Ashkenazim as Rama and Sephardim as Shulchan
peace,
A. What is the source of the validity that Ashkenazim should rule as the Rama (or as is customary among Ashkenazim, etc.) and Sephardim as the Shul? Or do you think that this has no validity? What is the point of the dispute? I emphasize that I am asking about halachic rulings and not about customs.
[I will also emphasize that the question is regarding a situation where a person does not have a solid and definitive opinion regarding a particular halakha, in which case I assume you would say that he should rule according to his opinion, even against the Rema/Shula].
on. Now I will also ask about customs. On the face of it, the moment we left the lands of exile and came to the land, the local customs of our grandfathers and grandmothers were nullified, and one must rule according to the rest of the rules of halakhah. Or are the customs of our ancestors also valid?
Also, is there a connection between these concepts of local custom and ancestral custom to the first question?
Thank you very much.
The question is only about a situation where you do not have a solid opinion. When you have one, you must follow your own system. If you do not have one, follow the custom. And the custom of the world is to rule according to the system of your community, Ashkenazim as the Rama and Sephardim as the author.
The custom today is that customs are not based on geography (as was the case during the Talmud and in the past, local custom) but rather on origin. There is a good reason for this, as today there is great mobility in the world, and therefore it is better to formulate customs according to origin, which does not change.
Regarding rulings, in your understanding, then, a new ruling rule has been created here for situations of doubt? That is, just as the rules developed: “Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Meir rule as Rabbi Yehuda;” “Halacha as Berelai;” “Halacha as Abibai Ya’al Ka’m;” “Single and plural rule as plural;” etc., etc., so now there is an additional ruling rule?
Regarding customs, is the chapter “Where they were” actually translated today to “the community that was”?
This is not a new rule. In doubt, we follow the custom. And the custom is like that.
Indeed.
I want to study Halacha and I am Ashkenazi but I study Rema and there is a clear Mishnah and there are many disputes about many of Rema's words until the end of our time like which last one to go to?
That's why I studied with Beit Yosef to understand the issue but still to bypass the Och you have to learn faster and you can't follow everything and it's not like learning the issue slowly but it is worth ruling
In principle, you should do what you think. As long as you haven't had time to clarify the issues, follow the custom. And if there are disputes, then act according to the laws of disputes. Doubt the matter or the sound, or the matter of the da'ma.
Does the Rabbi mean by the word "Daraita" to mean "Drabnaan"?
What is the definition of "Sugine Da'lama"?
Yes. Sugyin Da'lma is a term used by a political judge who erred. I mean what is accepted as a ruling in practice.
This does not contradict each other.
?
If you're going to ask something, you should ask.
What does the Rabbi mean by what is accepted as a practical ruling? If we are limited in our interpretation of the text and in our interpretation of the text, what does what is accepted belong to?
The rules of doubting a matter or a statement were stated when you have no other way of deciding, that is, when a law has not been ruled upon. If the law has been ruled upon, you are not in doubt and you follow the custom. In any case, the rule of doubting a matter or a statement does not apply. In other words, the rule of following the custom precedes the rules of spikot. If there is a custom, the laws of spikot do not apply.
Otherwise, in every law that is disputed in the Talmud, we would have to follow the laws of spikot and not put our heart into the words of the jurists and our own understanding.
Continuing with the question I asked at the beginning of the thread, I will present it in a different variation –
Let's say there was no such custom of ruling according to sect, would it have been permissible to rule according to sect in a situation of doubt (and not, for example, to be stricter in the Dauraita when I have no opinion)?
Or in other words – the first ones who began ruling according to their sect even though they were no longer in their place (Ashkenazim who moved to Sephardic lands and Sephardim who moved to Ashkenazi lands), apparently did not act lawfully, since there was no such custom yet? Perhaps a historical example of this is the Ashkenazim who settled in the Old City of Jerusalem in the 19th century but continued to rule according to Ashkenazim ruling.
I suppose not. If you were in doubt, there are laws of sufficiency. But a custom is always created in a vacuum. At first, there is a custom to rule like someone because people believe like him (like the Sugiyin Da'lama). And that spreads and then a custom is created, and now it has the status of a custom towards me as well.
We had a debate today, and I wanted to ask a few questions:
A. Can I, for example, who is of Ashkenazi origin, read a halachic ruling by Rabbi Ovadia for example and do the same? I am not in a place where I can rule for myself.
B. When I do not know how to rule, do I have to follow one halachic ruling, or can I sometimes follow R’ Shlomo Zalman, sometimes R’ Asher Weiss, etc.?
Since I do not have anyone I have a reason to follow specifically, there are many sages.
C. Is Rabbi Ofir Malka, who follows the Mishnah Berura and not the Sephardic halachic rulings, acting legitimately? Or is he obligated to the Sephardic halachic rulings?
In essence: What is the validity of the Shul and the Rema? Must we adhere to them? Are they a guideline?
What validity do they have?
A. I didn't understand the question. Did you arrive on a deserted island and find a synagogue left behind by Robinson Crusoe, with a series of Zohar books by Rabbi Nachman and a single volume of Yahva Da'at?
Your origin is irrelevant. In principle, Rabbi Ovadia's rulings are not intended for Sephardim, but perhaps in a place where there are differences in customs and rulings. If there is such a difference, it depends on whether you have your own position or not. If you can read his words and the words of others and decide - do it. If not - it is appropriate to follow the Ashkenazi custom.
B. In my opinion, there is no obligation to follow one, and Puk Chezi Mai Amma says nothing. This is of course if you don't choose votes (this vote and that).
C. I don't know him, but if this is his position, then excellent. If he doesn't have a position and he chose them, it seems problematic to me because there is an ancestral custom.
D. The validity of the rulings of the Shul and the Ramma is that of custom for those who do not have their own position. It is also appropriate to consider their rulings when formulating your own position. This has weight.
A. Okay, so in an issue that I am not familiar with, I have to do as Ashkenazic custom does. And if there is no custom, then no.
B. So what to do when Ashkenazic poskim disagree, how do I decide? Just pick someone?
C. He chose the position because he values the work of the Mishnah Berura. Is this legitimate? Or is there a problem of ancestral custom?
D. Thank you very much. Does the rabbi have an article on the subject?
Does the third book in the trilogy address the subject?
B. When you do not have your own position, this is a situation of doubt. In principle, one should go to the Kola in Drabban and the Chumara in Dauraita, but in times of need, one can rely on the Mikal.
C. It seems to me that so. The Rabbi in the Kosh refers to the words of the Rabbi's son (in the response to Zichron Yosef) about a rabbi who chooses a ruling and follows him (Rambam, Rashba, etc.). The Rabbi's son claims that it is forbidden, and the Rabbi writes that it is customary to permit it. From his explanation, it seems to me that this is like choosing a rabbi, and therefore it is permitted.
D. I don't think I wrote about it.
Why does having my own position invalidate the accepted custom?
Because a custom is only valid if you do not have your own position. A custom should not cause you to act contrary to the law. Therefore, if you have a halakhic position, then you must act according to it even if there is a contrary custom. Custom is the way to act when you do not have a position, as the Jerusalemite writes: “If you do not know the most beautiful of women, go out at the heels of the flock and pasture your kids at the shepherds' lodgings”. Only when he does not know do I follow the heels of the flock.
All of this is in the custom of ruling, meaning that it is customary to rule in a halakhic dispute this way and that way. There are customs that are not related to the law and there they have a status regardless of my position because in principle this is not a halakhic question. Of course, if this is a foolish custom, it should be abolished.
Why is a custom that is not related to Halacha not a foolish custom in the first place, and what is its validity?
Why is this nonsense? And is it all Halacha? Are the willow and the water regulation (control, which is the LBM) related to Halacha? Just as there are Sage regulations, so there are customs that extend beyond what Halacha requires. Sometimes they have good taste, and then it is a good custom. When there is no taste, it is a foolish custom.
I think it is appropriate for all Haredim to depart from the ruling of the Shul and the Rema, to read the words of the Rema in his introduction to the Shul: “He who has a palate to taste will discern the delicacies by tasting them himself and will not rely on others, and he who has not reached this level will not deviate from the custom, as the aforementioned rabbi (Rabbi Yosef Karo) himself wrote in the introduction to his great book.”
The ceremony is over
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