On Tradition and Dynamism: C. Between Factual and Normative Tradition (column 624)

With God’s help

In the previous two columns, I presented two concepts of tradition: a rigid tradition (of cedar) that advocates the transmission of information through a hollow tube, without touching it, and in contrast, a dynamic tradition (of reed) that advocates the transmission of information while processing, interpreting, and refining it. I argued that it is factually clear that tradition is dynamic (a broken telephone), and that anyone who thinks otherwise simply lives in an ethos that ignores or is at least unaware of the dynamism that is necessarily built into tradition. I also argued in favor of the dynamic concept, which has two advantages: instrumental – it is useful for survival and coping with changes in opinions and circumstances. essential – it is useful for revealing additional facets of the same tradition, of which we were previously unaware. In many cases, these additional facets are revealed (are revealed?) through controversy and a plurality of opinions. In the previous column, I argued for the survival advantage of dynamism, which rescued us from a crisis of deadlock that threatened to disintegrate the people of Israel and the Torah. In the next column, I will discuss the fundamental advantage of a dynamic tradition.

But first, I would like to touch on the difference between ethos and factual truth, and clarify the strange situation of living within an ethos that does not reflect reality. From this, we can understand how a person can live with a sense of tradition of cedar and hollow pipes, while he himself processes, interprets, and refines it.

Reminder: The Rabbi on the Great Rabbi

At the end of the previous column, I tried to demonstrate this through the words of the Rabbi about the great Rambam. On the one hand, he believed that he was only transmitting the words of his rabbis and never said anything that he had not heard from his rabbi. While in reality, he renewed and processed this tradition, and said things that no one had ever heard. He lived with the feeling of being a hollow tube, even though the truth is that he himself was far from that. The Rabbi feels that everything he says was given to Moses at Sinai (as you may recall, Abaye and Rambam learned Yiddish), but the truth is completely different. Desire blinds a person from seeing reality. He interprets it according to his heart's desires. We will return to the Rabbi later, but I will begin with a discussion of the Maimonides' perception of tradition.

Maimonides on Tradition and the Central Library

Maimonides has a very firm position regarding tradition. In the introduction to his commentary on the Mishnah, after describing the manner in which the Torah was transmitted from Moses to the people after the presence of Mount Sinai, he writes:

And the ministers are scattered throughout the House of Israel to teach and memorize until they know that scripture and are proficient in its reading, and they teach them the interpretation of that scripture given by God, and that interpretation is the generality of matters. And they would write the scripture and memorize the Kabbalah orally, and thus the Sages say, O God, the written Torah and the oral Torah. And they say, O God, in the covenant, And the Lord spoke to Moses on Mount Sinai, what is the twelfth chapter on Mount Sinai? And was not the entire Torah spoken from Sinai, but to tell you what is below, its generalities, details, and grammar were spoken from Sinai. Even all the commandments were spoken from Sinai, their generalities, details, and grammar were spoken from Sinai.

Up to this point, it could be understood that the laws of the Torah themselves were all delivered to Moses at Sinai. But he does not mean that the entire Oral Torah as it is in our possession, in all its details, was delivered to Moses. What is written in the written Torah was entirely delivered to Moses, but over the course of the generations, interpretations and expansions were added to it by the sages. I do not mean here the laws of the rabbis, but rather the laws of the Torah, since the vast majority of them are the product of the sages throughout the generations and do not appear in the Torah and were probably not delivered to Moses orally.

Immediately afterwards he continues and writes:

And here is a parable for you, the Lord said to him: You shall dwell in the tabernacles for seven days. And the Lord, may He be exalted, also informed him that this tabernacle is the duty of males, not females, and is not obligatory for the sick or for travelers, and that it is not covered except with what grows from the earth, and that it is not covered with wool, silk, or utensils, even from what grows on the earth, such as mats and clothing, and eating, drinking, and sleeping shall be in it for all seven days, and it shall not be less than seven cubits long by seven cubits wide, and its height shall not be less than ten cubits. And when the Messenger, peace be upon him, came, he received this commandment and its explanation, and thus are all six hundred and thirteen commandments and their interpretations. The reading is written in the scrolls and the interpretation is oral.

It seems that he believed that all the laws of the Torah, in their details, were given to Moses at Sinai.

He then writes:

And when he died, and he had already conveyed to Joshua the interpretations that were given to him, and Joshua and the people of his generation dealt with them, and everything that he or one of the elders received from him was not open to debate and there was no dispute about it, and what they did not hear from the Prophet, may God bless him and grant him peace, was open to debate in its branches, and the law was taught in him through the methods of study of the thirteen measures that were given to him at Sinai, and they are the thirteen measures that the Torah is required to follow. And from those things that they learned, there were matters in which there was no dispute, but everyone agreed on them. And of those in which there was a dispute between two opinions, one discussed the law and was strengthened by him, and the other discussed the law and was strengthened by him, according to the methods of argumentative and debatable arguments, these cases will occur in their results, and when this dispute arises in them, they follow many, as the written saying goes, "Follow many to deviate."

Everything received from Sinai has never been disputed. Only what was not heard from Moses (but was later renewed in the 13 Proverbs or through interpretation) can be disputed.

And later he wonders:

It must be argued that if the interpretations of the Torah were accepted from Moses according to the rules we mentioned when we mentioned that the entire Torah was spoken, its generalities, details, and grammar, from Sinai, then what are those special laws that they said were the law of Moses from Sinai?

If everything was transmitted from Sinai, why are the laws that the Sages call "the law of Moses from Sinai" so few? Not everything that was transmitted from Sinai and was not disputed is called "the law of the Central Library." In short, what distinguishes the particular laws that are called "the law of the Central Library"?

At the beginning of the explanation, he prefaces that there are laws that were handed down from Sinai and yet they found an anchor in Scripture:

And here is a foundation that you should know. It is that the accepted interpretations of Moses are not at all controversial, since until now we have not found that there has been any disagreement among the sages at any time from the time of Moses our Lord until Rav Ashi, that one said that whoever blinds a person's eye and puts out his eye, as the Lord says, "An eye for an eye will be raised," and another said that only blood is required. We also did not find any disagreement in what the scripture says about the fruit of the palm tree, which one said is the etrog, and another said it is the privish or the harem, or others. We also did not find any disagreement in the thick tree, which is the myrtle. We did not find any disagreement in the interpretation, "An eye will be raised and its tip will be cut off," which is blood. And in what is said, "And the daughter of a priest, if she begins to commit adultery with her father, she defiles herself and shall be burned with fire," that this punishment is not carried out unless she is the wife of a man. Likewise, the punishment for someone who is not found to be virgin and is stoned, we have not heard of any disagreement from the time of Moses until now, that it is not unless she is the wife of a man, and it is established by witnesses and it is revealed that after the consecration she committed adultery. And so, in all the commandments, there is no dispute about them, since they are accepted interpretations of Moses, and about them and the like, the entire Torah was spoken, its generalities, details, and grammar from Sinai. But even though they are accepted and there is no dispute about them, from the grammar of the Bible that has been given to us, we can learn these are the interpretations in the legal system, the references, the hints, and the instructions that are in the Bible. And when you see in the Talmud, they discuss and argue and divide on the basis of their own research and bring evidence for one of these interpretations and the like, such as when they said that the fruit of a citrus tree will rise, and perhaps it is a harmonium or a parish or something else, until they bring evidence for their statement that it is a fruit of a tree, and they said that a tree whose wood is fragrant and its fruit is sweet, and they said that after the fruit of a citrus tree from year to year, and they said after the fruit of a citrus tree on every water, this is not because they doubted the matter until they learned about it with these evidences, but rather we have seen without a doubt from Joshua until now that the etrog is the one that is taken with the lulav every year and there is no dispute about this, and they only inquired about the teaching that is in the Bible for this accepted interpretation.

There was no dispute about what was conveyed to Moses. Although sometimes they seek a source for it in a sermon from Scripture. In any case, even if they bring a sermon that confirms that tradition, it is still a matter of Halm. He must still explain what the laws are that are called 'the laws of Moses from Sinai':

And every matter that has no allusion in the Bible and no reference and cannot be taught in one of the meds, in these alone they say halakha to Moses from Sinai, and therefore when we said that the halakhah to Moses from Sinai was derived, we made it difficult and said, how can you say about them that they are halakha to Moses from Sinai, when the lessons are alluded to in the verse of the land of wheat and barley, and the answer was that they are halakha to Moses from Sinai, and they have no basis from which to learn from it in one of the meds, and they have no allusion in the entire Torah, but the samikum to this verse as a kind of sign so that they may memorize and remember it, and this is not the concern of the verse, and this is the concern of those who say, "Read the reference in the Bible, wherever it is mentioned." And I am setting out for you here most of the laws in which the halakha of Moses from Sinai was said, and perhaps all of them, so that it will become clear to you the truth of what I told you, that there is not a single one of them that was taught in one of the meds, and it is impossible to teach it from a verse except by way of reference, as we have explained, and we also did not find them to have been quoted or given in any of them at all, and they did not bring any evidence for them, except to accept them from Moses as God commanded them.

In other words, only laws that have no basis in Scripture are called "halm" by the Sages. But there are many more laws that were given to Moses at Sinai, and in light of what we saw above, these are all laws that were not disputed.

Two possible interpretations of Maimonides' words

There is room to discuss the intent of his words. It is understandable that what was disputed was not necessarily conveyed to us at Sinai. The assumption here is that the tradition is completely reliable and has never been distorted or disputed. Another possibility is that if there was a dispute over any halacha, then what we have is the majority decision or the consent of the sages and not necessarily what was originally conveyed to Moses. Therefore, this is not called 'halacha to Moses from Sinai,' but not because God did not convey this halacha to Moses, but because what we have is not necessarily what was conveyed to Moses. Note that the second approach does not assume absolute reliability of the tradition. There are things that were conveyed from Sinai and were distorted and disputed, but after the dispute was resolved and the binding halacha was formalized, it cannot be considered authoritative.

In light of what the Rambam wrote above, it seems that in his opinion everything was given to Moses at Sinai, but there are things that were forgotten and then there was controversy about them, and these are not called the LBM. In other words, he is not claiming that there was no controversy about what was given to Moses at Sinai, but rather that if there was controversy, it is impossible to determine that what we have was given to Moses at Sinai (because perhaps the Sages made a mistake in their reconstruction).

But in his words above, we saw that he explicitly wrote differently:

And whatever he or one of the elders received from him was not subject to negotiation and there was no dispute about it.

If so, it seems that he really claims that what was delivered from Sinai cannot be disputed. And in particular the CBS, which are clearly delivered from Sinai, cannot be disputed. This is also what some recent scholars (such as theHavi (S. Katsav and others).[1]

In his book, Planted within usRabbi Shmuel Ariel suggests that according to Maimonides, only when a sage says "I have accepted" regarding a certain halakhah, there is no dispute about it. But there is no blanket claim in his words that there cannot be a dispute in the Halacha (see here a copy of his words, starting at the end of the first page). But it seems to me that Maimonides' words above do not reflect his words. For example, in the following sentence:

And here is a fundamental thing you need to know: that the accepted interpretations of Moses are not in dispute at all.

And also at the end of the last section we brought:

And I am setting out for you here most of the laws in which the halakha of Moses from Sinai was said, and perhaps all of them, so that it will become clear to you the truth of what I told you, that there is not a single one of them that was taught in one of the meds, and it is impossible to teach it from a verse except by way of reference, as we have explained, and we also did not find them to have been quoted or given in any of them at all, and they did not bring any evidence for them, except to accept them from Moses as God commanded them.

It seems to Hadiya that in his opinion there is no disagreement at all in the CBS.

Furthermore, the assumption that if a person announces that the halakha he has is from the mouth of Kabbalah, this prevents the possibility of a dispute, is naive and does not stand the test of fact. In the previous column, we saw that the Rebbe held all the teachings of his rabbis and his declarations that all of them were accepted by Moses at Sinai were of no help to him. His friends and students disagreed with him despite this. Even in the issue of a rebellious son and a teacher, a person can declare that he himself sat on the grave of a rebellious son, and this does not prevent the bar of his group from claiming that a rebellious son did not exist and will not exist (see Sanhedrin 1991, and more later in the column). In short, facts do not make much of an impression on us. I think the reason for this is precisely a blessed sobriety in relation to tradition. The assumption that tradition does not go wrong, meaning that if you announce that you have a tradition, you are certainly right, is incorrect. The broken phone is a fact that cannot be denied. That is why sages sometimes prefer their own judgment (at least in a situation where they have great confidence in it) over traditions that come to them. Traditions can go wrong, and in their view, hasbara is a more powerful tool.

The difficulties

How does this reconcile with Maimonides' claim that all the laws of the Torah, in all their details, were given to Moses at Sinai? On the face of it, we would expect that there would be no disagreement over any law of the Torah. Alternatively, it should be said that there are many laws of the Torah that are not from Moses at Sinai, and this does not reconcile with his statements cited above.

Furthermore, in previous columns we saw that this thesis is also factually very unlikely. The phenomenon of the broken telephone was supposed to cause disruptions in the transmission of tradition. It is very difficult to assume that everything received at Sinai was passed on verbatim without any disruption. Just as an example, the Gemara in Shavuot 26a cites the following case:

The man said, "By oath, except for rape, you are my blood, like the priest and the priest, because he is the one who keeps my place." The man said, "I swear by it," and the man said, "I swear by it," and the man said, "I swear by it," and the man said, "I swear by it," and the priest said, "I swear by it," because he is with him. The man said, "I swear by it," and the man said, "I swear by it."

Two of the chosen disciples of Rav, Rav Kahana and Rav Asi, heard some halakha from him, and each of them was certain that he had heard the opposite from his friend. Each of them was so certain of this that he even swore by it. With one step of transmitting one detail from Rav to two disciples, a dispute arose from one end to the other. Can one seriously claim that in all the Toshbap that was delivered to Moses at Sinai dozens and hundreds of generations ago, there were no disputes and disruptions?!

Furthermore, the Gemara in Temurah 16a describes a great forgetfulness that occurred in the Torah we received from Moses:

Rav Yehuda himself said, Samuel said, Three thousand laws were forgotten during the days of mourning for Moses. They told Joshua to ask, "God is not in the sky." They told Samuel to ask, "These are the commandments that the prophet is not permitted to renew anything from now on." Rabbi Yitzchak Naphha said, "Even a sin whose owner has died is forgotten during the days of mourning for Moses." They told Pinchas to ask, "It is not in the sky." Eleazar to ask, "These are the commandments that the prophet is not permitted to renew anything from now on." Rav Yehuda said, "When Moses our Lord passed away to the Garden of Eden, he told Joshua to ask me about all the spies you have." Rabbi Yehuda said to him, "What did I leave you for one hour and go to another place?" Rabbi Yehuda said to him, "Isn't that how you wrote about me?" And his servant Joshua son of Nun, a young man, did not leave the tent immediately. Joshua's strength was fifty-six. And three hundred laws were forgotten from him, and seven hundred spies were born to him, and all Israel stood to kill him. The Holy One, blessed be He, said to him, "It is not possible for you to do this, and you are troubled in the war, as it is said, "And it came to pass after the death of Moses the servant of the Lord, and the Lord said, etc."

The Gemara says that during the forty days of mourning for Moses, thousands of laws of Moses from Sinai were forgotten. Interestingly, it later appears that sermons were also forgotten:

In the mid-terms of Tana, one thousand seven hundred camels and donkeys, and equal decrees and the exactitudes of scribes were forgotten during the days of mourning for Moses, said Rabbi Abbahu. However, Othniel ben Kenaz brought them back from his calabash, as it is said, "And Othniel ben Kenaz, the younger brother of Caleb, captured her [and gave him Achsah his daughter as a wife].

But Othniel ben Kenaz restored the sermons in Pelopoulou (he simply preached them again). On the other hand, there is no way to restore the laws. This is information, and when it is lost, it is lost.

The Rambam himself cites the Gemara about the students of Hillel and Shamai who did not use any konserkan, and therefore the disputes arose. What is this, if not a disruption due to forgetfulness? Indeed, the Rambam himself, in his introduction to the Mishnah, divides the laws into five types, and in the third type of laws that are taught in the midrashim in the Midot Hardash, he refers to the disputes between the students of Hillel and Shamai, and writes:

But you thought that those who thought that even the laws in which there is disagreement were accepted from Moses, and that disagreement arose due to an error in acceptance or forgetfulness, and that one was right in his acceptance and the other was wrong in his acceptance, or forgot, or did not hear from his rabbi everything that needed to be heard, and cite as evidence for this what many of the disciples of Shammai and Hillel said, that they did not use any means, that there was great controversy in Israel and that the Torah was made into two Torahs, behold, this, God lives, is a very obscene and strange thing, and it is incorrect and does not fit the rules, and it casts doubt on the people from whom we received the Torah, and all of this is null and void. And this led them to a lost view, this lack of knowledge of the words of the sages found in the Talmud, since they found that the interpretation was accepted from Moses and that it is correct according to the rules that we have advanced, but they did not distinguish between the accepted rules and the new ones that were learned [through the methods of study].

But if you are satisfied with something, you certainly will not be satisfied with the dispute between the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel in their statement that they honor the Temple and then take the lead or take the lead and then honor the Temple, that neither of the two explanations is acceptable to Moses and did not hear from Sinai, and the root of their dispute is like saying that one of them forbids using the people of the land and the other permits, and so on, and everything similar to these disputes, which are clauses upon clauses upon clauses.

But they said that since the students of Shammai and Hillel were numerous and did not use any means, there was great disagreement in Israel. This matter is very clear, because two people who are equal in understanding, study, and knowledge of the rules they learn from them will not have a disagreement between them in what they learn in one of the meds under any circumstances, and if there is, it will be minimal, just as we did not find a disagreement between Shammai and Hillel except in matters of unity, since their methods of learning in everything they learned in one of the meds were close to each other, and the correct rules that were with one were also with the other. And when the learning of their students decreased and their methods of law weakened in their respect for Shammai and Hillel, their rabbis, a disagreement arose between them during negotiations on many matters, since each of them judged according to the power of his mind and according to the rules known to him. And they should not be accused of this, because we cannot force two people who are arguing to argue according to the [level] of the intellect of Joshua and Phinehas, and we are also not entitled to doubt what they disagreed about because they are not like Meir and Hallel or above them, because God, may He be exalted, did not oblige us to do so. Rather, He obliged us to hear from the wise, the wise of whatever generation there may be, as He said or to the judge who would be in those days and preached. And in this way a dispute arose, not because they erred in accepting them and accepting one as true and the other as invalid. And how clear these things are to those who contemplate them, and how great this foundation is in the Torah.

He explains that these disputes arose only in the laws that were not transmitted from Sinai, but were renewed in the manners of the sermon. What was not used by every consumer caused a decrease in intelligence and a devaluation in understanding the methods of halakhic and interpretive deduction, and therefore disputes arose. But I do not see how there was a forgetting and a dispute in the methods of the sermon (which themselves are the central tenets, even according to the Rambam himself), but there cannot be a dispute in the content of the laws that are transmitted. These are strange words.

theHavi In S. Katsav, he discusses these words of the Rambam at length, and reviews many of the LBMs about which we find disagreements in the Talmud. He finds explanations (some more convincing and some less so) for some of them, but not for all of them. Ultimately, these words of the Rambam are true. It is not clear how the Rambam can say that there was no disagreement and no forgetting in everything that was given to Moses at Sinai, when it is factually and logically clear that such a thing always gets confused and forgotten and is subject to interpretations.

theHavi A difficult name (in my opinion, cynically):

The words of the Shas are explained by the GK, and it is difficult for the Blessed One to give all the Torah orally in the book of Halam, so that they would not be forgotten, and the R'al, who would benefit from this, did not lead to forgetfulness and stuttering, which is the source of the disputes. And in this GK, he said that an excuse was given for why the Torah was not written, making many books, etc. This too is explained, and this excuse is valid for both of them, and thus the words of the Torah and the Rambam are consistent.

He asks the Rambam why God did not give the entire Oral Torah in the format of the LBM? This would have ensured that it would not be forgotten by us (since according to the Rambam, the LBM are not forgotten and there is no dispute about them). He says that the Gemara in Iruvin 21 resolves the issue of why not everything was written (because they did not want to make endless books), and it also resolves this issue. I wrote that it seemed cynical to me, since I do not see what it means to give a halakha as the LBM? All the halakha were given this way, but some of them were forgotten. And if we call any halakha the LBM, is that a guarantee that we will not forget it?!

Attitude to the laws that were repeated by Wisdon

The Gemara in the Tumarah there further says that one of the laws that has been forgotten is the law of a sin that its owner has died. In practice, we know this law: she goes to death (Mishnah Meila 3:1; Tumarah 2:2; Gemara Nazir 21:2), and it was even ruled as a law by the Rambam (Halal Psuli Mokudeshin 14:1). It turns out that this is a restatement of the law that was ignored, and they probably succeeded (or failed) in extracting it from some commentary or midrash. In any case, the question is how to relate to this law? Can we say that it is the LBM? After all, we have no way of knowing that this is indeed the law that was originally received, since it ignored us. Perhaps what was decided does not correspond to what was conveyed to Moses at Sinai? How can we know that we were not mistaken? We will note that there is division How she is killed (by hand, by starvation, or by feeding her barley until her throat is slit). See also the disagreement on the Tannaim in Temara 15:1 regarding the actual ruling. This may be the result of forgetfulness, but the fact that she died is still remembered from the halakha of Moses. And this still does not solve our difficulty, since according to each of the opinions regarding the manner of killing, one can ask whether this is the LBM or not.

onAnciT Volume 9, p. 'Halakhah of Moses from Sinai' presents a list of the laws of Moses from Sinai that were forgotten and were later revised and revised by the sages:

In some laws of Moses from Sinai, they are said to have been given in the Kabbalah to Moses from Sinai and forgotten and later returned to Wisdom, such as lessons on punishments – at what rate of forbidden eating does one incur punishment – they are laws of Moses from Sinai, and forgotten and returned to the court of the court of Jabez – Othniel ben Kenaz – and Wisdom. And so they said in the letters of the Manzaffach that they were given from the law to Moses from Sinai80 and they forgot it and the Tzofim – the prophets of the generations – returned and were wise. And so they said in the Arava, while the Temple was standing, that the law to Moses from Sinai was practiced and was forgotten and the prophets returned and established it. And so they said in the law of two kinds of barley for the hair* that the law to Moses from Sinai was in their hands and they forgot it and were returned and were remembered. And they said that three thousand laws were forgotten during the days of mourning for Moses, and one of them was a sin whose owners died, which was the law to Moses from Sinai. Even the laws that they said were forgotten and returned and were wise, some wrote that they were from the total of the three thousand laws. And some wrote that these were three thousand laws that were forgotten, and a sin whose owners died in general, when the court of law returned later and ruled on them, they did not rule according to the Torah of the LBM, and therefore another court can annul them.

And truly, literally Facial appearance Yerushalmi Shabbat Pa"a Ha"d (i.e. 'Five Sins') wrote that this should not be considered as a Halacha (meaning that in his opinion it is not even a law of the Torah at all, but this is very puzzling), for this matter a later Yad could annul or change this Halacha. This is of course not the accepted approach, and we will return to this immediately.

Ethos versus historical facts

It seems to me that there is no escape from the conclusion that Maimonides' intention in his words is not to make a historical claim but a normative claim. We should treat these laws as if they were delivered to Moses at Sinai as they are. His intention is to instruct us to ignore the disputes, negotiations, and decisions given there. From our perspective, these are laws that were delivered through a hollow conduit, and the product of the discussions is the law given to Moses at Sinai. According to my suggestion, Maimonides' intention is to say that if any law is defined as a historical law, we should treat it as the law given to Moses at Sinai as it is in our possession, even though it has been factually interpreted and disputed and a decision has been made regarding it. This is a normative claim, not a factual-historical one. Among other things, he seems to object to the following: Facial appearance The above-mentioned sees any such reconstruction as rabbinical law. Once we have the law of sin whose owners died, then from our perspective this is the original Halacha. And again, not factual but normative.

This is also how the Talmudic sayings, such as those mentioned in the column, should be understood. 622, regarding the fact that the entire Torah we have was spoken to Moses at Sinai. For example, in Yerushalmi Paha 5:15, we find:

Rival said about them and about them, all things, as the words of the Mishnah, Talmud, and Aggadah, even what a veteran student is about to teach before his master, was already told to Moses at Sinai. What is the point [Ecclesiastes 1:10] of something that a man might say, "See, this is new," etc., when his companion answers him and says, "It has already been forever."

It is clear to any reasonable person that this cannot be factually correct. Many laws of the Torah have been renewed over the generations, and there is no doubt that they do not originate from the tradition from Sinai. Take as an example the Gemara on Shabbat 36b:

As Datania and Dovah Bandathe, the early elders said that she should not dye her hair, nor dye her hair, nor adorn herself with colorful clothes until Rabbi Akiva came and taught, "If you defend her husband and her husband is found to have divorced her, what else will you learn to say?" And Dovah Bandathe, her bandathe, will be until she comes to the water:

This is a Torah law, since it is required by a verse, and yet a Rabbi, by virtue of his opinion, changes what was practiced in the generations before him. Therefore, it seems that the intention of these Talmudic sayings is normative and not factual. Every innovation that a sage brings out of the Torah should be considered, from our perspective, as if it were given to Moses at Sinai. This is the word of God and it is as binding on us as what is written in the Torah.

The sermons in the Midot Hardash are also an excellent example of this. It is accepted among all the Rishonim that the Midot Hardash of the Halacha are the LBM, even though the laws that are learned from them are of course created by the Sages. There is one exception, and that is the Midot Gezash, which is accepted that a person does not judge on his own (see Nida 22b and parallels). Rashi explains this by saying that all the specific sermons in the Gezash were delivered to Moses at Sinai (and not just the Midot Hardash itself), and from there they were passed down from rabbi to student. And behold, several Rishonim wrote that these sermons were controversial and it is clear that the laws discussed were not delivered as given from Sinai (see, for example, the Ramban's interpretations of the roots in 2 and 3).AnciT (E. 'Gezra Shova'). The matter is explained, for example, in the question of Shabbat 67:1: "The places of the deities are the same decree." We see that the sermon that was given in the Gezra Shova was renewed at some stage. If this is the case in the Gezra Shova, then in the laws that are not taught in the Gezra Shova but in other ways, about which it is not even said that they are from Sinai, it is clear that many of them were created by sages throughout history.

As long as the tools with which the laws are created are tools of interpretation or tools that belong to the standards of the sermon (which are themselves the LBM, although there are disagreements about them, such as between the Rabbis who require 'multiplicity and minority' and the Rabbis who require 'general and particular' – see Shavuot 26a, the same page where the aforementioned distortion by Rav Kahana and Rav Assi appears), the products are laws from the Torah.[2] The defining factor of Torah law versus rabbinic law is not whether it was given at Sinai or renewed throughout history, as almost everything was renewed later. The difference is whether the sages created the law in question through sermons and commentary from the verses (then it is Torah law) or whether they enacted a new law from their own mind without taking it from a verse (then it is rabbinic law).

False consciousness?

We saw that the Rambam says that the LBM did not fall into dispute, and in my opinion this is a normative statement and not necessarily a factual one. There are two ways to understand my claim regarding the Rambam:

1. Maimonides himself presented things this way even though he understood that this was not the case in fact. This is an example of the esoteric discourse he advocates in delicate cases (see the introduction). Teacher of the Confused).
2. Maimonides himself lives in the (false) consciousness that indeed all of these are the LBM. The ethos he is trying to instill seems to him to be truly authentic, and that is why he wrote this. Many rabbis today firmly advocate the claim that all the laws we have were handed down to Moses at Sinai, even though there is no doubt that these things are invalid. Anyone who has a hand in the Talmud (and also in logic) should know that this is not true. It is likely that these things are ideologically difficult for them, and therefore, even though they are well aware of the situation, they still hold the view that it is not right to bring a puma to a puma.

Although, since Maimonides advocates an esoteric discourse and since he does not seem naive to me, I think it is more reasonable to adopt the first interpretation of his words. He is aware of the historical facts but does not present them as they are, in order to create the desired halakhic ethos in the public.

An example of this can be seen in the Talmudic discussion on "an eye for an eye." The Gemara in the Book of Ecclesiastes 12:2-3 goes on to show, through several conditions, that the verse "an eye for an eye" is interpreted specifically as referring to money, and not literally. At the end of the issue, the opinion of the Rabbis is presented, which apparently does not say so:

Tania RA says, "An eye for an eye, really, really, clear your mind, Rabbi Eliezer, let him be, as I have said, "Tanai said, "Rabba said, "He is not classified as a slave of God, my father, but as a freedman, as a freedman, who has blood for him?" But Rav Ashi said, "He is not classified as a harm, but as a harmer.".

In the baraita, we see that the Rabbis apparently believed that the verse should be read literally. But the Gemara is not willing to accept that it disagrees with all the conditions we have given, and therefore the Amoraim push the baraita in other directions. Most scholars believe that the Rabbis intended to say that the verse "an eye for an eye" is interpreted literally. And what the Gemara pushes the baraita in is to strengthen the argument that it is about money and to dissuade those who err from saying that this is not a binding law because it is only an interpretation of the Sages. We have often found statements in the Rishonim that explain Talmudic sayings in this way (see, for example, here). One can of course be convinced that the Gemara really thought that the Rabbi did not disagree with this, but I think it makes much more sense to say that this is a statement for the purpose of reinforcement. That is why they also took the time to present all the methods of the previous conditions there in the issue, in order to prove that this is a matter of money. There is a very clear tendency in the issue there to strengthen this law and take it out of the hands of those who doubt it, precisely because of its novelty and its contradiction to the simple.[3]

Maimonides, in the book of Havval Vemzik, p. 1:3-6, cites the sources for this law and then adds that it is a tradition from Sinai about which there has never been any disagreement (see, for example, the article here):

3. What is said in the Torah, when a person is given a disability, it is given to him, not to be injured by it as one injures his fellow man, but rather that he deserves to have a limb removed or to be injured by it as he did, and therefore he pays for his damage, and it says in Numbers 35:31, "And you shall not take a ransom for the soul of a murderer." For a murderer alone, there is no ransom, but for the loss of limbs or injuries there is a ransom.

4. And so it is that which is said, "Your eye shall not spare him who injures his neighbor and harms him, nor shall you spare him in making restitution, lest you say, 'He is poor,' and that we have pity on him unintentionally, for this reason it is said, 'Your eye shall not spare him.'"

5. And whence it is that it is said in the limbs, an eye for an eye, etc., peace, as it is said +Mishpat 21:25+, a bruise for a bruise, and it is expressly said, "And if a man strikes his neighbor with a stone or with his fist, etc., he shall only give him a slap, and he shall be healed." Have you not learned that under the word "under the limb," peace is said, and the same is the law for under the word "under the limb," and the other limbs?

6. Even though these things seem to be from the perspective of the written Torah, they are all explained from the mouth of Moses from Mount Sinai, and all of them are in our hands as a matter of practice, and this is how our ancestors saw it, judging in the court of Joshua and in the court of Samuel the Ramoth-gilead, and in every court and tribunal that has stood from the days of Moses until now.

Of course, one can understand this simply, that because it is a question of the LBM, it is clear that even the Rabbis did not disagree with it, and therefore his words should be rejected. But in the issue there is no mention at all that it is the LBM, and supposedly she had to write this and shut the mouths of all the detractors at once. Therefore, it is more likely that the intention of the Gemara and also the Rambam is a normative and not a factual statement. This should be seen as the LBM even if historically it does not come from there. Therefore, the Rambam is not satisfied with saying that it is the LBM, but emphasizes that this is how courts have discussed this throughout the generations. He is loyal to the policy of the Gemara, which concealed the controversy on this matter because of Eina Bisha.

This brings me back to the author of this mimra, R.A. We saw in the previous column that R.A. is a clear traditionalist. He stuck to his traditionalist position against all his friends and also paid heavy prices for it. At the end of the column, I brought the words of the R.A. about R.A. not saying anything that he did not hear from his master and at the same time innovating things that you have never heard before. I suggested there that R.A. may have lived with the consciousness that he was only a hollow tube that passed on the teachings of his rabbis, but the truth is that he had many innovations, all of which he heard through his sensitive ear in the teachings of his rabbis. If so, the Gemara here in the Bible exemplifies such an approach to R.A.'s own words. In light of what we saw in the previous column, it can be hypothesized that R.A. fought against the innovators also regarding the interpretation of the verse "eye for eye": they offered many reasons why it was about money (as described in the issue there), but he insisted that it was about money in the literal sense, because this is the tradition. When he insisted on his position against the discretion of all his comrades, the sages made it clear to him that it was necessary to eliminate his principled position that advocates tradition over discretion and negotiation. If so, perhaps this issue is also part of the whole described in the previous column.

[In parentheses: It is interesting to note that in the issue of Sanhedrin 1111 that we cited regarding a rebellious son who never was and never will be, a similar saying of the Prophet is also cited regarding a remote city:

As for the city of Datania, it was not and will not be, and why was it written, "A city that is rejected has not been and will not be, and why was it written, "A demand and a reward have been made." As for the city of Datania, Rabbi Eliezer says, "Every city that has even one mezuzah in it is not made a city that is rejected. Why did he say, "Call, and gather all its spoils into a broad place and burn it with fire?" And since there is a mezuzah, it is not possible that it is written, "You shall not do so to the Lord your God," said Rabbi Jonathan. "I saw it, and I sat on a pillar.".

The one who follows the method of the Rabbi is not impressed by the testimony of Rabbi Yonatan and insists on his own that the remote city did not exist and will not exist. Although here it seems that he is relying on an argument and not on tradition, it should be noted that this is not the Rabbi himself. The Rabbi is the one who gives the reasoning, but he is not the one who claims that the remote city did not exist and will not exist.]

Implications: Commitment to Halacha and Autonomy in Jurisprudence

As we have seen, it is factually clear that tradition is dynamic (the tradition of a reed). This is clear both factually (we see that traditions have renewed laws, such as the 'Hadvah Bendah' of the Rabbis and others) and logically (the broken telephone effect). But sometimes the sages were concerned that this dynamism would arouse objections and criticisms that could lead to disdain, distrust, and ultimately even abandonment of commitment to it, and therefore some of them took an esoteric path, that is, they presented the tradition as if it were passing through a hollow tube (the tradition of an erez), while factually this is certainly not the case.

I suppose that some probably really believed this (at least in the sense of bringing in a puma, not a galia), like many of the sages of our time. These are the naive ones. But with others, more sober (like Maimonides), it can be attributed to an esoteric approach. They talk about a tradition of a hollow tube, but their intention is not a factual claim but a normative one: this is how we should treat tradition. Everything that a veteran student re-establishes receives normative status as if it were given from Sinai. The reason for this is that he uses the tools of preaching and the intellect he received from his Creator, and the application of these tools to the biblical text or any other text should be considered as revealing the content hidden in it. Therefore, de facto it was given to us at Sinai. Even if there is a possibility of error, and even if in practice that student was wrong (meaning that this was not really the original intention of God), if from his perspective this is the best interpretation, then he should see it as much as possible for Moses at Sinai.

Therefore, laws that are renewed throughout the generations in the various tools of sermon and commentary receive the status of Torah laws. A prohibition on opening bottles on Shabbat has never existed, if only because these bottles did not exist until our time. But the poskim who see this as an example of a blow with a hammer, a builder, or a soter, from their perspective this is what was given to Moses at Sinai within the framework of the prohibitions on Shabbat work. There is no need to assume for this purpose that God actually showed Moses at Mount Sinai the shape of a metal or plastic stopper for various bottles from all generations. This is of course a simple example of a new application of old law, but note that even in this there are disagreements among the poskim of our time, meaning that this application is not simple and agreed upon. Beyond this, disagreements about the law itself (and not just its applications) can also receive exactly the same treatment. If in my opinion my interpretation is the correct interpretation of the law that we have received in tradition – then from my perspective this is what God showed Moses at Sinai. Not necessarily factual but normative.

I have been asked several times in the past how it is possible to be committed to a tradition that was mostly created by humans. And do we worship the Rabbis? Our commitment is to God and only to Him. The apologetic tendency is to reply that this tradition was given entirely at Sinai, preferably while extolling the greatness of the copyists of the rumor who did not err and could not err. In my answers, I explained that none of this is necessary. The copyists of the rumor were people like you and me, and they probably erred quite a bit, like me and you. But my commitment to the halacha is not a function of its authenticity, that is, of its alignment with the original will of God. I am obligated to uphold the halacha not because I am convinced that this is what was told to Moses at Sinai, and this is even when there are no new contemporary circumstances. Like every person and like the great rabbis, the sages of their time could err and probably did. But this should not affect our commitment to the halacha. I am committed to it because normatively, this is what was given to Moses at Sinai, even if not factually.

It should not be concluded from this that I advocate adhering to the precedents of the great rabbis. I do not. On the contrary, precisely because the tradition, in my opinion, is dynamic, then what I conclude from studying the issue is what binds me, and as far as I am concerned, it is what was said to Moses at Sinai. Just as the previous sages processed and interpreted the tradition, I do the same as they did. The tradition has always been dynamic and must continue to be dynamic. It must continue to flourish and multiply just as it did in the days of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Hananiah and Rabbi Abi. This is also the reason why I am not troubled by errors that have occurred in the tradition throughout the generations. The broken telephone is part of the facts of life, and I am sure that God, the Blessed, knows this too. He expects us to do the best according to our understanding, since the Torah was not given to ministering angels. If we did this – we did His will, even if factually it is not what He intended.

I think this is the essence of the message in the story of Akhnai's oven, when the Rabbi brandishes authenticity (the entire information from Sinai is with him) and the walls of the Beit Midrash prove his righteousness and justice (that he is in line with God's will. God, the Blessed One, also believes the same):

Rabbi Yehoshua stood on his feet and said, "It is not in the sky, is it not in the sky?" Rabbi Jeremiah said, "The Torah was already given on Mount Sinai. We do not observe the voice that you have already written on Mount Sinai in the Torah after many years of fervor."

The sages answer the RA, "It is not in the sky." Halacha is determined according to what the sages see and not only according to traditions. As we have seen, sometimes their judgment prevails over faith in tradition.

I will mention that in the previous column we saw that his brother-in-law also used to check those who came through the gates of the Beit Midrash according to their qualities and reliability as morals (a hollow tube). But after the revolution, the Rabbinate opened the gates and increased the number of pews in Yavneh. I explained that this is because under his presidency, the law is determined through negotiations according to the reasons and not based solely on traditions.

And the Gemara continues there and says:

Rabbi Ashachiah gave to Elijah, saying to him, "What servant of the Holy One is blessed by you? He is in that place where you live." He said to him, "How did you live?" And he said, "Conquer me, my son, conquer me, my son."

God Himself smiles and says: "Conquer me, my son, conquer me, my son." The law was accepted not because this was God's authentic will. On the contrary, it was accepted even though it was clearly not what He intended. But it is His will that we accept halachic decisions in this way. God Himself wants a dynamic, not a frozen tradition.

[1] onAnciT In the book Halakha from Moses from Sinai, in note 89, he states that there is confusion about theHavi And other later scholars who understood the Rambam's claim that there was no disagreement in the Halbam, and claimed that nothing of the kind is written in the Rambam. See, for example, Maharat Hayut, in his book The Teachings of the Prophets, article 'Toshefa', p. 18.

[2] Specifically regarding the virtues of the sermon, the Rambam's approach in the second root is that these are not actual Torah laws. I expanded on this inMy articles On the second root in the book Will send out its roots, and in my books The Spirit of Justice At the second gate.

[3] Contrary to popular belief, there are few sermons that contradict and uproot the plain meaning. Usually, the sermon adds another interpretation to the plain meaning. "An eye for an eye" is a blatant and very unusual simile.