Questions about authority for changes in halacha

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asked 9 years ago

Hello Rabbi Avraham.
A few months ago we corresponded, among other things, about my reluctance to the rabbi’s opinion on changing the halakhah, and you sent me to study more the sources that discuss mechanisms for changes in halakhah, and so I did.
I had a few questions after reading these topics:

1. Recently there have been discussions (including following an article by Rabbi Eliezer Melamed, but even before) on the issue of swallowing tools. From all the discussions on the issue, I have seen many responses that discuss whether the halakha intended a factual or visible reality or whether the research is accurate or not, the intention of the Torah, and so on… But I have not seen anyone discussing the issue of “let’s assume we understood the intention of the Chazal or they were mistaken – are there any mechanisms for this change?” It seems to follow from Rabbi Lior’s answer that he permitted the use of tools retrospectively (although he qualified this with the agreement of other Sages of Israel) that the authority to change the words of the Chazal is simple if we know their intention and that they were mistaken for certain (he did not say this. Simply because I have not seen anyone discuss this issue at all). What am I missing in this discourse? Why are we not discussing whether we have any mechanisms for change? (Under the assumption that the prohibition on metal really originates in the Gemara at the end of Avoda Zarah, and then it has a law of Sages’ regulation). Maybe they consider stainless steel a different material than metal, and in any case, if they were having a discussion about metal, they would actually be discussing it? (I’ll blame the misunderstanding on my part.) The only one (that I saw) who mentioned this in the issue was Rabbi Asher Weiss, who said that one should be careful with such things for many reasons and that one does not know the intent of Chazal, etc.
2. Even if it is permissible to change a halakhah – what about all the many sources that say that it is forbidden to change customs (in which the discussion about the court and the minyan are not at all relevant). Isn’t the discussion also required to refer to the issue of “do not abandon” or is there no problem with it once the public decides to stop a custom? It is my understanding that the poskim were very concerned about these things (see the issue of the text of Birkat Naham or the regulation of legume crops, which they may be obligated to do just because of this).
3. I understand the rabbi’s argument that one should judge according to the claim itself and not according to the person making it. But does it appear that all the changes that the Conservative movement made are okay in terms of “halachic mathematics” or is their problem that conceptually it is possible to change but they did not use the legal mechanisms and therefore did not do well?
4. Do changes, when they can be made, require a court that is accepted by all of Israel (Sanhedrin style) or can any court order its community to contradict a general Israeli regulation (and this goes back to the issue of whether the Conservative innovations in halacha are legitimate in your opinion for those who are part of their community)?
5. I saw an answer regarding the theoretical possibility of a renewed requirement of the verses regarding a certain type of sexual intercourse if it is made by the Great Court… Ostensibly, the theoretical need for this change is known (although some will argue about it strongly and with great force). But isn’t the Rabbi afraid that if such a change is made or made, the law will no longer have any meaning because everyone will establish a court and demand according to what they think is best for their time, and nothing will remain of the law, and everything will be under the auspices of the law itself. It seems dangerous to me, and even more disturbing, that the law can freely permit and prohibit everything (a villain under the authority of the Torah?). Where does the line cross? By the way, see Rabbi Navon’s book The Good Fence for a discussion precisely on the issue of the danger of changes even if they are halachically allowed.

thanks,
Sorry for taking so long.

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מיכי Staff answered 9 years ago

First, some general comments. It is important to separate in such discussions between first- and second-order questions. That is, first one must discuss whether it is possible to change, and then whether it is appropriate to do so (due to slippery slope considerations and various dangers). These are two completely different questions. The first question is a question of halakhic law, and the second is a question of halakhic policy (and not a halakhic question). Of course, before anything else, one must ask whether there is even a need to change. My position is that on the question of necessity there is certainly a need, even beyond specific needs, in general there is a need for refreshing and updating, since many feel that the halacha is becoming a choka and italola, even in the eyes of its observant followers. As for the possibility of change, it depends on what is at stake (see below). Questions of policy are indeed difficult and I have no way of offering a comprehensive outline. On the other hand, it is important to remember that no change is no less dangerous. Already today, many are abandoning many halacha because they seem (and rightly so) irrelevant to them. Why should some of these be excluded from the map of our concerns?! The main question is the halakhic possibility of changing. Here I will say a few things (I don’t remember which sources I referred you to). First, when it is clear that the regulation is based on an error, there is no reason to change it, and there is no need for a great jurist with wisdom and minyan (after all, this is a regulation of an error that is as invalid as a purchase made in error). Although the explanation suggests that a consensus of poskim who agree on this (not halakhically but meta-halakhically) is required, but today there is a great reluctance among poskim because of the reform, and therefore I doubt that this will happen unless they start “from the bottom.” And when it comes to obvious errors, in my opinion, there is no need for such a consensus. As for the fear that we didn’t understand what they were saying, I’ve never understood these fears. After all, there is just as much fear that we did understand what they were saying, and then we now make mistakes and violate the halakha. Why should we fear this? We have nothing but to use our best common sense and make decisions. Not deciding is also a decision. Especially since it also has heavy costs and so on. Now I will move on to the sections you wrote: 1. Regarding swallowing utensils, if it is a different type of utensils, then the Sage law does not apply to it at all. It is not a change, so what is the problem? 2. A wrong custom must be abolished and it is important to abolish it (not just permissible). But wrong laws are not customs but wrong laws. The abolition of a law is not related to a custom. A custom is binding according to the law of not being abandoned, and should not be confused with the abolition of laws that have a different halachic boundary. Regarding legumes, see the second column on my website. 3. I don’t think all of their changes are legitimate (some on the content level and some due to ignoring the mechanisms of change in halakhah), but I’m also not willing to reject everything done by Conservatives. Each on its own merits. In addition, there are quite a few types of Conservatives (as well as Orthodox), and not all of them are in the same boat. 4. It depends on what the changes are, and so on. I think there is no point in discussing the question of whether the Conservative changes are right for their community, since the question is not what the authority of these rabbis (most of whom, in my opinion, are quite conservative) is, but whether these changes are valid. As a rule, a valid change can be made without any connection to this or that rabbi. There is currently no authorized rabbi who would be considered an rabbi (who permits something that is prohibited in the minyan). The question is whether the change is appropriate and can be made without a rabbi, and not who is currently authorized to make it. 5. I assume you mean male intercourse. I don’t understand the need for such concealments (like “the disease” instead of cancer). I don’t see a current need for change, although I would be happy if we could find a way to do it (people suffer greatly from the halakhic situation). The situation today is not fundamentally different from the past (except that it was less public then), and therefore it is not a matter of needing change but of reexamining the halakhic law (is it really forbidden). I am indeed afraid that everyone will set up their own “Yid” and do whatever their heart desires, but I will comment again in my own words: A. Either way, this is done today, and because rabbis do not participate in this, it is done by the “Amartzim” (those who decide to text on Shabbat, etc.). Is this better? on. I’m just as afraid of not making changes. That too has heavy costs. I am familiar with Rabbi Navon’s conservative approach, and I completely disagree with him on this matter (in my column on legumes, I referred to a radio debate we had on this subject). —————————————————————————————— Asks: As usual, thanks for the reference. To the body of things. 1. If it were ordinary metal, would it be permissible without a court of law? Apparently, Rabbi Melamed writes that in retrospect it is permissible with metal, not specifically stainless steel (if I saw it correctly, Tza). I did not see at all that it is related to what is required for this, that is, broad agreement to repeal the ruling of the Sages, etc…. What am I missing? 2. And a custom that they simply want to abolish because it makes life difficult (of course, let’s just assume that they decided that it should be abolished for political reasons, etc., etc.) is that possible? (The mitigating and adversarial opinion of the court says yes… but the poskim opposed it in the past, perhaps for political reasons?) 3. It is indeed clear. 4. Let’s say that after long considerations, we have reached the conclusion of the Rabbinate that it is practically possible to establish a Beit Din whenever possible – does that Beit Din Pillai have to be accepted by all of Israel or can each community conceive of its own? 5. It is clear that the discourse is theoretical and there is no need to rush to change it, etc., etc. I have no problem writing the term “remembered bed.” I didn’t want someone to type the term into Google in order to supposedly get permission for themselves to come here and draw incorrect conclusions. As usual, I am wary. In my opinion, rightly so… The context is completely different. The rabbi wrote that he is doubtful about the existence of the next world and private providence. If that is the case, then there is no reward or punishment in our day, neither in this world nor in the next… and therefore, according to this approach, there is no reason left (and once again, seemingly) to keep the commandments except for considerations of gratitude, morality, respect for tradition, etc…. Do you think it would really be possible to keep an entire people observant of the commandments like that? (I know the opposition to holy lies, but not everyone is mature) As usual, thank you and all the best. —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: 1. Even if it is a regular metal, it will be permissible without a court, since it is a case of a decree made in error. This is what I wrote earlier. 2. A custom that is simply wanted to be abolished because it makes life difficult, one must discuss why in previous generations it was not abolished, or why it was even amended, after all, it made life difficult even then. And the fact that it was simplified and not annulled, means that it was automatically annulled (as a rule or custom that was not simplified in most of Israel). In any case, with regard to a custom, one must of course be lenient, unlike a law for which this is not a reason. Perhaps if the decree is annulled in public, it should be discussed from the perspective of a decree that was simplified and annulled. In practice, it seems that it is entirely a matter of halachic policy and not of actual halachic law. 4. I didn’t understand the question. 5. Do you really think people are so stupid that they don’t understand what you meant and now they won’t be able to type it into Google? In our generation, these evasions are worthless and pointless. They only hurt. I don’t know if there is a point or not. But as I explained, I am not willing to build the service of God on holy lies. It has no value like that. Beyond that, there is a point in keeping the commandments because it is the truth. Regardless of matters of reward and punishment, as the Rambam’s advisor Rafi Mahal’ Teshuvah said. And if holding the people to be observant of the commandments requires lies, I have no part in such service of God. Then let them not keep the commandments. I am not willing to make decisions for others. —————————————————————————————— Asks: 2. So, perhaps it would also be worth discussing “mechanisms for changing custom” as part of the discussion on changes in halacha. I just didn’t see that they touched on it. 4. In short – does one of the criteria for a court of law that is allowed to annul decrees include that it be acceptable to all of Israel? For example, to demand a new eye for an eye, literally. 5. The opposite. I was counting on Google’s stupidity not to send them to this page because the phrase was missing. The people here will probably understand what I meant, Google won’t. However, after you wrote it, there was no point in it anymore and I had no problem repeating it anyway. I understand… but I hope you also understand a little of my concern about this… especially since it’s not about inventing lies, but about an opinion that spread throughout Israel and our sages really accepted it as truth… Admittedly, the Rabbi is skeptical about it for various reasons… But teaching that there is a hereafter even if it’s not 100% certain or (maybe!) just a sage’s hypothesis seems to me to be a perfectly reasonable thing… I accept that it’s possible and it’s worth mentioning. In any case – a minor one. I disagree but respect it. I can only hope that my concerns about the risk in this will be proven wrong. Incidentally, I do accept the afterlife approach because it is the tradition and because it has clear theological logic, but my opinion is irrelevant to the discussion. And after all that, I will say this. In the last six months, I have learned a lot from the rabbi’s writings and my mind has truly been opened to many directions (philosophy, logic, theology, halakha, eliminating fear of questions and opinions, analyzing inferences, etc.) and in general to dealing with subjects that I have not yet delved into in Judaism, and for all that, despite the criticism, I have to thank you. If you managed to intellectually break some of my friends in 8200, I have nothing but to take my hat off to them. (Although I am not at all sure that dealing with these subjects is appropriate for every Jew, but that is another discussion). Like many, I look forward to the next books being published, although I am clear that they are going to cause a stir (in a negative context) in the style that the teacher caused at the time… —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: There are no mechanisms for changing a custom. Another custom will change it. In the case of an individual, there is sometimes a waiver of vows. There is no halachic criterion of the Jewish Law that is accepted by all of Israel. The Sanhedrin is of course accepted by all of Israel by definition, but it is not what we are talking about here. I’m glad my words are helpful. Although I didn’t understand what “breaking your friends at 8200” meant. Anyway, if you take your hat off, note that the sergeant is not around. 🙂 —————————————————————————————— Asks: So if, for example, I decide to stop prohibiting legumes (I’m Sephardic, so it’s not relevant, but let’s say) or a custom that even makes sense, I don’t violate “Al Titoush”? (Maybe I missed something and there’s no such rule? Does the waiver of vows apply to this as well?) Because it follows from your words that if many people are criminals and violate the custom, then it is canceled. Is it just me who finds it a bit puzzling? What they mean is that there might be something to what you’re saying. For a place made up of a lot of 18-year-olds with degrees, this is completely non-trivial…. —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: Regarding legumes, see the second column on my website. You do violate the law of not abandoning, which is why I said that in a private custom, sometimes a waiver of vows is required. But when the public stops practicing, the custom will be canceled. Every custom is a deviation from the halakhic norm, and it begins with a few people who decided to do so without a basis. Therefore, even a custom that stops another custom is actually a custom that begins with a deviation. Take as an example the custom of not placing tefillin on the Sabbath. It has no source in the Gemara itself (where it is about a holiday). So there is a criminal custom here, and after there were several criminals who violated the commandment of tefillin, a custom of not placing tefillin was made. Note that here we are talking about an actual halakhic offense and not just a violation of custom.

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