Ontological arguments

Regarding the ontological arguments that you discuss in your book “The First Founding” regarding Anselm’s argument for proving God, it seems that it is possible to propose such an ontological argument that is the argument given in the problem:
I can conceive of something smaller than which it is inconceivable, and if the thing exists in my mind as existing, then it is not the smallest thing that can be conceived, and since the thing that exists in my mind necessarily exists only in my mind and does not exist in my mind as existing in reality, it follows that the whole existence of the thing is only in my mind and not in my mind as existing in reality.
And it necessarily exists only in my mind, and has no other attribute at all, since it is not a thing that exists as a given existence and has other attributes, but rather it exists only in my mind, and its attribute is what I define it to be in my mind alone, and in another way it can be argued that to the extent that it has any other definition and any other attribute that exists in it, it is found that it is not the smallest thing that can be conceived, since it is possible to conceive of something smaller than it that does not have an attribute, it is found that the definition smaller than it is inconceivable, its meaning – it lacks any attribute that can be conceived, and in the totality of these attributes is the attribute of existence, since a thing that exists in my mind as an existence is greater than the thing that exists in my mind as X and nothing more.
And if the same thing were something smaller than which it is inconceivable to occur to us as actually existing, then we must necessarily know that existence does not require any attribute and existence itself is devoid of any attribute, and if the existence of the same thing is possible, then the idea in my mind is something smaller than which it is inconceivable, and its entire idea in my mind is in its possibility as existing in my mind as existing, but since the thing that exists in my mind is smaller than the thing that exists in my mind as existing, it is found that something exists in my mind that does not exist.
And this is not possible since existence is distilled from existence in the system in which it arises, and it is not possible for the existence of a thing in my mind to be that it does not exist outside my mind, and that it is devoid of any existence whatsoever, that it does not give existence to what is in my mind that which does not exist outside of it but exists in it, and that there is an existence whose entire content of existence is that it does not exist at all.
And yet I imagine in my mind the existence of the smallest conceivable thing, but this leads to something that is not feasible, to have in my mind something that does not exist in my mind at all, and this is its existence in my mind.
Ostensibly, this actually leads us to Kant’s argument about conceiving, that it is not possible to conceive of something definable and force something about the world from this definition or give it any validity.
Or do we have a necessity that the existent is not greater than the non-existent, but rather that existence in the mind as existent is placing the thing on another plane of perception of the thing, similar to what Kant said regarding actual existence, one can say regarding existence in the mind, and existence in my mind not as existing in reality is the imagination of what exists in my mind as existing equally.
Although this argument does not establish the matter in a different way than we initially imagined, and this is different from Anselm’s argument in which he establishes the thing that “exists in his mind” as “exists in his mind as existing,” which is the beauty of his argument, but if a conclusion can be drawn from the mere raising of the mind, which is the flourishing of an understandable definition, in this argument we are led to something that is understandable in our mind, but on the other hand it is not possible, unlike just something that is not understandable, such as a round triangle, which cannot initially be conceived in our mind, and moreover, because there necessarily exists in our mind something smaller than which it cannot be conceived in our mind.
But perhaps it is possible to argue that the matter of raising as existing is something that does not contradict the understanding of the definition, and this is different from this argument that is possible and after analyzing the definition it becomes incomprehensible, since we say that something exists in my mind, and in fact, according to the continuation of the definition of the thing, we are actually saying that nothing exists, and therefore the smallest thing that exists in my mind that can be conceived, its one and only necessary attribute is existence in my mind, and if existence in my mind requires something, then this thing is the attribute of the smallest thing that can be conceived, and this is the smallest thing that has this attribute and apart from this it is not capable of an attribute.
Thank you very much, I would appreciate a response.