On empirical free choice
You recently mentioned (502) that your book on freedom of choice was written, among other things, to examine the claim that this issue has now been decided by science. Despite my appreciation for the book, I feel that it lacks much in terms of precise conceptual definitions regarding this relationship, and I would be happy if there were details (here or in a column) about this and I would elaborate.
In general, the subject can be divided into two parts: a purely philosophical examination and in terms of the interface with science (hereinafter referred to as scientific despite the lack of precision). The subject from a scientific perspective can be divided into problems surrounding the principle of causality and questions that arise from an experimental perspective (Libet experiments and the like). My questions are about the latter. Beyond the possible explanations for the results of one experiment or another, what is even possible from an empirical perspective? What type of correlation (if any) contradicts free choice (100 percent, to be precise?) Is there any theoretical experiment that can test this? (In terms of accuracy and other possible limitations).
Thank you and Happy New Year
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Your Honor, on which page in the book did you define, for example, free choice or discretion?
A. I agree that your book is the most successful in this respect, and therefore the question is addressed specifically to those who I think are capable of answering (this is not intended to be a judgmental criticism). B. Regarding the questions that arise from a correlation between a particular choice and a measured value, I felt that there was a question with relevant excuses for the experiment of Libet and his successors, but less of a thorough systematic analysis (indeed, the problem is not in the definition of the concepts) that attacks the very question of whether the issue of free choice is not empirical at all or whether there is a principled experiment that can clarify it (obviously, the conclusion of such an experiment will also depend on the weight between different intuitions - if the intuition of choice has more significant weight than my belief that the experiments are not faked, then it does not start, for example, and this was certainly mentioned in the book) Thank you
I still don't understand. In the chapter on Libet's experiments, I detailed exactly the path of a series of experiments that could bring us closer and closer to a scientific decision, and I explained what each such experiment would mean. The conclusion was that, at least in Libet's way, we don't seem to be getting a scientific decision in the future either. If there are other ideas, I have no way of knowing. All of this is written and explained there in detail, so I don't understand what you think is missing.
By the way, after the book was published, the results of an experiment that was done exactly the way I suggested (with a great idea from Adi on how to implement it) were published. There is a lecture by Liad Modrik, who was a partner in it, and I have included it here on the site. The results clearly expressed my predictions. By the way, when I asked Liad Modrik, she said that she had not read my book.
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