“You Intended Evil Against Me”: Another Look at Divine Involvement in the World (Column 436)
This past Wednesday I gave a class to a group of soldiers in Tel Aviv, focusing on a verse from Parashat Vayechi in which Joseph calms his brothers’ fears of his taking revenge. At first glance, the verse is puzzling, and its various interpretations touch on the question of divine involvement in events of the world.
The Negotiation between Joseph and His Brothers
After the death of our forefather Jacob, the brothers fear Joseph’s revenge, and the Torah describes negotiations between them and him (Genesis 50:14–20):
And Joseph returned to Egypt—he, his brothers, and all who had gone up with him to bury his father—after he had buried his father. And Joseph’s brothers saw that their father was dead, and they said, “Perhaps Joseph will bear us enmity and surely repay us all the evil that we did to him.” So they sent a charge to Joseph, saying, “Your father commanded before his death, saying: Thus shall you say to Joseph, ‘Please, forgive now the transgression of your brothers and their sin, for they did evil to you.’ And now, please forgive the transgression of the servants of the God of your father.” And Joseph wept when they spoke to him. Joseph’s brothers also went and fell before him, and they said, “Behold, we are your servants.”
They tell him of Jacob’s instruction that he forgive them (it’s unclear whether this is true), and Joseph replies:
And Joseph said to them, “Do not fear, for am I in the place of God? And as for you, you intended evil against me; God intended it for good, in order to do as it is this day—to sustain a great people alive.”
He divides his words into two parts: (1) He is not in God’s place. (2) They indeed intended to harm him, but in the end God turned it (or planned it in advance) for good.
Or HaChaim’s Interpretation
The author of Or HaChaim explains this as two distinct claims:
“For am I in the place of God….” Meaning: if you deserve punishment for the matter, God is the Judge; I will neither take vengeance nor bear a grudge. And the reason he did not forgive them may be that for the descendants of Noah, the matter does not depend on the victim’s forgiveness. For example, if someone steals from another and the victim forgives him, the thief is not exempt from the death penalty; or even among Israelites, if a Jew kidnaps a Jew and sells him, the victim has no power to exempt the kidnapper from death. And he further told them that there is room to judge them meritoriously:
“And you intended evil… God intended it for good.” This is like one who intended to give his fellow a cup of poison and instead gave him a cup of wine; he incurs no liability and is acquitted even by the Heavenly courts.
God will judge them for this and not Joseph. Beyond that, there is even a claim in their favor: the situation resembles someone who intended to give his fellow a cup of poison but gave him a cup of wine. He is apparently alluding to the Talmud, Nazir 23a:
“Our Rabbis taught: ‘Her husband invalidated [her vow], and the Lord will forgive her’—this refers to a woman whose husband annulled her vow and she did not know; the verse speaks of her requiring atonement and forgiveness. When R. Akiva would reach this verse he would weep: If one who intended to eat pork and it turned out to be lamb still requires atonement and forgiveness, then one who intended to eat pork and indeed ate pork—how much more so!”
That is, one who intended to eat pork but ended up eating lamb requires atonement and forgiveness, though he did not actually transgress. Still, it is unclear why Or HaChaim writes that they are exempt even by the Heavenly courts, when the Talmud explicitly says they require forgiveness and atonement.
Attempted Transgression
There is an even greater difficulty in his words. In Column 353 (see also the columns referenced there), I argued that the claim “it turned out to be lamb” does not diminish the severity of the act. Attempted murder that fails is exactly as grave as murder. True, the result did not materialize, but the offender did everything for it to happen; what prevented it was an external factor he had not accounted for. Beyond being wicked, he is inept—but ineptitude is neither a defense nor a claim for diminished culpability.
In the legal realm there may be room to distinguish between attempt and consummated offense, and even there it is far from simple (it depends on the goals and justification of punishment). But in the moral realm there is no difference. The degree of wickedness of one who attempts is precisely that of one who succeeds. Therefore it is not clear why Joseph would see this as an exculpatory argument for the brothers.
Perhaps the explanation is this. Joseph begins with the claim “Am I in the place of God?”—meaning that punishment is fitting for evil intent, not for the realization of that intent. But punishments are meted out by God, Who sees into the heart to know whether there was evil intent or not. As for Joseph, he is not in God’s place—he is not an authority empowered to punish someone for transgressions—and therefore, for him, their intention is irrelevant. But the brothers’ fear was not of judicial punishment; it was fear of revenge. Regarding that, Joseph tells them he has nothing to avenge, for in fact nothing bad ultimately happened to him. Vengeance arises only when an evil intention has been realized in practice and the victim seeks to take revenge on the offender.
Divine Involvement in the World
Note the significant difference between Or HaChaim’s interpretation and what the verse itself suggests. As we saw, Or HaChaim grounds the exculpation in the outcome. But the verse seems to mean something else: it was not you who did what happened here, but God. This is not a consequentialist claim (“the outcome didn’t occur”); it is an argument about lack of culpability. Joseph says the brothers served as God’s rod, but it was God Who orchestrated what happened—not they—and therefore the guilt lies with Him, not them. This has nothing to do with the Nazir passage we cited, which addresses realization of an outcome.
One could still wonder why this should be an exculpatory argument. The brothers intended to harm him, and only God prevented it. How does that reduce their guilt? Moreover, does God’s providence over what happens diminish the guilt of wrongdoers?! Why do we judge Sabbath desecrators or pork eaters at all—if the act occurred, apparently God willed it, and there is no guilt upon them. Such determinism empties human responsibility of content.
It therefore seems that Joseph’s intent was to say that this case is exceptional: generally, a person who commits a transgression is guilty and responsible for its consequences, but here it was different. The explanation may be that in this case the brothers did not decide at all; rather, God did. He acted, and therefore they are not culpable.
In Column 301, in a note, I cited the Talmud in Berakhot 9, which brings a baraita stating that the despoiling of Egypt occurred against the Egyptians’ will. This seems to contradict the verses themselves, which describe that God gave the people favor in the eyes of the Egyptians, and thus they gave them silver and gold. It seems that this baraita means that when God turns the Egyptians’ thoughts and suddenly causes them to find Israel endearing and give them of their wealth, that is not an act the Egyptians did. They were “enchanted,” as it were—but this act was against their will (even if they themselves are unaware of it). Likewise for the brothers: God apparently turned their thoughts (He “entranced” them), and thus it was not their action and not their responsibility.
Note that this line of reasoning assumes that under ordinary circumstances divine providence over human conduct and the world does not reduce a person’s guilt. In other words, transgressions that a person does willfully are the product of his decision, and the responsibility lies entirely with him. It was not God Who did it, but he. Only in this specific case Joseph thought the situation was different (perhaps by prophecy): here it was a divine maneuver, and therefore they truly bear no responsibility at all.
The conclusion is that if a person chooses to do something evil, the outcome is not “on God’s account.” If someone murders his fellow (as in a terror attack), there is no point in seeking explanations or justifications for why the victim “deserved” to die, or why God “did this to him.” The victim did not necessarily deserve to die, and God did not do it. The murderer was given free choice to do evil, and he decided to kill. He did it, not God—therefore we should not seek theological justifications for that outcome.[1]
Indeed, the Talmud in Chagigah 4b–5a cites the verse (Proverbs 13:23), “There is one who is swept away without justice,” and explains that there can be cases in which a person dies despite not deserving to die. R. Hananel there explains:
“The explanation of ‘there is one who is swept away without [justice]’ is, for example, a person whom another killed.”
We see that a person has the choice to harm his fellow even when the fellow does not deserve the harm—and even to kill him.
Divine Involvement in Acts of Inadvertence
From the picture I’ve described, it follows that if someone kills his fellow inadvertently—that can be ascribed to God. In such a case the killer did not decide to kill; if it nonetheless happened, perhaps it is indeed the result of a divine reckoning. In such a case the killer serves as God’s rod, and this is not his own act.[2]
This resolves the Talmud in Makkot 10b:
“Reish Lakish opened this section from here: ‘And who did not lie in ambush, and God caused it to come to his hand…’ (Exod. 21:13). As is said in the proverb of the ancients: ‘From the wicked comes forth wickedness’ (1 Sam. 24:14). To what does the verse refer? To two men, each of whom killed a person—one inadvertently and one deliberately. For this one there are no witnesses, and for that one there are no witnesses. The Holy One brings them together at one inn: the one who killed deliberately sits beneath the ladder; the one who killed inadvertently descends the ladder, falls upon him, and kills him. The one who killed deliberately is [now] killed, and the one who killed inadvertently goes into exile.”
Everything is orchestrated from Above. Seemingly this contradicts the passage in Chagigah and R. Hananel there, but according to our approach there is no contradiction. Our passage deals with the inadvertent killer, i.e., one who did not decide to kill but it happened inadvertently. Such an act is indeed orchestrated from Above and is not his act. But when a person decides to murder his fellow willfully, that is his act, and it can occur “without justice,” without God having decreed that the victim die.
This is also how we should understand Ramban on false witnesses (Deuteronomy 19:19):
“‘As he conspired’—and not ‘as he did.’ From here [the Sages] said: if [the falsely accused] was executed, the [false witnesses] are not executed (Makkot 5b). The reason is that the judgment of witnesses is under the decree of the Ruler, for they come two and two. When two testify that Reuven killed a person and two others come and discredit them as false witnesses, the Torah commanded that the former be executed, for by Reuven’s merit—being innocent and righteous—this came about; had he been guilty and deserving of death, God would not have saved him from the court’s hand, as it says (Exod. 23:7), ‘I will not justify the wicked.’ But if Reuven was executed, we must think that all that the first [witnesses] testified was true, for he died for his sin; had he been righteous, the Lord would not have abandoned him into their hand, as it says (Ps. 37:33), ‘The Lord will not abandon him to his hand, nor let him be condemned when he is judged.’ Moreover, the Lord will not let the righteous judges who stand before Him shed innocent blood, for the judgment is God’s, and among the judges He judges. All this is a great elevation for the judges of Israel and the assurance that the Holy One agrees with them and is with them in matters of judgment. This is the meaning of (v. 17) ‘The two men who have the dispute shall stand before the Lord’—for before the Lord they stand when they come before the priests and judges, and He guides them in the true path. I have already mentioned this in Parashat Mishpatim.”
False witnesses receive the punishment they conspired to impose. But if they are exposed as false after the accused has already been executed, they are not executed. Ramban explains that this is because if he was executed, he was presumably guilty, since God would not allow the judges to err and execute an innocent person. Here the judges do consciously and willfully decide to execute him, but that decision is based on a mistake (perjured testimony). The judges did not actually choose to kill an innocent man. Such an act is analogous to inadvertence, not willfulness. Such an act is in God’s hands; a person will not die “without justice” (i.e., if he does not deserve to die).
Back to Joseph and His Brothers
True, the brothers acted willfully against Joseph, and therefore responsibility would ordinarily be theirs. But as we have seen, Joseph perceived—by prophecy—that God had turned the brothers’ thoughts so that they would act as they did. Specifically here, it was not their deed at all, even though they outwardly acted willfully.
Sforno, in his commentary to our verses, writes:
“‘Am I in the place of God?’—Am I truly a judge in His stead, that I should adjudicate against His decrees and punish one who was His emissary to carry them out, like a court that overrules another court? For indeed you were His emissaries in this, without doubt—as in [Gen. 45:8] ‘It was not you who sent me here, but God.’”
“‘Behold, your action was in error, for you thought me a pursuer [rodef]; and had that been true, your action would have been lawful.’”
“‘God intended it for good’—He brought about this error in you for a good end.”
He begins by saying that they were God’s agents, and therefore are not responsible for the outcome (unlike Or HaChaim, but in line with the plain sense of the verses). He adds, however, that they acted inadvertently, thinking Joseph was a pursuer, and God brought about their inadvertence for a good purpose. According to him, the brothers’ responsibility is mitigated because they acted in good faith and were inadvertent; in such a case responsibility lies with God, not with them.
There is, however, a novelty here: Joseph was certainly not pursuing them to kill them. At most, he maligned them before their father, or perhaps sought to humble them (by making them bow to him). Does that, too, fall under the category of a “pursuer”? Sforno thinks so. The response permitted in such a case must be proportional; thus they were not permitted to kill him (for he was not pursuing to kill but to harm). They decided to sell him to the Ishmaelites—perhaps a proportionate response.
Are Inadvertent Acts Really “in God’s Hands”?
So far the conclusion has been that willful acts are certainly not God’s deeds, whereas inadvertent acts are. But there is room to qualify this further. It is not obvious why Ramban added that this is a “great elevation” for Israel’s judges. Can other judges execute an innocent person? If they do not intend willfully to execute the accused, then he should not die “without justice.” That should be true for any private individual, and certainly not only for Israel’s judges. What, then, is the special elevation of Israel’s judges?
It seems from Ramban that this is not a sweeping principle governing all inadvertent acts; rather, it is a principle specific to courts that adjudicate by Torah law. Inadvertent acts are also our acts, not God’s, and even there someone can die “without justice” (someone undeserving of death may die). A ruling of a court that judges by Torah law is exceptional; there, injustice cannot occur inadvertently.
This also accords with reason: if every inadvertent act were God’s, it would be unclear why an inadvertent killer must go into exile. If an inadvertent act is God’s act, then God—not the person—would be responsible. Were it not for the passage in Makkot, it would seem that even in inadvertent killing it is not God’s deed. A person can cause another’s death “without justice” even if it is done inadvertently. Only with judges, Ramban contends, can this not occur.
We thus arrive at a very limited conception of providence. The Talmud says, “Everything is in the hands of Heaven except fear of Heaven” (Moed Katan 16, and elsewhere). That is, actions with a moral dimension are not given to Heaven but to us. Here we have seen that divine involvement in human actions (matters that touch on “fear of Heaven”) exists, at most, in inadvertent acts—and from Ramban it emerges that perhaps not even there. See more on this in Rabbi Shmuel Ariel’s essay here.
A Note on Divine Involvement in General
I will not re-enter here into my own view that, at least in recent generations, almost nothing—even the unfolding of natural events—is handed over to Heaven. Nature and human beings operate by the power granted them by God, in the spirit of Deuteronomy 8:17–18:
“And you will say in your heart, ‘My power and the might of my hand have made me this wealth.’ But you shall remember the Lord your God, for it is He Who gives you the power to make wealth, in order to establish His covenant that He swore to your fathers, as this day.”
God gives us the power to achieve, but with that power it is we who achieve.
I discussed this at length in the second book of the trilogy and also here on the site in several columns and responsa. I explained that the claim that acts done by our free choice are also God’s acts is not only implausible but logically untenable. I also showed there that the claim that natural events are God’s acts is untenable, for a double explanatory scheme (a natural-scientific explanation and a theological explanation for the same event) is also logically problematic.[3]
Rashi’s Interpretation: Absolute Divine Control
Rashi on the Genesis verses offers a different explanation:
“‘Am I in the place of God?’—Am I in His place?! If I wanted to harm you, could I? You all intended evil against me, and God intended it for good—so how could I alone harm you?”
He explains that Joseph’s words are a single unit rather than two, as we understood earlier. He argues that everything is in God’s hands, and proof is that they all intended to harm him and did not succeed. Therefore they need not fear his revenge, for to the same extent he cannot take revenge unless God so wills.
This is a very radical conception, according to which a person cannot harm another unless God has decreed it. These words are very puzzling, even though this is the view commonly held by most people. It sits ill with reason and with several sources, and requires further analysis.
[1] Of course, there is still room to ask why God does not intervene. I have addressed this here more than once (the question of evil—human and natural), and in greater detail in the second book of the trilogy.
[2] On this view, the penalty of exile for the inadvertent killer is not fully clear. If he served as God’s rod, why does he deserve punishment? Perhaps the exile is intended as deterrence and to uphold the value of life—but this is strained.
[3] A cause is supposed to be a sufficient condition for its effect; logically, there cannot be two independent sufficient conditions for the same outcome.
Discussion
Sorry, my mistake. It’s already late at night…
The opposite.
Here we see that even a person who sins deliberately fills a role in the cinema of reality. In other words, he is a puppet on strings.
When Joseph says, “Am I in the place of God?” he is referring to their proposal that they become his slaves instead of slaves of the God of his father.
And they approached him as though he were the one who bears iniquity and transgression.
After the Torah was given, judicial matters passed to us; before that, it was God’s concern.
And nowhere in the Torah does it say that one should relate to the intentions of the person who acted rather than to God’s intentions.
A. I don’t understand how one can include several different periods in the same article:
Joseph’s period, in which (according to your view) there was providence.
Later periods, in which it is unclear whether you know whether there was providence (according to your view).
Our own time, in which (according to your view) there is no providence.
This is becoming a mishmash.
B. “This does not fit with reason nor with several sources.”
Your own view also does not fit with rabbinic sources, and then you answer, “The Sages did not have the tools to recognize reality, and therefore no conclusions should be drawn from their words.” And when your view clashes with the Torah, you write, “It is impossible to understand the Torah’s intent.”
So I do not understand: when your view does not align with sources—everything is fine.
When views opposite to yours do not align with sources—that is a problem for those views.
All the best
You really are making a big salad, but the salad is of your own making.
A. I said explicitly that I am not speaking here about my own view, but about the views of the commentators I cited. None of them distinguishes between periods.
But even according to my own view, in the biblical period the Holy One, blessed be He, was involved, and it is still clear that what a person did by his own choice was not done by the Holy One, blessed be He. The logic that says that if I do something, then it is I and not the Holy One, blessed be He—that was true then as well. Except that according to my view, there were then cases in which the Holy One, blessed be He, took the reins into His own hands and stripped a person of free choice, whereas today apparently there are none.
B. When someone wants to develop a view that fits the sources, one must examine whether it fits them or not. That is what the commentators are trying to do. From the outset I am not trying to fit them, because I think they were mistaken.
Moreover, according to my view I claim that Hazal were mistaken in science, because modern science is more developed. But if I wanted to say the same thing within Rashi’s approach, which holds that everything is in the hands of the Holy One, blessed be He—meaning, if I claimed that Hazal, who said otherwise, were mistaken on that point according to his view—then that would be a statement in the opposite direction: that they were simply mistaken in their conception, not mistaken in science. That is not something the commentators usually say (though according to my view there is no barrier even to that). In any case, these are not comparable at all.
So there you have it: tomatoes separate and cucumbers separate.
With God’s help, 15 Tevet 5782
One may see a parallel to Jacob’s answer to Rachel, “Am I in the place of God?”, whose point is: “I am not the address to ask for children; rather, you must ask this from God.”
So too Joseph says to his brothers: “You need not ask me to bear your transgression, for I ‘came out ahead’ from your actions, since I rose to greatness and merited ‘to keep many people alive.’ Your sin, in your evil intention, was purely ‘between man and God’; therefore it is before the Lord that you must purify yourselves and ask forgiveness for having violated His will.”
Regards, Yaron Fishel Ordner
The brothers are now at the level of “repentance out of fear,” since their request for forgiveness from Joseph comes out of fear that Joseph will punish them for their sin—as they say, “What if Joseph still bears a grudge against us and pays us back for all the wrong that we did to him?”
Joseph shows them the path of “repentance out of love,” which will bring them to the state of “God meant it for good,” in which the deliberate sin itself turns into merit because of the high spiritual level to which the person has risen through his repentance—a level that only the fall could have brought about. When a person repents out of love, his thought is not merely nullified to the will of his Creator; it identifies with the will of his Creator. And just as “God meant it for good,” so too the person thinks for good.
The brothers will reach the level of “repentance out of love” only after Joseph’s death, when they are no longer dependent on him. If then, when the Lord remembers them and they leave Egypt, they remember their promise to Joseph and bring him up with them—then it will become clear that their repentance was complete, born of full recognition of the covenant of brothers that cannot be severed. And then it will be revealed that they too think for good.
Regards, Ami’oz Yaron Shnitzler
This is so true that I wonder where we get the confidence that in the past there really was divine involvement in what happens in the world. There is a kind of “the burden of proof is on the claimant” here with respect to a substantive change made in the nature of the world. A change that at face value seems implausible.
Moreover, the conception of divine involvement often comes together with ignorance and lack of knowledge. The more we were exposed to science, the more we abandoned outdated notions about incurable illnesses sent by God, and so forth.
Isn’t it reasonable to assume that all the divine interventions described in Scripture are the result of ignorance and an attempt to provide a satisfying explanation for things whose meaning people did not understand?
The beginning of “repentance out of love” was Judah’s willingness to give his life in order to bring Benjamin back. But that was still for Jacob’s sake. The commitment to bring back Joseph, however, marks a higher stage: devotion to a brother for his own sake.
Regards, Yifa”or
I did not understand what radical conception the rabbi found in Rashi.
Rashi simply means that in this case they clearly saw the hand of providence that brought everything about,
for from throwing him into the pit he eventually became king in order to keep them alive.
And that is what he said to them: in this case, “here,” there is clear intervention by God, just as all of you thought, etc.
Now they understood that their story defied every possible forecast,
and why should Joseph try to harm them, seeing for themselves that the Holy One, blessed be He, prevented all of them together from harming him.
In the Torah itself there are passages that describe prophets and prophecy. Those prophets report supernatural events to us. The splitting of the sea does not look like something that has a natural explanation. I do not think scientific knowledge changes this point, since in most cases these are phenomena for which even today we have no explanation.
Rashi writes that just as the brothers did not succeed in their scheme, so Joseph himself likewise cannot succeed (and not merely that there is no reason for him to try, as you suggested). We see that everything is in the hands of the Holy One, blessed be He.
1. Regarding Rashi—it seems that Joseph does not think that it is altogether impossible to harm anyone, but rather that in certain situations it will not work. And perhaps by the words “all of you and I alone” he means, in the context that all are sons of Jacob, that even the majority cannot uproot the minority from the tribes of Israel, all the more so the reverse is impossible.
That is, Joseph assumes that harming his brothers is more against God’s will than just doing some bad deed, just as God did not want harm to come to him even though by the natural course of events that is what should have happened.
2. Regarding the punishment of an inadvertent killer (note 2)—his punishment is for not being careful. “God caused it to come into his hand” is a much more severe result than his own act, and for that he is not punished. True, the condition for his exile is that someone dies, but that is a condition and not the reason.
With God’s help, 18 Tevet 5782
To Moshe—greetings,
In the whole story of Joseph there is no deviation whatsoever from the order of nature and the natural conduct of the world. As is the way of the world, the strong defeat the weak. The brothers throw their younger brother into a pit and send him as a slave to Egypt, a situation from which he has no natural chance of going free. Potiphar’s wife “buries” Joseph in prison, from which he has no chance at all of getting out.
And behold, it turns out that all the attempts to “bury” the weak only brought him closer to fulfilling the destiny that God had placed upon him. Joseph’s becoming a slave is what brought him near to power and qualified him for rule. As a slave, Joseph understands that he must set his own dreams aside and devote himself to fulfilling other people’s dreams, and thus in every place he becomes the “de facto ruler.” With this insight he comes to be the deputy to “the chief jailer,” and from there advances to be the de facto ruler of the Egyptian empire.
But the revolution does not come without divine intervention guiding it. The “active agents” do not merit prophecy, but through dreams (which themselves are natural occurrences), God hints to people and directs them toward their destiny. A dream is not an unalterable “decree of fate.” A dream sets a goal before a person, and the upheavals of his life teach him, with no small amount of “trial and error,” how to act in order to realize his dream.
That is why Pharaoh is so impressed by Joseph’s interpretation. Unlike the magicians, who saw in the dream a “decree of fate” against which nothing can be done—they say: “You will father seven daughters and you will bury seven daughters,” and there is nothing you can do. But Joseph says: God is sharing His plans with you so that you can do something with this knowledge and prepare provisions in the years of plenty for the years of famine.
And the lesson:
If a person thinks that his own strength and effort as such will determine his fate—“He who sits in heaven laughs” at him, and shows him how all his powers and actions achieved the opposite of what would have been expected by the natural course of events. But when a person aligns his actions with the divine plan—then there will be blessing in his deeds, and it will be fulfilled in him: “The Lord made everything he did prosper in his hand.”
Regards, Eliam Fishel Workheimer
In other stories in the Bible as well there appears this “divine humor,” in which God shows the one who thinks he is “the master of the house” how all his deeds achieved the opposite. Pharaoh commands that every Hebrew boy be thrown into the Nile, and from that very decree a Hebrew boy comes to be raised as a prince in his palace; Haman rises early to destroy Mordecai, and his efforts bring about the exact opposite—Mordecai rises to greatness and Haman falls.
With God’s help, 18 Tevet 5782
In his article “How Deliberate Sins Are Turned into Merits” (on the Tzohar website), Rabbi Ronen Neuwirth says (following Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik and Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook) that repentance out of love clarifies the good root within a person that, in its distorted form, caused the sin. When one identifies that strong aspiration that found expression in the sin, and finds positive channels in which it can operate—the “deliberate sin” is transformed into merit. That same powerful desire that burst forth in a negative way will henceforth burst forth in a positive and corrected way.
Thus we may say that God identified in the brothers’ thinking the good element: “to keep many people alive”—not to accept the domination of a single individual before whom everyone nullifies himself, but rather to see in a leader an emissary and public servant who fulfills his role “to keep many people alive.”
When Joseph and the brothers understand that they are not in a competition of “one against another,” but in mutual completion of “one for all and all for one,” the picture becomes clear; and from now on, the powers that the sides developed in the struggle will be harnessed to love and joint action.
Regards, Eliam Fishel Workheimer
“One could ask here as well why this is a claim of exemption. The brothers intended to harm him, and only the Holy One, blessed be He, prevented it. How does that lessen their guilt?”
I don’t really understand. Do you relate in the same way to someone who tried to murder and failed and to someone who tried and succeeded?
An illustration: someone tells you that in his youth he was really extreme and threw stones at random Arab vehicles in the territories with the intention of killing. Today he has normalized, etc. Most people would accept him as normal (because today he is normal). But if you learned that once he succeeded and indeed wiped out a family with a stone, he would no longer be accepted back so easily into the fold of normality.
The difference lies in something that did not depend on him—he succeeded and he did not succeed.>
I ask that we focus on the example—do your moral intuitions really make no distinction at all between a youth who tried and a youth who tried and hit?
I wrote very clearly: there is not the slightest difference. And if you have a feeling that there is a difference, that is merely a psychological bias.
Granted, throwing stones is not an act of murder, because there is a considerable chance that the person will not die. But let’s talk about people who shot and missed, or shot and their gun jammed. Exactly the same thing.
Well, in my opinion there is a difference. And you too do not live as though there were no difference. That is, theoretically I could agree, but in practice in everyday life nobody lives like that; it is very unintuitive.
People look at their phones while driving (negligence with no small deliberate element), and lots of people do this. Of them, some killed negligently, but most did not. Do you treat the less careful drivers you know as though they had killed?
There is no difference whatsoever. People do have a tendency to take the outcome into account, but that is only a psychological artifact (when someone dies, it has a powerful impact on us). The difference lies only in the responsibility of the offender, because if there is no result, he has no duty to repair it. But the wickedness is the same in both situations. I have written on the site several times about the difference between guilt and responsibility, and you can search for it.
With God’s help, 19 Tevet 5782
To Rabbi M. A.—greetings,
It seems that the Torah too has a “tendency to take the outcome into account.” One who wanted to eat forbidden fat and happened to eat kosher meat requires atonement, but is not liable to lashes or karet. It appears plainly that an attempted sin that succeeded entails a far more severe punishment than an attempt that failed.
Regards, Nisan Fishel Matzliach
That has nothing to do with it. As I wrote, it depends on the theory of punishment, that is, what justifies punishment. But the degree of guilt and wickedness is identical in an attempt and in the completed act.
Is someone who tried to eat forbidden fat and failed considered a “wicked man of violence” and thereby disqualified from testimony?
Regards, N.P.M.
Every wicked person is disqualified from testimony, not only a “wicked man of violence.” But a wicked person is defined as one who commits a transgression punishable by lashes. And indeed several halakhic decisors wrote that even if he did not actually incur lashes, he is disqualified. Proof to the contrary.
And above all, the disqualification of a wicked person is based on a very specific definition of “wicked person,” and that is not what we call wicked.
But the whole discussion from sources is unnecessary. Why do I need a verse?! It is simple reasoning.
If we are discussing one whom the Torah calls “wicked,” then there is no disqualification from testimony as a “wicked person” except for one who actually transgressed (even if he was not actually flogged). And if it depends on “what we call wicked,” then that is a subjective matter.
Regards, N.P.M.
I already answered that. But just for the challenge, find me proof that someone who thought he was eating pork and ended up with lamb is not disqualified from testimony. I bet you will not find it.
There is a discussion of the words of the Or HaChaim in Rabbi Asher Weiss’s lecture, “If one intended to violate a prohibition, does he require atonement? (5773).” In his opinion, one who intended to eat pork and ate lamb—this is a full-fledged transgression, for which one is liable to rabbinic lashes (sections 1–2), and one who assists him violates “Do not place a stumbling block before the blind” (section 3), but he takes it as obvious that such a person is not disqualified from testimony (section 5).
Therefore one may argue that someone who gambled and it did not work out is not disqualified from testimony 🙂
Regards, Nisan Fishel Matzliach
Paragraph 2, line 1
…that someone who gambled and it did not work out…
I asked for proof, not an opinion.
By the way, Rabbi Yitzchak Ze’ev Soloveitchik, in the stencil notes on the Nazirite sugya, argues that someone who thought he was eating pork and ended up with lamb committed a Torah transgression (except that he does not receive lashes), and according to his view it is reasonable that he is disqualified from testimony.
And also see the article by Dr. Gabriel Hazut, “Between Act and Intention in Halakhah—A Look at Deontology and Teleology,” on his website.
In practice, one should ask that if the brothers’ sin was that they violated “Whoever kidnaps a man and sells him”—then this is a full-fledged transgression for which one is liable under human law, and not merely an “attempt.”
Therefore I suggested (above) that Joseph says to them:
“Am I in the place of God, that I should bear your transgression? For the grave offense you committed—you have an account with God, and it is from Him that you must ask forgiveness. But for the harm done to me, you need not ask me for pardon, since you caused me a great benefit.”
Regards, Yifa”or
Interestingly, the brothers too do not ask forgiveness for the sale itself, but for the ingratitude—“for they did you evil.” Joseph came to inquire after their welfare, and they threw him into the pit and sold him as a slave.
This may strengthen Rashbam’s view that in fact the brothers did not sell Joseph, but rather the Midianites who passed by noticed him and took him; therefore they do not ask forgiveness for the sale, but for the ungrateful conduct of throwing him into the pit.
And perhaps it may be said that they did not see any prohibition in the sale itself, because they thought that just as under the laws of the Noahides a father may sell his son as a slave, so too the older brothers may sell their younger brother as a slave if he does not treat them with honor. But for the ingratitude they saw a need to ask forgiveness.
And what about the story of the Ten Martyrs of the Kingdom as punishment for the sale of Joseph?
It seems to me that beyond the historical story of a governmental pretext for killing Jews, Hazal also take it seriously.
It should read:
“the article by Dr. Hazut” is an article that I wrote that appears here on the site.
I did not understand the question.
I would be glad to hear some insights about this. On the face of it, it supports the opinion that there is indeed guilt here despite the good outcome and despite the divine guidance. But is this a kind of collective punishment? Why after so many generations? Why these particular people?
Now that I reread Joseph’s words, maybe it seems that he is even hinting at some future punishment from the Holy One, blessed be He, that awaits them. That is, this is not my business, forgiveness is not relevant, and the story is apparently not over…
Rather chilling
In any case, the proof from “God meant it for good” is a departure from the strict letter of the law, which should not be expected to forgive an offender because of the good that eventually came from his act without his intending it.
This is superhuman conduct, greatness of soul on the part of the victim who is willing to forgive his brothers for many years of suffering because of the good that came out at the end. We marvel at the piety of Joseph, “the prince among his brothers,” and try to attain something of his piety—but we cannot demand that an entire society behave with such extraordinary piety. A normative society is founded on obligation, not on limitless forbearance.
Therefore it was specifically Judah who was chosen to be the “lawgiver,” because he knew not to give in to himself, and he brought about the repair of the sin by his willingness to admit his failings and give his life to keep his promise to his father. One who can make demands of himself is the one who can also demand of “the flock of his pasture” that they keep strict “rules of the game.”
Regards, Hanoch Henech Feinshmakher-Palti
With God’s help, 19 Tevet 5782
And perhaps the deliberate sins of one who repents out of love are “counted for good” and become merits because there is here a “measure for measure”: just as he is willing to accept his sufferings with love and see in them necessary stages on the path of purifying repair—so too, “measure for measure,” the Lord counts his failures and falls as stages on the path to the repair of his soul.
By learning a lesson from a mistake, a person arrives at deeper and stronger insights than he would under conditions of tranquility. The sufferings of the fall intensify and internalize in a person his attachment to the good.
Joseph does not spare his brothers the torments of soul over their sin. On the contrary, he directs them to God, for only He can forgive them. But by judging their sin favorably, Joseph shows his brothers the way to “accepting suffering with love,” a path that will bring them to the level of “repentance out of love.”
Regards, Hanoch Henech Feinshmakher-Palti
I do not think bringing Ramban on conspiring witnesses into this line of thought works well. The judges are not inadvertent when they rule on the basis of two witnesses; they are occupied/under compulsion—they are not inadvertent murderers, they are not murderers at all. The murderers are the witnesses, and they are of course deliberate, not inadvertent.
I don’t think so. The witnesses are at most indirect causation of murder. The one who carries it out and turns him into a dead man is the court, and even if the witnesses choose to make them err, the Holy One, blessed be He, will not allow an inadvertent murder to occur through them.
This is unlike every case of “placing a stumbling block before the blind,” where a person causes his fellow to sin; there the one causing the sin has the choice and the ability to do so.
But if the court itself murders deliberately (rules for death without evidence, simply because they chose to murder), there the Holy One, blessed be He, can sometimes allow it.
A. In the case of conspiring witnesses there is no exemption because of indirect causation—and the proof is: if they did not kill, they are killed. One cannot say that they are put to death merely for the lie; rather, certainly the death penalty is for attempted murder that did not succeed, just as you wrote in the article, “Attempted murder that fails is exactly as grave as murder.” It is not plausible that liability for death would be for the transgression of lying.
B. Even if we accept that “the witnesses are at most indirect causation of murder,” that still does not mean that the court is considered an inadvertent murderer rather than acting under compulsion/without awareness. For example, if one person throws his fellow onto a baby and the baby is killed, the thrower is the murderer and not the one thrown; and if the thrower threw in an indirect way, would the fellow who was thrown become a murderer?!
And in general, if someone murders by indirect causation deliberately (for example, he ties a person up in a way that he will be killed by a secondary force), does the Holy One, blessed be He, intervene there, because he is no longer a deliberate murderer but only “at most indirect causation of murder”?!
It seems to me that the whole subject of indirect causation is not relevant to the issue of deliberate action and responsibility for the murder. Indirect causation is some kind of exemption from punishment, and conspiring witnesses were excluded from that exemption, just as conspiring witnesses were excluded from the exemption of one who attempted to murder, which is as severe as murder. A murderer by indirect causation, in terms of responsibility/guilt, is a full murderer.
And by the way, I assume the judges do not do the hanging themselves; there is an executioner who carries out the job, so the judges are no less “at most indirect causation of murder” than the witnesses.
It seems to me that you are mixing together different planes of discussion again and again. I am not dealing with halakhah (why so-and-so is exempt or liable, or what the halakhic category of the act is—inadvertent, deliberate, compelled, or unknowing). My claims are on the theological plane, not the halakhic one.
From this you will understand that the distinction between inadvertent action and compulsion or unknowing is irrelevant. The claim was that everything that is not deliberate is done by God’s hand, and there no one dies without justice. Only in deliberate choice can one kill without justice.
The same applies to the exemption of conspiring witnesses because of indirect causation. Who spoke about granting the witnesses an exemption? I said that they are only indirect causation and not direct murderers, and therefore their scheme does not necessarily succeed even though they are deliberate. The reason is that on the way stands the court, and the Holy One, blessed be He, protects them so that no mishap occurs through them.
And what you said, that the court too is only indirect causation, is incorrect (incidentally, according to the Torah the executioners are the witnesses: “The hand of the witnesses shall be first upon him to put him to death”). I was precise in my wording: the court’s ruling turns him into a dead man, which is not true of the testimony. Once the court rules him liable to death, he is a dead man. Beyond that, Ramban says there is a special protection over the court that no mishap should occur through them, and this does not exist with regard to the court’s agent as such. But even if the court were only indirect causation, that would still not be relevant to the discussion. There is still protection over them that no mishap should emerge from their hands.
And independently of that, though it is irrelevant to the discussion, the witnesses are indeed killers by indirect causation. Exactly like one who sends a fire by the hand of a deaf-mute, an incompetent, or a minor, which is one of the cases of indirect causation in the chapter HaKones. When you send an inadvertent person or someone lacking awareness to commit a transgression, you caused the transgression, and are liable in the judgment of Heaven. So when you send the court, who are inadvertent (they do not know you are lying and think they are doing their job), that is indirect causation. The court indeed acts here as one acting without awareness or under compulsion, but the witnesses are killers by indirect causation (they send the court to kill through unknowing/inadvertent action).
In short, I will summarize, because it seems to me the discussion is just getting bogged down. My claim regarding Ramban is that if the court had decided to kill deliberately, they certainly could have done so even if the defendant did not deserve to die. What Ramban says applies only when the court rules innocently on the basis of testimony, and then they are acting not deliberately (and it does not matter whether the category is inadvertent, unknowing, or compelled). Therefore there he assumes that if they executed him, he probably did deserve to die. And the fact that the witnesses schemed deliberately is irrelevant here, because the protection is over the court, that they should not stumble inadvertently even if the witnesses try to make them stumble.
You might ask what the difference is between the court and any ordinary person. After all, I claimed that with any person, when he acts inadvertently, he carries out God’s will, and then there is no death without justice. So what is special about a court acting inadvertently, that no mishap comes through them? Ostensibly that is true of every person. The answer to this is contained in your very question: the court was caused to err by people who schemed deliberately to kill (the conspiring witnesses), and in the case of an ordinary person that could have succeeded. But in the case of the court, Ramban claims that there is special protection that no mishap should occur through them; therefore there it does not just happen, and if it did nevertheless happen, he probably deserved to die.
I answered above.
I will try to sharpen my point (my apologies that it is still a bit long):
Let us suppose that Ramban disagrees with Rabbenu Hananel and holds that the Holy One, blessed be He, intervenes both in deliberate action and in inadvertent action, and let us see whether that fits.
Of course the question immediately arises: every murderer—why is he liable, if he is only an instrument in the hand of the Holy One, blessed be He, to kill the one killed, who previously committed a capital offense? And the simple answer is at hand: “It is not in heaven,” and in judgment we do not make calculations of Heaven.
Now to Ramban’s own words:
Ramban asks, “for they are two against two”—that is, why, when the defendant was not killed, do we believe the latter witnesses?
To this Ramban answers: “for I will not justify the wicked”—if the first witnesses were telling the truth, the Holy One, blessed be He, would have held back the latter witnesses so as not to justify the wicked one (who would be saved because of two against two, without any decrees or heavenly calculations). From here it follows that the first are the liars.
Here the question arises: but this is a heavenly calculation, and in judgment we do not calculate heaven. Therefore Ramban opens with “it is the decree of the Ruler.” Surely Ramban does not mean that this is a scriptural decree without reason, for immediately afterward he gives a reason. Rather, there is logic here that is a heavenly calculation—but a “decree of the Ruler” is needed to create an exception to the rule that we do not calculate heavenly calculations in judgment.
Of course, if the latter witnesses arrive after the defendant’s death, then the calculation no longer works. For if the defendant were innocent, “the Lord would not leave him in his hand, nor let him be condemned when judged. Furthermore, the Lord would not allow the righteous judges who stand before Him to shed innocent blood.” And indeed it is reversed—the first witnesses are the trusted ones, as Ramban writes: “But if Reuben was killed, we will think that all that the first witnesses testified about him was true.”
So what remains unresolved in Ramban if he disagrees with Rabbenu Hananel?
And more than that: according to your explanation of Ramban along the lines of Rabbenu Hananel’s view, the first witnesses are in fact liars but are not killed because they testified against a man who was, in heaven’s eyes, already liable to death for another offense he had committed. But that is not what Ramban writes—Ramban says that the first are believed if he was executed.
It seems to me that you did not understand my argument. The whole move is the opposite. Ramban may disagree with Rabbenu Hananel; the question is whether that is necessary (for in my view it is clear that Rabbenu Hananel is right, so I prefer to reconcile Ramban with him). My claim is that it is not necessary, because Ramban is speaking about inadvertent action, while Rabbenu Hananel spoke about deliberate action.
Your answer that “in judgment we do not make calculations of Heaven” says nothing. If in fact the Holy One, blessed be He, did this, then one cannot punish him for it. What use are slogans like that to me?
According to my explanation, the first witnesses are telling the truth. For here we have two against two, and ordinarily we prefer the latter witnesses. But if he was executed, it becomes clear that here the first witnesses are the truthful ones. And the practical difference is that in such a situation not only do we not do to them “as they conspired,” but they are also not disqualified from testimony.
Thank you for the clarification; indeed I had understood you the opposite way.
As for “in judgment we do not make calculations of Heaven”—that indeed says nothing from a theological standpoint; it is a legal rule. And according to the view that the Holy One, blessed be He, intervenes even in deliberate action, the murderer’s punishment is for his evil choice. And even if we were to bring heavenly calculations into judgment, no murderer would ever incur court-imposed death, and the punishment would become a dead letter and would not deter murder.
But there is no need to deter. Murder happens only when the Holy One, blessed be He, decides, so there is no problem with murdering. And my intentions too are events in the world, and if everything that happens is brought about by the Holy One, blessed be He, then so are my intentions. There is no difference between a mental event and a physical one.
But it seems to me we have exhausted this.
Hello Rabbi, I did not understand the logical fallacy you described in “a cause is supposed to be a sufficient condition for the effect, and logically there cannot be two independent sufficient conditions for the same result.” Could you expand?
It sounds quite reasonable…
It reminds me of Kishon’s skit about Abba Eban: “How beautifully he spoke; I did not understand a single word” (Abba Eban had exceptionally fine English).
To your point, my formulation really was not precise, unfortunately.
To say that A is a sufficient condition for X means that if A occurs, then B necessarily occurs (that is, it is enough to know that A happened in order to infer B). If we assume that there is another independent sufficient condition, C, which is also sufficient for B, then if either A occurs or C occurs, B will occur. In that picture there is no problem in itself.
What I meant to say was that if theology is a sufficient condition, that means that the fulfillment of the theological conditions is enough for the event to happen, even if the physical conditions do not occur—and vice versa. That does not fit our conception of science or theology. If the physical conditions are fulfilled, the apple will fall regardless of theology, and if they are not fulfilled, it will not fall. That basically means that science is a necessary and sufficient condition. In the accepted views, theology too is necessary and sufficient.
Joseph uses the expression of his father Jacob to his mother Rachel before Joseph was born, when she demanded children from him: “Am I in the place of God?”—as a hint to his brothers: I know what my father said to my mother before I was born; do you think I believe you when you tell me, “Your father commanded before his death”…?
I understood the words of the Or HaChaim themselves as based on the fact that they were inadvertent, because it is not likely that he would completely ignore the Talmudic discussion of pork meat and lamb meat; and it stands to reason that he is relying on the discussion in Menachot about one who intended to catch fish on Shabbat (inadvertently) and ended up saving a baby.
You have written more than once that from a moral-value standpoint we should judge a person according to his own outlook, while from a practical judicial standpoint we judge a person according to our own outlook.
It is entirely plausible that Joseph would say this to his brothers: had you succeeded in your scheme to do harm, I would have punished you from the practical standpoint as evildoers, even if you thought justice was on your side. But since God meant it for good, and since your evil intention too was justified according to your own view, there is no place at all to hold you legally liable.
Someone who intended to catch fish and ended up with a baby is exactly like someone who thought he was eating pork and ended up with lamb. He too requires atonement.
Your interpretation is impossible. If they were inadvertent, then they were not thinking they were eating pork.
I do not think that is correct.
Someone who wanted to eat pork thinking it was permitted, and ended up with lamb, does not necessarily require atonement. The sugya in Nedarim speaks about someone who wanted to do something bad and did not succeed; the sugya in Menachot speaks about someone who wanted to do a neutral act, which from our perspective is a bad act, but did not succeed in doing it in the “bad” way, and therefore truly does not require atonement (at least according to the accepted halakhic ruling. There is a dispute whether we go by his act or by his intention).
Someone who thinks of doing wrong inadvertently is not considered to be thinking of doing wrong. The Or HaChaim is speaking about someone who thinks he is giving a cup of poison to drink, and that is like one who thought he was eating pork and knew it was pork, or one who thought he was catching fish on Shabbat and knew he was doing so on Shabbat. I do not understand how you want to read into him that this was a neutral thought.
With God’s help, Purim of the unwalled cities, 5782
And perhaps this matter—the ability of repentance out of love to turn deliberate sins into merits—is hinted at in the words of Hazal: “A person is obligated to become intoxicated on Purim until he does not know the difference between ‘cursed be Haman’ and ‘blessed be Mordechai.’” For when one returns through becoming intoxicated with love, through “drinking that brings the distant near,” then even Haman’s deliberate sins are turned into merits.
For it becomes clear that “at the end of the day” all of Haman’s malicious intentions brought no harm at all. On the contrary, because of him Israel attained an exalted level. They repaired the defect of “scattered and dispersed” with “Go, gather all the Jews,” and the defect of “they do not keep the king’s laws [the King of the universe]” they repaired with “They reaccepted it in the days of Ahasuerus.”
Haman’s evil intentions yielded, “to his own rage and wrath,” only blessing; they restored unity to Israel and brought about a renewed acceptance of the kingdom of Heaven, a return to the standing at Mount Sinai. Everything he intended for evil—God turned to good!
Therefore Haman merited to restore to the “third people” the “ear” that heard and received Torah from Sinai, a Torah in which there is “black fire upon white fire,” like the black poppy seed enclosed in a pure white shell, and whose taste is like manna. To life, dear Jews, to life!
With the blessing of “let us become cheerfully intoxicated,” Hasdai Betzalel Duvdevani Kirshen-Kvas
Haman also merited that from his descendants came the great teacher Rav Shmuel bar Shilat (Sanhedrin 97, according to the version of Rabbi Aharon Hyman), who was renowned for his devotion to his students, such that even thirteen years after his “retirement,” his students never left his mind.
You wrote, “1. He is not under God”; did you mean “he is under God,” right?