The witness’s argument

In notebook number 5, you wrote about Yom’s counterargument:
“According to Hume’s approach, it is impossible for us to accept this report from him, since we would always prefer the assumption that there was a lie or an illusion or some other distortion here. If so, according to David Hume, no report of a revelation can be accepted by us. So now come and think, is it any wonder that in our experience we do not know of revelations? Revelations can occur thousands of times to thousands of people, and yet from our point of view there are no revelations. Any report of a revelation would be rejected out of hand because of Hume’s argument of criticism. Furthermore, even if the revelation had occurred to us ourselves, we would prefer the interpretation that it was a hallucination to the possibility that it actually happened. If so, Hume’s argument of criticism builds itself up.”

I think Yom meant something a little different than you seem to have understood here. His point was that for us, personally, as those considering whether to accept the argument, there never was a revelation. So, as someone who has never experienced a revelation (or anything else supernatural), why would I believe that all the miraculous miracles described in the Torah (when miraculous miracles appear abundantly in other traditions of the period, and when it is completely out of my own experience) are more likely than there being a mythicization or ingrained story in the people in some other way than miraculous revelation?