A Philosophical Look at Contemporary Disputes (Column 563)
A. What Happens When We Debate the Rules of the Game?
With God’s help
Disclaimer: This post was translated from Hebrew using AI (ChatGPT 5 Thinking), so there may be inaccuracies or nuances lost. If something seems unclear, please refer to the Hebrew original or contact us for clarification.
“For there is silence within the storms”
(Yechiel Mohar)
Last Wednesday I gave a lecture at Café Luda in Lod,[1] and the topic was a philosophical look at contemporary disputes. Some of these matters were discussed here in earlier columns that dealt with these controversies, but in the lecture I focused on one aspect that is worth our attention. I thought it worthwhile to devote two columns to these points.
Description of the Dispute and Its Significance
The present dispute is raging. Boundaries are being crossed day by day, and it seems there is something unusual here that did not exist in earlier controversies. We have had fierce arguments before, but the current feeling is that the dispute is extremely polarizing and that there is concern for the very existence of society and the state. It’s a bit reminiscent of the dispute around the Disengagement, and it’s no wonder that the comparison comes up again and again in today’s debates. In these columns I will try to examine the nature of the current dispute and, in particular, to compare it with the dispute over the Disengagement.
There is a tendency to attribute the storms and the radicalization to the fact that the issues at stake are very fundamental and important—touching the apple of people’s eye. These are sociological, psychological, and ideological explanations (the topic is especially important and/or infuriating, social rifts, and so on). But in my view the reason here is different and lies on the logical plane. The reason is that, unlike previous controversies, this dispute is being waged over the rules of the game, not within them.
For comparison, the dispute over the Disengagement was also very heated. People were outraged and complained against the institutions about the way the decision was made, about the content of the decision, and about the alienation from those harmed. As with protests occasionally held by supporters of the reform, the Disengagement also saw refusals and road blockages; there too there was a certain degree of institutional tolerance. But I’m not interested here in entering the details of those comparisons. I invoke the Disengagement precisely because of its seeming similarity to today’s dispute. My claim is that despite similarities in intensity and character, the reason for the storms then was different from the reason today. Then the reason was ideological; today the reason is logical.
The storms back then were ignited because of the importance and fundamental nature of the matter under discussion and the degree of harm to the values, property, and psyche of one side. It is no wonder that such deep harms arouse intense storms. But today’s storms are awakened not only because of the importance of the issue but mainly because the debate is about the rules of the game. The Disengagement was a deep and fundamental disagreement conducted within the framework of democratic rules of the game. It was clear how it was to be managed, and even if claims were heard that steps and behaviors deviated from the proper path, the impression was that the heated debate was conducted within clear rules. Today, however, the debate is about the rules themselves, and therefore, naturally, there is no way to conduct the debate within those rules, for they themselves are the subject of contention. I argue that, in principle, even if the topics under discussion were not so fundamental and important, one would expect lines to be crossed and norms to be exceeded, for that is the nature of a dispute waged over the rules of the game.
A Talmudic Example: The Dispute Between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel
Disputes probably always existed among Israel, but the dispute between Beit Shammai (the School of Shammai) and Beit Hillel (the School of Hillel) was extremely unusual compared to everything that preceded it. Its unusual nature lay in its extremity (see below), in the length of time it persisted, in the consolidation of the disputants into two large and distinct “houses,” and of course in the breadth of its content (there are dozens of laws and conceptual positions on which the two schools disagreed).
The sages of Beit Hillel were more numerous than those of Beit Shammai, and ostensibly the halakhah should have been decided in their favor, since the rule is “incline after the majority.” There was, however, one famous exception at the session in the upper chamber of Ḥananiah ben Ḥizkiyah ben Garon, where Beit Shammai outnumbered Beit Hillel. Concerning the dispute at the session in the upper chamber of Ḥananiah ben Garon, the Tosefta (Shabbat 1:16) says:
“These are among the laws that were stated in the upper chamber of Ḥananiah ben Ḥizkiyah ben Garon when they went up to visit him: they counted and Beit Shammai outnumbered Beit Hillel; eighteen matters they decreed on that day, and that day was as hard for Israel as the day the [golden] calf was made.”
The Jerusalem Talmud (Shabbat 1:4) provides another description of this dispute:
“Rabbi Yehoshua Onyia taught: ‘The disciples of Beit Shammai stood below and were killing the disciples of Beit Hillel.’ It was taught: ‘Six of them went up, and the rest stood over them with swords and spears.’ It was taught: ‘Eighteen matters they decreed; in eighteen they outnumbered; and in eighteen they disagreed.’”
The Babylonian Talmud (Shabbat 17a) also gives the following description:
“They drove a sword into the study hall and said: ‘Whoever enters may enter and whoever leaves shall not leave.’ And on that day Hillel was bent and sat before Shammai like one of the students, and it was as hard for Israel as the day the [golden] calf was made.”
All of these descriptions point to the intensity of that dispute, reaching to the point of killing one another. The reasons were apparently the long duration and broad scope of the dispute, which threatened the wholeness of the people of Israel. The Torah was becoming like two different Torahs, and the fear of a split of the people and the Torah was palpable. When no decision can be reached in such a situation, it is no wonder that force and extreme measures are used, and ultimately they even come to kill each other. This certainly resembles our current situation. We cannot reach a decision by accepted means, and so extreme and unacceptable measures are taken. The split is already on the horizon. In such a situation there is an urgent need to reach a decision and an agreement in one way or another, and the question both then and now was how this can be done, especially if the very path to it is itself disputed.
In the end, a decision was reached in the dispute between the two schools. It is described in Eruvin 13b:
“Rabbi Abba said in the name of Shmuel: For three years Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed, these saying, ‘The halakhah is like us,’ and those saying, ‘The halakhah is like us.’ A bat kol (heavenly voice) went forth and said: ‘These and those are the words of the living God, but the halakhah is in accordance with Beit Hillel.’ And since both are the words of the living God, why did Beit Hillel merit that the halakhah be fixed like them? Because they were pleasant and humble; they would teach their own words and the words of Beit Shammai, and not only that, they would even place the words of Beit Shammai before their own.”
A bat kol emerges and rules that the halakhah follows Beit Hillel. From then on, the statements of Beit Shammai in place of Beit Hillel are not considered authoritative (see Berakhot 36b and many parallels). Because of the intensity of the dispute and the fear of it, once a decision was reached the sages were unwilling to allow it to flare up again. They decided to trample Beit Shammai and grant them and their positions no standing at all—unlike the usual practice in ordinary halakhic disputes.[2]
Two Difficulties and Their Resolution
Commentators on this passage raise two questions. First, why did they not put matters to a vote and decide the disputes by majority? The rule we have is “incline after the majority,” meant for use when a dispute arises. That is supposed to be the halakhic way to decide disagreements. What was unique about the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel that did not allow the use of the majority rule? Incidentally, the very same question is asked today, when the dispute rages and people are unwilling to decide it by a vote and to accept the rule of the majority (as determined in elections). This question can pertain both to the lack of a decision in the dispute and to its very emergence: Why was the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel so extreme? How did it arise at all? How does it differ from the disputes that preceded it?
Another question that arises from the Gemara is how a bat kol is allowed to decide a halakhic dispute, when the rule we have (Bava Metzia 59, in the story of the Oven of Achnai) is: “It is not in heaven.”
Tosafot raises this in the comment to “Here, after the bat kol,” Eruvin 6b:
“Here—after the bat kol. And if you would say: What is different, that we do not follow the bat kol in the case of Rabbi Eliezer concerning the oven made of earthenware (Bava Metzia 59b)?”
Tosafot offers two answers. The first:
“We can say that there [the bat kol] came out only for his honor, as is proven there.”
As a matter of halakhah we do heed a bat kol, but in the Oven of Achnai the bat kol did not truly intend to rule in favor of Rabbi Eliezer; it emerged only to honor him. According to this answer there is no general rule that we ignore a bat kol—at least when it emerges seriously to express a halakhic stance. This view is not very common among the commentators.
And the second:
“Moreover, there it was against the many, and the Torah says, ‘incline after the majority’; but here, on the contrary, Beit Hillel were the majority, and the bat kol was needed only because Beit Shammai were sharper.”
Here the assumption is the opposite: in truth a bat kol has no standing to make a halakhic decision—but only when it contradicts halakhic rules, such as going against the opinion of the majority. That was the situation for Rabbi Eliezer in the Oven of Achnai. But here Beit Hillel were the majority, and the bat kol supported them; therefore it does have standing. One might say that, in a sense, even here it had no standing and emerged only to remind us of the rule to follow the majority.
Within this, Tosafot wonders: What did Beit Shammai think? If Beit Hillel were indeed the majority, why did we need the bat kol’s help to understand that we must follow the majority? Did Beit Shammai dispute the halakhic rule “incline after the majority”? We should remember that it is explicit in the Torah. Tosafot answered my second question above, but the first difficulty remains: Why not follow the majority? As will be seen immediately, once we understand this point, the answers to the second difficulty will also become superfluous.
Tosafot explains Beit Shammai’s position by noting that they were sharper than Beit Hillel, and the rule to follow the majority applies only where the participants in the discussion are approximately equal in wisdom (as is explicitly stated in Yevamot 14a). Simply put, everyone—including Beit Hillel—agreed that Beit Shammai were indeed sharper and more incisive. This means that Beit Shammai also accepted the rule to follow the majority, but they claimed that the relevant “majority” was a majority of wisdom, not a majority of persons (we must count heads, not legs; see on this in Column 400). Therefore, Beit Shammai held that “incline after the majority” actually dictates that the halakhah follows them, not Beit Hillel.[3]
This, it seems, was the basis for the emergence and intensity of the dispute. There was a debate over the rules of the game themselves: Is the decisive majority a majority of heads or a majority of legs? Such a dispute cannot be decided, for even if they hold a vote to decide that very question, they will be stuck at the same point (should we follow Beit Shammai or Beit Hillel?). This is why, in that dispute, they could not decide by majority. This is also why they resorted to a bat kol. The rule that we do not resort to a bat kol applies only when we have a way to decide a dispute by means of halakhic rules. But if there is no halakhic way to decide, then “It is not in heaven” does not apply (perhaps this is exactly what Tosafot meant as well). This explains why, according to Beit Shammai, the majority was not followed and the dispute remained undecided, and it also explains why a bat kol emerged and was heeded despite “It is not in heaven”: it was the only way to extricate themselves from a deadlock for which no halakhic exit existed.
From here we can also understand why the dispute between the schools continued for so long. It cannot be decided through the rules, and so it continues endlessly without resolution, because it revolves around the rules themselves. In such a situation it is also clear why it became extreme: the only way to move forward was by force and extreme measures. Rules designed to resolve disputes and make decisions cannot be applied when the dispute concerns the rules themselves. The only way to save the people of Israel and the Torah was to use force (even to the point of killing) and extreme steps (trampling the legitimacy of the “losing” side).
Back to Us
My claim is that this is also the root of our situation today. The dispute is over the rules of the game, not over a specific substantive issue. Therefore, following the majority—the rule intended to resolve and decide disputes—is inapplicable. This dispute cannot be decided with democratic tools, since, as will be seen below, it concerns the rules of democracy themselves. It is no wonder that it appears insoluble and leads to extreme and even violent steps. The deviation from the rules of the game is the result of a logical problem: How do we decide a dispute that concerns the rules themselves? The customary decision rules within the game cannot serve us in such a situation, and what remains is the use of force and unconventional steps outside the rules of the game.
This can be better understood by returning to the comparison with what happened around the Disengagement. The debate there concerned a painful and difficult issue for a large public, but it did not deal with the rules of the game themselves. It was a sharp disagreement, and the steps taken expressed great pain and distress, but there one could argue that the debate had to be conducted by the democratic rules. Deviations from the rules stemmed from pain, not from a substantive justification. By contrast, when the debate is about the rules of the game themselves, deviating from the rules in conducting the debate is a logical consequence of the situation, not necessarily an expression of pain. The justification for these deviations is not only the pain and the harm to the protesting minority, but the fact that there is no way to demand that they operate within the rules if, in their view, those rules are being violated by the other side and are no longer binding.
The similarity between the situations (the debate over judicial reform and the debate over the Disengagement) actually sharpens the differences. If the deviations from the rules and the extremity there stemmed from the depth of harm to the ideology and views of one side, here the extremity and deviations arise from the fact that conduct cannot proceed within the rules. In the protesters’ view the rules have been broken and are no longer binding. From their standpoint, one side is not keeping the rules and demands that the other side obey them—an absurd demand. The protesting minority’s justification in our case is that, under the circumstances, there is no basis to demand that they act lawfully (a logical justification).
I will now explain the claim that the current debate turns on the rules of the game.
What Are “Rules of the Game”?
The current debate concerns Basic Laws and their status, the separation of powers and legislative procedures, oversight of the executive branch, and questions about how to handle conflicts among the branches and what authority each possesses. There is no dispute here over any specific content that could be seen as an ideological disagreement. The question is: What are the rules of the game, how are ideological decisions made, and how are disagreements between sides that do not agree ideologically to be resolved? The protesters argue that the government made a decision it has no authority to make—not merely that it acts in a way they deem wrong or harmful. By contrast, in the Disengagement the core debate was clearly ideological; therefore, in principle, it should have been conducted within the rules of the game.
In principle, one might claim that the Disengagement also broke the rules of the game: infringement of property rights, of the integrity of the land, of the right to protest, and so on; the way the decision was made was seen by many as an infringement of the rules. The claim would be that there are foundational assumptions that are never to be violated, even if the law itself does not require it. But this already broadens the concept of “rules of the game.” Under such broadening, anyone could in any instance with which he disagrees claim that the rules have been broken. That is formally possible but not plausible. As long as the discussion concerns specific content or a particular mode of conduct, it should be carried out within the rules. But here the subject of discussion is the rules themselves, not a local breach of them.
Incidentally, this is the root of the profound misunderstanding that appears again and again with Aharon Barak. He constantly wonders why he is hated and asks why what he did is controversial. He repeatedly says that all he sought was to regulate the situation and enable the sides to conduct their dispute appropriately by defining and maintaining the rules. His opponents, however, present him as an active side in the dispute. Why? Because he thought there was a dispute like any other and it should be conducted within the rules. But his opponents disputed the rules themselves and therefore saw him as a party, not a neutral arbiter. Today it is already clear to all that Barak is very much a side in the dispute (to a large extent he created it), because the dispute revolves around the rules as he and his colleagues designed them. The coalition seeks to change them and the protesters wish to preserve them. This is not a dispute over this or that decision, more or less important, but over the rules themselves.
In Column 552 I explained that this is what happens when the rules of the game are not well defined (upon the state’s founding the Constituent Assembly did not enact them in the form of a constitution, and we were left with a vacuum). In such a situation the matter is left to the players on the ground (the different branches), and it is no surprise that each tries to pull the rules in its own direction. We do not truly have rules of the game, and so each side tries to establish facts. There are no statutory determinations in our law concerning questions such as: What is a Basic Law? What is its status? How is it enacted? What is its relation to other laws? Which body should determine that relation? The relations among the branches and the types of considerations each may make—these too. A significant portion of our rules simply do not exist. The rules we do have are largely norms that took root through power plays or forceful takeovers of the field and its rules by the government or by the court. Therefore, even if the Knesset enacts a Basic Law, nobody knows what that means and whether it is even within its authority. It is no wonder that the High Court has hinted more than once at the possibility of reviewing Basic Laws—something that would seem logically impossible (since its authority is at most to review by Basic Laws; it is not a legislative body). But in the prevailing vacuum (mainly the Knesset’s fault), there are no definitions of what a Basic Law is and what to do with it. So what is the Court supposed to do with such a law? It makes decisions on its own according to its understanding and outlook. Ostensibly this is against the rules of the game, but in practice there are no real rules.
As I explained there, in truth it could not have been otherwise. Once a dispute arises and the court must decide and determine the legal result, if it does not find before it a law that guides it, it is no wonder that it is forced to set the rules itself. At bottom, these lacunae are the fault of the Knesset and the (original) Constituent Assembly. They created this vacuum in the rules, and we are left with a situation in which “every man does what is right in his own eyes.”
Where Our Rules of the Game Are Broken: Back to “Tyranny of the Majority”
If the root problem is indeed the absence of rules, then ostensibly the current coalition is doing well by trying to create them now. Better late than never. What the old Constituent Assembly should have done, the present Knesset will do (in its capacity as a constituent body). I will set aside for our purposes the fact that the coalition’s original proposal did not include very important elements of regulation (such as determining the path to enact Basic Laws and defining their status). At present the discussion is about a general arrangement, including those points. So why do so many claim that this action is problematic (contrary to the rules of the game, insofar as any exist)?
The explanation lies in the concept of “tyranny of the majority,” which I touched on briefly in Column 552 and elaborated on in Column 553. Here I will only recall the common understanding of it as moral: although the majority has the authority to decide, it must treat the minority appropriately and not harm it too severely. The claim is that the majority must not use its duly held power for unworthy purposes. I explained there that in many cases the concept of “tyranny of the majority” rests on a more fundamental consideration: there are situations in which the majority has no such power and authority at all. As I will now explain, in this respect the Disengagement and today’s dispute again diverge: there it was a moral demand; here that demand rests on a logical argument.
I explained there that the majority’s authority to set the path for the minority is conditioned on the minority’s agreement to this arrangement. When we decide to run a shared society for all of us, that decision includes each minority’s agreement to accept the majority’s decision (if that is the agreed rule). But when a dispute arises between a majority and a minority that do not belong to the same group, there the majority’s view has no decisive weight and there is no obligation to follow it. I illustrated this with a large state trying to dictate modes of operation to a smaller state. It cannot claim to it that it must obey because “we are the majority.” The reason is that the two states are two separate groups, and the majority’s authority exists only when disagreements arise within one group playing a shared game and making decisions jointly, according to rules agreed upon by all.
How do we determine that this is one group and an internal dispute within it? When all participants agreed to the rules that constitute this game. As part of those rules is, of course, the principle of following the majority, and if those rules were accepted, they are what grant the majority its authority. But if the minority declares that the game has been dissolved, or that the majority is deviating from the rules, then the basic situation returns: the majority has no authority to determine anything for the minority. Certainly when the discussion is about the rules themselves. In such a place, the majority has no meaning. Setting the rules is the constituting of the group, and each person must decide whether to join or not. Only after he joins and knows the rules do they apply to him—particularly the obligation to accept the majority’s decision.
The concept of “tyranny of the majority” thus takes on an additional meaning. The minority is not demanding that the majority take it into account through a moral claim. The minority argues that the majority has no authority at all to decide the fundamental rules. These require general consent, for they constitute the game, and from them arises the principle that grants the majority the authority to decide. Therefore, in this debate the minority does not accept the majority’s decision—not as a protest against draconian measures but because the majority has no authority to set the rules.
Note that this follows from the assertion at the beginning of the column. In the Disengagement one could say that the minority claimed against the majority that it was using its power for unworthy ends. That is a moral claim—that the majority’s harm to the minority is too severe—and so they ask it to desist. In other words, we might phrase it as preventing a “pursuer,” and one may strike a pursuer to save oneself. By contrast, today’s debate concerns the rules, and here the minority’s claims are logical, not ideological, sociological, or ethical. The minority argues that the majority is not acting by virtue of the authority vested in it. It has no authority to set the rules of the game.
In my understanding this is the root of the intensification of today’s protest. The protesters claim that the coalition has broken the rules, or rather is trying to constitute them on its own without consent—and even a majority has no mandate to do this. Once the rules are broken, actions and modes of protest that deviate from the rules can be used. One can no longer argue to the protesters that they must act by the rules, and certainly not that they must accept the majority’s decision.
From here you can understand the massive road blockages, refusal in the army (without entering the debate over whether this involved only refraining from volunteering or actual refusal—beyond doubt there were threats of outright refusal), threats of tax rebellion and refusal to enlist, and more. We can also add steps that are not illegal but deviate from accepted norms, such as moving funds and businesses abroad solely as a protest, preventing foreign investment, enlisting international actors (sometimes with false claims), and more. All these are accused of being illegitimate activities against a democratic majority decision made in free elections, duly and lawfully. The protesters’ claim is that there is no game because the rules have been broken, and therefore the majority’s decision has no validity (remember Beit Shammai?), and so the protesters do not see themselves as obligated to conduct themselves by the rules.[4]
It seems to me that the Supreme Court’s review of Basic Laws is also a deviation from the rules on a similar basis. The Court sees that arbitrary grabs are being made without a legal basis (Basic Laws are being set arbitrarily and without justification, merely for conjunctural purposes, and nevertheless granted the status of a Basic Law), so it decides to permit itself to review Basic Laws. It is indeed acting here not in accordance with the rules, but it does so out of a sense that the rules have been broken—“when they break the tools, we don’t play.”
Is a De Facto Dissolution of the Group/Game Required?
In the column cited I presented the minority’s right to oppose the majority on the basis of dissolving the game. But I noted there that there are intermediate situations in which the package is not actually dissolved, yet one may oppose the majority’s decision by virtue of the principled ability to dissolve the game (I referred to this there as a kind of migo: if I may dissolve the package, then certainly I may oppose things done within it). In light of what we have seen here, we can phrase this differently. At the stage when the rules are being discussed, the consent of all participants is required and the majority has no right that its opinion be accepted. This is not about dissolving the package but about its construction. This is not opposition to the majority’s view and authority and dissolution of the package, but a demand for the minority’s partnership (broad consent) in the initial construction of the game/field.
This picture creates another difference between the Disengagement and today’s debate. We saw that during the Disengagement the minority’s protest was based on a demand that the majority avoid tyranny. I did note that—if we adopt a somewhat broadened lexicon—one might perhaps see such conduct as breaking the rules, but at most that leads to current dissolution of the package, because the majority is not behaving properly. By contrast, in today’s debate there is a claim that the initial joining of the game was mistaken. We joined certain rules, not those you are now trying to impose (al da’ata dehai—on this understanding—we did not join). This is a stronger claim than dissolution. Dissolution is breach of contract, perhaps for a justified reason; but the debate over the rules is a claim that ab initio there is no contract and no game (for this is not the contract we joined).[5]
In the next column we will deal with different situations in which one may act contrary to the system’s laws, and after that we will return to our discussion.
[1] This is a laudable social project established not for profit. Its goal is to employ at-risk youth and women together with students and to create a venue for leisure and culture in Lod, the City of Lights. I also gave the lecture for Zikaron BaSalon there on the last Holocaust Remembrance Day (on judging evil).
[2] Incidentally, the Talmud is full of discussions of Beit Shammai’s positions, and there are even passages in which the halakhah follows them. This is another example of the ambivalent attitude of the Talmud and halakhah to sweeping rules, which I have noted more than once.
[3] For some reason—by chance or not—the dispute over which majority to follow split according to reality: the sharper Beit Shammai also held that sharpness is the decisive majority, and the less-sharp Beit Hillel also held that the numerical majority decides. See also Columns 195–196 on paradox and anti-paradox.
[4] Incidentally, Rabbi Eliezer the Great did not accept the majority’s decision in the dispute over the Oven of Achnai (Bava Metzia 59) and remained excommunicated alone in Lod until his death. One can understand why he did not accept the majority’s decision, for in his view the majority is meaningless when one knows the truth (he possessed all the traditions and knew the halakhah). On the other hand, it is also clear why they excommunicated him: there was no other way to deal with someone who does not accept the rules. Rabban Gamliel of Yavneh, his brother-in-law, was removed from his presidency on the same grounds, but he accepted the new rules and was therefore reinstated (in rotation with Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah). See on this in my article here and in the prologue to my book Mehalakhim Bein HaOmdim.
[5] This is entirely parallel to the difference between a “petach” (opening) and “charatah” (regret) in the annulment of vows. Some decisors hold that one can turn regret into an opening—i.e., had the person known he would regret it, he would not have vowed in the first place—but simply put, the difference between the two mechanisms is that regret dissolves from now on, whereas an opening uproots retroactively (“on that understanding I did not vow”).
Interesting.
What amuses me about the current controversy is that the right this time is reformist and the left is conservative. The system is being replaced.
I don't know who you're calling 'right' here. The current coalition is the radical left.
There is a concept of a temporary injunction that was only allowed for a certain time to save the people of Israel in the context of Sisera, especially since she was from the nations of the world.
According to this, what gives the majority the (moral) authority to force the individual in the state to do the same, if the individual does not agree to the rules of the game?
If one does not agree to the rules of the game, he should not participate in it. Whoever participates is presumed to have implicitly agreed to the rules.
I'm not speaking on his behalf, but on the state's behalf. For example, there was a man (search YouTube) who declared his own state, of which he was the king. It turns out that this is illegal, and he was arrested. The question is what authority does the state have to do this (let's put it this way, I understand why he can't drive on state roads anymore, but printing an ID card, etc., seems reasonable to me).
Logic works on both sides, even towards the right. The right understands that Aharon Barak's move thirty years ago was a break in the rules of the game, so it is legitimate for the right to take extreme steps to change the rules. Right now, the main tool at its disposal is the Knesset and the government, so it is legitimate to act through them (even aggressively).
Absolutely. My intention was to explain both sides.
Only in practice the coalition (nothing to do with the right. It's the extreme left) doesn't think it's breaking the rules (on the contrary, they talk about the majority decision as binding and that the brains are acting against the rules). The brains agree that they themselves are acting against the rules, and therefore justification for this is required.
There is a great deal of exaggeration in attributing the constitutional revolution to Aharon Barak.
A kind of cunning demon who stole the right to vote from the public in the dark.
Those who passed the laws of the revolution were Dan Meridor and Uriel Lin from the Likud according to the principle of judicial supremacy from Menachem Begin's school of thought.
There are long and orderly minutes from meetings in the Knesset where the possibility of repealing laws is discussed with opponents and supporters, and at the end a compromise is defined that repealing laws by the judicial leadership will only apply going forward and anchoring the existing laws…
These are tedious and unnecessary quibbles. Those who claim that Barak invented the possibility of invalidating laws based on basic laws are truly mind-boggling. Not only because of the protocols, and not only because after two years these amendments were actually included in the law, but because this is the simple meaning of basic laws. When the Knesset determined that these are basic laws, it is reasonable to conclude from this that they override ordinary laws.
But this is not the main argument against Barak. He introduced several sweeping changes in addition to this (expanding the right to stand, reasonableness and good faith, the status of legal advisors, which court can invalidate laws, and more). There are lectures by Daniel Friedman and others that detail the matter.
It is true that Barak is exaggerating a bit (it started even earlier, mainly with Shamgar).
And how does the rabbi think it is appropriate to balance the above changes?
The reason for reasonableness, the right to stand and the status of legal advice..
And in general, can the rabbi give an example of a reasonable reform in his opinion?
Is the rabbi in favor of changing the committee after the Saar change?
Is the rabbi in favor of a ruling on overriding even if the manner in which laws are invalidated by the High Court is tightened (say, a composition of 11 justices requiring a majority of 7 or 8)?
If the rabbi still thinks that overriding is necessary, what is the majority?
This is a question that cannot be answered in one go. I will write in principle from the beginning.
The reason for the reasonableness is not a law but an administrative decision. A legal advisor can be a trusted appointment, but his decisions are binding (and it is desirable that he cannot be dismissed).
The situation of the Judicial Appointments Committee is currently in perfect order and there is no need for change.
Invalidation of laws by the High Court of Justice in its entirety and with a large majority (for example, 12). And since this is possible, the Knesset will be able to invalidate the invalidation only with a majority of the coalition + a few more from the opposition (say 5).
All this after the Basic Law is enacted, which will determine what a Basic Law is (only matters of principle) and how it is adopted (preferably in four readings in two Knessets) and what its status is (compared to ordinary laws), and who can invalidate an ordinary law by its own power (only the Supreme Court).
Is a situation where judges have the right to veto a reasonable thing? And what do judges (and lawyers) even have to look for in such a committee? After all, today it is clear that judging is not just a professional matter but more of a political one, so only public representatives should elect them
The story with the lawyer is a joke. Who has ever heard of such a thing as the government's lawyer becoming its judge. Does this seem reasonable to a rabbi? How can a government take responsibility for its actions in such a case? See Smotrich's entry and the exemption from testing for imported drugs. This is proof that the rabbi himself is no longer reasonable.
All of this was really good and beautiful and very interesting, until the protests continued, and with exactly the same intensity (and even with publications like “It is very important to demonstrate right now”), and on a host of other issues (which are completely within the rules of the game) even after they had already announced the start of dialogue talks to reach a broad consensus, and even after they had actually begun. So philosophical or not – it simply has nothing to do with reality. It has nothing to do with setting the rules of the game, which half of the protesters don't know what they actually are or what the reform is trying to change in them, and the half who do understand are using them as a pickaxe to dig into it, and this is clear from their rhetoric about the end of democracy (to the point of an article in Haaretz titled something about the abolition of the seniority system being the beginning of a dictatorship, and a recent article by Talia Sasson about how in a reformed country the seniority system is a matter of course. Such nonsense can only come out of the keyboards of those who know that there is no connection between what they are writing and reality).
I don't know why this became a response to someone specific, I meant to respond to the column itself.
These are biased and demagogic generalizations. The protesters know the rules of the game just like you. They are all protesting against the reform and some of them also attribute it to a desire against the government and its decisions. Completely legitimate. If you choose stupid statements, I can offer you a thousand times more of them from the other side. This is demagogy.
You ignored the seriousness of my words, you referred to what you were comfortable referring to (“generalizations”. Because I really meant exactly half and half, about the percentage. Eliminate the order of the principle of kindness, eh? For that matter – yes, I know some protesters who know what they're talking about and I just don't agree with them) and you call me a demagogue. A real lesson in rhetoric.
Absolutely not true!
He changed the authority of the police, and they didn't even have to listen to his rulings
They change with full authority and by law
Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, is it a coincidence that each side believed that the decision was according to its own words, and not that the decision was according to the other side (and I thought that they would kill each other). Of course, it could be a coincidence or a touch. But what do you think about the following proposal? The decision rules are determined by the results, like theory by experiment, and if Beit Hillel sees that in a hundred disputes of Beit Shammai, the harsh sages say the opposite, and in Beit Hillel's opinion, Beit Shammai is wrong, then there is no logic in establishing a decision rule according to a majority of wisdom that will lead to wrong results (in Beit Hillel's opinion). Not because empiricism (in the above hundred experiments) proves in their opinion that the decision rule (as much wisdom) is wrong, but because the decision rules are subject to the given decisions. The decision rules are not an independent principle but an attempt to speculate what will most advance the specific results in which I am interested.
In my haste, I missed note 3, which refers to columns 195-6, and I'll look there.
There is no answer to these questions there.
This is an interesting suggestion, but I think the rules should be set behind a veil of ignorance and not according to the specific circumstances before us. The same is true in the current debate, where both sides want to set the rules of the game according to the government that is currently in place without considering what will happen to these rules in other governments. This is true for both sides in the dispute. In my opinion, the rules of the game should be set according to principled logic and ethics, when you ignore the specific individuals and groups that currently occupy the positions. The same is true for B&H. There too, it was not appropriate to set the rules in order to promote a particular agenda. I remember we once argued about this (perhaps when I was talking about the problematic nature of our legislative processes and unstable laws that people use to promote an agenda, and you wondered what was wrong with that).
After all, B&H should take into account that in their opinion B&H are wrong, this too stems from the fact that they do not understand them (like R&H who did not let his friends come to their senses due to the intensity of his sharpness).
This does not mean that B&H and B&H acted fairly, and perhaps they really wanted to set the rules by ignoring the veil of ignorance. But in my opinion, it is not appropriate to do so.
Another example of this is the well-known paradox in the Jewish law of souls who all voted for the death penalty and the 23rd judge is hesitant because he supposedly should vote the opposite of what he thinks. Regarding this, I also wrote that he should vote according to what he thinks and not take the results into account. I explained that if he votes the opposite of what he thinks, it is problematic, because the Torah does not want a person to be killed who all the judges believe deserves death, and in fact this is what is happening now. We should not be wiser than the Torah/halakha. The same principle applies to the debate between B’s and G’s. B’s want to be wiser than the Torah/Halakhah, and even though it would be appropriate to follow the harshness, they will adopt the view that they are following the feet in order to advance the agenda that is correct in their view. But the Torah wants the harshness to determine (this is their fundamental assumption, if not for the agenda).
[I took some time to think, although in the end I didn't come up with anything].
There are essential 'rules of the game' that are a consequence of fairness, such as the majority decision you wrote in one of the columns, which is not from the side of clarifying the truth but rather as a result of everyone's freedom to decide their own future. But there are technical rules that have nothing in them except an attempt to define the results. The separation of powers has no value status, but is an attempt to establish rules that will lead to reasonable results and prevent extremely bad results. In seemingly technical rules, there is no possibility of discussing the 'substance of the matter' in isolation from the results. If the entire technical rule that I am seeking to agree on is one that will advance my goals, then it is impossible to use the veil of ignorance and neutralize my principles, for the sole purpose of which the technical rules are relevant. A veil of ignorance can only filter out biases such as personal interests when dealing with clarifying objective principles. Therefore, ostensibly, the discussion (if there are no knowledge gaps between the parties) should be about results, and after they have agreed on them in some way, one can try to establish formal rules of the game that are as rigid as possible, which, according to the hypothesis, will reasonably approximate the agreed-upon set of results. Is there a difference between substantive and technical rules, and can technical rules be discussed separately from the results behind a screen of ignorance?
Regarding the paradox of the 23rd judge, from a purely formal point of view, it seems to me that the proof should be rejected. You prove that the judge must express his opinion (that he must) because otherwise he is being clever against the Torah, which precisely wanted the accused to be acquitted. One could say that what the Torah wanted was that in the event that the judge sees that everyone was swept along unanimously, then if he is sufficiently certain that everyone was swept along and was mistaken, he will have the option of vetoing the decision and saying he must, thereby acquitting the accused. [Indeed, if the Torah truly intended the decree of Scripture not to rely on the wisdom of the judges in such a case where all are guilty, then certainly, as you say, the judge is obliged to tell the truth in his opinion and not to deceive. And even in the opposite case (if the law were that all are guilty and all are acquitted), then he was obliged to state his opinion that he was acquitted, even though in his opinion this would put a righteous defendant to death. Even though you said that it would be unreasonable for the decree of Scripture to put to death in the presence of conspiring witnesses, here this is not the decree of Scripture but an estimate of the Torah that cannot be weighed within the system of judges.]
In my opinion, it is possible and appropriate to set rules of the game without predetermining outcomes. It is true that it is not a moral obligation, but it is a more correct way, because otherwise everything is subject to the agenda and it will be difficult to reach agreements. Think of two people who have different goals. If they want to set common rules and the criterion for each is reaching their goals, there is no chance that they will agree on the rules.
This is unreasonable chatter.
Note.
How can one claim a majority when in the elections the current coalition won less than 48.5% of the votes?
(2 parties from the opposing side were on the verge of the % of the blockage and did not pass)
That is: in fact there was no majority.
Although legally they now have a majority in parliament.
Assuming that routine government matters and routine budget matters are in their hands to manage.
They are going to the polls anyway.
But a change in values and a game in the basic definitions of the nation, they really did not have a majority in reality…
If so, they really do not have a mandate to change and do not have a claim to a majority…
Needless to say, according to the polls, the opposition is now winning 70 seats and counting
And specifically, the proposals to crush the judicial system have a minority of 20% who support or a third (depending on different polls, mainly on the presentation of the question, such as the government proposal + slight changes in favor of the opposition's position raising support from 20% to about a third)
And the overwhelming and unequivocal majority is against
So they have no moral and ethical authority for such matters.
This is an argument that definitely boils anyone who opposes the coup.
In simple Hebrew: Who are you???
As far as I remember, the coalition had a majority of the votes even if you take into account the votes that were disqualified. Beyond that, these are the rules of the game. The majority is determined by the ballot box, not by polls or other calculations. It is true that consensus is required to formulate the rules of the game, and that is what I wrote. But without that, it is clear that they are acting according to the rules of the game.
A. To be precise, only about 48.3% of the votes
and not a majority.
B. It is true that they work within the rules of the game for various matters that the government has been deciding on for 75 years.
But if they suddenly come to change the basic definitions of government in the nation, and pave the way for sweeping changes in the nation's work program (and not just ordinary and existing government matters), the question arises, who are you?
After all, you do not have a de facto majority in the nation now
and in fact you never have.
And this is even a majority in the minimal sense of the word of 50% of the votes + 1 vote.
And that is not a broad consensus
Now it is clear that there is no opponent of a coup who will not rise up and in whatever way possible
In fact, as an equally fierce opponent of the reform, I have to admit that formally they have the authority to pass it, and probably also the authority to crown Bibi as monarch by a simple majority. The Constituent Assembly acted in a lawless manner, and did not define any restrictions on itself or on a future Knesset. If, as is customary for all parties, the Knesset is seen as a constituent authority, it will not allow any restrictions on this authority. [Unless the Declaration of Independence itself or the partition decision are seen as binding documents – which is less absurd in my opinion than what is being made of it. ]
Still, I will fight this because I do not want to live in a dictatorship, and I am not willing to pay for the above lawlessness by living in a dictatorship.
Where does the insistence on calling the current coalition extreme left come from?
Let's think together:
Is the repeal of the disengagement law in northern Samaria extreme left?
Is the regulation of 9 outposts, most of which are in very, very strategic locations, extreme left?
Is the decision on 10,000 additional housing units in Judea and Samaria (and more to come soon in Judea and Samaria) extreme left?
Is Smotrich's economic policy extreme left?
Is the insane budget allocation for infrastructure in Judea and Samaria extreme left?
Is the record number of terrorists eliminated during the current government extreme left?
So, yes, there is room to criticize the government -
Not responding properly to the shooting from Gaza.
Still no demonstrations from the government in all parts of the country.
Socialism is also recognized in economic conduct (well, what can the Haredim do in a coalition?) and more.
But Mikhi, why do you behave in a demagogic manner that makes you appear neither serious nor genuine?
I have explained more than once why I think this is an extreme left. A policy that strengthens the power of the government at the expense of the judicial system is left-wing (centralism of the executive branch). Transferring money to unproductive populations is socialism. Indifference to economic considerations is left-wing. Other governments have also done the outpost training, and I have not yet seen what came of it in the end. And we haven't even talked about governance and the response to terrorism and Gaza, etc. In short, a left that is blabbering about right-wing nonsense.
Regarding strengthening the government at the expense of the judicial system
Bennett and Shaked – Yamina, Yisrael Beiteinu, and of course Feiglin's “Zehut” all regretted their pledge to weaken the court, and even more so than the original Levin reform.
They are all extreme leftists on this issue. Okay, fine. We heard.
Transferring money to unproductive populations –
Israeli governments have always done this. Some more, some less. So Bennett was more in the direction of the Arab-Muslim public. I don't remember hearing you call him “extreme leftist” here either.
In any case, Israel's economic policy is really not socialist, despite what needs to be paid to unproductive populations (which is something that needs to be improvised within it).
“Indifference to economic considerations” – Demagoguery at its finest. Here too, it is not worth responding. Even if you give an example or two of this, I will give a million examples of the very caring and serious policy that Bibi and Smuts are running’.
Legalizing outposts – Which outposts did the previous governments legalize?
Can you mention anything that happened in recent years?
Have you read on the websites of left-wing organizations about the significance of legalizing these ten/nine strategic outposts?
Have you heard of “Fresh dick” in Talmon?
Have you perhaps visited the Peace Now website or are you just spouting nonsense without knowing the facts?
I also want to explain to you why it is right-wing policy to regulate these outposts –
This deepens the State of Israel's grip on Judea and Samaria, and causes the dream of an Arab state between the sea and the Jordan to move further away. This is called right-wing policy.
I can't explain it any better than that. I hope you understand.
Well, we're left with the fact that there is no governance and that there is no response to Gaza –
Regarding Gaza, there is a certain response, which even Gantz recently defined as a very serious response. The fact that we expect, and rightly so, a more powerful response is excellent and legitimate. But that doesn't mean there is no response because of Gaza. They will soon resume the aerial assassinations there.
Regarding the fact that there is no governance – You are welcome to contact all the legal entities that are delaying laws such as searching homes for weapons without a warrant, or judges who are not strict with serious criminals (especially in the Arab sector), or simply delaying the establishment of the National Guard. Including the previous governments that did not address the plight of the police and did not increase budgets.
And of course, in addition to what I have written so far, you are avoiding the parameters that show that this government cannot be called extreme left:
A record for construction in Judea and Samaria, a record in the killing of terrorists, a record in the Judea and Samaria infrastructure budget, the opening of the market to additional competitors (a very socialist move).
Demagogue and scoundrel
He just lost his mind.
I'm currently hospitalized, so I can't answer your pressing questions.
Miki, please publish visiting days and hours. 😉
Be careful, madness is a contagious disease.
A. Do you really think that the reason for the protest stems only from breaking the rules of the game and not to overthrow the government or promote progressive values and trample on the values of Judaism because according to those representing the demonstrations, this does not seem to be the case.
B. How does changing the committee for selecting judges/overriding clause/the position of the judge/reasonableness factor relate to changing the rules of the game.
C. Let's assume that you are right and that in matters related to the rules of the game, the majority has no advantage over the minority, so what is the value of general agreement? Will one person who objects be able to claim that he is not in the group?
And maybe he will decide that it is time to fire a firearm against the dictatorship like the lawyer whose name I forgot.
A. Bringing out the crowd is breaking the rules of the game. There are extremes for each side in the protest. So what?
B. These are the rules of the game that have been in place so far.
And they are coming to cancel this.
And some of the people are not ready
C. Widespread agreement, even the few tend to accept it, and if they really don't, then they leave
B. This side changed the rules of the game in the 1990s. The other side waited patiently to change it according to the law, and now they are coming to it with claims?
Mandy,
A. I think this is the main reason, and I explained why. Even up until now, they wanted the same things and the storms weren't like this. The desire to overthrow the government was disguised as a protest against the reform, and it's part of the issue. They want to overthrow a government that breaks the rules of the game. No one wants to trample on the values of Judaism except the government itself, which tramples on them with a rough foot. Promoting progressive values didn't even touch this protest with a finger. It's propaganda by B.B.-Haredim-Haredim. The fact that there are also LGBT flags there represents a huge brain drain, and they're also putting it there because the government and its breaking of the rules of the game threaten them.
B. I explained it well. Beyond that, there's no need for an explanation. You've given a list of rules of the game here, so discussing them is a discussion about the rules of the game.
C. No. There's common sense. You need broad agreement from a variety of people. That's how public decisions are made. If there is one person who thinks differently, it's not really interesting.
If someone thinks there's going to be a dictatorship here, then I completely understand that they would shoot a gun. Completely legitimate in their opinion.
In my opinion, the debate begins with the question of what the source of authority is - reason or the people. And from there also grows the claim about breaking the rules of the game (if the source of authority is reason, it is not within the authority of the Knesset to change the rules of election to the High Court, which is the representative of reason, and make them political). For me, as a supporter of reform, the pilots' steps are a rebellion against an elected government, even if they found a legal loophole to do so.
Two comments on the comments:
We also note that Beit Shammai instead of Beit Hillel does not matter (it seems to me at the beginning of the rabbis). Not everywhere in the Talmud does the rabbi attach importance to the rabbi.
– Rabban Gamliel of Yavneh and not Rabban Gamliel the Elder who lived at the time of the rabbi.
I disagree. In my opinion, reason has nothing to do with democracy. See columns 69 and 79 on the meaning of a democratic majority. And yet, in my opinion, a majority does not have the authority to change the rules of the game.
The pilots did not find a legal loophole to do this, but a moral loophole. It is illegal, but it is completely moral (in their opinion).
Regarding B”S, you only had to read the column. I cited both the Mimra and the sources for it there.
Regarding R”G, indeed. I was wrong here.
The idea that a person has the right to control their own life is a rational idea. Therefore, there is a connection between democracy and reason. The problem begins when the judges appointed themselves as representatives of reason here in this country. With your permission, I expanded on this here:
https://yuddaaled.wordpress.com/2023/03/30/%d7%9e%d7%94-%d7%9e%d7%a7%d7%95%d7%a8-%d7%94%d7%a1%d7%9e%d7%9b%d7%95%d7%aa/
It is a value, and therefore I would not see it as a rational idea. When I wrote here that it has nothing to do with rationality, I meant that democratic decisions do not strive for the truth (the best decision) but for what the public wants. As explained in my above column”
In my opinion, you are presenting things too extreme. The court does not represent reason against the will of the people, but rather is a body whose purpose is to criticize a vested interest with a lot of power (the government) in order to prevent rampages that can themselves also exceed the limits of the law and the will of the public.
The ’people’ has no authority over the individual, otherwise the German people had the authority to burn the Jewish minority and the Christian/Muslim government had the authority to force religious conversion on the Jewish minority.
It is interesting to see that Hitler also liked to claim that he was doing things in the name of the people (Volk).
The individual has inalienable rights that the ’people’ (or the majority) has no right to deny.
Usually, individual rights are enshrined in the constitution (which we did not get here) and the protector is the court that constitutes the barrier against the tyranny of the majority.
I don't know if your honor served in the army, but an army commander has the authority to order an assault even at the cost of risking his life (in cases of guaranteed suicide, they usually ask for a volunteer). And if someone refuses, they can be put on trial and executed on the spot. Basically, every law assumes that the state has authority over the individual. Otherwise, you can't be punished for not following the law.
Criticism of the Nazi regime or other regimes that did other terrible things does not come from a political science perspective, but from a moral perspective. Most people have the power to do things for the minority, whether we like it or not. And yet we assume that in a dynamic democratic regime, the majority will be deterred from taking extreme actions for various reasons. See Yagil Henkin on Subject:
https://www.dyoma.co.il/%D7%99%D7%92%D7%99%D7%9C-%D7%94%D7%A0%D7%A7%D7%99%D7%9F/1608-%D7%9E%D7%99-%D7%99%D7%92%D7%9F-%D7%A2%D7%9C-%D7%94%D7%92-%D7%99%D7%A0%D7%92-%D7%99%D7%9D-%E2%80%93-%D7%A2%D7%99%D7%A7%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%9F-%D7%94 %D7%94%D7%A4%D7%99%D7%9B%D7%95%D7%AA,-%D7%9E%D7%97%D7%99%D7%A8-%D7%94%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%A0%D7%95%D7%99-%D7%95%D7%94%D 7%94%D7%AA%D7%97%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%A2%D7%9C-%D7%AA%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%9B%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%A2%D7%95%D7%98
Individual rights are defined by law. If the court had upheld the law and not tried to usurp my right to criticize the reasonableness of government decisions for itself, there would have been no need for reform. The only reason for reform is the court's blatant attempt to steal from me the democratic right to determine whether government decisions were reasonable or unreasonable in my eyes and in the eyes of every other voter.
Your Honor served in the army for 3 years and was satisfied with that.
Your Honor would not want to spend his life in a country under military rule.
The army is an anomaly, not the norm.
What your Honor is arguing is that the right to life, freedom, freedom of religion, property, and other human rights are mine because the majority has been kind enough to give them to me, and if the majority decides otherwise, the rights will be taken away.
A hundred years ago, there was such a ruling ideology that has since lost some of its luster.
But you have come to restore its former glory.
They always come because the majority or the general public decides to grant them to you. Without that, you return to the state of nature and then there are no rights. People forget that without the state, rights would be meaningless. That is why Shaarei Yosher argued that the assumption of the existence of the state precedes the Torah, since the Torah assumes that there is property in the world even before the Torah. The only thing that does precede the state are moral obligations, but moral obligations, unlike rights, are not absolute (see the site owner's discussion of the Rashi method of the prohibition of saving a life at the expense of another person's property in column 291).
Since the existence of the state requires general social consent (a social contract) on a national basis, then the eight rights you receive are due to you solely because the majority, in its goodness, decided to give them to you. You don't have to be ungrateful and you can certainly show them a favor for it.
Excuse me, I will only intervene in the last statement. In my opinion, nothing here is correct.
First, Rabbi Shimon is not talking about a state but about legal agreement. This can be in any group. He is also not talking about human rights but about property rights specifically, and only about them.
Second, the state of nature is a fiction that describes facts and not essence. It may be true that in the state of nature there was violence, but that does not mean that there were no rights then. At most, there were people who did not protect them. There are still some today. There are always criminals.
And third, the majority does not give anyone rights. Rights exist by virtue of our being human beings and a human society, and they are given to us by God Almighty. At most, the majority is supposed to protect and not use its power to violate existing rights. It is not the one who grants them.
Thanking the majority for not using their power to violate my rights is like thanking the thug for not murdering me.
In my opinion, in the state of nature there are only moral obligations. That is why God judged Cain for killing Abel and it is possible to put on trial international war criminals who committed crimes against humanity. But talking about rights outside the framework of the law seems illogical to me. Only the law grants rights to a citizen by being part of the social contract. God as the giver of the Torah grants rights that stem from the Torah but there are no rights from God in the non-civil state of nature (in my opinion this is the mistake of the High Court regarding infiltrators), only moral obligations.
So yes, we don't have to thank the majority for not murdering me - that is their moral duty - but we do have to thank them for the legal framework within which I, as a citizen, have civil rights.
Y.D. Your opinions are the best explanation for the necessity of protest.
We remember what happened in countries where your opinions took over the legal system.
I assume you studied in an educational system similar to mine (perhaps a few years later) and were amazed to discover over and over again how erroneous ideas became legitimate.
The first time I heard Yeshayahu Leibowitz's corruption theory, I thought he was polemical and there was no way that the chosen people who knew persecution and the Holocaust would adopt the norms of their persecutors.
Today it seems that he was gentle with us …
Forgive me, but I am not claiming that there are no moral obligations in the natural state. Moral obligations exist in every situation and it is possible to judge a person who violated moral obligations, just as God judged Cain for murdering Abel and today we judge international criminals. What is not there in the natural state are rights, since rights are a derivative of citizenship.
And it is not the least precisely for this reason that reform is needed so that judges can make the distinction between civil rights that belong to the citizens on whom they are entrusted as they are defined by law and moral obligations handed down by the elected echelon, the reasonableness of which is examined by voters.
Hitler used the ’people’ to escape morality, while in a democracy the ’people’people’ is the way to clarify morality. Whose moral opinion is more correct: yours or mine? Aharon Barak's or Netanyahu's? Ahmed Tibi's or Aryeh Deri's? The issue is of course not with respect to the truth but with respect to coercion in the system.
No one, in our debate in Israel, claims that the people, who are the sovereign, are always perfect and cannot support injustices; everyone admits such a possibility. The problem is that the left – or those opposed to reform – deny the fact that everyone can be evil, even Supreme Court justices. Studying law does not make a person more righteous or more just than anyone else. They have no priority over anyone else's positions and opinions. Just as the Knesset can legislate against gypsies, so the three-member High Court can interpret in a ruling that freedom of movement will not apply to gypsies.
And in such a situation, the principle that the reform is intended to do is to return the values in the space to those that depend on the dynamics within a society. After all, today, a situation in which 3 judges can overturn legislation with the unanimous consent of 120 Knesset members is the same situation as what is happening in Iran: the people choose, but the ayatollahs decide whether there is value in this choice. And we did not choose the ayatollahs of the High Court, as we know.
What will the details of the reform look like? This can indeed be discussed, but the principle must not be missed: we need to anchor the dynamics of the worldviews that exist in society, and prevent the tyranny that has insidiously harmed us.
In mockery of language and in another language he will speak to this people
Rabbi Michael escapes into the philosophical perspective and discusses the issues of the demonstrations as if they were based on noble principles and feelings.
I, a countryman like me, prefer the words of our Rabbi's friend, Professor Mautner.
The demonstrations are of a public that has lost power and wants to continue to rule.
Professor Mautner's language speaks of the desire for power, the desire to determine the public space in opposition to the will of the public, based on the interpretation of the law, and all of these on the part of the opposition that found an enthusiastic partner in the court.
These are Professor Mautner's words - not mine (Mautner is not a Bibbist).
Professor Mautner's lecture was given about fifteen years ago.
Since then he has become abhorrent to liberals.
In particular, he insists that the court has taken upon itself the right to invalidate laws - a right not granted to it by the legislature.
You really are talking nonsense. There are two flaws in your words: 1. Ad hominem (so what if Mautner said this?). 2. As far as I know, he did not say this. He understands the current protests very well, and in his opinion they have very good reasons. He does not agree with the extremist protests and the apocalyptic predictions, but as far as I know, he certainly shares the criticism of the extremism of the reform and its legitimacy. It is clear that the basis of the protests is also an attempt to change the election results, but such large-scale social processes are immediately prevented by many reasons from many groups. To say that all this is nothing more than an attempt not to accept the election results is just nonsense.
1. I said, “I, a countryman like me, agree with Professor Mautner.” And since Professor Mautner also opposes the “legal coup,” I can see him as a helper.
You can’t claim that he is a “Bibist.”
All I said was, “The Supremes as humans, not as angels.” And my point of view, the countryman, is that they are also power-hungry. Why is this nonsense?
And Professor Abinari said this back in 1995.
2. Here are Mautner’s words: An interview in the newspaper “Haaretz.” 1.03.2023
https://www.haaretz.co.il/magazine/the-edge/2023-03-01/ty-article-magazine/.highlight/00000186-9c7e-d2ea-af96-dcfe50100000
There is also a lecture of his on YouTube – from 15 years ago (probably)
And there is more - check it out there.
I've already answered everything. No one is saying that the superiors aren't human, and no one is saying that they always act appropriately. As for the desire for power, that's a matter of definition. But it seems to me that there's no possibility of attentive discourse, so we'll end here.