Again regarding the ontological view
You interpreted that it is ‘greater than reason’ to believe in something that exists. And this is because the translation neurons in the brain are active when believing in something that exists, unlike knowing without belief. And I wondered if this doesn’t undermine an argument that claims to be composed of pure logic? Because here comes an element of science that deduces from observation. And if research shows in broad daylight that there are more specialized neurons that are active when not believing in something, then the whole argument falls apart. Because it will no longer be greater than reason.
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I've been thinking about the argument a lot lately, so I hope I'm not bothering you. I just wanted to ask if it makes sense to say about someone that they deny the existence of something that doesn't exist. That is, when we say about someone who denies that God doesn't exist, we are actually claiming that they deny the existence (because that's what they're actually denying) of a God that doesn't exist. When the concept "doesn't exist" is already included in the word "denies," which is a kind of strange duplication and sounds like a mere play on words.
I didn't understand the question. Even if X doesn't actually exist, in the debate about whether X exists or not, whoever denies its existence denies its existence. But why is that interesting? It's just empty semantics.
We have adopted the view that everyone agrees on the divine definition but disagrees on its very existence. Can't the atheist retract this assumption? Since the definition leads him to a contradiction, he can claim that he really disagrees with the definition and that God, for him, is something greater than he can conceive (a God who exists). And why would the claim contradict his denial rather than contradict his very agreement with the definition? He didn't see things that way at first, but in retrospect it turned out that he disagreed with the definition as well.
I explained this in my notebook. You can't dispute a definition because a definition asserts nothing. I posit a definition, and from it I prove its realization.
At most he can dispute that it is possible to conceive of something greater than which it is inconceivable.
If you have already answered me, can you explain to me why it is not correct to say that he denies the God that the believer understands and he does not deny the God that he understands. After all, he understands that he does not exist and he does not deny that, but the existing God that the other person understands.
I didn't answer that, and for good reason. Nor will I. I don't have time to play pointless word games.
I argue that the pun is in the ontological argument. What is denying something that does not exist, is that not a pun? But I did not waste your time (?) Thanks anyway
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