Severe side dislocation

You write the opposite here
https://www.dropbox.com/s/w8hk4lqumzdp9ae/%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%93%D7%94%20%D7%98%D7%95%D7%91%D7%94%201.pdf.png?dl=0

Tos’ in Ketubot does not ask this. He complicates the Gemara as I described here. See the above column.

Okay, I'll see.

In the article "A Good Measure on Names," you argue for two different views of an equal side:
Is the teaching from both teachers, or from one of them and the other only removes the contradiction.

Which side do you lean towards? (I'm for the first)
Is the model you developed in the first book of Talmudic Logic appropriate for both approaches?

This is a dispute between the Rishonim (the first and the great ones in the Bible and the Apocrypha). But I think there are places where it is this way and there is this way.

A. You explain that a serious side-splitting is raised when the sides are halakhic features and not factual features (=microscopic parameters).
Whereas in Sota 29: a serious side-splitting is raised, in that a day-immersion has in its nature the origin of impurity and a clay vessel defiles from its image and therefore it is not possible to learn from them that there are already two defilements negative for giving.

And here, the origin of impurity is in its nature a factual feature, and despite this, a serious side-splitting is raised?

B. In Ketubot Lev. They try to learn from a fellow slave that just as he owes money and lashes and yet money pays lashes that are not enough, then all that he owes money and lashes is that the law should pay and not be punished.
Is the feature of “being indebted to money and lashes” a factual or halakhic feature? Is it a microscopic parameter or another column in the inference table?

A. What?? There is in the nature of the impurity a halakhic and not a factual attribute.
B. Halakhic of course. I don't understand the question. We are talking about laws that are practiced in it. Factual attributes are attributes that come from observation with the senses.

That a man is the father of the ancestors of impurity is a halakhic law??? That this is a fact. A fact that the Torah taught us. "You cannot see it, but he is the father of the ancestors of impurity"
Halakhic law is a norm. And being the father of impurity is not a norm but a fact that follows from it there are norms (a priest should not touch her, etc.)

B. In the inference there, we conclude that if he owes money and lashes, then he must only pay. That is, one entails the other, just as a factual attribute entails a halakhic attribute…

This is not like in kiddushin, where since money makes kiddushin valid and not marriage, we claim from this halakhic attribute that there is a fact behind it because of which a wedding will make kiddushin valid.

In the ketubat, the attribute “owes money and lashes” entails “he must only pay,” whereas in kiddushin, the attribute “makes kiddushin valid and not marriage” is not what entails the law that a wedding will make kiddushin valid.

Therefore, I see a difference between “owes money and lashes” and “makes kiddushin valid and not marriage.” The second is indeed a halakhic attribute, but the first apparently is not.

Man is the father of impurity. This is a halakhic statement, not a fact. Some speculate that it is based on a factual claim (impurity as a metaphysical reality), but the argument is not built on that. And even if there is such a fact, it is an ethical fact (see column 456 and more), for which there is no naturalistic fallacy. That is, de facto it is a norm, not a fact.
B. Any inference from a halakhic attribute is like that. It is clearly a norm, not a fact. A sufferer and a payer is a halakhic teaching, not a property of an act or object. I really don't understand this discussion. It's completely simple.

I don't know if you remember, but is the excuse you gave in good measure, part one, page 182, on the question "How can it be that the severe side is being dismantled?" the same as the excuse that appears in column 346?
As I understand it, it is not the same, so you changed your mind about it? Or did I not understand the excuse that appears in the book called

The Poskim in Matov 4: According to the sages, there is no Lukin on a non-existent fact.
And so it seems that this interpretation (the interpretation of a serious side) is accepted.

Whereas in column 346 (note 6) you write that according to the halakhah, like Rav Yehuda, one does not interpret a serious side, and your explanation behind this is that if the halakhic properties are different, then the burden of proof that both have a common factual property falls on the interpreter.

Isn't there a contradiction here?

Above you wrote "B. Every inference from a halakhic attribute is like this. This is clearly a norm and not a fact. A person who is deprived and punished is a halakhic teaching and not a characteristic of an act or object. I really don't understand this discussion. It's completely simple."

I'll put it nicely and you'll understand my question and request:
I didn't talk about "a person who is deprived and punished" as you wrote, but about "a person who is indebted for money and punishments." What do I mean?
After all, you've already written in other places that at the basis of a halakhic norm is a microscopic parameter, which is the cause of the halakhic norm. For example, there is something about money that causes it to apply kiddushin.
Therefore, when there is an inference, we build a table in which there are actions and results, and the results come from the actions following the microscopic parameter it has. The parameter does not appear in the table! It is at the base of the table, because it is the cause that the action causes the result.
And so, in the case of Ketubot Lev., there is some kind of problem. After all, what causes a person to be "struck and punished" is the fact that he "owes money and lashes." In other words, should the table be written as a result that the conspiring witnesses are "living money and lashes," and again add a column that says "struck and punished." It seems difficult, because the fact that he owes money and lashes is itself the reason he is struck and punished.

Similarly, in lashes 4:, being "not one who has no deed" causes "not one who has no deed" to occur, so is this a halachic or factual characteristic? Should we write in an additional column "not one who has no deed"?

From Kiddushin 5:, where the fact that a beer forgives a marriage is not what causes it to forgive a marriage. Therefore, it is possible to construct a table with two columns (kiddushin and marriage), so we can conclude "from the fact that a marriage forgives a marriage and a wedding, and a wedding, and a wedding, it is obvious that it will also begin a marriage."

As we discussed, the poskim did not adhere to consistency in the form of the sermon. The Maimonides ruled on certain issues as a ra and on others as a ris in terms of the form of the sermon (plurality and minority or general and particular). This may be the case here as well. I explained in the past that this may be the result of later methods that mixed the earlier methods.

Obliged to pay money and lashes is the context in question. The discussion deals with the question of what the law is when there is a liability for money and lashes. Therefore, this is not a feature, neither factual nor halakhic (although the determination itself is of course halakhic). The question is when there is a double liability, which of them is realized. Just as in the Avot Niziki, the fact that the boro caused the damage is not a feature in the logical analysis but the framework of the discussion. The discussion deals with the damages of a boro.
The fact that there is no action is the framework of the law and not an attribute (but here the determination is factual. The fact that there is no action is a fact and not a determination of the halacha. The halacha says whether such an offense is punishable or not).