A response to women joining the minyan and leading it as a public mission

Hello Jonathan. Short but long question.

I will state in advance that my answer is written from a copy, and not from actual practice. I have not checked enough. If this is from actual practice, please tell me and I will check more carefully. Here I have written only what comes to my mind at the moment for the sake of studying the Bible.

It seems that this basically depends on two points:
1. Is a woman obligated to pray like men (because one who is not obligated in anything does not exempt others from prayer, 18th century). The Mishnah in Berachot explains that yes. I think that according to most opinions, the Halacha also says so (prayer according to the Torah according to the Rambam does not have time, and prayer that depends on time is according to the Rabbis, and according to the Asahzag according to the Rabbis, women are obligated according to many opinions. And in the Mab’b it is written that even for opinions that exempt them, they are obligated in prayer, not a single drachma – and the Tza’a is this a different obligation from men. It does not seem so from the explanation).
2. Does she join the minyan (because someone who does not join cannot be a Shatz). Here it is accepted that she does not, but this is only for reasons of public respect or modesty, which in my opinion do not apply today. And does the Law of Attraction apply to this? A null and void rule does not invalidate a rule, or is there no rule here but a custom that was practiced out of modesty and public respect.
Therefore, seemingly from the law there is a great deal of room to say that a woman can also be a Shatz. But it is difficult to permit something that has become so deeply rooted in prohibition that it seems to be truly puzzling (Varpermars 30). In any case, if I were to find myself in a place where a woman serves as a Shatz, I would pray with them (meaning, one recites Shev Shamatata in the repetition of the Shatz that she says and thereby intends to fulfill her commandment of the 50th day).

You did ask about Musaf, and from the explanation it seemed to me that the situation there is different. Indeed, I found Shrek’a quoting from the Rosh perfumes (which is fake as you know :)) that the obligation of prayer depends on the obligation of the sacrifice, and women have no share in the sacrifice because they are not obligated to pay half the shekel (a bit confusing, baseless and unreasonable in my opinion, and should be easily rejected. If Shrek’a had known that this was a forgery, perhaps he would not have written it either). It is true that the Tzalah wrote that they do not belong in the sacrifice because it is a matter of the za’ga, and this is more apparent. Therefore, in the Musaf, I would not permit such a thing.

And in the Shema, we must again discuss it, since women are exempt from it. But with regard to the blessings of the Shema, the Rishonim have already discussed whether they are part of the prayer form or are blessings over the Shema itself (and with regard to great love, there is a difference in it because of the blessings of the Torah, and women are obligated to recite the blessings of the Torah, as the Shulchan Aruch rules). If so, then in this too, women are not necessarily obligated. But I think that in the blessings of the Shema, the question does not arise because there is no status for a public messenger. The blessings of the Shema are also said in the singular, and I think that what is said together is only because of the majority of the people.

I will say again that I did not read all the necessary information, and I hope I did not miss anything. If this is a practical question, please tell me that I need to look into this further.
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A’:
In honor of Rabbi Michael Avraham
Further to what you wrote regarding Aliyah for women, please refer to the accompanying article:
https://drive.google.com/open?id=0BwJAdMjYRm7IQmM1N2JSYkRlejg
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Rabbi:
Thank you for the article (which I was at least partly familiar with, and I even commented on it quite a bit).
I have now quickly gone through his writings again, and I see that it is good. Although there is of course a great deal to discuss in the manner of Torah, I will make only a few comments here (and again, I hope that you will forgive me if I am wrong because I went through them very quickly):
1. As I believe, in some cases the poskim who believe that women are exempt from reading the Torah do not say this before the consideration of public honor, but rather from this consideration itself. If this is so – then according to them the conclusion can be different (after all, if the consideration of public honor is null, and this too of course must be discussed, then the obligation itself returns). This is how I wondered about the words of the Ma’b, which cites the words of the Maga and does not bring dissenters, but nevertheless comments that indeed many did not act like him and even women used to go out. This means that there is no disagreement in principle here, but only a lack of strictness in fulfilling their obligation for some secondary reason (public honor??). Indeed, the Katzlaa says why go out if they are not obligated? And is there a prohibition on this?! I did not check now.
One way or another, regarding Aliyah and even a blessing, there is a lot of room for permission even if they themselves do not require recitation as stated in the article.
2. The words of the Rashba that you cited, that in a public setting anyone can read, even those who are not obligated, should be expanded further. As soon as the mitzvot imposed on the public are obligatory, women are also obligated in the general public, even if they are mitzvot that they should have been exempted from (such as because of the time, as in the congregation. As in education, etc.). Therefore, perhaps also in reading the Torah, and even if they understand that it is part of the law of Talmud Torah (which in itself is highly questionable to the Jewish people for several reasons), since it is a public law, women are also obligated in the general matter, and then it follows that even from the principle of the law they are actually obligated in this, and not just that they can ascend and recite the blessing.
3. I will also note that regarding public honor, if I understood correctly (I read very quickly), the article mainly discusses two arguments: 1. Is forgiveness possible? 2. Does human dignity reject it (Sperber’s words). But a third argument could also arise: 3. In our current situation, there is no problem with public honor at all, because there is no harm to public honor when women read or perform ol’ah. And perhaps the opposite, when they do not perform ol’ah, it is harm to public honor. This of course depends on the question of what public honor means, and so on.
4. I would also add that even if the Rishonim and the poskim explain the term public honor in a certain way, the bottom line still depends on whether or not public honor is actually harmed. For example, even if someone explains that public honor is harmed if someone who is not obligated comes, and even if we assume that women are truly not obligated in a matter, we still have to discuss what the law is if in fact public honor is not harmed by this (or at least that is how it is perceived today). Is this exactly like a public that forgives its honor, and Talia cannot forgive or not (as discussed in the article). Or perhaps what cannot be forgiven is only said when in most cases the public does see it as an injury to its honor, and then there are opinions that if there is a specific public that wants to forgive, it cannot forgive. But here the reality has changed and all publics (at least modern ones) do not see it as an injury, so by all accounts there is no problem with public honor and Talia cannot forgive or not. In other words: the question of whether the poskim’s determination that it is not public honor is factual or normative.

There is a related question here as well.

Thanks again,
Michi
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Tuvia:
There is confusion here in my humble opinion. The woman certainly does not join the minyan, not for reasons of ‘public honor’ but by virtue of the scriptural decree that we learn from the spies. At the same time, it is conceivable that she would be a public messenger even though she does not join the minyan, and just as she can ascend to the Torah from the principle of the law even though she does not join the ten without whom there is no reading of the Torah

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Rabbi:
Indeed, confusion has arisen. This was said about a minyan of seven. Regarding adding to a minyan of ten, see my comments here .