Autonomous Halacha ruling as a value
Hello Rabbi,
I recently heard in one of your lessons from the Confusions of the Generation series that the origin of the value of autonomous halakhic rulings stems from examples in the Gemara in which there is a violation of the ruling autonomy of others. From there I understood that there is a value in not violating one’s own ruling autonomy by deferring to great rabbis. But as for violating one’s own autonomy, there is no violation here at all, because when a person violates his own autonomy, it is a violation of authority.
I thought that the logic of autonomous rulings could be explained by the fact that in this way there is protection against the entrenchment of ruling errors that arise as a result of the ruling of one great rabbi, which causes a chain effect of the rabbis who come after him to align with the ruling of the first, even if most of them think differently. In addition, it can protect against hidden typographical errors in the rulings of the first. Therefore, in fact, I argue that there is no value in autonomous halachic rulings in themselves, but rather that they are only a means to get closer to halachic truth. What do you think, and are there additional foundations for the value of autonomous rulings beyond the examples of the type I mentioned above.
Best regards,
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True, now I remembered that you illustrated it with the examples of violating the autonomy of others from the Gemara. But still violating the autonomy of others is more serious than violating one's own autonomy. Beyond that, where is the value in autonomous halakhic rulings at all?
The source is a commentary. In the Gemara itself, we see this in several places. First, it is not in the sky. Second, what the Rabbis did not rule on because his friends did not reach the end of their minds (although it is clear that he was right because he was wiser than them). And third, from the very fact that it is forbidden to deprive a person of autonomy, even when in my opinion he has committed an offense (such as eating outside the Sukkah).
And what about the value of ’autonomy’ in the case of ‘Zekan Mamra’?
Best regards, S.C. Levinger
The value of halachic autonomy only exists when there is no real authority.
Indeed. The law of an elder of Me'ra comes to exclude from the system of autonomy when there is authority by virtue of "not to deviate". And by the way, even with regard to an elder of Me'ra, the contradictions are already known in the law of "mistaking the commandment to hear the words of the Sages" (see Horiyot 2 and in the commentaries), and on the right which is the right, etc.
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