faith

Was the hansha tendon a commandment at Sinai? I don't understand why you chose this problematic example.

In lesson 6 there I quoted the words of the Maimonides in the Friday sermon from Holin. See there.

Won't someone who hasn't been circumcised before be punished with circumcision?

It seems not. Unless God renewed a special covenant on the commandment to Abraham. This is not our covenant in any way, as is said about the commandment given at Sinai.

And what is the meaning of God's saying in the prophecy to Abraham that those who are not circumcised will be punished?

I didn't understand. What statement?

In my opinion, Maimonides' intention revolves around the reliability of Abraham's prophecy, meaning that we are not obligated to believe Abraham, but only if Moses confirms it.

” A statement” meaning the warning that if their sons are not circumcised, they will be obligated to pay a severance pay.

Father, I explained that if there is a covenant, it is a separate month from the command to Abraham. The command there was for all the members of his household and not necessarily for his sons. Therefore, it is certainly a different command and a different covenant. Otherwise, it would not have been necessary to say that the covenant was already stated after the presence of Mount Sinai, or conversely, it would not have been necessary to say it here.

Where does it say "knowledge with Abraham"?

See the introduction.

I didn't really understand, is there a punishment for cutting off the penis in the Torah for canceling a circumcision except for Abraham?

You are right. I was wrong here. For some reason I thought it was repeated. Indeed, the punishment only appears with Abraham. But the Maimonides writes in Pihamash Cholin that the obligation to observe the commandment of circumcision is not because of the commandment to Abraham but because of the commandment at Sinai (there is also a commandment in the book of Leviticus. See below):

Pay attention to this great rule that is presented in this mishna and it is that it was forbidden from Sinai, and it is that you should know that everything that we are careful of or do today we do it only because of the commands of God through Moses, not because God commanded the prophets who preceded him. For example, we do not eat an animal organ not because God forbade the sons of Noah to eat an animal organ, but because Moses forbade us to eat an animal organ in what was commanded at Sinai that an animal organ should remain forbidden. And we do not circumcise because Abraham circumcised himself and the men of his household, but because God We were commanded by Moses to circumcise, just as Abraham, peace be upon him, commanded, and so is the sinew of the woman. We do not follow the commandments of our forefather Jacob, but rather the commandments of our Lord Moses. You will see that they said that six hundred and thirteen commandments were given to Moses at Sinai, and all of these are from among the commandments.

It seems to me that the punishment does not appear again in the Torah, and perhaps it is included in the principle in the Sanhedrin that everything that was said and not repeated at Sinai was said only to Israel. Although this is written about a commandment to the sons of Noah, and here we are talking about a commandment to Abraham. But it is likely that if something was said to Abraham and not repeated, it is no worse than if it was said to the sons of Noah and not repeated.
Indeed, when the Maimonides describes the order of giving the commandments in 1 Kings 9:1, he writes that Abraham was commanded to circumcise. But in light of his words in Sefamatz and Pihamatz, it seems that his intention is that the obligation to observe is only because it appears in the Torah given at Sinai (and perhaps the appearance of the verses spoken to Abraham, not necessarily the verses of Leviticus), and not because of the commandment to Abraham.
If so, the punishment of the knowledge spoken to Abraham was also spoken for its time, and only from the time he returned to Sinai was it converted to Israel according to their commandment.

In the same matter, you brought up the Maimonides in Halek Melekhim regarding the son of Noah, and explained it in accordance with the Maimonides in Halekhem ez ” HaOved ma’ahaba etc., meaning that the fulfillment of the commandments is considered only if done out of obedience to a divine command, you claimed that the Maimonides in Holin is not the same thing. And it corresponds with a different principle, it should be noted that in Halek Melekhim the Maimonides emphasizes that the son of Noah is considered Righteous Among the Nations only if he does the commandments because ” it is written in the Torah by Moses”
And apparently it was enough if one performs the mitzvah because one thinks that God commanded, and it doesn't matter where He commanded, so it seems that this nevertheless corresponds with Maimonides in Holin, even though it turns out that in principle it is as you say.

That's exactly what I said. He hangs both principles on Sinai, and yet they are different principles: Holin is the basic norm and Hal’ Melechim is the definition of a mitzvah. And as mentioned, both depend on the commandment on Sinai.

It's still a bit unclear to me why, for the purpose of defining it as a mitzvah, the Maimonides demands that the son of Noah perform it because of a specific command from Moses. Ostensibly, a mitzvah derives its validity from being dictated by God.

But not a commandment of the Jewish religion. The revelation of the Holy One in the Mitzvah was at Sinai. This is the basic norm. Keeping His commandments that did not come at Sinai can also lead to Christianity or Islam. They also claim to be keeping the commandments of the same God.

This would be understandable if Maimonides had only discussed the law of the resident alien, but he also refers to the aspect of their share in the world to come, and I would have said that the fulfillment of a mitzvah, whatever it is, is only when the doer does it because Moses commanded, in other words, what is the logic?

After all, he does it because he believes God commanded it,

I answered that. I don't understand what's new in the question.

For example, if you perform a mitzvah that does not exist and was not commanded at all, then it is not a mitzvah act, but when God commanded and established it as a religious act, what do we care if the doer thinks that Abraham delivered it or, alternatively, Moses. This is seemingly an immaterial detail, since Shlomo in the Rambam's Cholin speaks of a binding factor, it can be understood that only the prophecy of Moses is binding, but to say that it is not a mitzvah act at all if I do not know that Moses said it is not understandable and requires a source from the Rambam.

We are talking about the commandments given at Sinai. If you are doing a mitzvah because you believe that God commanded you personally or through Shimon Cohen of Ashdod, you are not doing a mitzvah but inventing a mitzvah. I don't understand what the difficulty is.

Let me try again, please. Why does a son of Noah who did not steal because God forbade Noah (which is indeed true) not believe that he is forbidden to steal because Moses specifically said so? He is in the category of inventing a mitzvah, for he truly commands not to steal, by virtue of God's requirement that he act in this way, and not because Moses serves only as a tool to announce that a prohibition exists and is not the source of authority?

Because if he does it by virtue of an invalid command, it is like doing it because of the command of Shimon Cohen of Ashdod. That command that gave rest no longer exists. In the background of the matter is the claim that part of the essence of the command is compliance with the command, meaning not only what you do but also why.