Evil in the World: The Big Picture (Column 547)
In Column 541 I dealt with the question of Halakhah and morality, namely the moral meaning of Halakhah and the relationship between Halakhah and morality. My conclusion was that these are two independent categories. Similar questions arise regarding the relationship between reality and morality, that is, the meaning of evil in the world and its relation to God. These questions were sharply highlighted following the recent columns about the remarks of Rabbi Shmuel Eliyahu (Columns 543 and 546), especially the last column which touched on this more directly. In the comments to that column (see especially the thread that begins here with Dror, and the addition of the âcobblerâs mateâ I was graciously given here) and also in the question here (which apparently arose due to that column), the issues became even sharper and a discussion developed which I thought had no place there because I had already addressed itâbut it became clear to me that this was not so. In the course of these discussions I was surprised to discover that although I have quite a few references to the question of evil in the worldâboth in the Q&A (such as here and many more; search: ânatural evilâ and âhuman evilâ) and in certain columns (like Column 214 which I mentioned there), and of course in the second book of the trilogyâI have not yet written here on the site a column that presents the full picture on this matter. So here it is. Afterwards you can reassess whether I indeed received a âcobblerâs mate,â or perhaps it was a âPyrrhic mate.â In my view, neither.
I must preface that, because of the breadth of the subject, I will be brief here on issues that have been discussed elsewhereâeven if some are very important and essential to my discussion here. I will refer where possible to other places, since my aim here is to sketch the outline of the full picture, even at the expense of detail on specific points. If someone struggles with or wishes to comment on a particular point in my words, I would be very grateful if before posting the comment they would glance at the sources I have linked. It is entirely possible that I addressed there the very difficulty that troubles them.
Point of Departure: Godâs Goodness
The starting point for the discussion is Godâs goodness. There are countless sources for this from Scripture and, of course, from Hazal and the entire literature of Jewish thought (for those to whom all this speaks): from âA God of faithfulness and without iniquity; just and upright is He,â to âThe Lord is good to all, and His compassion is over all His works,â and many more. There is no point in elaborating on this here due to its obviousness. In any case, this is the starting point of this discussion, and for one who does not accept it, the discussion is pointless. Therefore I place this assumption at the outset.
The Difficulty: Reality Is Not Perfectly Good
One can argue about whether reality is good or bad. Seemingly, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disputed this (Eruvin 13b), and in conclusion all agreed that it would have been more comfortable for a person not to have been created. One can debate the meaning of that conclusion, but it is quite clear that reality has bad aspects as well, and for our purposes this suffices. There are people or groups who in at least some situations suffer greatly, and the question that arises is: how does God do this? If He is good, I would expect the works of His hands to be good. It is not plausible that a good being produces deeds so evil. Many have already cried out about this: âShall the Judge of all the earth not do justice?â âWhy do the way of the wicked prosper?â and the like. One illustration of this difficulty is âthe righteous who suffers,â but that is only an example of the more general problem of evil. People and animals suffer in this world, and even where there is guilt it is not always possible to find proportionality between what they didâthat is, the degree of their guilt and what they deserveâand what they actually endure.
Background Assumption: Active Divine Involvement in the World
Clearly, in the background of this difficulty lies the assumption that God, the Creator of the world, also has the capacity to control all that happens in it. He created our world and governs it, and therefore the question arises whether such governance is consistent with His goodness. This assumption itself requires discussion. It is clear that God has control over all that occursâthat is, He can intervene and change as He wishes. But it does not appear that He makes use of this capacity.
Regarding the extent of His involvement, three positions can be presented: (a) Some will say that He produces everything that happens in the worldâfrom the eggs of lice to the horns of ramsâeverything is the work of Godâs hands. No blade of grass grows without an angel over it telling it to grow. (b) Others think there are events in the world that are Godâs doing and others that are not. He is involved in the world, but not everything that happens here is from Him. See this in detail in the article by Rabbi Shmuel Ariel. (c) I have written more than once that, in my humble opinion, He is probably not involved here at all (perhaps except for sporadic cases of which there is no way to know).
According to my approach, stories of miracles and of providential âhandsâ experienced by people are usually the result of hasty inference and lack of probabilistic literacy. So too with historical processes (such as redemption and the establishment of the State of Israel, victories in wars, and the like). True, there are clear sources that He is involvedâfrom the Bible, Hazal, and all the commentatorsâbut to my judgment reality teaches otherwise. In practice this does not happen, and one who is honest with himself must admit it. At the very least there is no indication of His involvement. I will not return to this here, for I have dealt with it elsewhere at length (see at length in Columns 280 and 298 and the references there).
The biblical sources that clearly indicate His involvement can be explained in several ways. I suggested there that God changes policy, and as the world and humanity mature, He grants them more independenceâuntil in our days He is no longer involved at all (like a parent and children). But whether one accepts this or not, reality itself speaks a very clear language. The fact that we were educated to view a sober look at reality as the counsel of the evil inclination, and that piety obligates us to deny common senseâthat is a problem of the educators, not ours. In my eyes, a person must maintain intellectual honesty even if his conclusions are labeled âheresy.â Truth is never disgraceful, nor can it be heresy (even if various preachers insist on presenting it as such and explain to us constantly that faith demands ignoring common sense).
For our purposes here, it is important for me to stress that my conclusion regarding the absence of Godâs active involvement in the world is not merely an ad hoc answer to the problem of evil (as I will show below). In those columns I brought very strong arguments for this view even independent of the problem of evil, and I also showed that people actually hold it even if they do not admit it (for fear that it constitutes heresy in a principle).
Back to the Difficulty of Reality and Morality
When a terror attack or traffic accident occurs, for example, voices immediately arise that we do not know the calculations of the Almighty: why it was fitting for those people or children to die. But the assumption is that in some sense they indeed deserved it (stated differently: their death is justified). If it happened, then apparently that is what was supposed to happenâonly we do not understand why. I already mentioned here the interview with the cousin of the two children who were murdered in the attack on Friday two weeks ago. He said there that this righteous family accepted the judgment, and everyone there understands that this is apparently what God decided, even if they do not know why. He added that it is clear to everyone that even if the terrorist had not decided to murder them, it would have happened to them in another way (an accident, illness, and so on). Some of you may think these are extreme and unrepresentative statements, but I disagree. They are indeed extreme but very representative. This is the prevalent approach in the public, even if in books and various ideologies there are of course other approaches. Especially when one puts the difficulty squarely before the eyesâthen, and only then, everyone immediately discovers that they themselves do not hold such a position. But for some reason this is the typical and prevalent religious discourse.
At the basis of such statements lies the assumption that the event occurred by Godâs agency; therefore, if the children were murdered, it is clear that God decided they should die. This brings me back to the three conceptions I described above. Statements like these express the first conception. It is essentially a kind of Druze-style fatalism (âevery bullet has an addressâ). If someone died, apparently he deserved to die, and it would have happened in any case. Note that this is the conclusion both of those who propose explanations for such phenomena (the children were murdered to punish us or their family, or to teach us or their family something, or any other fantasy) and of those who say we do not know the heavenly calculations. The assumption of all is that there is such a calculationâthat is, the result is a corollary of some heavenly calculus, which we may not understand.
This approach naturally arouses the difficulty of reality versus morality: if God is good, how can He do such things?! By contrast, one who holds the second approach (that there are things not done by Him) should not resort to such statements, for it may beâand is even highly likelyâthat this case belongs to the category not wrought by God, since, as recalled, He is righteous and good and His compassion is over all His works. If something bad happened, it likely did not come from Himââno evil descends from Above.â If so, there is no need to say we do not know heavenly calculations, for it is not at all clear there was any such heavenly calculation here. Needless to say, one who holds the third approach (mine) does not need such statements at all.
According to the last two approaches, there is, of course, a question: why did God not intervene and prevent the suffering and pain? Even if He did not do it with His own hands, we still expect a moral being to intervene and prevent it. This certainly arises according to the second approach. In the third, it is a matter of His principled policy not to intervene, and therefore the difficulty is lesserâthough it still requires some explanation.
What Is Moral Conduct?
Many who hold the first (and also the second) position argue that indeed God is good in all His ways, and it is also true that everything that occurs here is His handiwork; nevertheless there is no contradiction between reality and those two assumptions. There are hidden moral considerations underlying Godâs conduct, and we do not understand everything. Who can know the mind of the Most High?! Do we understand why a corpse defiles or why pig is forbidden to eat? Godâs conduct in the world is in the realm of âdecreesâ we cannot comprehend.
In Column 541 I presented a similar argument and wrote that it empties morality of content. Killing a baby who did nothing and could do nothing is not moral. There is no possible explanation for it; therefore one cannot say there is an explanation we do not understand. One who tries to argue that such an act is moral due to hidden considerations of one sort or another simply empties the concept âmoralityâ of content. He essentially admits it is not moral, but replaces the meaning of the term âmorality.â That is not a solution to the difficulty but a surrender of the assumption that God is moral (in the accepted sense of the term). As recalled, our discussion proceeds on that assumption; hence this dubious âsolutionâ is irrelevant. In Column 457 I explained that such an approach turns the statement about Godâs goodness from a claim into a definition, rendering it empty and contentless.
Other Justifications
One could formulate a slightly different justification. True, from the perspective of moral considerations such conduct is improper. Babies who did nothing should not suffer. Period. But God has other considerations, presumably global ones, because of which He nonetheless had to harm those babies. Note that this is not a moral justification, but some other type of justification. For example, a doctor causes pain to his patient in order to heal him. The act is indeed painful to the patient, but it is justified since ultimately it is for the patientâs benefit. Likewise, the suffering of babies is indeed not moral and has no moral justification, but one can still justify it by the existence of other considerations, not from the realm of moralityâfor example, the tikkun of the sefirah of Netzach in Hod, or an attempt to teach a lesson to the society to which those babies belong, and the like.
Such a direction is of course possible in principle, but even here two difficulties arise:
- According to this, we cannot offer a moral interpretation for Godâs actions, as Rabbi Shmuel Eliyahu, for example, did. It may be that the events in question have various hidden justifications and that indeed there is no moral justification here. For example, how can one infer that the suffering of babies in the earthquake in Turkey is because Turkey is hostile to Israel? Perhaps it is to achieve other hidden aims (Netzach in Hod, and not deterring the wicked Turks from hostility to Israel)? It is manifestly immoral to inflict such suffering on babies; therefore it is quite reasonable that the act has other aims.
But one might answer that God has no alternative way to deter the Turks. The sacrifice of the babies was necessary to achieve the desired and proper outcome. Which brings me to the more substantive difficulty:
- This is a situation in which an action X that is not moral (the torture and slaughter of babies) is required to achieve an outcome Y that is desirableâspiritually, theologically, or even practically in our world (deterring the Turks, as above). But in such a situation I would expect an omnipotent agent to act otherwise: to bring about Y without needing X. âIs anything too wondrous for the Lord?!â Why not deter the Turks by killing ErdoÄan, harming his generals, targeted assassinations of the wicked in the Turkish establishment or even among the public? Why does God resort to the indiscriminate slaughter of thousands? As for the thousands of adults killedâone can feign naivete and claim they were all, to the last, anti-Semites and potential terrorists who happened to gather in the same region in Turkey and Syria (ignoring that a significant part of the quake occurred in a Kurdish area, hardly considered an enemy of Israel). But what guilt do the babies have? Could one not deter our enemies without torturing them to death?
Even I, a mere worm and not a man, could suggest to God a thousand other, more moral ways to achieve that aim. And we have not yet spoken of the fact that those wicked Turks do not know why this calamity befell them; so what is the point of inflicting it? They are not engaging in soul-searching (they do not possess Rabbi Eliyahuâs deep grasp of the heavenly accounts which he âdoes not understand,â yet that does not stop him from explaining them in great detail to all Israel and the world). I therefore assume they will not change their policy toward Israel because of the disaster. And if it is merely punishment, retribution, or a sanction not intended to deterâthen is it justified to inflict such punishment on babies who have not sinned? It is manifestly immoral.
Can One Judge God?
Mordechai, may he live long, in an angry comment to the previous column (see from here onward) argued that God is the Baal HaBayit (as the saying goes: âhusband of the houseâ), since He created the world; therefore He has the right to do here whatever He wishes, including killing and causing suffering to whomever He wantsâguilty or not, justified or not. We cannot judge Him for such actions.
Although it is very hard to contend with such resolute faith and such impressive fear of Heaven, this is, of course, nonsense. He is essentially claiming that God is not moral. Even a person who has a ârightâ to abuse an animal that belongs to him is not moral if he does so. The question is not a legal one of rights but a moral one. Beyond that, God Himself tells us that He acts morally and lovingly toward all His creatures; therefore, we can certainly judge Him on that premise. He perhaps was not obligated to be moral (in my view He was; see Column 457), but if He Himself says He is moral, then the question of the morality of His conduct is certainly in place. Even according to Mordechaiâs strange view, there is at least a claim of logical inconsistency, even if not of immorality. One can of course say that His morality is exalted and incomprehensible to mere mortals like me, and certainly it is not our base, inferior human morality. But that, of course, empties the statements about His morality of content and turns them into definitions (see also on this in Column 457). Moreover, the whole discussion about âthe righteous who suffersâ and the theological ponderings of thinkers throughout the generationsâfrom the Bible to our dayâassume that there is room for such questions and propose answers to them. Therefore, one way or another, I am conducting the discussion within that framework.
Between a Question and a Contradiction
It is very important to clarify another point here. Often people do not distinguish between a question and a contradiction (kushya). A question points to a lack of understanding. Thus, for example, a person may wonder why one must don tefillin or not eat pork. I do not understand these commandments, but that says very little about God and much more about me. I assume there is a good answer, although due to my human limitations I do not know it. Nor should this cause me to abandon my obligation to don tefillinâat least if I have trust in God and a commitment to His commands.
That is as far as questions go. By contrast, if I have a contradictionâand certainly if I have an outright inconsistencyâthe situation is altogether different. For example, suppose I think there is a contradiction between His foreknowledge of the future and our free will; that is a contradiction, not a mere question. Here I have no option to remain committed to both opposing sides without knowing the resolution. The reason is very simple: if I believe He knows everything in advance, then that contradicts the assumption of free will. If so, it turns out I both believe in free will and do not believe in it simultaneously. But that is empty of content. I have uttered words from my mouth (or keyboard), but they have no meaning. Therefore, it is impossible to believe logical contradictionsâunless someone clarifies to me that it is not a true logical contradiction.[1]
If so, one cannot say about God a thing and its opposite, and what is somehow called the âdoctrine of the unity of oppositesâ is mere empty verbiage (unless it deals with something that is not a logical opposition). Hence, to our matter: to say that He conducts Himself in a perfectly moral manner and also does acts that are manifestly immoral is a frontal logical contradiction and therefore impossible (see also sources in Column 303 and in this article, though it is not necessary here). To say He is moral yet causes, by His own hand, immense suffering to babies who have not sinned is an oxymoron. By contrast, one can believe that God departs from the laws of natureâthat is, performs actions that contravene natural law (miracles)âfor there is no principled problem here: the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted, and if He created the laws of nature He can also depart from them or suspend them.
The problematic nature of such arguments can also be seen from a slightly different angle. The presence of a contradiction in a system of thought is a proof by contradiction that at least one of its premises is false. If premise X brings me to a contradiction, this is a proof by contradiction that X is falseâor alternatively that I must relinquish one of the other premises that led to the contradiction. Just as in mathematics, so in a framework of faith: a contradiction proves that something within that framework is not true.
Moreover, from a logical contradiction one can infer any conclusion (and also its opposite). Therefore one who holds a contradictory set of beliefs, in fact, believes in nothingâor in everything. He believes that God exists and also that He does not, that He is good and also not good, that He is providential and also not, that He took us out of Egypt and also not, that His color is green and also colorless, and so on. This empties our discourse and thought of content, and even for this reason alone such an approach cannot be a real option for us.
Our Logical and Ethical Indifference
Alas, we have become accustomed to living with these contradictions. In recent generations no one gets excited anymore about the problems of evil or âthe righteous who suffers.â When we see horrific events like a terror attack, an accident, an earthquake, etc., statements automatically arise: âAh, this is âthe righteous who suffers,ââ or âWe do not know the heavenly calculations,â and thus everything is neatly resolved (and as noted, there are also those who, after this âwere it not that I fear,â immediately supply learned explanations). Prophets, commentators, and thinkers have addressed thisâso all is fine. But the fact that they addressed it teaches me nothing. After all, answers are not to be found there.
Well, but perhaps we are small and do not understand? Here enters my claim that âthe righteous who suffersâ is a contradiction, not a question. Evil resulting from a divine actâgiven the assumption that God is a perfectly moral beingâis a contradiction, not a matter of incomprehension. There is a contradiction to the assumption of Godâs goodness; hence it is insufficient to claim we do not understand everything. As noted, there is no possible moral explanation for the suffering of babies who have not sinned. An omnipotent being who chooses an immoral path when He has more moral options is an immoral being. One cannot accept His morality in light of the facts we encounter in reality. We are forgiving toward those who themselves have undergone terrible suffering (like Holocaust survivors), but in truth there is no principled difference between those who encountered reality and experienced suffering and those who sit in armchairs and do theology (like me). The former are less inclined to accept such âexplanations,â and they are right. If I, from the philosopherâs armchair, permit myself to utter meaningless words that answer nothing and keep livingâthat does not mean there is any possible justification.
The only way to remain with the belief that God is moral together with a sober look at the world and without emptying the concept âmoralityâ of content is to examine the assumptions that led us to this contradiction (as noted, a contradiction is a proof by contradiction). I now come to this. But first I must distinguish between two kinds of evil.
Two Kinds of Evil: Human and Natural
For the continuation of the discussion we must distinguish between human evil and natural evil (this, too, has arisen on the site more than once and can be found with a simple search). Natural evil is suffering and pain caused by earthquakes, tsunamis, pandemics, and the like. Human evil is suffering and pain caused by peopleâs voluntary actions (non-volitional acts by people are considered, for our discussion, natural evil; see more below). Each kind of evil requires separate treatment, which I will now do. I will begin with human evil.
Human Evil
Reuven chooses to do an evil actâsuch as causing suffering or death to Shimonâand succeeds. The first question is whether God did this or Reuvenâor perhaps both together (that is, perhaps there is no contradiction between attributing the act to Reuven and attributing it to God)? From the very claim that Reuven did this by choice, it follows that he could also have chosen otherwise. That is, what was done here was not Godâs will, and certainly not Godâs deed. In fact, this is how one should describe every sinful act (halakhic or moral) done by a person. There is no logic in claiming that God did this through him, not only because this empties his free choice of content but also because if God did it through him there is no reason to blame Reuven. Beyond all that, there is no logic in saying that God did somethingâor forced us to do somethingâthat He Himself does not want done and even forbade us to do.
If so, it is clear that Reuven can succeed in harming Shimon even if Shimon does not deserve it and even if God did not decide Shimon would be harmed. This is what the Gemara says (Hagigah 5a): âThere is one who is swept away without justice.â And R. Hananel there wrote: âFor example, a person who killed his fellow.â That is, if Reuven chooses to kill Shimon, he can succeed even if Shimon does not deserve to die. This is the meaning of the possibility (granted to all of us) to choose evil. In Column 436 I elaborated on this and explained that there is no escape from this conclusion. Claims that whatever someone does to us we must have deserved do not hold water logically, and in particular do not cohere with the assumption of free will. This is why God had to harden Pharaohâs heart so he would do to us what God expected him to do. Without the hardening of the heart, it was up to Pharaoh; he could have decided not to do what God wanted done. Of course, God can take away a personâs free choice or protect the potential victim and cause Reuven to fail to harm him. But in such cases the harm is Reuvenâs deed, not Godâs.
Thus, when it comes to human evil, the question is not why God causes harm to an innocent person, for He did not cause the harmâit was the other person who decided to harm him. The question here is at most why God did not prevent itâwhy He did not intervene and take away the perpetratorâs choice if the victim did not deserve to be harmed.
This is already an easier question, for God is not the direct wrongdoer but at most one who did not prevent the harm. In every legal system, and in Halakhah, there is a clear difference between a person who harms another and one who does not prevent the harm or fails to save him from it. This is true regarding people and also regarding God. Still, this leaves us with a question needing an answerâespecially with respect to God. We would also expect a moral person to prevent harm if he can. And of a moral and omnipotent being we certainly expect intervention to protect innocent victims and not allow others to harm them for no reason.
There is an important difference between the two questions. If God were the direct wrongdoer, then a priori no explanation would be possible. Above I explained that this is a contradiction, not a question; hence it will not help to say we do not understand and the like. Assuming we are dealing with an innocent person, there can be no explanationâmoral or otherwise (see above)âthat justifies harming him. But if Reuven is the wrongdoer and the question is only why God did not interveneâhere it is a question, not a contradiction, and in my opinion it can indeed have an answer.
Here is my proposal for a possible answer (at least to demonstrate that an answer is possible and that there is no logical contradiction). If God were to intervene, free choice would be taken from people. Whenever someone chose evil God would prevent it. De facto, then, we would have no free choiceâperhaps only in a very hypothetical sense (only at the level of desireâwhat we want to doâand not at the level of what actually occurs). But the fact is that God decided to grant us free will, and apparently it is important to Him that our deeds be done by choice (see in Column 170 a possible explanation for this). R. Akiva explains to Turnus Rufus (Bava Batra 10) that God does not provide for the poor because He wants us to do so by our free choiceâeven though such a policy risks that the poor not be supported due to the giverâs free choice.
One might have expected that from a certain degree of suffering and above He would indeed intervene and save the victim, but there is here a slippery slope and it is unclear where to draw the line. Why is a small suffering justified? Is the great suffering of one person different from the great suffering of thousands or millions? For each one, his suffering is terribleâwhether or not there are others around him who also suffer. Therefore one can understand that God decided to âhand His world over to guardians,â i.e., to give the earth to human beings to act in it, manage it, and make decisions freelyâwith the responsibility upon them for all the consequences. If the Nazis decide to perpetrate a Holocaust, indeed there are innocent sufferers, but that is the result of a failure of humanity, which creates for itself such suffering. So too when Reuven causes Shimon some harm.
One can view this as a situation in which God stands opposite all humanity as a collective and leaves it to manage the world. The suffering generated by bad choices is our fault as a human collective. The difficulty arises when a person looks at humans as a collection of individuals; then there is no justification for a decision by Reuven to cause Shimon, who did not sin, to suffer. But if one views humanity as a collective organism meant to manage its life (like a state or a community; see on this also in Column 539 and much more), then the outcomes are our own doing. In any case, even if someone will claim there is a better model, in my opinion this difficulty regarding God is at the level of a question, not a contradiction: why He decides to give us free choice and not take into His own hands full control over what happens. This admits metaphysical explanations of various kinds (e.g., the one I proposed in Column 170, or another). In any case, there is certainly no contradiction here that demands resolution before accepting both sides. As I explained above, He has no possibility to grant us free choice while retaining for Himself the option to dictate outcomes (i.e., to prevent suffering). This is impossible even for Him (because it is a logical contradiction, not merely an a priori or physical impossibility), and therefore there is no contradiction as to why He did not do so (see this in detail in Column 302).
In fact, we can sum up what I have written so far in Hazalâs dictum: âEverything is in the hands of Heaven except the fear of Heaven.â What pertains to peopleâs choices are decisions that pertain to fear of Heavenâthat is, decisions with a moral dimension. Such decisionsâwhether sins between man and God or sins between man and his fellow (moral transgressions that harm or cause suffering to others)âare not in the hands of Heaven but in human hands. Whereas everything else (natural processes or non-volitional human conduct) is indeed in Godâs handsâwhich brings us to the discussion of natural evil.
Natural Evil
I ended the previous section by saying that every event that is not a personâs moral choice is in the hands of Heavenâthat is, determined by God. This also follows from the words of R. Hananel in Hagigah that I cited: he assumes that only a personâs actions can harm an innocent person (âwithout justiceâ), implying that in his opinion natural events cannot harm innocents. The explanation lies in the fact that such events are in the hands of Heaven (unlike human choices); therefore it is clear that they must be carried out with just calculation. God does not mete out judgment without justice (see on this in Column 436). But, as noted, reality contradicts this. It is a fact that innocents are harmed also by natural disasters. If such disasters are Godâs handiwork, how can this be reconciled with Godâs goodness and morality? We saw that regarding the suffering of adults one might perhaps claim that everyone harmed deserved it (very strange, but theoretically perhaps possible), but regarding the suffering of babies such a claim cannot stand. I assume that in light of this, even regarding adults we must assume that not everyone harmed by a natural event deserved to die.
Here I propose a move very similar to what I suggested regarding volitional actionsâa move that shifts the discussion from a contradiction to a question that can be answered or at least assumed to have an answer. The basis of my proposal is the fact that God decided to create the world so that it runs according to rigid natural laws. This is first of all a fact we all know. It is not entirely clear why He decided thus, but it is crystal clear that He did. I can think of different ideas why He did so. For example, if the world does not operate according to fixed laws, we will not be able to orient ourselves in it and make informed decisions. If there is chaos, and causes do not always generate the same outcomesâhow will we know whether to fear fire or whipped cream? How will we know that fires are extinguished with water and not with paper? And so on. But this is only a suggestion; there may be other explanations for this decision. In any case, even if you have no explanation, this is a question, not a contradiction; hence we can assume there is such an explanation even if we do not know it. Conduct according to rigid laws is apparently the way to achieve Godâs aims in creation. Even if we have no idea what His aims are, it is hard to argue with this: this conclusion follows clearly from observing reality together with the assumption that God acts rationally and does not do things for no reason.
But if so, the question about Godâs goodness versus natural evil already requires preliminary discussion. Assuming the world must operate according to rigid laws to achieve the aims of creation, then again natural evil is not caused by God but by the laws of nature. True, He created (legislated) the laws of nature, but the claim that He should have prevented natural evil assumes another significant premise: that there exists another system of rigid natural laws that would lead the world to precisely the same aims and with equal successâbut without causing undeserved suffering. The big question is: whence do we know that such a system exists?
I have no way to prove either way, but if I had to bet I would bet that no such system exists. I am, of course, speaking of a rigid system of laws (not an ad hoc adjustment of nature to desired outcomesâthat is not a rigid system). I mean a system of laws that yields exactly the same outcomes as the current laws of nature but without the unjust harms to people or animalsâonly those would change in the alternative system. In every situation where harm to an innocent is expected, the new laws would produce a different outcome; but in all other situations they would yield exactly the same outcomes. It seems to me very unlikely that there is any rigid legal system that could do this. This is, of course, only my view; yet for our purposes it suffices for me to argue that the claim against God can arise only on the assumption that such an alternative system exists. As long as you have not shown it exists, there is no room for a claim against God. We have reached a logical contradiction to which even God is subject: He cannot create a rigid system of laws that cannot existâjust as He cannot create a round triangle or a triangle whose angles sum to 217 degrees, or a square whose diagonal is shorter than its side. In this article I discussed this and brought sources from the Rishonim (Rambam and Rashba) who argue that even God cannot act thusâand there is no contradiction to His omnipotence. But I do not need sources: there is a logical proof. The opposite statement is meaningless and contradictory.
If so, the answer to the question of how there is natural evil and how this is consistent with Godâs goodness is that natural evil is produced by the laws of nature, and that even God Himself cannot create a system of natural law without elements of natural evil in certain situations. Granted, there remains a weaker claim regarding God: surely He can suspend or freeze the laws when necessary; hence He should have saved innocents from suffering they do not deserveâjust as we saw in the previous section regarding human evil.
My answer here parallels what we saw in the previous section. If God were to intervene whenever there is undeserved suffering (to prevent natural evil), again we would no longer have rigid natural laws. If the assumption is that the aims of the world are not achieved if it does not operate by rigid laws, then again there is no justification to demand that God intervene and suspend the laws in all these situations. He can of course do so in very particular situations without our noticing, and perhaps He indeed does. But on large scales it appears that the contradiction between reality and the assumption of Godâs goodness is unfounded. The burden of proof lies on the one who raises the difficulty, for he must prove that the aims of creation can be achieved even if God intervenes and prevents natural evilâor replaces the system of laws.
Here too one can speak of different degrees of suffering and build a model of intervention only in the most severe degrees of natural suffering. But again I answer, as above, that there is no clear line that can be drawn on the suffering scale, and there is no justification to distinguish between different levels of suffering (or numbers of sufferers). On the principled level, all suffering is unjustified and calls for intervention; therefore, intervention to prevent suffering means the abolition of rigid natural laws. One way or another, again we see that the suffering is caused by the laws of nature and not by God; and the question why He does not intervene is no longer a contradiction but a questionâand with a question it suffices to say that there is a justification we do not understand.
I repeat: the picture I present here is of course only one possibility. It may be that there is an alternative system of laws; it may be that divine intervention beyond some threshold of suffering would still not impede the aims of creation, contrary to my suggestions. But it suffices for me that I have shown the burden of proof lies on the one who challenges God and not on the one who reconciles His conduct. It suffices that there is a possible account as I described to show that there is no longer a contradiction. One who challenges must prove that such a possibility does not exist.
Comparison with Rabbi Eliyahuâs Approach
I assume there will be readers who will ask themselves, in light of the picture I described, what is wrong with Rabbi Shmuel Eliyahuâs conception, which I criticized in those columns. He claimed that the earthquake in Turkey was Godâs act to punish or deter our enemies. I argued against him that this is an immoral act and therefore unlikely that God did it. I explained here why the question of non-intervention is weaker (because it is a question, not a contradiction). But one could argue that his explanations can also rely on the claim that God cannot punish the Turks without harming children. He too can speak of limits to Godâs omnipotence. How is he different from me?
This comparison is incorrect. If one accepts the premise that there are limits on God Himself, then it is unclear how he infers that the aim was to punish the Turks. Perhaps He had a different aim altogether and all the suffering Turks are merely side effects of these actions? And why look for explanations at all if he too agrees that at least some of these outcomes have no explanation (they are the result of constraints)? Is it not more reasonable and logical to say that all that happens here is the result of constraint? Surely something incomprehensible and immoral occurred. Even Rabbi Eliyahu admits thisâcertainly after his apology. So the obvious interpretation is that this was not Godâs deed, instead of assuming it was but that there were constraints. If that were his position, he should merely have clarified that the suffering of the babies (and also of the innocent adults) certainly was not Godâs doingâonly the harm to terrorists who hid among them (if there were such). He would not have needed to apologize or retract anythingâonly to clarify this point.
Therefore my critique of him stands. First, I assume he would not accept my premise that there are constraints on Godâs actionsâjust as most believers and religious thinkers do not accept it (he did not write this, and his apology shows that he does not accept it). But even if he did accept it, there would be no logic in inferring the conclusions he inferred from the events. This is, of course, beyond the logical flaws in his interpretation that I described in the first column about his remarks.
Interim Summary
What we have seen so far is that realityâboth natural and humanâdoes not contradict Godâs goodness and morality. One can of course argue that He is indeed not moral and not good, or that He does not exist at all. My discussion assumes that He exists and that He is good. My aim was to show that even under these assumptions we do not reach a contradiction.
A human doctor who wishes to heal another person sometimes has to cause him pain, for he has no way to heal without pain. We would not say such a doctor is evil, for he has no other way to heal the patient without causing pain. My claim here is that so too regarding God. Even if He wishes to benefit all of us, sometimes He has no possibility of doing so without causing usâor some of usâpain. The novelty is that even God acts under constraints, and that does not contradict His omnipotence.
All this is true if, and only if, the constraints in question are logical. A human doctor is constrained also by the laws of nature; he cannot heal without pain. God is not constrained by that, for the laws of nature do not bind Him. He created them, and therefore He can also freeze them (the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted). But logical constraints bind even God Himself. To give us free choice while retaining for Himself the possibility of dictating the outcome (i.e., preventing suffering) is a logical contradiction and therefore not within Godâs power. To run the world by rigid natural laws and at the same time intervene as needed to prevent suffering is also a logical contradiction and therefore not within His power. Under these constraints, God should be judged exactly like the human doctor who acts under constraints and cannot always avoid causing suffering to his patients. This does not necessarily indicate that he is not moralâand so too regarding God.
Godâs Involvement in the World
I have often written that, in my view, God is not involved in the world. I have also written that this conclusion is not meant to resolve the problem of evil but is based on strong philosophical and scientific arguments independent of it. But of course, if one adopts such a view, it obviates the discussion from the outset, for under such a policy He neither causes suffering nor is He expected to prevent it. He does not act here at all. He has left the world to natural law and human choices, and what transpires here is the result of those two. At least in recent generations, God adopts a policy of general non-intervention.
But to argue all I have written thus far, one need not reach that view. It suffices for me to claim that even if He is involved in the world there are limits to His involvement to explain that this is precisely the case in situations where there is suffering of innocents. True, if I assume that the avoidance of intervention is in order to let the world operate according to rigid laws, then the full conclusion suggests itselfâthat He is not involved at all. But I explained that this conclusion is not strictly necessary to adopt the picture I have described here (this is essentially the second view I cited above: partial divine involvement in the worldâsee there the difficulties it poses).
In the comments to the previous columns several objections and difficulties were raised regarding the picture I proposed and the problems at its foundation. I now wish to address them briefly.
Yaakov: Reincarnations
Yaakov insisted on burdening us with tedious comments about reincarnations and how they solve all the difficulties I raised (see, for example, here and much more nearby). Except that, as he claims, an âinfidelâ like me does not believe in reincarnations.
So I have a novelty for him. First, this âinfidelâ before you certainly takes into account the possibility of reincarnations. I am not inclined to think any of us knows whether there are or are not reincarnations, and certainly not to identify who is the reincarnation of whom; but in principle the possibility of reincarnations is not implausible to me. If I accept that in us there is a soul beyond the material (I am a dualist), then when the body dies one can certainly accept the claim that the soul remains in some formâeither it remains Above or it returns to the world in another incarnation. This is, of course, not clear to me, but I do not reject the possibility. Precisely because of this it is important to understand that this possibility does not offer a solution to the problem of sufferingâwhether human or natural. If it did, that would itself be a good argument for the existence of reincarnations.
Why does it not solve the difficulty? Because even if the person who died returns here in another incarnation, why did he have to suffer in the present incarnation without any fault of his own? When a baby dies in agony, the fact that he will return here as a monkey or another person does not change at all the fact that he suffered undeservedly. It perhaps solves the question of unjust deathâbecause he âreturns to lifeââbut not the question of suffering. One can perhaps compensate him for the undeserved suffering in the next incarnation, but I do not see a justification for undeserved suffering with compensation. One can also claim that the suffering is a response to his sins in a previous incarnation, but that is a very strange claim. Why should he not suffer in the same incarnation in which he sinned? Why cause suffering to another personâeven if he has the same soul? That person does not even remember what he did in a previous incarnation and will certainly derive no moral lesson from it.
Beyond all that, such a claim certainly does not salvage Rabbi Eliyahuâs explanations. He ties the suffering to the Turksâ hostility toward usânot to transgressions those people perpetrated in previous incarnations. If we resort to reincarnation rationales, then we have no business seeking justifications in terms of events and actions occurring in our world. That renders his explanations even more speculative than they were without the reincarnation thesis.
Dror: What About the Past?
Now to the questions of âBobbyâ Dror Fisher, and the cobblerâs mate he kindly bestowed upon me (for his questions see here, here, here, and here). There are various questions there that were already answered in the column, so I will not repeat them hereâfor example, the difference between the claim that God does not intervene and the claim that He Himself causes it. Dror argues that in both situations the conduct is immoral (a father who sees his son suffering will certainly intervene to save him). Above I explained at length the difference between a question and a contradiction, and between non-intervention and direct causation. I will therefore focus here on his questions about the past.
He rightly says that I too agree that God was involved in the world in the past. From here he wonders why innocents suffered then. What is the explanation for the natural and human evil that prevailed then? I preface with two remarks I made here: (a) My explanation for evil does not necessarily depend on my view of providence. (b) That view is based on very strong arguments on its merits; it is not an ad hoc explanation for the problem of evil. True, once one adopts it, it bolsters the explanations presented here. Now to his questions.
My thesis does not posit a sharp transition from full involvement (no nature at all) to no involvement whatsoever (the world runs on its own). It is a gradual transition, and in all periods there were laws of nature. Dror asked why there must be disengagement if the world progresses without it. A very weak question. It progresses because of the disengagement, and the disengagement happens because of the progress. It is like asking why a father disengages from his son as he advancesâafter all, he advances even without it. If there were involvement at a high dosage, there would be no natural law at all. In such a case scientific progress would not be possible, nor moral progress (if everything depends on us and God will not prevent evil, that is motivation to act accordingly and deal with evil ourselves. Not for nothing are the international institutions that address evil and try to reduce it established in a period of secularization). Therefore there is logic in gradual disengagement.
Thus, in all periods divine involvement was sporadic; the difference lies only in dosage. Dror asked how I would explain the suffering of babies in earthquakes that occurred in the past. But in the column above I wrote that even according to the second approach (partial divine involvement) one can answer the problem of evil. Partial involvement is precisely what existed in the past. According to my proposal, the suffering of innocent people then was also the result of natural laws and a policy of non-intervention. True, in earlier periods the divine involvement was at a higher dosage, but there too there were natural laws.
Moreover, then we also had prophets who could point to that involvement and explain it. When a prophet in the past told me that God did X because of Y, he said this from knowledge, not speculation. But one who offers such explanations today (like Rabbi Eliyahu), beyond the fact that in my opinion there is no involvement, also adopts a very speculative path. He is not a prophet and has no way to know Godâs calculations. So why offer explanations at all?! If a prophet comes and tells me that such-and-such an event in the past was punishment for sinâand if in that event there was suffering of innocentsâthen I will say that apparently it was not Godâs act but a constraint compelled it and He decided not to intervene (for the reasons I have given above). The dosage of involvement is a function of the period, but that does not mean that in the past He intervened always. As noted, there were natural laws then as well.
Drorâs request for well-defined âborderlinesâ of Godâs involvement is, of course, ridiculous. To answer the difficulty of the problem of evil it suffices for me to point out that there can be considerations that justify non-intervention. I need not draw a line or assume there is any line at all. If an asteroid were to destroy the earth, perhaps God would intervene and perhaps not. How does that touch my thesis? This is a very basic logical misunderstanding of what is required to raise a contradiction and what is required to resolve it. âOne must challenge only with great difficultyâ is nonsense; but âone may resolve even with difficultyâ is entirely legitimate. One who raises the difficulty must claim that there is no alternative explanation; but one who resolves may point to an alternative explanation even without supplying all the detailsâespecially when there is no reason he should know them (who knows Godâs considerations?!). As noted, it suffices for me to show that this is a question, not a contradiction.
One must understand that on the logical level there cannot be direct harm by God Himself to innocents without justification, for that contradicts the assumption of His morality. Therefore I do not understand what the examples Dror brought are meant to prove. I do indeed accept his claim that in the past there were events in which innocents were harmed. But what does that prove? What in my words must now be revoked? That the conclusion is that God is not moral? Or that harming innocents is good? The second option is an oxymoron. The first throws out the baby with the bathwater. So what remains is that there are justifications not on the moral plane for such harms (constraints to which God is subject). But I have already rejected this notion conceptually and philosophicallyâand in any case I have shown that Rabbi Eliyahuâs thesis cannot rest on this view. So at most we remain with âneeds further inquiryâ regarding those descriptionsâand in my view, because this is a contradiction and not a question, one must find an answer to them. One cannot maintain that God is moral and continue to claim He acts thus. That necessarily brings us to the conclusion that there are constraints to which God is subject, and hence to His policy of non-intervention. For example, He decided to destroy the Temple and Jerusalem, but as a consequence there would be children suffering starvation. That is forced upon Him; otherwise He is again rendered immoral. But as I explained, once one accepts that there are constraints even upon God, we again arrive at my thesis. There is no point stopping halfway and seeking explanations and justifications for events that may very well be the result of constraintsâcertainly not when the explanations limp and we have no prophet who can assert authoritatively that this is the information he possesses.
At the end of the day, Dror does not propose another solution to the problem of evil. Even if I accepted everything he writes (and I certainly do not), he would have to choose between these conclusions: either God is evil, or conduct that inflicts suffering on innocents is good. Good luck to him.
[1] It is important to understand that this pertains to logical contradictions. In a priori contradictions (that is, philosophical contradictions that are not logical; see on this here), the situation is different.
Discussion
Thank you, and more power to you!
One can interpret it in accordance with Rambaman (Mendelssohn), that there was no divine punishment or miracle here; rather, Pharaoh himself hardened his heart, except that all actions are attributed to God in a certain sense, because He is the First Cause. And I would add that the actions attributed in the sacred books to God are those unusual actions whose cause is not understood by us; and so too here, Pharaohâs stubbornness after seeing so many signs and wonders is a strange and astonishing thing, and therefore it was attributed to God. And similarly: âBut the Lord has not given you a heart to know, and eyes to see, and ears to hear, unto this dayâ (Deuteronomy 29:3), and likewise, âFor the Lord said to him, Curse Davidâ (2 Samuel 16:10).
Shadal
There is not necessarily a contradiction. After reincarnation, the soul returns to its original body (which has already decayed). But all these are baseless discussions. Up in the air.
Strange things.
You wrote: “Once you already accept that there are constraints even on the Holy One, blessed be He, we arrive again at my thesis. There is no point in stopping halfway and looking for explanations and justifications for events that could definitely be the result of constraints.”
The reason is that your thesis requires assuming a substantial change in Godâs relation to the world, far more substantial than what our view of reality requires. There is no doubt that not every detail in events comes directly from God, and there is also no doubt that without a prophet it is difficult to impossible to know which is which, and trying is dangerous. Up to this point I am completely with you. But none of this entails the other extreme. It is certainly possible, as Rabbi Shmuel Ariel says, that the world follows its usual course and God intervenes when He sees fit. Why are innocent people killed as well? Constraints, or reasons unrelated to morality (as you rightly explained regarding a priestâs wife who was raped).
And if such a thing happened to Jews, our duty is to assume normatively (!) that we were not saved because we were unworthy, and to repent. That is allâand of course not to beat someone elseâs breast.
The truth is, there is nothing new under the sun. Everything Iâve seen, in books and in posts, is brought in the Book of Job with Malbimâs commentary, and I only got through a quarter of the book. The bottom line there is that the philosophical discussions between Job and his friends are not resolved, until the Holy One, blessed be He, in His own glory, argues philosophically with Job, and Job admits he was mistaken; and indeed, God has not abandoned the earth. But even according to your approach, it seems to me that you skipped a few stages. (At one time I placed my trust in philosophy, but I was disappointed, because there is really no way to come away with anything definite; there is no end to what the mind keeps producing. I read the whole trilogy, and some of your other books and articles, and I found no peace at all, so I went back to being a receiver of tradition. You will call it shelving the intellect, but I will call it an informed decision made by the intellectâa safe and peaceful path.) First explain to me the vague concept of âtzimtzum,â about which all the schools have grown weary of saying anything intelligible. If He is the place of the world and the world is not His place, and He fills all worlds, how can He create something outside Himself, that would supposedly stand on its own, without His providence? If you can crack that for me, weâll continue. (By the way, a good piece of advice for you: before you point to these contradictions, first examine whether these are logical contradictions or experiential contradictions. Iâll give an exampleâand give to a wise man and he will grow wiser. As you know, all the objects that appear to us are really a fiction, because all the atoms are moving at such speed that everything appears to us as solid matter. So the contradiction here is between what we experience and what the intellect saysâand the intellect is right, not the feeling.)
I donât understand exactly what you are claiming. You too agree that there is no point looking for explanations for what happens, especially if it is not logical/moral, since there are events that are the result of constraints. And if that is so, then there is no point in looking for explanations for anything. The question of whether to arrive at my approach regarding zero involvement really does not arise from here, and I wrote that. It arises from considerations of common sense, not as a solution to the problem of evil.
There is a mixture of claims here, and I will try to break it down a bit.
1. Regarding philosophy, I wrote several columns about this, and explained there that philosophical disputes are mostly illusory. So one certainly can reach philosophical conclusions.
2. I explained tzimtzum there quite well, and if you have a difficulty you are welcome to raise it here.
3. Both there and here (and elsewhere) I made a very clear distinction between these two kinds of contradiction. So I already took your good advice long ago, before you wrote it. It is hard for me to understand how you missed that if you really read what I wrote. By the way, the contradiction you described here (regarding solid objects) is not a contradiction at all, but simply a difference in resolutions.
I received from my teachers that caricature and satire are the weapons of the weak (intellectually). One who trusts his arguments has no need to place his opponentâs arguments before a distorted mirror in order to mock them. (Though one may excuse it by saying that once Adar enters, joy increases, etc.)
Well then, sir made two mistakes: (a) My talkback was not âoutraged.â (If sir, in his holy spirit, saw that my face was red, he misinterpreted it. It was because of the torments of rheumatism.) Even now I am not âoutragedâ (only tormented by rheumatism as above, thanks to which I have time to read your columns and respond to themâŚ). (b) The caricatured way in which Your Honor presents my position, as though I claimed that the Holy One, blessed be He, behaves capriciously but that âit is permitted to Him because He is the owner.â Not so.
I did indeed claim that the Holy One, blessed be He, is the owner and therefore âit is permitted to Him,â but not in the capricious senseârather in the essential sense. One cannot claim of the owner that he is âimmoralâ when he decides to destroy it, as it says in the famous Midrash that the Holy One, blessed be He, creates worlds and destroys them. Presumably those worlds too had innocent creatures in them, and in any case all living beings end up dyingâwhy? Why did the Holy One, blessed be He, block the way to the Tree of Life? Is it moral to kill a living creature after bringing it into the world? And furthermore, could the Holy One, blessed be He, not have created a perfect world with no evil at all (at least no ânatural evil,â in your terminology)? You âbetâ that this is impossible even for the Holy One, blessed be He. And on the basis of a âbetâ will you put to rest a question about Godâs governance? Even if it be merely a âquestionâ and not a âdifficulty.â
And let us assume, as you say, that the Holy One, blessed be He, cannot create a perfect world. But is this âthe best of all possible worldsâ (Leibniz)? Voltaire already explained in exquisite detail (in Candide, set to music by Leonard Bernstein of blessed memory) how ridiculous that idea is. Could the Holy One, blessed be He, not at least have given us the same mysterious gene that elephants have (according to the hypothesis, still undiscovered), which prevents them from getting cancer, even though the number of cells in an elephantâs body is many times over the number in a human body, and the statistical probability that one of them will âgo crazyâ and develop into a malignant tumor is (a priori) greater than in a human? Could He not have given us the stomach of crows, which never breaks down (even if they ate rotten carrion)? Could He not have given us the blood of a mongoose, immune to snake venom? And so on.
You argue that without the possibility of human evil, free choice cannot exist, and the Holy One, blessed be He, for reasons known to Himself (here even you admit that âthe ways of God are hiddenââŚ) thought that free choice was more important than preventing suffering. This is a very weak argument, because the question of evil in the world does not necessarily focus on its very existence (which might perhaps be explained by its necessity for free choice), but on its almost unchallenged reign throughout human history. Why does free choice require that âthe inclination of manâs heart is evil from his youthâ? What would be lacking in free choice if the natural tendency of most human beings were inclined toward good rather than evil, and most of human history had been good rather than bad?
So I am really not sure that the earthquake in Turkey was the work of the Holy One, blessed be He. It is certainly possible that it was the product of natural processes in the bowels of the earth, and the Holy One, blessed be He, for His own reasons, âmerelyâ did not intervene to prevent it. (The truth is that neither of us really knows! Only you pretend to âknow the mind of the Most Highâ without any basis.) But your âexplanation,â that the Holy One, blessed be He, changed His policy at some point and no longer intervenes âso that we will mature,â does not help at all. Standing by while thousands or millions are slaughtered and suffer, when He could by a mere utterance prevent these tragedies without effort and without cost, is morally equivalent to doing them with oneâs own hands. In this case He could have prevented the earthquake without our knowing about it (and thus would not have disturbed scientists from discovering regularities in nature, etc.). If it is not moral to âslaughterâ children in order to punish the Turks, it is equally immoral to stand by and not prevent the disaster âso that we will mature.â (And perhaps this is even worse.)
My argument is that we cannot say anything about the relation between the Holy One, blessed be He, and morality. First, we do not really know whether the Holy One, blessed be He, is subject to morality (and the same applies to logic; see below), and if soâto which morality? And even if you should say that He is subject to âthe morality of the Torahâ or âthe morality of the Prophetsâ (what is that?), does that mean that He is obligated by what we are obligated by? Surely we are bound by âYou shall not murder,â whereas He âputs to death and brings to life; He brings down to Sheol and raises up.â Your Honor argues that this turns Godâs morality into something âdefinitional.â Suppose so. So what? In my humble opinion that is perfectly fine. The âgoodâ throughout the entire Bible is defined as âwhat is right in the eyes of the Lord.â Besides, all your pilpul rests on an assumption (half-hidden) that if we do not understand Godâs morality, then it does not exist or it is merely definitional. The possibility that we simply do not understand it cannot exist, according to your view, and likewise the possibility that even if He is subject to morality, it is not necessarily our morality. That is, if the Holy One, blessed be He, is subject (or subjected Himself) to morality, then it is necessarily the very same morality to which we are subject (assuming that we are subject at all to an independent morality not deriving from the Torah, a claim of which I am also highly doubtful, but this is not the place to elaborate), or at least to a morality that we understand. All who take in wind have an excess spirit.
Indeed, great men of the world questioned Godâs governance. But it is important to listen not only to the questions (which were questions, not conclusions!) but also to the answer that, at least twice, came from the mouth of the Holy One, blessed be He, in His own glory. The first, in answer to Mosesâ question, âShow me now Your gloryââwhich Maimonides and others interpreted as a request for an explanation of Godâs governance in the worldâthe Holy One, blessed be He, answers: âYou shall see My back, but My face shall not be seen,â which those commentators interpreted as manâs inability to understand Godâs governance fully; these are ancient matters. The second, in answer to Jobâs piercing questions, the Holy One, blessed be He, replies: âGird up your loins like a man, and I will ask you, and you inform Me: Where were you when I founded the earth? Declare, if you have understanding!â (Job 38). From the whole divine speech, two points emerge: (a) You cannot understand. (b) I do not owe you an explanation. And that is the whole Torah in a nutshell (see there).
If you like, answer (a) is just another formulation of âthe ways of God are hidden,â and what I added in the âoutragedâ talkbacks is point (b). Here I add that this is not apologetics, but a piercing truth.
By the way, you keep claiming that one cannot say of the Holy One, blessed be He, something and its opposite, since in your view even the Holy One, blessed be He, is subject to logic. As stated, I am really not sure of that, but as I noted in one of the aforementioned âoutragedâ talkbacks, I am also not sure of the opposite, and I have no ordered doctrine on this matter. The reason is that I am certain of only one thing: that we have absolutely no ability to say anything true about the essence and very being of the Holy One, blessed be Heâand it is better that I not express here my opinion about the very pretension of doing so. (I did not wake up this morning in a sufficiently combative mood.) I once read that you explained that the contradictions raised by quantum mechanics disappear at larger scales. Fine, let it be so. But the problem is their very existence, at whatever scale. If a particle can be in superposition, and SchrĂśdingerâs cat can be alive and dead simultaneously, then the fact that it can do so only on a microscopic scale neither adds nor detracts. And if the particle and the cat can tolerate a logical contradiction on a microscopic scale, perhaps the Holy One, blessed be He, can tolerate it on an infinite scale as well? I have no answer, and in my opinion there can be no answer at all, since the human intellect is not equipped to deal with such questions. Whoever claims otherwise bears the burden of proof. I was not persuaded from your books that you possess such an ability (apparently not because you are not intelligent, but because, after all, you are human). And the same applies to moralityâand give to a wise man and he will become wiser, etc.
Do you see a difference between Maimonidesâ position in Guide of the Perplexed III:12 and the position you present here?
https://press.tau.ac.il/perplexed/chapters/chap_3_13.htm
For some reason an inappropriate picture appeared next to my comment; I donât know why or how to delete it.
Due to lack of time, Iâll answer the replies in fragmented comments of my own.
Regarding my argument of âwhy lump together minor suffering that does not require intervention with suffering against which a person can do nothingâ
This is what Michi wrote:
âHere too one can speak about different degrees of suffering and build a model of intervention only at the severe levels of natural suffering. But again I will answer, as above, that no line can be drawn on the scale of suffering, and there is also no justification for distinguishing between different levels of suffering (or numbers of suffering people). At the principled level, all suffering is unjustified and demands intervention, and therefore involvement to prevent suffering means abolishing the rigid laws of nature.â
I respond to this with several answers:
A. As I wrote in the previous column, we can certainly learn from our experience and draw a line of the âaverage fatherâ (for any given age of child).
True, it will not be an exact science, but as I illustrated in the previous columnâan average father does not help his child with mortgage payments, but rather lets him suffer overtime hours at work and the emotional burden and pressures involved in that (there is suffering here, no doubt).
An âaverage father,â on the other hand, will indeed do everything he can to rescue his son buried under the rubble of an earthquake.
This is not just theory. It is learning from our experience.
From here it is easy also to infer a reasonable picture of Godâs intervention (He being good) when innocents are harmed.
Michiâs answer (âno line can be drawn on the scale of sufferingâ) represents âintellectual lazinessââfundamentalismâa crazy adherence to his method. Even when a reasonable answer is presented for reasonable divine intervention, he exempts himself from discussing it in one sentence.
B. Also the continuation of the answerââthere is no justification for distinguishing between different levels of sufferingââthese too are things that do not fit with what we experience. An average person does indeed ignore another personâs suffering (not necessarily his sonâs), up to a certain threshold.
For exampleâwe all feel bad to hear about people whose mortgage payments keep swelling, but almost none of us takes out a loan to help them. On the other hand, every reasonable person will help an old man who collapses in front of him in the street.
And here is yet another simple proof, from our experience as human beings, that there is a reality in which we conduct ourselves with a moral and sensible approach, while at the same time justifying distinctions between different levels of suffering. We are all like that.
C. Michi again takes an easy way out here by writing that presumably God would have had to abolish all the laws of nature. That is not what I asked for.
What is called for is that when there is unreasonable suffering (and I showed that such suffering can indeed be defined), then one would expect God to intervene, whether He maintains some general policy of intervention or not intervening (in severe situations, let Him make an exception).
The laws of nature continue to be rigid, and yet things like crib death or babies dying in an earthquake simply do not exist, because they are miraculously prevented by God (unless there is a prophecy telling us that this baby died because he was the reincarnation of a wicked personâbut I do not want to go there).
After all, Michi himself would agree that such a thing is possible morally (of course), and also technically, since God is omnipotent.
And in the past, when He was actively involved, He did do such thingsâthere were rigid laws of nature and God performed miracles all the time, according to Michiâs own view.
More responses to the rest of the arguments to follow.
Dror
- According to your approach, He can impose judgment without justice (like destroying His house because it is His). Well then, I ask again: what is the meaning of the statements about His goodness? In what sense does He say about Himself that His mercies are over all His works and that He does only justified things? You say you did not mean capricious behavior, and then immediately return to saying that His behavior is capricious. He destroys the house just like that because He feels like it, and that is His right. Even if in your opinion one can say of the Holy One, blessed be He, something and its opposite, does that apply to you as well?
- I did indeed claim that He cannot create a world without evil. I wrote that, and therefore I do not understand your question. You can of course argue with it, but I did not understand what is new in your question here.
- The reign of evil in history is your fantasy alone. I deny it. The inclination of the human heart usually tends toward good, except that it has an evil inclination that it sometimes does not withstand. Especially when we are dealing with human evil, which is a product of choice and therefore forced upon God regardless of the laws of nature. The alternative is to create humanity without choice, but then there probably really would have been no point in creating it (as Rabbi Akiva said to Turnus Rufus).
- Again you err and mislead regarding my intent, in your demagogic way. I do not know the mind of the Most High and am not offering any explanation. I am proposing a possibility that neutralizes the difficulty. It is either true or not, but the burden of proof is on the questioner, not on the one who answers. I explained this more than once, but as is your way, you ignore it.
- Likewise regarding the difference between doing evil and not preventing it. I am sure that you yourself do not believe this, and I explained the difference very clearly. But as is your way, you ignore it.
- The Holy One, blessed be He, tells us that He is good, and of necessity the intention is goodness in the sense known to us. Fantasies about goodness in some other sense empty these statements of content.
- Inability to understand Godâs governance is exactly my claim. He has a policy whose aims are hidden from us. But one cannot turn evil into good. Again you ignore things I wrote and offer opposite interpretations of them.
- The claims about Godâs being subject to logic (which are also found in many of the Rishonim) are not claims about Him but about us. I have explained that many times, here too. But I am truly mortally weary of repeating the same things again and again as if a discussion were being held here and not a dialogue of the deaf.
A full recovery, of body and soul.
It is hard for me right now to get into all the details there. If there is a concrete question, Iâll be happy to discuss it. As for the picture, I will ask Oren to deal with it.
I donât see anything new here. I answered this in my remarks.
In reply to my talkback on the previous column you answered me that the question is why we should be normatively sad about the death of a baby. I donât understandâeven according to your current view (or perhaps I donât understand what I missed)âwhy is that sad? After all, even according to the explanation that this is the system of natural laws through which God will achieve the goals He wishes to achieve while causing the minimum suffering, why should one be distressed over the lesser evil? This is the best possible.
Michi, it seems to me that at the center of your theodicy is the attempt to deal with natural evil, but I donât understand how your argument can get off the ground. What is the problem with assuming the existence of an a priori and rigid system of laws that operates entirely differently from the system of natural laws and yet still affects it (at times)? I do not see any logical impossibility in this possibility. I have 2 examples of such systems: Godâs supernatural intervention in the world described in the Bible (which you yourself believe in) and human free will. To conclude, perhaps I even have a third exampleâthe findings of modern physics, especially in the quantum world (probabilistic causality). True, there we know that quantum regularity does not spill over into the macro world, but the point is that the behavior of the quantum world proves at least the existence of a system operating a priori on the basis of a completely different regularity. What matters is that in my opinion this assumption involves no logical impossibility.
In light of this, even I, the little one, can offer God suggestions for improvement. For example, to create time in such a way that under certain circumstances, say a mass disaster, time would stop and give people time to flee. If Godâthat is, the God you describeâhad indeed adopted my suggestions, He could have created the world such that whenever a great disaster was imminent, the metaphysical system (the rigid one!) behind the scenes would go into action. I do not see any logical difficulty here.
If I am right, then your proposal is not merely a âquestionâ but a âdifficulty.â
Your answer regarding the âinability to draw a suffering lineâ is like answering âbecause thatâs how it is.â
Honestly, I donât see anything in your answer beyond that.
Logic and rationality are on my side.
Let us try to show you and everyone else a bit more from experience, that it is indeed possible to indicate a line of suffering.
What do people complain about and ask âWhere is God?â when there is suffering?
When they lose money in the stock market? (In my opinion, no.)
When their child is sick with a fever? (In my opinion, no.)
When tens of thousands of innocent people are buried in an earthquake? (In my opinion, yes.)
When one and a half million children are sent to the crematoria and gas chambers? (In my opinion, yes.)
But I am already close to despairing of convincing you. Apparently intuition, logic and rationality, and learning from experience are not your portion, even when it is fairly clear that right is not on your side.
If I convince some of the readers, at least on this issue, then I have done my part.
Dror
This is my second response to Michi.
It was written:
âIn the final analysis, Dror is not offering another solution to the problem of evil. Even if I accept everything he writes (which I absolutely do not), he will have to choose between the following conclusions: either the Holy One, blessed be He, is evil, or conduct that causes suffering to innocents is good. So good luck to him.â
First of all, this is a false dilemma. Please donât put words in my mouth.
There is a third option: that there are no innocents at all in this whole story (according to Rabbi Eliyahu and Rabbi Yaakov).
The hidden assumption (or not so hidden) in what Rabbi Eliyahu wrote in his article, or in what Rabbi Yaakov wrote here regarding reincarnation of souls, is that there really are no innocents.
Regarding Rabbi Yaakov, it is quite clear that if this is about reincarnations and everything is engineered down to the last comma by the Holy One, blessed be He, then it is completely obvious that there is no issue of innocents here. As for what Rabbi Eliyahu wrote, in the end, together with the claims about the insensitivity in Rabbi Eliyahuâs writing, it is clear that Rabbi Eliyahu meant that justice was done here from Godâs perspective, and even the babies who died in terrible suffering are not regarded as innocent, because from Godâs perspective (according to Rabbi Eliyahu) there is here a sin of an entire nation (the Turks) against the people of Israel, and because of that even their babies have to suffer from it.
And I will tell you more than thatâyou yourself agree with such a mode of divine conduct.
You surely know the Book of Exodus, where it is told quite clearly that all the Egyptian firstborn died, because of Egyptâs sins toward the people of Israel.
And I am willing to bet all my money that when you read those verses in the Torah, you follow the Torah reader (or perhaps read them yourself) while seeing that text as sacred text representing the word of God, and detailing His mode of conduct.
Bottom line, I have no idea whether Rabbi Yaakov is right or Rabbi Eliyahu, or perhaps even your method.
I want to say two things:
A. Their method is far more consistent and logical, and presents the Holy One, blessed be He, in a much more positive light than your method.
B. You yourself read, with sparks of holiness beating in your heart, in the Book of Exodus about the deaths of quite a few Egyptian babies (perhaps more than those who died in Turkey). And very soon you will recline at the Passover table (the Seder night) and read the Haggadah with great joy. You will tell your sons about the wondrous miracles God performedâjudgments upon all the Egyptian firstborn.
That is to say, there is a problem with you, as someone who reads the Haggadah, criticizing Rabbi Eliyahuâs approach. It is a bit (very) hypocritical.
Wonders of the Creator.
Dror
Destroying oneâs own house is not âjudgment without justice.â It is âjudgment with justiceâ (because it is his!). One may wonder why and for what purposeâbut that is not a question of justice and morality, and on that point, it seems to me, you too admit that you have no answer.
What I asked was: even if we accept your premise that a world without evil is impossible, is this world in fact âthe best of all possible worldsâ (in Leibnizâs phrase)? To refute Leibnizâs claim, it is enough to point to one possible improvement, and I suggested several (and in my estimation there are many more). That is, not all evil in the world is necessary and stems from the principles you tried to formulate in your column, and as long as there is even a tiny bit of evil that the Holy One, blessed be He, could have prevented in the world without harming the above, your entire column has been of no use whatsoever and we are back to âthe ways of God are hidden.â
In my opinion, evil indeed reigns in human history beyond dispute, but a talkback is not the place to survey all of human history in order to prove it. Even so, the Book of Genesis, and in fact the entire Bible, is a chronicle of magnificent divine failures in the struggle against evil. (In contrast to the books of other religions, which only glorify and praise their gods and founders, but this is not the place to elaborate.) Already in the very first section it is told how the experiment failed and the Holy One, blessed be He, was forced to destroy His world. After that come the stories of the generation of the Dispersion, Sodom, Godâs despair of humanity and His choosing of Abraham, the stories of the Israelites in the wilderness, the stories of the kingdom of Israel, the division of the kingdom, and so on until the destructionâand of course the oath sworn by the Holy One, blessed be He, not to bring another flood upon the world. Why is there a need for an oath and the covenant of the rainbow if good rules the world and evil is temporary and passing? In general, anyone who knows the economic history of the world even superficially knows that only in the last two hundred years has humanity known real economic growth. Until then, the overwhelming majority of humanity lived in crippling poverty, exploitation, oppression, bondage, and incurable disease. Terrible, horrifying suffering without purpose, apparently. Political history is no better.
As for the burden of proofâobviously it is always on the one making the claim. In my opinion it is utterly absurd to ground the phenomenon of evil in the world on a âpossibleâ explanation, and elaboration is unnecessary (even if the explanation explained anything). As for not preventing disasterâI intentionally focused on concealed prevention of them (such as preventing the earthquake in Turkey), which involves no cost or effort whatsoever on Godâs part and therefore would not have harmed the picture of ârigid lawsâ or interfered with any scientist researching the laws of nature, etc.
The claim that if the Holy One, blessed be He, tells us He is good then it must necessarily be good in the sense known to usâmarvels upon marvels, wondrous and astonishing. I rest my case⌠(But if so, why does He need to tell us? We could have discovered it ourselves by observing His ways. And why, when asked about it, did He answer that we cannot understand and that He owes no explanation?)
As for logic etc.âI did not claim that the Holy One, blessed be He, is subject to it, nor did I claim that He is not. I openly admitted that I do not know, and only added that in my estimation no human being can know, because the matter lies beyond human cognitive ability, since as I understand it, discussion of this question involves discussion of Godâs essence and being. I understand that the entire topic is not suited to a talkback, but the fact that you are âmortally wearyâ can be interpreted in several ways. One is that your readership (and I in particular) are not sufficiently clever to understand the depth of your words (I at least take this possibility with all seriousness!). The second is that your formulation needs improvement for readers to understand. The third is that you are not convincing⌠(and perhaps there are more).
And thank you for the wishes for health (body and soul); I still need themâŚ
You sent there to a link someone asked you about explicit verses where God punishes small children because of adults; I didnât see an answer to that in the column here, I
What you wrote there on those verses is forced, not so great
But why is it bad for you to force the verses saying that God is good to mean that generally He is good and from time to time He is not good? After all, you keep forcing verses all the time. Unless maybe whatâs hard for you is the intuition that He is good in an absolute sense. To me it seems the intuition says that no evil comes from Him and everything is calculated down to the last detail.
I donât remember what this is about.
I think you already asked this once. I do not understand your argument. Supernatural intervention is not a rigid system of laws. Nor are quanta. Bottom line, one who makes claims against the Holy One, blessed be He, bears the burden of proof. Until you show that there is such a system, there is no difficulty.
As stated, everything was answered.
Unlike the relationship between parents and child, the Holy One, blessed be He, may have reasons not to intervene and to leave people with free choice. Beyond that, I claim there is no difference between small and great suffering at the logical level. If He is supposed to intervene to prevent suffering, that applies to every small suffering just as it does to great suffering. Why should people suffer? And if you accept that there is justification for small suffering, whence do you know there is no justification for great suffering? This is essentially different from directly causing unjustified suffering. Therefore I do not see a principled difference in levels of suffering. And if you say He is compelled to this because of His policy, then I do not see why one cannot say He is compelled to total non-intervention.
Donât despair. What is needed to convince me is only to raise successful arguments, and especially ones that have not yet been answered.
Dror, what words did I put in your mouth? I told you that according to your position you need to choose between two possibilities. Suppose in your opinion I was mistaken and this is a false dilemmaâbut where here did I put words in your mouth? Beyond that, I was of course not mistaken.
If in your opinion babies are not innocent, then truly we have nothing to discuss. I answered about reincarnation of souls in a separate section, so there is no point dragging it in here. In general, if you accept their delusions, then what is there to discuss? You are trying to dance at two weddings, both not to identify with them and also to explain that they are right. In your words, that is ânot a false dilemma.â
And of course if the babies in Turkey are really guilty because of reincarnations and the like, then what room is there for sorrow, and why Rabbi Eliyahuâs sharing in the suffering? Everything is fine. They deserve it.
Suffering of babies in the plague of the firstborn, like at the destruction of the Temple, was also answered. First, who said they suffered? If they did not suffer, that is punishment for the parents and not for them. And even if they did, it could be non-intervention in the general punishment and not direct imposition of punishment on them.
As for the comparisons to the strange methods (?) of Rabbi Eliyahu and Yaakov and to my hypocrisy, let the readers or their reincarnations judge. I am dealing here with arguments, not declarations.
It seems you insist on ignoring what I wrote without giving reasons, and so it indeed seems there is no point in discussion.
This is mere obstinacy. If there is a reason for killing the babies, there is no need to resort to His being the owner. If there is no reason, then that âjustificationâ does not turn the act into a moral one.
Your proposal to improve the world is nonsense. I explained that you need to propose an alternative system of laws, not a local improvement. A local improvement is simply preventing the evil. That is our whole discussion. How many times can one repeat this nonsense?!
Regarding the dominance of evil, that is something hard to decide. But to each his taste. Especially when you raise a difficulty from it.
I did not ground evil in the world on a possibility; I resolved the difficulty regarding the Holy One, blessed be He, by the possibility that He is not evil. The burden of proof is of course on the one who raises the difficulty. Again, I do not understand why these simple points need to be repeated again and again. This is just obstinacy.
According to your approach, when the Holy One, blessed be He, tells us He is good, this is said in a completely different sense of the concept âgood,â and of course this is a sense unknown to us. Why throw meaningless declarations into the void?! By the way, perhaps when He wrote in the Torah that He gave the Torah at Mount Sinai, He actually meant that He danced tango in occupied Paris with Himmler; and when He wrote that one must keep the Sabbath, He actually meant standing on one leg on Wednesday, and so on. Truly lofty and magnificent peaks of tendentious and ridiculous obstinacy.
I explained why you are mistaken regarding logic (= this is not a discussion about Him but about us). But with one who is not committed to logic, there is apparently no point wasting my words on him.
And perhaps all this is because you did not go to a doctor. So again, a full recovery.
Unclear Person,
I answered this. If the little ones only died, then it really is punishment for the adults and not for the little ones. If they suffered, then apparently it was only non-prevention and not direct causation.
Your mistake regarding forcing the verses is that there is no such thing as âsometimes good.â One who is only sometimes good is not good. Good means someone who behaves in a good way. Human beings, of course, sometimes fail because of the evil inclination, but the Holy One, blessed be He, is not supposed to fail. Therefore, if He is good, then He is always good.
And regarding your intuitionâgood for you. You just need to explain how it fits with reality. Good luck.
You write in the column that perhaps there is some purpose that we do not know what it is
And afterwards you object to a purpose that Rabbi Eliyahu proposed
After all, one can reach that purpose without killing babies. Indeed the purpose he proposes is strange (although in the Torah it seems there is collective punishment for a nation), but as for the matter itself, there may be other purposes of which we have no clue, and about them one cannot ask whether they can be achieved some other way. I did not understand why you rejected this path.
In any case it seems that even though you say one cannot learn anything from the Bible, one thing can apparently be learnedâthat there is no answer to the question of evil.
And the truth is, even that needs no verses, because the answers hereâhow shall we sayâarenât much.
First, Iâm sorry, but an argument of âwho says the babies in Egypt sufferedâ requires the same response:
Who says the babies buried in Turkey under the rubble for days (whether alive for days until death or dying immediately) sufferedâmaybe a miracle was done for them and everyone who died did not suffer at allâeither died immediately without pain or was in a coma for several days?
If you are allowed to use that argument, why would I be forbidden from using it?
I am not, Heaven forbid, belittling your argument, but presenting an identical argument. Decide what you think about it.
You also wrote: âAnd even if so, it could be non-intervention in the general punishment and not direct imposition of punishment on them.â
This makes the Holy One, blessed be He, appear immoral in my eyes. You argue that He did not punish the innocent babies (or the other innocents), but they were simply harmed âalong the way,â and the Holy One, blessed be He, who is omnipotent, did not see fit to exempt them (though He did know how to exempt the Israelites, did He not?).
I find that very difficult.
Second, I am convinced that there were many parents in Egypt who were not active participants in the enslavement of the people of Israel. Why did they deserve the immense emotional suffering of losing their firstborn (and Iâm not even mentioning the plagues before that that harmed their bodies and property)? Why here did the Holy One, blessed be He, act against innocents?
Why did He not perform a miracle and strike only the firstborn of Pharaohâs policemen and of the enslavers themselves?
After all, He is omnipotent, so why did He not act that way?
I felt that you did put words in my mouth, because there is the option that in an absolute sense (Godâs morality) everything is measured down to the millimeter. Anyone who wishes is welcome to choose that too (and there are plenty of such people, including leading rabbis). And this is not only in my opinion; it is a very accepted and widespread view among rabbis and believers. Whether you or I accept it or not, we ought to present it as an option.
Why does Rabbi Eliyahu share in the suffering?
Because he bears the image of the Creator, and even though (according to his view) the offender gets what he deserves, one can still be sad, and apparently although he himself thinks he knows Heavenâs calculations in the case of Turkey, he still does not know them precisely, but only in general terms (the Turks sinned against Israel).
I donât know rabbis all that well, but unlike how Rabbi Eliyahu presented it, 99.99% of the rabbis who do believe in Godâs providence say quite clearly that we do not know Heavenâs calculations at the resolutions Rabbi Eliyahu presented.
But even if Rabbi Eliyahu erred in his assessment of Heavenâs calculations (and the calculations are completely different, as Rabbi Yaakov presentedâreincarnations), still the method of accepting that there is Someone directing everything fits in my head better than your method, which holds non-intervention; for me that is no simple difficulty regarding Godâs conduct.
By the way, I suggest you read what Rabbi Shach of blessed memory said about the terrible Holocaust. Iâll even leave a link here. I donât know if it is right or not. But it does present God morally.
https://www.hidabroot.org/article/1122240
Dror
âI claim there is no difference between small and great suffering at the logical levelâ
This is already taking the discussion of the problem of evil to the highest possible placeâwhy God did not create a world where people only lick honey and eat chocolate all day. But that is not relevant.
The discussion here is in a much more limited placeâthe assumption that there is suffering permitted by God, and the question what its boundary is (in general) and whether it comes for nothing or not.
Suffering is a matter of sensation (that is also the dictionary definition), therefore the phrase âsuffering at the logical levelâ is not relevant to my point.
If you accept there is justification for small suffering, how do you know there is no justification for great suffering?
I am not claiming there is no justification for great suffering. If once again I go to reincarnations of soulsâthen for all I care, let Hitlerâs soul, may his name be blotted out, be reincarnated in countless German babies who undergo terrible suffering and die in their cribs.
My argument is that great suffering toward innocents is unjustified. And what I am arguing is that there is an option in Judaism according to which no suffering is for nothing. Whoever wants is welcome to accept it.
And if you say He is compelled to this because of His policy, then I do not see why one cannot say He is compelled to total non-intervention.
All natural suffering, whether great or small, is from the Holy One, blessed be He. This is the possible approach that is preferable to yours (whether this approach is correct or not).
It is certainly preferable to a constraint of total non-intervention, because in the method I support as more moral, no one is harmed innocently by natural evil. In your method, by contrast, innocents are harmed time and again because of a logical constraint.
Dror
Hector, even in Malbimâs commentary on Job there is nothing new, and all the significant ideas there are taken from thinkers before him. Malbim merely inserted the views after the fact and arranged the structure (with characteristic artistry and even more characteristic deviousness).
Once it seemed to me that the only idea that appeared new in Malbim is that there is a known argument (Eliphaz; chapter 22) that the Holy One, blessed be He, does not give reward and punishment in this world so as not to weaken free choice and to allow service for its own sake. And Job rejects this (chapter 24), for there are wicked people in remote places, and if the Holy One, blessed be He, were to destroy them, no one would know and it would not harm free choice; so why does the Holy One, blessed be He, not destroy them?! (Therefore there is evidently no providence, etc.). Not that I know much, but from Malbimâs references and from what I searched, I recall finding no precedent for this argument, and perhaps it is Malbimâs own innovation. And this argument of course seems puzzling, for how do we know that the Holy One, blessed be He, really does not destroy those wicked people in remote places? And if they were not to arise, and without providence we would expect them to arise, then that would be a sign and proof of providenceâwhich Eliphaz claims is meant to hide and conceal itself in utter secrecy.
And there is also a sort of side argument against free choice (end of chapter 12), for we see that sometimes whole peoples behave foolishly, and this cannot be if each individual has free choice, because then surely one of them would think of the right path and show it to everyone; therefore there is evidently no free choice but some foreign force compelling them. Besides being a shaky argument in itself, in column 539 it was nicely explained that collective determinism does not contradict free choice in individuals.
What has one born of woman to do among us?
You cannot reach that purpose without killing babies. That is the whole point here. If the purpose is collective punishment, then it is an immoral purpose. I am speaking about non-moral purposes. Beyond that, how can one infer that conclusion from the events? If the Holy One, blessed be He, wants to achieve some other purposes not required by morality, then you also cannot infer that He wanted to punish the Turks. Perhaps He wanted to thin out Asiaâs population?
I really do not learn anything from the Bible, contrary to your suggestion and Rabbi Eliyahuâs.
My answers do not exist, and therefore it is hard to discuss whether they are something or not something. What I propose is that there is no question to begin with, so no answer is needed. I argue that there is probably some purpose, and thatâs it. Rabbi Eliyahu explains what the purpose is, and there is no basis for that and it is also very illogical. Since I am resolving and not questioning, the burden of proof is not on me.
This is completely simple logic, and I do not understand the difficulty in it. The only alternative is to remain with it unresolved, and when it comes to a difficulty/contradiction and not a mere question, that is not an option.
If you had thought a bit, you would already have answered yourself. We know that the babies in Turkey suffered. We saw it. We really do not know that the babies in Egypt suffered. The angel of death killed them at midnight, in an instant. It is actually very likely that they did not suffer at all. If there were any indication whatsoever that they suffered, there would be room to discuss it, but when there is no indication that they suffered, and in fact it was a death in an instant, so it is likely they did not suffer, and in addition their suffering contradicts Godâs goodness, then inferring from here that they suffered is astonishing stubbornness.
I propose that He is indeed omnipotent but there are constraints He cannot deal with. And that is what causes Him not to intervene. I donât see what is difficult about that, especially since the only alternative is to conclude that He is not good.
I do not know who participated in the enslavement of the Jews and who did not, so it is hard for me to judge. You are making unnecessary assumptions and then pressing difficulties on a flimsy basis. I am proposing solutions to an existing difficulty, for which you have no solution.
As for Rabbi Eliyahuâs sharing in the suffering, I already answered. Does he also share in the suffering of terroristsâ families? Why? Just because here he sees why they deserve it? Then that is just psychology, weakness, and not values. One does not write articles about that.
On Rabbi Shachâs delusional answer I will not elaborate here. I will only say that he interprets it as punishment for the Haskalah; others interpret it as punishment for Zionism; and the Zionists interpret it as punishment for Haredism (opposition to Zionism). That is about what all those strange explanations are worth, and of course none of them answers the suffering of babies and righteous people.
Well, at this point there really is no point continuing. Everything has been explained.
Go finish your pruning and be gone.
From this arena I prove to you that there is no end to philosophical thinking; at some stage one always reaches a dead end. I gave you an opportunity to make me understand: how can One who is the cause of everything and the place of the world, who created and brought forth everything, do something outside Himself? The fact that you sent me to your book does not solve my problem, because there you merely pretend to decide which is the correct approach, but you did not manage to explain philosophically how this is possible. You keep waving around that the Holy One, blessed be He, is subject to this and subject to thatâhow is He not subject to the limitation of Himself? That too is a kind of logical contradiction. I am not asking mountains and hills of you; I am giving you a simple challenge. Try taking all the bombastic arguments and your creativity and start with the ABCs of this, and see how hard it is to arrive at anything. When one gets philosophically entangled, one always ends up at a dead end in the end; therefore I abandoned this crooked path.
Iâll just answer that even if in your opinion you came out reasonably from what I brought from Egypt, of course one can bring several more examples from the Bibleâ
Innocent babies who drowned in the Flood (for one who takes the story literally).
Innocent babies in Sodom and Gomorrah.
Amalekite babies whom David and Saul wiped out by Godâs command.
Babies of the Canaanite nations and the surrounding peoples whom Joshua and Moses wiped out by Godâs command.
And other examples as well…
I bet that here youâll claim that because we saw nothing, surely the Holy One, blessed be He, performed a miracle and all the innocent people who were harmed of course did not suffer more than a moment and no more.
In my opinion, this is apologetics at the cheapest possible level. And in my opinion that is also what any person with integrity and common sense ought to think.
Either one goes the way of those who want to think according to the method of believers in total providenceâthere are no innocents, even among the babies.
There are heavenly calculations here (reincarnation of souls, the sins of the nation, the sins of the fathers, or who knows what) that nobody knows exactly what they are.
But whoever wants to accept this method, with all the problems involved in it (it too does not sound brilliant, to put it mildly), is, in my opinion, much more honest than the method you present. And yes, God also comes out of that method completely moral (according to strict justice).
One more important thing in closing
The fact that there are several different approaches and explanations for the Holocaust does not mean they are all mistaken. It could be that one of them is actually right.
Or perhaps it may even be that there is a kernel of truth in all of them.
For example, those who joined the Zionists and as a result cast off the yoke of Torahâcertainly worsened the heavenly account.
By contrast, those who did not fulfill the commandment of settling the Land when there was an opportunityâalso worsened the heavenly account.
And of course the Reform movement in Germany also worsened the heavenly account.
Bottom lineâin all of them there is truth: Satmar, Religious Zionism, Lithuanians. You can accept all the views and stay alive.
Dror
It seems you have also abandoned the path of listening. Good luck to you.
In none of those cases is it necessary that there was suffering. That is in contrast to Turkey, where we know there was.
With Amalek (and perhaps also the Canaanite nations), we are dealing with the law of a pursuer. They were killed on account of what they would become. In a group that raises its children to pursue and murder, one may kill even children.
The fact that there are different explanations for the Holocaust certainly does not mean they are all mistaken; it only means that these explanations are dubious, and that the lesson of the Holocaust, if there was one, was not learned.
Everyone is right despite disagreeing with one another. Wonders of fuzzy logic.
All right, we have really exhausted this.
I did not understand your wordsâperhaps something with the punctuation or commas.
In any case, the claim was within your own words that there is some non-moral purpose, say, the repair of the Keter, and that is enough. About this you raised many claims, but they are only against Rabbi Eliyahuâs move; they do not rule out the possibility of an unknown purpose, and therefore nothing is difficult. There is perhaps a question, as you call it, but not a difficultyâjust as we do not know why pork is forbidden, so we do not know why the suffering of Turks is good.
I have gone to a doctor who charges nothing⌠and therefore I shall answer telegraphically.
His being the owner âpermitsâ Him to kill babies even in circumstances in which it is forbidden to people like us. That does not mean I understand why He does so, only that He is not a âmurdererâ and âslaughtererâ as you called Him in the previous column. What is so hard to understand?
So you said it is nonsenseâfine. But you did not explain why granting humanity blood immune to snake venom or a cancer-suppressing gene is âmerelyâ a local improvement and as such âmerelyâ the prevention of evil, and therefore pointless; nor did you explain whether (and if so how) this is âthe best of all possible worlds.â As long as you have not done that, all your pilpul is worthless. (Whether I am âobstinateâ or merely a nuisance is irrelevant.)
The entire Bible tells a chronicle of evil that God apparently failed, time after time, to defeat in His war against it, until the prophets promise that good will triumph only at the end of days. It is hard to ignore this and claim intellectual honesty.
Exactly as I said. You resolved the difficulty/question (choose according to your taste) on the basis of a âpossibilityâ that âallowsâ evil to exist and God to remain good according to your understanding. If that is not a Purim Torah, then I am apparently a Yekke who has never tasted paprika in his lifeâŚ
Distorting my words will not help, and as stated, satire and mockery based on a reflection in a crooked mirror (which you placed before me) testify to intellectual weakness. Indeed, the Holy One, blessed be He, tells us that He is good. But when the prophets ask Him to explain His (good) governance, they are told that He owes no explanation and in any case no one is capable of understanding. If this is âgood in a way we can understand,â then from the outset there is no difficulty at all, and the answer is at the very least puzzling.
The sentence ânot about Him but about usâ is really not an explanation. Nor did I ask for an explanation (I explicitly noted that I do not expect one within a talkback). True, I can guess what you meant by this âexplanation,â but if my guess is correct, then it explains nothingâand again, I did not mean to get into that here beyond a footnote.
And again, thank you for the good wishes.
Perhaps there is a feeling that the debate here among everyone has somewhat exhausted itself, but I flatter myself that my criticism of your remarks comes from a somewhat different direction, and perhaps therefore there is some interest in it.
1. Indeed, I asked you in the past and the answers then, like now, did not satisfy me.
2. It is acceptable to me that God, as we speak of Him, is not free from the bonds of logic. You are completely right here.
3. Now I am not sure that the concept of the rigid system you demand is necessary, but Iâll go along with you and assume that you are right in this too; that is, let us assume it is indeed required.
4. In light of that, why does what you call âsupernatural interventionâ not count in your view as a rigid system? Just as God created in man two systems (a bodily one subject to the laws of physics and a psychic/spiritual one that is rigid and does not obey them), so too from your point of view one can and in my opinion even ought to assume that God created the natural system similarly. That is, in the natural system He created, disasters occur subject to the usual laws, while in parallel, behind it, He created a metaphysical system able to intervene in special times of distress (which, let us say, God defined for it in advance). Is this not in your view a reasonable solution for one who holds your position? Why not attribute rigid status to such a metaphysical system?
5. If you do not accept this, then truly it is impossible to continue, but then in my opinion your whole move cannot get off the ground. On the other hand, if you do accept it, you will now run into a new problemâas far as we can see and know, if there is such a metaphysical system (with âsensorsâ for unreasonable suffering), it does not work.
6. Bottom line: in my opinion, if you were faithful to your explanatory line, you would be forced to propose the solution I have shown, but then it would be revealed that your proposal contradicts what happens in reality. Something basic in your explanatory axis is wrong.
7. I will hint at my solution: God is not âgoodâ by definition, but only the condition that makes that good possible. Of course, my proposal clashes with the idea of a God who is personal in essence, as appears in the Bible.
Indeed, in principle it is possible that there is an unknown purpose. My claims that the events are not the work of the Holy One, blessed be He, do not depend on my criticism of Rabbi Eliyahu.
But the thesis of an unknown purpose in itself is problematic. Why canât the Holy One, blessed be He, create that purpose without harming innocents? Of necessity, you arrive at the conclusion that He too is subject to limitations. But then I do not see what you have gained over my thesis, which also fits better with our perception of reality.
There is a difference between accepting the prohibition of eating pork without understanding it, because of the claim that there is an unknown reason, and doing something immoral because of an unknown reason. In the second case, if there is another solution, I would expect that solution to be chosen.
Killing without a reason is murder in ordinary language. Killing for a hidden reason is indeed possible, but that raises the question why not achieve that same reason without the killing (after all, He is omnipotent)? And if you accept that He is subject to constraints, then I have returned to my own position.
I explained this well. I am speaking about the fundamental laws of nature. They are what determined why our blood composition is as it is. That is a result, not a law of nature. Therefore, if you want to give us different blood, you need to change the laws of nature. Changing blood composition under the existing laws is again intervention in the laws, and that is what you wanted to avoid.
The best of all worlds is defined according to the best among systems of laws, not according to local changes at the expense of the laws.
The Bible tells us nothing about Godâs failures. See my replies to Dror.
The fact that the Holy One, blessed be He, does not explain does not mean that goodness for Him is interpreted differently. Rather, we cannot understand why this is the good. The hiddenness is not evaluative but factual. Otherwise the statements that He is good are emptied of contentâwhich of course you did not answer.
- In my book God Plays Dice I pointed out that the term âmetaphysicalâ is itself not well defined. In what sense is this system of laws metaphysical? You are only claiming that the system of natural laws is not just the collection of our physical laws but that there are a few more rigid laws as well (which you call metaphysical). Fine. The question remains whether there is such a rigid system or not. Calling it metaphysical does not help you show that such a system exists. Only if you give up its rigidityâbut then we are back at the starting point. In any case, its being metaphysical neither adds nor detracts.
As a dualist who believes in the separateness of body and soul (and you yourself define the latter as something that does not operate according to deterministic physical laws), your answer is really puzzling. What here is not well defined, or is essentially different from your own definition of the human soul? There too, God made an âI prepared it in advanceâ of two systems, and in your view everything is just fine and dandy.
In any case, I tried to follow the principle of charity in interpreting your proposal, and my conclusion was that even if we improve it to the maximum according to its inner logicâwhich you yourself did not doâthat is still not enough. We look at reality and see that the improved proposal does not work in practiceâŚ
And so it turns out that your God is bound in advance by laws that have no real logical necessity. As Mordechai, I think, put itâyour God is not the master even within His own house.
Either you did not read my remarks or you did not understand them, or I do not understand you. It seems to me Iâve exhausted it.
In the Prophets there are claims about the worst evil one can imagine. Mordechai hinted at this (by the way, apparently he is not a rabbi), namely that they see it happening under Godâs auspices. Including harm to innocents.
To innocents. Including severe and immense suffering caused to babies in an explicit verse.
Let us bring a few verses for the benefit of dear readers, from which it can be fairly inferred that there was no mercy on innocents, and severe suffering is described:
âShall women eat their fruit, the children they have cared for?â
âThe hands of compassionate women boiled their own children.â
âHer children have gone into captivity before the foe.â
âMy virgins and my young men have gone into captivity.â
âYou have slain in the day of Your anger; You have slaughtered without pity.â
And the passage about the babies suffering in hunger and thirst:
âThe tongue of the suckling cleaves to his palate for thirst; children ask for bread, and no one breaks it for them.â
But everything is fineâyou are allowed to continue with apologetics. It is legal.
So you are invited to try to justify this too.
Dror.
Let us continue with my series of questions.
You wrote
Drorâs request to get defined boundaries for Godâs involvement is, of course, ridiculous.
Iâll ask it a little differentlyâ
You wrote that Godâs involvement in the world keeps decreasing.
I quote (also from the current article):
âThis is a gradual transition… It is true that in earlier periods divine involvement was at a higher dosage…â
According to the site, you accept the theory of evolution, and generally think it is correct (I welcome that).
Do you mean that a billion years ago God was more involved than a hundred thousand years ago?
Or perhaps His more active involvement only began at a certain point in time, and since then it has been diminishing.
If it began only from a certain point in time, I want to know from what point in evolution Godâs involvement began.
For example, was it when Homo sapiens already existed (some 200â400 thousand years ago), or sometime before or after?
Iâd be happy with a very general answer, in order to try to understand the thesis.
This is not getting down to very small, marginal details or resolutions. It is about wanting to understand your general conception.
Dror
I have no idea. There is no way to know that, and it is also not relevant to the principled discussion. We can see that the involvement is decreasing, and that is according to everyone. Prophecy and open miracles no longer exist according to everyone. So there was some involvement in the past, and I do not know at what rate this changed or changes, or at exactly what stages in evolution He was involved, if at all.
It is like seeing footprints in the sand, and inferring from this that some creature passed here and made them. Must I describe that creature in order to claim this?
Another example is the presumption of prior status. The mikveh was valid a month ago, and now we see that it is lacking. Somewhere in the middle something happened there (the water evaporated, for example, or someone drew some of it out). In order to apply the laws of presumption or to claim that there was a change, do I need to explain at what rate the water evaporated, or whether this change happened all at once, and when and why?
My desire is to understand the method, in order to continue probing it.
Presumably, in periods when God was involved as much as possible, the world was a safer and more tranquil place.
If, for example, you were to say that in your opinion God has been involved from the moment evolution began (after the first cell was created), I would object, since it is known that in the past the inhabitants of Earth underwent several extinctions, including extinctions that wiped out almost everything. Which means that if this were indeed your approach (that involvement extends throughout all of evolution), then one could easily find failures in it.
Even if you argue that the involvement began only from the moment Homo sapiens started walking around here, or even only 6,000 years ago, one can think of possible failures.
That is to say, together with the other difficulties I raised (including an explicit quotation from a prophet holding that innocents suffered quite a lot), in every scenario of the theory of âinvolvement that keeps fading,â there are more holes than in Swiss cheese after several mice have gone over it.
Dror
Not at all. Today human beings take much greater care of our condition and thereby complete what the Holy One, blessed be He, does not do. The conclusion that the world was once safer is incorrect, nor does it follow from anything I said. On the contrary, because in the past human beings were helpless and at a low moral level, the Holy One, blessed be He, had to intervene more in order to balance that somewhat. And still, there remained quite a lot of evil there. Today the need for His involvement has diminished because the responsibility, the abilities, and the values are ours and in our hands.
I did not see any significant difficulty in what you wrote, but truly I feel we are going in circles.
I will summarize for the readers, so far:
(!) I claim that the method that says everything is from the Holy One, blessed be He, and there really are no innocentsâor that at least the reasonable suffering (âa thorn under the footâ) permitted by the Holy One, blessed be Heâis a more ethical, logical, and moral presentation of God than Michiâs method.
(!!) I claim that one can define a sensible line for what average suffering is that is also reasonable from a human standpoint.
(!!!) I maintain, based on explicit verses in the Bible, that in the past too âinnocentâ babies (there are not really innocentsâeverything is by justice) suffered and were in pain. Michi holds that there is no proof that in the past (when God was more involved compared to today) there was suffering of innocents as there is in our time. Readers are invited to look at the verses I brought from Lamentations (for example).
(!!!!) I claim that in the past as well humanity (or creation before humanity) experienced natural disasters and the deaths of innocents, exactly as today we know about natural disasters and the deaths of innocents in them, perhaps even more so (mass extinctions). Michi claims that even if there were natural disasters during the period of Godâs involvement, the number of innocent victims was lower than today (relatively speaking), because the Holy One, blessed be He, would perform miracles, and rescue, for example, some of those trapped under the ruins of the earthquake (but of course not all of them, because there was still room for plenty of natural evil, and there is no need to perform a miracle for everyone, just for some).
I hope I presented the matter correctly and fairly.
Let the readers judge.
Dror.
Just a general remark.
It is hard for me to understand how Rabbi Michi takes it upon himself to interpret Godâs actions and intentions and determine that God âchanged policyâ (as he writes and explains also in volume 2 of his book). How does he know?
The difference, or change, between our period and the biblical period (some 3,000 years) lies in the development of human consciousness, and as a result in manâs understanding of reality and its interpretation. A small child sees a hill as a high mountainâŚ
Nature probably has not changed over these 3,000 years. There were always disasters even if they were not mentioned in the Bible. What was mentioned was only the impression of the people of that period regarding certain events, which they interpreted as âmiracles.â
Columbus threatened the natives with Godâs wrath and as a sign of it âpredictedâ that the next day there would be a lunar eclipse. ⌠And so it was. His consciousness was more developed than that of the nativesâŚ
As for the rest, go and learn.
Tzvika Gelbfish
My explanations are in the nature of a proposal. The facts are that once there was involvement (if you believe the Torah and the Prophets), and nowadays apparently there is not. Nature indeed has not changed. What has changed is the dosage of Godâs involvement.
Of course, if you do not accept the Torah and the Prophets, then you have no reason to resort to such explanations.
A great many things are written in the Bible.
It says the world was created in six days (in the plain sense), and you do not accept that.
It says in the Book of Lamentations about suffering caused to innocentsâyou do not accept that.
It says in the Bible about Godâs involvementâthat you do accept. For example, the Revelation at Sinai, the overthrow of Sodom and Gomorrah, the sun standing still at Gibeon, or even things not written, like rescuing some (only some, of course, not all) of the innocents in a natural earthquake.
By the way, it is interesting why not simply do one small miracle from the outset to prevent a natural earthquake that would harm innocents, and instead do many miracles to rescue various innocents buried under the rubble. Very strange. Indeed, the ways of the Holy One, blessed be He, are hidden, as they say.
A rhetorical questionâwhat is the practical difference between what you accept (the sun at Gibeon) and what you do not (six days)?
Everything has to be examined critically to see whether there is a real basis for it.
Dror
Wow. What an expressive talent. I think like you. Good is not equivalent to âpleasant.â Of course the definition of divine good is derived from moral good from another source (from the essence of the Holy One, blessed be He, via His âattributesâ), and that is what is defined as good (even though it involves suffering).
Dror, Iâd be happy for a link to the discussion you had with the rabbi the previous time.
Thank you very much!
*Doron
Nav0863
Were you asking me for a link?
I have much more to remark both on this column and its talkbacks, and on the next column about democracy and game theory (which, at least in the areas where I understand something, is full of mistakes like a pomegranateâat the level of knowledge, information in foreign jargonâafter all, philosophical skill is not everythingâŚ), but I have no time or ability (also because of health, etc.).
Even so, I will make one general remark here. Michi claims that ârealityâ shows that the Holy One, blessed be He, intervenes less in creation, and I wonder what glasses he is wearing. After all, the claim from reality is itself a âtheological interpretationâ (or atheistic one). It is like the claim that âthe Bible says,â when Michi strongly argues that the Bible says what the reader puts into its mouth. This is precisely the heart of the disputeâwhether one can see in reality the fingerprints of the Holy One, blessed be He, and whether the matter is comparable to footprints in the sand, as Michi described above, from which we are trying to describe who and what kind of creature walked here. One person will say dinosaur, and another will say the holy ShekhinahâŚ
That is to say, the claim from reality is empty of content. And so too is the claim that nowadays there are no miracles and no prophecy. When the Sages spoke about the end of prophecy, they meant prophets who were commanded to publicize their prophecies and write them down for all generations. Can we be sure that there are no people among us who merited prophetic revelation? (In my life I met some whom I suspectedâŚ). It is worth recalling the famous stories about a heavenly voice that pointed out certain sages who were worthy of the divine presence resting upon them as with Moses our teacher and with Ezra, etc. It does not say that they merited no revelation at all, only that they did not merit revelation at so high a level as Moses and Ezra. Can we be sure that there are no such people among us today? On what basis? (Decades ago I knew a humble kabbalist, modest, a giant Torah scholar who fled publicity like fire, who told me that he knew of several people in recent generations who merited revelation. One can mock, etc., but on what basis can one determine with certainty that he was mistaken?)
The same applies to miracles. True, I have not seen the splitting of the sea with my own eyes (only in moviesâŚ). But Michi himself said on several occasions (once I even heard it from his holy mouth) that he cannot rule out that nevertheless the Holy One, blessed be He, intervenes in a hidden way here and there. If that cannot be ruled out, then the claim that the Holy One, blessed be He, is not involved falls away. At most one can be agnostic on this question, and all this is only perhaps.
Mordechai, give one example of an error at the level of knowledge (the most serious error in your opinion), and then there will be a basis for your general claim that there are many more.
For example, Michiâs emphatic assertion that the government controls the coalition (and therefore the Knesset) without restraint. This is nonsense that many opposition spokesmen keep repeating until some accept it as true uncritically.
But, on the contrary: the coalition controls the government. Government decisions reflect a political equilibrium (Nash or otherwiseâthis is not the place to elaborate) of the forces in the Knesset (not only in the coalition). When the equilibrium is disturbed, the coalition falls apart and the government falls. (As far as I recall, there has not been an Israeli government that completed its term, and this is the reason.)
By the way, in the 1990s (if I recall correctly), researchers from the University of Haifa (again, if I recall correctly⌠I am writing from memory without the ability right now to search the written sources) calculated the Shapley and Banzhaf indices (look them up) of the parties in Israel, and found that the theory works (amazinglyâŚ), and all the urban legends about âHaredi extortionâ and the like are hot air. The parties (in both coalition and opposition) almost always manage to obtain what is expected according to their relative power as measured by those indices.
As stated, there are other mistakes and errors in the column due to lack of knowledge. But typing causes me pain (that cursed rheumatism), and I think that suffices.
Are you claiming that there is no significant difference between being in the coalition and being in the opposition, because a party almost always manages to obtain what is expected for it according to its relative strength in the Knesset?
Why do you burden me with typing during rheumatism? đ
I did not claim there is no difference between being in the coalition or in the opposition. What are you talking about?
But I did claim that over time (which needs to be defined, and right now it is hard for me to elaborate as above) parties manage to achieve according to their relative strength, and this includes opposition parties as well. Being in the opposition itself reduces their power, of course, and this is reflected in the above power indices. But opposition parties too can achieve significant accomplishments in various constellations, but this is not the place to elaborate.
The matter is explained more broadly in the Open University course âPolitical Economy.â (It recently came out in a temporary internal edition; I hope it will soon appear in a permanent edition for the general public as well.)
Yes, if there is one. It was mentioned above that you already discussed this in the past. If you know where, Iâd be glad!
I agree so much with your position! In my opinion everything else is just synthetic argument-mongering.
I donât really remember where⌠Iâve been commenting on this site for years already, and more than once or twice Iâve argued with Michi about all sorts of things (and also agree with him on lots of other things). In general I think Michi sets forth a correct philosophy but fails to apply it consistently. If the will should arise before me or behind me, I may respond to his current column on logic, and there Iâll argue something related to the idea that God is not good (or evil).
You wrote, âThis necessarily brings us to the conclusion that there are constraints to which the Holy One, blessed be He, is subject, and from here to His policy of non-intervention. For example, He decided to destroy the Temple and Jerusalem, but as a consequence there would be children who would suffer the disgrace of hunger.â
I did not understand why you call that ânon-intervention.â Is this not a case of an inevitable consequence, and He relates to it?
In your opinion is there no moral problem in killing children without their suffering?
Indeed it is an inevitable consequence. Do you want to summon Him to a Torah court? This whole world was created by Him, and all the consequences (at least the natural ones) are inevitable consequences.
There is a problem, but simply speaking it is not toward the children. After they have been killed, they no longer exist.
So if they are orphans, is it permitted to kill them? And what about their parentsâis it permitted for them to kill their children?
Then in what sense is this ânon-interventionâ and not His action in the plain sense?
That is with respect to the Holy One, blessed be He.
In the same sense that every refraining is non-intervention.
How does this fit with the soulâs remaining? If something continues to exist even after they have been killed, then something bad happened to them themselves, somewhat like what Your Honor elaborated on in the post about fear of death.
In any case, they do not suffer and are not distressed.
I do indeed connect more with your outlook on this than with the other outlooks (after you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth. (Sherlock Holmes, The Sign of Four)
Only in any case
it still seems, as above, that there are holes, and there is room for simple questions
such as
that if He had created us from the outset, for example, with a strong stomach like a crowâs, it would not have harmed any regularity at all
and if so, since He could have done that and did not, is there not apparently evil here? You didnât answer this clearly
Thank you
I did not understand how this differs from all the other questions about suffering, which I already answered.
You answered that there is no other possible world, because that would violate the regularity, and you said the questioner has to prove there is such a world, so here I am proposing that world He created with just a small change for the benefit of human beingsâa stomach like a crowâs?
What would happen? No regularity would be violated, and if He is the pinnacle of goodness, why not make this better thing?
A very basic misunderstanding of this column. Laws that would bring about a different stomach for man are different laws. This change has many other consequences as well, and you do not know what their nature would be.
Ah okay, if that is the answer, then your proposal is voidâto offer a suggestion for a better worldâbecause you will always claim: perhaps there would be consequences whose nature you do not know.
So we have returned to the devout and radical faith that even if something seems bad to us, trust Himâit is the best that could have been for you. Only instead of blind faith, blind philosophy.
Long live the great difference (believers believe He could have done better, for after all He is omnipotent, yet nevertheless this is the best, like a square triangle; and philosophers hold that He is not omnipotent and could not do better because of various constraints).
So do not mislead us and trouble us by asking for another proposal, because after we have labored over it (and found the bird whose stomach would satisfy us), you toss it aside casually.
With misunderstanding at this level, I am truly wasting my time and words in vain.
Aâsorry
Bânot wasting, there will always be someone among the followers whom this will sharpen things for
Câso if you feel like explaining again, what sort of proposal would you accept, or is there any proposal from a human being about which you would not say this sentence: âthis change has many other consequences as well, and you do not know what their nature would beâ?
Thank you
I asked in the Q&A a few days ago and, with your permission, Iâll try again to ask in the column.
Similar to Yodaiâs question, who asked what could be bad about a stronger stomach, or what could be bad about fire that doesnât burn human beingsâand one can bring endless examplesâand you answered that we do not know what negative consequences such a thing would have.
But surely God can establish different laws of nature only in those specific mattersâthat fire should not burn human beings, and so onâand everything else in the laws of nature would remain the same without change. It is hard to think of negative consequences in the fact that fire would not have the natural ability to control human beings, and only human beings?
I have explained this to exhaustion in several places. Search for evil in the world (natural evil).
Does reincarnation contradict the resurrection of the dead?
If a soul has reincarnated from body to body over the generations, who will return at the resurrection of the dead?