalism? She testifies that she is left-wing, and along with her so are most Haaretz readers, so no wonder such feelings arise in her and in them. The leftist is always for the weak (excuse me: the “weakened”). He always feels pangs of conscience when weakness is presented to him. He is allergic to power. The question of justice, of course, interests him not one bit. Two assumptions always stand before his eyes: the weak is always weakened, and the weakened is always right (and therefore the weakening party, real or imagined, is always guilty).
I cannot avoid noting that in this case the author is a woman—and that matters a great deal. Haredi women are ignorant in the Torah realm, and to the extent of the ignorance so is the extent of the religious-Haredi zeal and devotion. That’s how they are raised. They have not a drop of halakhic-Torah understanding, and they are educated to think that every silly detail someone decreed descended from Sinai. A yeshiva man or just a Haredi man has at least studied Torah and can know what is essential law, what is custom, what is meta-halakhic Torah policy, and what is just the whim of some rabbi or askan. They at least can know this, even if they don’t always use that ability. But women don’t have the tools to understand any of this. They were raised to think that every Jew need only study Torah so as not to sever the chain of generations. They are required to self-sacrifice for values whose source they have no idea of, and whether they have any validity. They do not imagine that perhaps the rabbi who leads them is mistaken, or that he doesn’t know what he’s talking about. They have never studied the parameters of the mitzvah of Torah study, and I assume they don’t really know history either—otherwise they would know that such a situation never existed (the chain she doesn’t want to sever is about fifty years old, and of course it exists only thanks to the State of Israel and only within it and under its support). As a Haredi woman, she has not the faintest idea who invented the values for which she is ready to sacrifice her life (and especially others’ lives), but that doesn’t detract one whit from her zeal. On the contrary, her zeal is built on that ignorance.
Secular people’s sense that Haredi women are subjugated to male chauvinism and excluded from society arouses in those women feelings of frustration. They genuinely feel that this is not true. They strongly identify with those values and with their own exclusion. What they don’t understand is that this identification is produced by preserving their pristine ignorance and denying them the tools and possibilities to critique those demands and to shape an independent position regarding them. This is a classic case of false consciousness—see Columns 203 – 204 and 233—as much as I dislike that paternalistic term.
One can indeed debate whether this is confirmation bias or self-echo. It does not seem she adduces proof for her claims from her interpretation of secular criticism, and therefore there is no circularity. Seemingly she brings substantive (albeit absurd) arguments, and from them concludes that if one wants to impose equality on the Haredim without justification, then the motive is apparently to make them abandon their religion. There is likely confirmation bias here, but even more so the fallacy of appeal to motive. If so, she violates Michi Laws 1–2, but not necessarily 3.
Returning to our topic, all these remarks are meant to sharpen the central claim: if you are ignorant and have no substantive arguments, focus on motives. That way you can avoid engaging with substantive arguments.
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In the first example, I think the fallacy is different: the assumption of the requested and not ad hominem.
You wrote “How do I know that this argument is not true? Because the arguer is a chauvinist and that his argument leads to chauvinist conclusions.”
But I think it is actually “How do I know that this argument is not true? Because it leads to chauvinist conclusions. How do I know that the arguer is a chauvinist? Because his argument is chauvinist”.
I think this is so according to my arguments with people who are usually of my opinion when I argue something that leads to a conclusion that contradicts my beliefs. They conclude from this that I am in the other camp.
The argument does not lead to chauvinistic conclusions but to chauvinistic implications. The result is the exclusion of women, but that does not mean that the real purpose of this trend is the exclusion of women. This is a failure to diagnose the motives according to the results.
Yes. That's what I meant.
Well, you've convinced Arbinka that it's the deed that matters, not the doer.
And from now on, that will be his motto.
But, Arbinka will tell you, that's all true, but here I am – because it's about Bibi.
The analysis you make of these claims makes them laughable, but their true intent may be more complex and less ridiculous. For example, regarding the criticism of Channel 14, it can be understood differently: We (the writer of the criticism) suspect Channel 14 of being chauvinistic and indeed find that they make claims that may be interpreted as such, which confirms the suspicion. All this even though it is possible that from someone else's lips we would not interpret these claims in this way. What could refute the suspicion? If their claims cannot be interpreted as chauvinistic.
I will give an example: Suppose I suspect someone of being a bank robber and I do see him hanging around banks a lot. I can interpret this as meaning that he is indeed a bank robber (assuming that bank robbers hang around banks more for the sake of the example) or that he often goes to the bank for his bank account. In such a situation, each of the data I have reinforces the other. The rate of bank robbers among those who hang around banks is higher than their rate among the general population. In addition, among those who hang around banks, the fact that one of them is suspected of being a robber increases the chances that he is indeed one and that it is not just a matter of wandering around but of planning the robbery. So although neither of the reasons is sufficient on its own, the combination of both, with each based a little on himself and a little on his friend, raises suspicion. If one of the reasons were based entirely on his friend, there would be an invalid circularity here. Similarly, if the suspect hung around banks less than average, this would weaken the suspicion so that there is no self-resonance here.
But why be suspicious if one can address the arguments themselves? They made a claim that a soldier and a woman together for hours are bound to fail. Maybe they even claim such information (I don't know. I haven't heard. And I assume that even if it turns up in the results of the investigation, none of us will hear about it). So why is it relevant that they have motives for excluding women? I wrote that her fallacy exists even if she is right in diagnosing the motives.
I explained the circularity fallacy. It is not the conclusion itself. It is actually completely logical according to the critic's method. But the question is whether this strengthens his conclusion or not. Strengthening the conclusion is circular.
I remember reading an article many, many years ago by Rabbi Charlo that addressed the demand of the women of the Western Wall to pray in a tallit and tefillin in the Western Wall plaza. He asked whether they also insist on their right to wear a small tallit throughout the day? His intention, of course, was to prove that they had no intention of observing a mitzvah but rather to protest and express feminism. At first glance, I thought it was a very pointed and effective argument. But at second glance, I realized how many flaws there are here. A. It seems to me that in those circles, regardless of women, they really do insist on a large tallit and not a small tallit (which is really not obligatory). B. Even if they express feminism and even if they are inconsistent, they still have a claim: they want to pray in a tallit at the Western Wall. This is their right, certainly if there is no prohibition. They do not ask Rabbi Charlo for permission and certainly do not expect him to do them any favors. If they are right and their demand is correct and appropriate, their motives are of no importance, even if they are indeed feminist or protest. When a man comes to pray with a tallit, do they check whether he is also wearing a small tallit? C. What is wrong with feminism? If there is no equality where there should be equality, the feminists are right. The fact that the nature of any claim is feminist neither disqualifies it in itself nor is it in itself invalid (feminism is a completely legitimate position, and in my opinion even morally binding).
By the way, that was many, many years ago. I bet he wouldn't be writing this today, and that's a good thing.
I haven't delved into Rabbi Sherlow's writings, but I assume he means that feminists don't really come to pray. The Reformers have long since removed Jerusalem and the Temple from their siddurim, and some (if not all!!!) are even atheists. (The Reform movement in the US decided a few decades ago that ordination to the Reform ”rabbinate” should not be conditioned on belief in God.) So who do they pray to? It is clear that the entire monthly ceremony of the “Women of the Western Wall” does not come from religious piety (whatever the religion) but rather is a provocation for its own sake in order to receive media attention and, by the way, perhaps attract a few innocent people to the emptying temples and fill the dwindling coffers (which pay the rabbis' salaries).
Years ago, as a representative of the Open University, I hosted Prof. Elsa Fornero-D'Aglio (later Minister of Labor and Social Affairs in the technocratic government in Italy) and her husband, Professor Mario D'Aglio. Both are friends of mine and my wife (born in Italy) and devout Catholics. We organized a tour of Jerusalem for them, at the end of which we arrived at the Western Wall towards evening and said goodbye - my wife accompanied Elsa to the women's section and I took Mario to the men's section, where I asked Mario for a few minutes for the mincha prayer in the minyan and he asked "Are the Gentiles also allowed to pray here?" I instinctively replied by quoting the verse from Isaiah "For my house shall be called a house of prayer" and "And the Gentiles". As I spoke I realized the mistake I had made, but it was already too late. (I just remembered that he prays to a Jew and not to the God of the Jews.)
What is the difference between these two lovable Gentiles and the women of the Western Wall? They asked about the customs of the place and did not try to impose their opinion and will, they accepted with understanding and agreement every demand (modest clothing, head covering, gender separation, etc.) and did not think it was their “right” to make a loud show in front of the media. They are truly religious people who came to pray to their God according to their faith, and as such they respected the customs of the place. And yet, they are a complete disgrace.
The very fact that he doesn't understand this on his own is problematic …
“Obviously, the entire monthly ceremony of the “Women of the Wall” does not come from religious piety”
It is “obvious” because of a logical fallacy. I think you did not read this column.
Your logical fallacy that you didn't read my (much shorter) response.
I clearly stated what my conclusion is based on - the removal of Zion and Jerusalem from the Reform prayer books and the atheism of most of them. What is wrong with them and the Western Wall? They long for the building of the Temple and the return of the sacrificial service? Who do they even pray to? A God they don't believe in?
So before you correct my mistakes (thank you very much), correct yours.
Mordechai, I was wondering if you yourself believe in the nonsense you wrote here. Suddenly I thought, much to my chagrin, that maybe you do.
1. In fact, it's not just about Reform.
2. The removal of Zion and Jerusalem from the prayer book happened a long time ago, and I assume that you also know that things have changed in the meantime. You know, a few days have already passed and in the meantime there was Zionism and a state was established and so on. Perhaps you haven't updated yourself on these events. Of course, these things are said in Reform Judaism in Israel. You can read on Wikipedia that tefillin, tallitot, and tzitzit have also received a different status among them over the years. You can like or dislike Reformers, but it's not worth distorting and telling half-truths.
3. I don't think the Reformers in Israel are trying to fill temples in America. Furthermore, it seems to me that the Orthodox temples are also emptying a bit, and sometimes I feel that these stupid struggles over the Western Wall are intended to fill them. And by the way, even if they want to fill temples in this way, that's their right too. And does every Orthodox who comes to pray at the Western Wall do so for noble reasons? And does every pilgrim to the Temple Mount do so only out of a desire to worship the Lord (or perhaps protests and nationalist tendencies, etc.)? See my comment to my father below (from 23:04). The Western Wall is theirs just as much as yours, and a state is supposed to ensure freedom of worship for its citizens. Therefore, they are not accountable to you for their motives.
4. The question of who they pray to is their own business. You are not the one to decide for them. By the way, not even I (I also marvel every now and then at the prayers of atheists, but it's very fashionable lately). If an atheist wants to hold a ceremony at the Western Wall, that's his right. The IDF holds ceremonies there, and even there it's not done for religious reasons.
5. Even if you were right about everything, I explained in the column that they still have the right to pray there.
6. I assume that the subtle difference between Catholics at the Western Wall and Jews who think and believe differently than you about the Western Wall – even you can understand (maybe after a few months of study and thought). Jews do not demand to pray in a church, and if they go there, I assume they will respect the customs of the place. But if there are Christians in the community who think that things should be conducted differently there, it is certainly possible that they will not respect the place. What's more, this is a national site and not my synagogue or yours or Smotrich's grandmother's, and as such it belongs to all Jews (and actually to all citizens of the country).
I remember as a child that one of the Prophet Isaiah's cunning argumentative techniques, when pressed with questions to which he had no answer (and my older brother Shalit and his friends enjoyed asking him such questions), was an outburst of rage, accompanied by curses, mockery, and insults. Even then, I noticed that these theatrical outbursts (which, to the best of my judgment, at least some of them were made up and staged) had a magical-suggestive effect of paralyzing any sense of criticism among his foolish followers, after which they ate with appetite the spaghetti (loksha'n bala'z) that they had fed him. I may be a fool, but I am not a follower, and I only eat spaghetti from the excellent cuisine of my Italian wife Talit. Mockery, cynicism, sarcasm and smugness do not turn nonsense into wisdom in my eyes.
As a gesture of brotherhood to the citizen of the Hungarian Empire (szervusz), I will explain to the Honorable his nonsense in the order in which it appeared in the sacred writings of the Bélio. (It's nice, but I don't charge authors for it).
1. So what? Every person is required to respect the customs of the houses of worship he visits. This is the A&B of being a cultured person.
2. So what 2? Has the statute of limitations expired on the crime? Was Zionism founded? What do you say? And don't you know that the Reform and Haredim (in Munich or Frankfurt, I can't remember now) worked together to thwart the first Zionist Congress until Herzl was forced to move it to Basel? Don't you know that they tried to thwart rescue operations in the Holocaust and the recognition of the United States in the country? Have they become Zionists in the meantime?
Well, let me tell you that even today the Reform movement is bitterly hostile to Zionism and the State of Israel, and its leaders (Rabbais Bela) not only encourage assimilation and marry mixed couples in Christian churches, many of them also hold positions of honor in BDS organizations and other strictly anti-Semitic organizations.
Indeed, the Reformers have adopted some Jewish symbols, as have the Christians and Muslims (there are quotes in the Quran, usually distorted, of verses and sages' sermons that Muhammad apparently heard from Jewish merchants in Mecca). Since then, missionaries from various religions have striven to present their religion as an “authentic” continuation of Judaism. So what is 3?
3. The Reform interest in the State of Israel began at the same time as the emptying of the temples (a result of the assimilation that they so happily encourage). The dwindling sources of income have forced them to seek new pastures and the old things. You should also update yourself and decorate yourself, etc. And yet, this is an extreme anti-Zionist movement.
Even Orthodox people do things that they wouldn't do at the Western Wall (parties, begging, etc.). Anyone who desecrates the sanctity of the Western Wall area (which most jurists consider a synagogue of many) should be treated without discrimination. So what 4? How long will you bother us with your Watabautism?
By the way, the Western Wall is not “mine”, not “yours”, and not anyone's. The Western Wall has been a Jewish place of prayer for thousands of years (except during periods when the Gentiles blocked access to it for Jews), and as such it is sacred. It is strange to read this worn-out demagogic claim from your keyboard, and even stranger to have to explain to you (a rabbi in Israel) the halakhic status of the Western Wall. As stated above, anyone entering a synagogue is required to respect the customs of the place, just like anyone visiting a church, mosque, Buddhist monastery, etc. When I found out that anyone entering the Sistine Chapel was required to remove their bald head covering, I gave up on visiting, even though as an avid art lover I wanted to see Michelangelo's "Day of Judgment". Complicated?
4. I don't care who they pray to, as long as they don't try to impose their customs on the synagogues, including the Western Wall plaza, and behave like civilized people (like the friendly Gentiles I hosted at the time). By the way, out of the corner of my eye I followed Mario D'Alio as he prayed (to those who prayed) in front of the stones of the Western Wall, and in my heart I greatly appreciated him for refraining from crossing himself. Another difference between a religious and cultured person and the reformed hooligans-provocateurs.
And no, not everyone has the "right" to perform any "ceremony" at the Western Wall. Where did you get this nonsense from? Indeed, the IDF performs ceremonies there. So what? (And indeed, it would have been better if the "national" ceremonies had been held elsewhere, but it is worth noting that the IDF limits them to the upper plaza, perhaps because its commanders believe that it is not a place of prayer and worship.)
5. And even if you are right (and I disagree with the whole "rights discourse," but this is not the place for this discussion), they have a duty to respect the customs of the place, etc.
6. Indeed, there is a subtle difference between Catholics and Reformed Jews. The former believe in a rebellious religion that separated from Judaism about 2,000 years ago, and the latter in a rebellious religion (if you can call it that) that separated from Judaism "only" about 200 years ago. I am not a rabbi and arbiter (nor are you, but let's assume this), but even according to your view, the Reformed are not "Jews who think differently," but are annihilated. After all, according to your view, which is that Judaism is just a law and nothing more - in this too they are infidels. They are a scoundrel, their slaughter is a scoundrel, and if it weren't for Damasthenia (did I mention that I'm not a judge?) I would say that they don't desecrate the Sabbath for their own safety. They are of a different religion just like Catholics and other Gentiles, and they won't try to impose their religious customs on us. Their genetic origin (today it may be only that of a minority) is irrelevant.
As stated, the Western Wall Plaza is first and foremost a Jewish house of prayer. Even if the state considers it a "national site", this does not take away its status, and all visitors are required to respect the customs of the synagogue when they come to it. Yes, even the Reforms, dear to your heart (and also my Haredi brothers, the secular, the Haredi, and the rest of the Jews, dear to my heart). Let me remind you again, the Western Wall does not "belong" to anyone. It is holy.
As an aside – the passionate defenses of the Reformers that you issue from time to time (compared to the hatred you pour out on the Haredim and other Orthodox groups) connect to the third book in your trilogy of horrors, which, contrary to what many believe – I see as the most terrible and horrible of them all.
Mordechai,
We await a counter-trilogy from His Honor. And if not, then at least a sharp and clear criticism of the claims that appear.
The response is unnecessary. There is not a single substantive reference to my claims here, as will be clear to anyone who bothers to read. So I will stop here.
I read it. Your words are a frivolous evasion.
Instead of writing a casual and general statement and sending me to write scrolls that have no point (in my opinion), I suggest that you present here one example of his argument that is of the type of the matter and has not been answered in my previous words. You know what? Choose the first argument you find in his words that fulfills this (of the type of the matter and has not been answered), and then we can discuss it. And then if you want, we can move on to a second argument, if for some reason you find one, and so on. I have not found a single such argument. Good luck to you.
This argument (they don't wear a small tallit) is really irrelevant when you academically examine the requirement to walk with a large tallit at the Western Wall. But the question of motive is relevant when you ask how much effort should be put into them - changing existing procedures, dealing with others who are bothered by it, etc. When the motives are not pure, it's simply a case of trolling, and then there's much less incentive to make an effort. Let them first do what they can without demanding anything from others.
No, it's irrelevant. No one is doing them any favors. The procedures are intended to serve the entire public and they don't belong to the father of just one of us. Equality is not a privilege that you, as an enlightened ruler, grant to someone. This whole discourse is delusional. Suddenly a person has to be worthy of receiving his rights.
A few years ago, Reformers asked for a budget for mikvahs in the same way that Orthodox ones are treated. A review revealed that there are almost no mikvahs in Reform communities in the US, meaning that the request here was a troll. Should they be allocated financial resources? Administrative resources? Some kind of attention?
Procedures are designed to ensure that resources are allocated efficiently. Part of this is to prevent parts of the public from bending others just because they can.
What's the point of Shmita at Mount Sinai?! If there's no real need, don't allocate resources. But if people want to pray, that's their right. This isn't about resources.
Perhaps even Jews who convert to Christianity will want to have a baptism ceremony or pray to Jesus there. That is their right, isn't it?
By the way, I must add that I have never understood who is bothered by some women wearing tallit. But if this is the status quo, and its violation is a bona fide disruption of prayer arrangements, then so be it.
By the same logic, the ascent of Jews to the Temple Mount also violates the status quo and disturbs Muslims. Not to mention the fact that the number of Jews who want to ascend is negligible compared to Muslims. Furthermore, it is also clear there that the main motivation is not religious but protest and a national agenda. Therefore, for all intents and purposes, the ascent of Jews to the Mount should be prohibited. Good luck to us.
Mikhi
I think the main difficulty in your defense of the rights of the Women of the Western Wall is entrenching yourself in an overly formalistic position. A certain formalism is appropriate and even necessary (certainly in the defense of rights) but the wisdom is to know when to apply it. Of course, there are no unambiguous “formal” rules for the question of when to give more weight to formal rights and when to give it to ”content”, but there is common sense and life experience and intuitions and the like.
In this case, my basic intuition is that the Women of the Western Wall (Reform) have no real moral commitment to the Temple Mount and therefore their demand is much more of a defiance than a central value. This of course does not mean that they do not have authentic feelings for the Western Wall, but that is something else. Therefore, allowing them to realize their desire in the name of that formalism seems a bit problematic to me.
In any case, even the darkest opponents of the Women of the Western Wall do not want to prohibit them from coming and praying (albeit under their own terms). Here, formalism as a protection of rights is common to everyone and everyone agrees on it. You propose to stretch that formalism one more level.
A small thought experiment (and not so far removed from reality, in my opinion): Would you agree, in the name of that formalism, to allow worship at the Western Wall in inappropriate clothing? A swimsuit, for example.
This thought experiment is necessary. I would object for two reasons (two distinctions from our case): 1. Because swimsuit wearers have no principle for wearing such a garment. Let them come in another garment. But here they have a principle for wrapping themselves in a tallit. 2. Because a swimsuit disturbs the public and causes them to commit a transgression (it is halachically forbidden to pray in front of such mirrors or even to see them). But there is no prohibition and it should not bother people to see women with a tallit. This is just conservatism that wants to impose my norms on others. It is none of your grandmother's business whether I am wearing a tallit.
Mikhi
I think that in your response to the thought experiment I suggested to you, you are retreating from the radical and problematic formalism in my opinion, in whose name you argued earlier. In doing so, you reinforce my criticism that your position here is inconsistent.
1. The claim that there is (currently) no principle for wearing swimsuits is an appeal on your part to reality check and common sense, not to formalism (in whose name you argued). On the contrary, the “swimsuits at the Western Wall” sect will answer you in the same way that you answered your criticism and tell you that your approach is patronizing.
2. The same applies to the halakhic prohibition of praying in front of distracting mirrors.. As far as I understand, the main point of your argument was not based on halakhic law but on an abstract formal principle that, in your opinion, applies equally to all people in the world (including Reform Jews who do not make a distinction between halakhic and halakhic). By the way, I have a feeling that most of those who oppose the Women of the Wall – and among them there are some very obscure people – do not only use halachic arguments. In this matter, they understand that there is a problem here that cannot be solved in a sweeping formal way….
You are introducing a formalism into my words that does not exist. I am talking about natural rights and not about something formal.
If it interferes halakhically then there is the benefit of others and not just the women of the Western Wall, and therefore the situation is symmetrical. But if it does not interfere then they have the right to pray as they understand and should not be prevented from doing so.
If you mean by ”natural rights” to freedom of worship (which would supposedly forbid the right of the Women of the Western Wall to pray at the Western Wall in their own way), then that is not enough. A “natural”right is only valid when it is interpreted and applied within a concrete state of affairs. For example, no one would allow a Christian – even if he is an Israeli citizen – to come and pray at the Western Wall with a cross, even though on a formal level he also has “freedom of worship”.
The argument against you is exactly this: “formally” one might think that the Women of the Western Wall have an equal right. In practice and taking into account the concrete local reality test, this is not the case.
I did not understand your second answer.
Are we back to formalism again? I already wrote that I don't know where you saw that in me.
I pointed out exactly where in my last response and also gave my reasons.
You didn't vote, because there is no basis for it in my words, and you didn't provide any such basis. And by the way, I'm not sure that Christians don't deserve it either.
Well, when you present it like that, I'm convinced.
Feminism is bad precisely because of the intentions behind its proponents. Feminists don't want equality, they want to control. They want everything. Equality where it's convenient for them, and where they have privileges, the preservation of the existing situation. The fact that in matters of custody or child support, they either don't care or they fight to preserve the existing unequal situation. Discrimination on the basis of gender is not something problematic if it is justified. Where it is unjustified, then the problem is that it is unjustified. Not because of the gender background. Gender background, like racial background, has no special status over other backgrounds in terms of discrimination or condescension, and it is no more equal than other backgrounds. Just as there is no such thing as racism, there is no such thing as chauvinism. Background is not important for unjust behavior. The problem is in injustice, not in the background, and not even in discrimination and arrogance per se (if they are justified. Regarding arrogance, there is a problem because God is proud, great, and glorious, etc., and not flesh and blood, and therefore there is a feeling that all arrogance has a problem. But God has no problem with arrogance. So arrogance in itself is not bad).
In short, the real problem with feminism is the name itself. Why don't they simply call themselves "justice fighters" and that's it? Why simply be a fighter for justice and not simply fight for each case on its own merits without being a "justice fighter." In short, it's all ego and ego at the expense of God's work in general. In any case, the Western Wall square is a synagogue and is holy in the sanctity of a synagogue, and they are violating the Jewish custom (which is a law) of thousands of years that women do not put on tefillin and tallit. And they are violating it in the house of God himself. So their demand is unjustified. If the Reformers cared about the Western Wall, then after the Six Days they could have demanded some piece of land there for a Reform square (a fast that was unjustified because they were not in the land at all and had no part in the war. Nor in the Temple, which they despised - and therefore they did not demand such a portion. Now it is too late.
It is clear that the Women of the Wall want to rule, and God forbid that they are forcibly deprived of a right that is granted to them like the rest of us. A glorious chauvinistic reality reading.
After all, the state (with the approval of the Holy High Court) invested millions in preparing the "Israel Plaza" so that they could "pray" there. That plaza is in front of that Western Wall (the remnant of the Temple, their soul's desire). Why is that plaza empty and these hooligans insist on coming with photographers and rioting precisely in the Orthodox prayer plaza?
I was talking about feminism in general, not about the women of the Western Wall. And what right are they given here in the first place? They are demanding a right they don't deserve. (There is a synagogue with rules of conduct inside it and they are using force to settle in this synagogue and act contrary to the rules of conduct there) And again, there is no such thing as chauvinism at all. I certainly don't hide the fact that I think that men should generally lead (and I personally don't have enough respect for those who are led to want to lead them, nor do I have the motivation to deal with the fetus and the placenta). I know how to identify as such someone who is truly lustful for power and someone who truly wants what he deserves according to justice. You might be surprised, but you yourself are as lustful for power as everyone else, you just don't have the power (quite rightly, it must be said) and motivation to deal with people whose only thing in life is a lust for power (activists). You simply want to be part of the "Council of the Elders of the Generation" Like any TA who is a little more than a rabbi in a high school yeshiva. That is, to give general instructions that do not require too much effort and without going into the details (that's for politicians). Maybe you are not aware of this. You are not Rabbi Kook.
Thanks for the column. Thought-provoking.
In the book of Tsev, there is an expansion on the subject of the starling's journey to the raven. The Gem there judges Esau's marriage to Ishmael's daughter Malath and the empty chatter surrounding Jephthah. As examples of this idea (or the same - see the Gem). The Gem also cites the book of Ben Sira: "Every bird dwells after its kind, and a man after his likeness."
I think that even with a controlled view of the theory, there is room for a practical observation, and there is still room to consider the context and the indications that can be received around it.
In the language of the Rabbi - although they are "second-order arguments", they are nevertheless "arguments".
Thanks.
I didn't understand your last comment (“I think”). What is it even talking about?
I meant to say that although I agree with the Rabbi's statement that the act should not be judged by the doer, I do not necessarily see a difficulty in the words of the Gamma, even though it deals with the building and not the animal. Because in my opinion, some weight can be given to the knowledge we have regarding the doer himself before we judge the act itself - and in this part I wonder whether my words agree with the Rabbi's method.
We can use the experience and previous knowledge we have to formulate some kind of perception - initial, regarding the act (this idea can be compared to a second-order ruling, as opposed to formulating a position by researching first-order sources).
I didn't understand the comment. After all, that's exactly what I wrote in the column. It's certainly reasonable to judge the act also by the doer, but with two caveats: 1. That it is indeed a reasonable judgment in fact (not to force the judgment, and not to ignore substantive arguments just because of your opinion of the doer). 2. That you don't use this judgment in a circular manner to strengthen your a priori position.
My mistake. I missed that in the column. Because in the paragraph “The Starling and the Crow: The Relationship Between Judgment of the Deed and Judgment of the Doer” the Rabbi seems to oppose in principle any type of “mention” and association between a person and his actions (otherwise why would the Rabbi need that phrase at all, and there is no difficulty in it).
This may be a matter for a completely different post, but we should remember that the claim “arguments should be treated as they are” assumes a platform for fair and informed debate. But what can we do? In real life, in many cases, there is no real platform for such a debate, but a struggle for public opinion that is not necessarily influenced by fair and informed debates. In such cases, the question of “who is the person” has rhetorical importance. From such a perspective, the world does not wait for the conclusion of the theoretical debate, and therefore those who wait for the outcome of the debate will find themselves at a disadvantage compared to those who do not. Addressing a person’s body certainly allows for a faster response. Even those who see value in addressing arguments as they are (like me) cannot ignore these significant practical implications.
So we can stop critical and logical discourse altogether and focus on wringing our hands. This is indeed what is usually done, and I am writing against this on this site and in particular in this column.
I don't think you're getting to the bottom of my point. I'm not saying that we should all stop having a critical and logical discourse, I'm saying that when we come to analyze discourse, we should remember the things I mentioned above. For example, you say, "Sometimes I wonder if the ultra-Orthodox speakers who are now heard under every green tree don't themselves understand the absurdity of their arguments." But you provide the answer itself later in the paragraph: "I estimate that quite a few readers of her article will feel uncomfortable in front of the mirror that is placed before their eyes: How are we pursuing such a perfect society that has adhered to its values? Where is our liberalism? She testifies to herself that she is a leftist, and along with her, so is the majority of all readers of the country, so it's no wonder that such feelings arise in her and them."
In other words, if we analyze the discourse not according to the quality of the arguments, but according to their effectiveness, then there is no problem with the arguments. You can think of this as a kind of rhetorical pragmatism - a good argument is one that is influential and persuasive, not necessarily one with reasonable assumptions and systematic inference.
Of course, this concept of rhetorical pragmatism can be rejected (and I don't particularly like it either), but it is important to recognize it as a phenomenon when we come to analyze reality. Let's take the example you gave above, of Rotem Isaac's criticism of Channel 14. Ostensibly, you could say, Channel 14 made an argument and Rotem Isaac did not deal with the argument but attacked Channel 14 for its motives. Now the question arises as to how we understand the phenomenon. There could be several (non-exclusive) possibilities here:
A. Rotem Isaac does not know how to deal with Channel 14's argument
B. Rotem Isaac did not understand Channel 14's argument for the first time
C. Rotem Isaac hates Channel 14 and doesn't want to have any discussion with them, but only to annoy them
D. Rotem Isaac thinks that Channel 14 is just trolling and doesn't believe their own argument, so there's no point in trying to refute the argument
E. Rotem thinks that her audience understands that the argument is unfounded, but doesn't understand Channel 14's motives, and that's what she wants to show them.
And so on and so forth. The point is that understanding the social dynamics behind the debate is important to explain why people debate the way they do, and to avoid jumping to far-reaching conclusions about why they say what they say. You're welcome to look at the options I've presented and think for yourself - which of the options I've presented (or a combination of them, or none of them) seems most plausible to you, and how do you know.
PS. You may not care at all about the motives behind the debate, but only about the quality of the arguments. That's perfectly fine, of course, but in this case the entire column seems a bit pointless to me, since the question underlying the column, as I understand it, is "why are the arguments not good/do not address the substance of the argument" and not "are the arguments good?"
I know the phenomenon and I speak out against it. Rhetorical pragmatism is a fallacy and deception and I write against it. The fact that they call fraud rhetorical pragmatism does not change its being fraud. An argument that does not hold water but is convincing is deception and not “rhetorical pragmatism”.
I said that what strengthens my argument is that the claims of the Haredim are, on the merits, very weak, and against this background the fallacy of appealing to motives is much more blatant and prominent. If I were to point out flaws in the other person's words and conclude from this that he has dark motives, that would be perfectly fine. But to argue against him on the basis of the motives themselves is a fallacy.
Excellent column Michael, thank you very much 🙏
I divide the teachings of R’ Michi into two - the thought itself (Nomna) ‘eat its insides’, and the thought of the phenomena (Phenomena) ‘throw away its shell’.
In short, I am addicted to your thought!!!
Thank you…
It's worth considering the opposite view: If a parrot ate you, you should examine why you want to throw away my shell. Is the problem mine or yours? Simply put, the shell is a natural consequence of thinking (especially for me, whose only concern is to formulate a consistent picture and draw conclusions from it for our world and our thoughts), and your conservatism does not allow you to recognize this. In my opinion, this is the correct description of the situation. At your discretion, of course.