Divine Involvement in the World – The Full Picture (Column 280)

With God’s help

In this column I return once again to the issue of divine involvement in the world. I do not call it "providence" as is customary, because that term is imprecise. Providence can also be understood in a passive sense (keeping track of what happens here, even without intervention). The occasion for this discussion is Rabbi Moshe Rat’s critique of my approach to this issue, published a few days ago under the title "The Lord Has Not Abandoned the Land – A Reply to Rabbi Michael Abraham".

His remarks were written following many debates between us on this subject (some of them have already been published in the past, and some appear in various forms in the trilogy itself), and I assume that anyone interested will also be able to hear about them at the conference to be held the day after tomorrow in honor of the publication of the trilogy (Wednesday, 4.3, 15:45-18:30, at the Institute for Advanced Torah Studies, Bar-Ilan University. See the notice here on the left). Rabbi Moshe will speak there about his critique, and I will respond briefly.

I will begin by briefly describing my approach, and afterward I will address the critiques mentioned above. The description of my approach will be fairly concise, but it will try to encompass all the relevant points (and therefore this column is somewhat longer than usual). This is an opportunity to get a full, albeit schematic, picture of this issue, which returns here for discussion more than once (for more detail, see the second book of the trilogy, No One Rules the Spirit).

Point of Departure: Methodological Assumptions

In my understanding, it is my methodological assumptions that stand at the center of the discussion, and therefore I will begin with them (some of these matters are discussed in column 243, where I placed them in an interpretive and mathematical context). What generates the dispute is a conflict, or apparent contradiction, between what emerges from the sources and tradition (Torah, Talmud, the Sages and commentators, and actual communal practice) and what emerges from observing the world and from scientific conceptions. Therefore it is important to establish from the outset: for me, looking at the world is the primary basis for factual conceptions. I do not learn facts from the Torah or from the Talmud, but mainly from observing the world. In principle, the Torah is not a source of facts, nor does it purport to be such; it is mainly a source of values and halakhic norms. There are indeed factual claims in the Torah (the creation of the world, the giving of the Torah, our father Abraham, Moses our teacher, the entry into the land, and the like), and of course also in the Sages and the commentators (conceptions of providence, the meaning of prayer, and so on), and I will explain how, in my opinion, these should be treated.

Facts in the Torah depend on our interpretation of them. This is already a principle established for us by Maimonides regarding creation ex nihilo and the anthropomorphic descriptions of God: if there is a contradiction between what emerges from our inquiry (philosophical and factual-scientific) and what is written in the Torah, one may and should take up the tool of interpretation and reconcile what is written in the Torah with our conclusion. As is well known, he did this quite a bit. Beyond interpreting specific events, such as the visit of the angels to Abraham, which he understood as a dream, he was even prepared to forgo the claim that the world was created ex nihilo if that had indeed been his scientific-philosophical conclusion (that is, if Aristotle, who argued for the eternity of the world, had brought good proofs for his view). This despite the Torah’s opening with the solemn declaration In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth (and of course also all the rest of the universe, as described later in the first chapter). One could hardly imagine a stronger factual description than that, and yet even on that point Maimonides would have been prepared to yield in the face of a different factual-philosophical-scientific conclusion. The allegorists, some of whom follow the aforementioned Maimonides (regarding the dream of the angels), are prepared to give up all the factual-historical descriptions in Scripture and see them as allegory alone. True, Rashba polemicized against them sharply, but there were nevertheless those who accepted this. Moreover, Rashba did so mainly because, in his view, they had arrived at problematic conclusions, and less because of the allegorical approach as such. But even if Rashba did in fact think otherwise, I allow myself not to accept his view on this matter, because I do not see him as a source of authority for interpreting the Torah, which brings me to my attitude toward the Sages and the scholars of the generations.

As I have written more than once, I distinguish between two types of authority: formal authority (I must accept it even though I disagree) and substantive authority (I should accept it because they possess knowledge or wisdom that I do not, and therefore they are surely right). Already on the conceptual plane, it is impossible to speak of formal authority with respect to facts, even if these are facts not subject to direct or indirect sensory observation (such as providence, the coming of the Messiah, the world to come, and the like). One cannot tell a person that he is obligated to accept a fact if in practice he thinks otherwise. What one can do is convince him that he is mistaken, that is, appeal to substantive authority. One may persuade him by means of arguments or by appealing to the authority of those making the claims. The substantive authority of the sages of the generations (the Sages or the commentators) regarding factual-theoretical determinations can rest on three sources: a tradition from Sinai, interpretation of Scripture (assuming they have interpretive skill superior to mine), or their own reasoning, that is, the result of philosophical reflection or empirical-scientific observation (in which case the assumption is that they possess superior wisdom or sources of information unavailable to me).

So long as there is no clear evidence of a tradition from Sinai, I do not see a statement of the Sages, and certainly not of commentators who came after them, as a source of substantive authority. The existence of a consensus does not testify to a tradition, certainly not in these areas. Consensus can arise in all sorts of ways. As for interpretation of Scripture, I already addressed that above. Anyone may interpret according to his understanding, and the Sages have neither the authority nor the ability to interpret Scripture better than I can (in Jewish law they have authority because we accepted them upon ourselves). And on the plane of understanding reality and scientific-philosophical knowledge, they have no advantage over me or over you. All of us have reasoning, and with respect to science it is more plausible to say that we have an advantage over them. Certainly there is no holiness in what they said, just as there is no holiness in what I say. These are human reasonings and conclusions, by people like me and like you.

Even things that are regarded as though they were received by tradition, and around which there is even a broad consensus, have the same status. Tradition has no standing for me outside the halakhic realm unless it is clear that it comes from Sinai. Therefore prevalent conceptions on one intellectual or factual issue or another do not impress me in the least. Of course, they should be examined respectfully on their merits, like any other reasoned position, but the claim that many people think this way cannot replace arguments on the merits of the matter. This is an ad populum or ad hominem fallacy, and therefore such a claim is, in my view, not substantive.

I will say more than that. Such a tradition and consensus do not even have the status of imposing the burden of proof on me. Even if I disagreed with all the sages of the generations (and I do not), I still would not think that the burden of proof is on me. This means that even if I am in doubt about the issue under discussion, I do not see any necessity to accept their position. If I am in doubt, then I am in doubt, and that is that. As noted, in my opinion they have no advantage over me in these areas, nor do they possess any source of information unknown to me. The acceptance of ideas in general, including among the sages of Israel, can be based on their own reasoning or on the conception (mistaken, in my opinion) that obligatory positions exist here (that there is tradition and authority in questions of thought and fact). The acceptance of ideas has various dynamics, but the question of their truth must be discussed on its own merits.

To conclude this section, I will only mention that in column 243 I cited Maimonides’ words in Eight Chapters as a model for dealing with a contradiction between sources from the Sages and reasoning in a value context (whether it is preferable to be "upright" or "self-restrained"). See there also the words of the Ran in Sukkah to the effect that one should not deny what is palpable.

I will now turn to discuss the issue of divine involvement itself.

What Reality Says About Divine Involvement

From a simple look at reality, it is clear to every one of us that there are laws of nature. Moreover, according to the best current scientific knowledge, the laws of nature are deterministic. I have already explained in the past why quantum theory is not relevant to this issue. Briefly, it deals with microscopic scales and not with our world, and it describes the world’s behavior through a rigid distribution that has nothing to do with our actions or with divine policy and decisions.

People quite innocently assume that every event has a natural cause, and when that cause is present, the event will occur. If we have not found the cause, we still assume that there is such a cause, only that we have not found it. No one assumes that some object begins to move without a physical cause.[1] These are fantasies that no one believes, and I do not believe even those who say they believe them. I have given several examples of this.

None of us would accept a person’s claim that he moved forward along the sidewalk without moving his legs. Nor would we accept the claim that, true, I moved my legs, but what caused my forward motion was God and not the movement of my legs. Alternatively, I cooked cholent, but it was not the fire that did it; it was God (I merely made an "effort"). It is important to understand that an electron, or any other physical object, is exactly like the human body. There too, nothing happens unless there is a physical cause (or human will) that brings it about. When I take acetaminophen, my fever goes down, and it makes no difference whether I prayed or not, or how good the quality of my prayer was. This is simple chemistry. And if the fever does not go down, I will immediately check the pill or go to the doctor to see what is going on. And even if no cause is found, it will still be obvious to all of us that there is a cause that for some reason escaped us. After all, every scientist who discovers a new phenomenon that does not fit the laws of nature should have concluded that this is the hand of God and therefore a deviation from nature. But for some reason he goes on searching, and of course always finds, another cause. The laws of nature are always there. They are not always the ones known to us, and at times our understanding of the laws of nature is renewed, but it is always a natural explanation. Even if in the end we give up and do not find the reason the fever did not go down or the matter does not work according to the laws, and only then perhaps speak of the hand of God and of prayer, I think it is clear to all of us that this is lip service. No one really believes it (see Rabbi Steinman’s remarks cited in the previous column). If this were really an option in our eyes, it is doubtful how much effort we would invest in investigations, since there is always the possibility that it is because of prayer. And in general, instead of frantically checking why the fever is not going down, one can simply pray better now (as a make-up or voluntary prayer) and thereby make the need for examination and treatment unnecessary. Ah, I forgot the "obligation to make the requisite effort"…

I already mentioned here (and in the trilogy) that when people do medical research and compare a sample group with a control group, no one bothers to neutralize the effect of prayers and commandments. They neutralize placebo, or any other small factor that comes to mind, and forget the most central factor of all: prayer and commandments. No one does this, neither God-fearing researchers nor God-fearing patients who make use of the results of medical studies. But if the main healing is done by God and prayer, this is gross research negligence. When people investigate a crash of an airplane or a traffic accident, they always look for a natural source (a crack in the wing, a malfunction, and the like). Even if they have not found one, it is clear to us that there is such a source. How would you regard a police officer who investigated an accident and found no explanation, and then said: apparently he did not pray properly. It is obvious to all of us that this is lip service. And so in every area of our lives. In columns 39 and 271 you can see further examples showing that people do not really assume the doctrine of effort about which they declare. I repeated this and showed it very clearly also in column 279, where I rejected the bizarre yet prevalent theses regarding the "obligation to make the requisite effort." No one really believes this or acts accordingly. People understand that they have to act in order to bring about results, and that it is the actions that bring the results (they do not live in a Matrix where we perform actions and God brings the results).

There is a very important point here. In the comments to the previous column several claims were raised that there is an obligation of effort up to a certain level. There were various confusions there between different claims, and I will not go into them in detail. Here I will only say that if there is some level of effort that is indeed required in order to bring about results, there is no reason to assume that it has a boundary. These are speculations without logic and without source. If the results depend on our actions, then we must act in a way that will bring them about, and not perform partial actions and rely partly on God. Where did this strange thesis come from? There are only two possibilities worth discussing: either to keep living in the fantasy of the "obligation of effort," or to understand that nature operates according to its own course and God is not involved. All the discussions about the precise boundaries of the obligation of effort, how far it extends, are fantasies that I have no idea who invented.[2]

Another prevalent and mistaken myth is the possibility of divine involvement within nature. Quite a few commentators (including the Sages), and of course people in our own time as well, speak of the possibility of divine involvement within nature. Note that they are not speaking about a hidden miracle but about involvement that is not a miracle. The results are possible according to nature as well, and God merely sees to it that they occur. But this is, of course, a misunderstanding. Divine involvement means that without His involvement X would happen, and He intervenes and brings about Y. That is, the laws of nature would have brought about a different result from the one He produced. Therefore any involvement means a deviation from natural conduct and from the laws of nature (as noted, I include our free will within nature). There is no such thing as involvement within nature. One can of course distinguish between a hidden miracle, that is, a miracle in which it is not clear to the observers that there was a deviation from nature (although in fact there was), and an open miracle, in which everyone sees that there was a miracle. That is how one distinguishes between the miracles of the Scroll of Esther and the plagues of Egypt or the splitting of the sea. Here and there, on accepted views, the events were brought about by God, except that in the Scroll of Esther this was hidden under a natural cloak, whereas in Egypt it was obvious to all that these were miracles. But both kinds of miracles are deviations from nature.

The scientific conception I have described rules out the existence of both kinds of miracles. Our assumption is that every event has a cause, whether or not we understand and see it. It is true that one cannot rule out the existence of sporadic divine interventions. It may be that here and there He intervenes without our noticing (a hidden miracle), but in the ongoing course of life and the natural world there is no divine involvement.

This has two implications:

• It is customary among us that whenever someone dies, we immediately ask why this happened, and even if no reason is found, we explain that God does not work for us and that His considerations are not clear to us. The implication is that everyone is sure that it is indeed His handiwork, only that it cannot always be understood. This is a hidden miracle. No one raises the possibility that so-and-so died because of an illness or because of some event or other, unrelated to theological-divine considerations. That is not an option. From the picture I have described, this is incorrect. In some cases it may indeed be God’s handiwork, but the assumption that this is always so is mistaken.
• Even regarding sporadic cases, this is only a hypothetical possibility. I cannot rule out such interventions. Still, the burden of proof that they exist lies on whoever claims so. For my part, I see no indication of this at all, and feelings on this matter are worth nothing. Almost all the cases brought to my attention in these contexts can be explained by simple statistics, and therefore there is no reason to assume they are the fruit of divine involvement.

As an example, I will take the modern return to Zion or victory in one war or another. Some claim that these are open miracles. That is, of course, nonsense. There is not even a single event here that is plainly contrary to the laws of nature. One may perhaps argue that this is a hidden miracle (as in the Scroll of Esther), a divine process that appears as though it were within nature and its laws (as stated, divine involvement is always a deviation from nature, except that in a hidden miracle the deviation is not visible). But even here, although this is perhaps possible, I see no necessity for it. The victories in war have very good explanations on the military-historical plane. These "miracles" (including those among them that indeed happened)[3] are, at most, coincidences, which can always happen, certainly in a situation as catastrophic as war. Therefore whoever claims that the divine hand is at work here bears the burden of proof, even if such a claim is possible.

With regard to the return to Zion there is, seemingly, a stronger argument, for it is given to us in advance in prophecy. At first glance this is crushing evidence for divine involvement. But here too, although it is of course possible, there is no necessity whatsoever. Our culture and values (the Torah) are what caused our survival and our connection to the land, and therefore they are what brought us back to it. There is no need to say that this is direct divine involvement (apart from the choosing of Abraham and his descendants and the giving of the Torah, of course). Moreover, does the fact that God, who sees the generations in advance, knows what is going to happen prove that He is involved? That is absurd. After all, He knows what is going to happen even if it is done by us, does He not?[4] Can God not know that a people that received the Torah and adopted its culture and values will aspire to return to the land and succeed in doing so? Even in the verses that say that God will restore our fortunes and return us to the land, there is no necessity to say that this means active assistance. The Torah that was given to us is what does that work. It is like the fact that God Who continually renews each day the work of creation, that is, He created laws of nature that operate by His power and continue the work of creation until our own day.[5]

Let me ask you another question. How many of you would abandon your religious commitment and faith if the State of Israel were destroyed and we returned to exile? I assume almost no one. Moreover, even whoever did so, the rabbis would explain to all of us that this is weakness and the counsel of the evil inclination. But if the fulfillment of the prophecies is proof of their truth and of God’s hand, then their refutation should have been proof that there is nothing to them, should it not? If everything that happens, and its opposite, fits these prophecies, then those prophecies do not really say anything that can be falsified, and therefore one cannot bring any proof from them for anything. It is a very small kind of wisdom (indeed, a lack of honesty) to bring proofs for the hand of God from prophecies whose failure would not have been perceived as refuting them. This is a tendentious and unserious argument.

Up to this point I have dealt with the question of how the world looks in our simple observation. I assume that most of us would agree that without the assumptions of tradition and Scripture about divine involvement, we would not think there was such involvement. But there are such sources, and therefore we must now examine their meaning. Does what emerges from the sources not obligate us to adopt conceptions of divine involvement and understand that even if we do not see it, it is there somewhere?

What the Torah and the Sages Say About Divine Involvement

I will mention here only briefly what I wrote in column 243. I showed there that it is entirely possible to interpret the verses of the Torah that speak of divine involvement as dealing with the biblical period and not with our own time. Therefore, from my perspective, there is no contradiction between them and the claim that over the course of history God disengages from the world. This is certainly a possible interpretation of the Torah’s verses. Even if it were strained, where there is good evidence we adopt strained interpretations (for example, regarding the age of the world, the biblical description of creation, and more). The Sages and the commentators engage in interpretations far bolder and more remote from the plain meaning than this one.

Beyond that, there are quite a few matters that appear in the Torah and disappeared over time. There are open miracles that, by general agreement, disappeared. There is prophecy that, by general agreement, disappeared. Not to mention the sacrificial service, and whole halakhic systems that are no longer relevant today. Reality changes, and perhaps God’s policy changes as well. Rabbi Kook speaks in several places about the fact that when reality changes, this is not accidental. It testifies to a change in God’s policy and to a change in what He wants from us (for example, the fact that today there are no Amalekites whom we are obligated to kill). Moreover, in my opinion this interpretation is not really strained. After all, prophecy and open miracles have ceased by common agreement. So why not assume the hidden miracles have as well? If God is progressively disengaging from the world, it is only reasonable to apply this also to His hidden ties with it.

Therefore, in my opinion there is no interpretive obstacle to understanding that the verses dealing with divine involvement were true in that period but are not true in our time, that is, that the policy has changed. The question is what to do with the fact that our tradition says otherwise. There is a broad consensus among Torah sages across the generations that even today God is involved. About that I have already said that such a consensus does not make much impression on me. If observing the world yields, in my eyes, a different picture, I prefer to adopt an interpretation of Scripture that fits it, exactly as Maimonides called on us to do in such cases (in the examples I mentioned regarding anthropomorphism and creation ex nihilo).

Beyond all this, this consensus is not as complete as people present it. There were quite a few sages throughout the generations who thought that God is not involved (including the Sages in midrashim who said that even the open miracles were embedded in reality from the outset, and Maimonides cites their words and adopts this picture in several places). There are many sources according to which He is involved only partially, and certainly does not bring about everything that happens here. Here I will only mention the words of Rabbeinu Hananel in Chagigah 5a, who explains that a person who is murdered could die without it truly being deserved: There is one who perishes without justice. Contrary to the common dogma, this is not God’s handiwork. I brought additional sources in the second book of the trilogy, and I will not repeat them here because it is not important for the discussion. As stated, even if there were a completely full consensus, I would not change my position.

It is important to clarify that I do not mean to say that God cannot intervene. Whoever created the world and legislated its laws can certainly change them or suspend them. My claim is that in practice His policy (at least today) is not to intervene. Therefore the question of God’s omnipotence is irrelevant to our discussion.

The Meaning of Requests in Prayer

The conception of divine involvement that I have presented here has a halakhic implication with respect to prayer. After all, prayer contains requests and thanksgivings, and both of these parts assume God’s involvement in the world. We thank Him for what He has done and ask Him to do. At first glance, according to the picture I have described up to this point, neither of these has any place. On the other hand, there is no indication that prayers are really answered. God responding to prayers is a prime example, and perhaps from time to time this does indeed happen, but there is no indication of it. Every case presented as a demonstration of an answer can of course be explained by way of nature. And once again we have returned to all the dilemmas and arguments we have seen until now.

But here a new element enters, since with respect to Jewish law the Talmud has authority, because here we are dealing with a norm and not a fact. Yet behind the law in this case stands a factual-theoretical worldview (that God is involved and answers prayers). Does halakhic authority not obligate us to accept also the conceptual infrastructure that underlies it? How can one observe the law if one does not accept the infrastructure?

As for thanksgivings, it is fairly easy to manage. We thank God for the creation of the world and the laws of nature, which are what bring about everything that happens to us and enable us to live and function. Giving thanks specifically when a "miracle" occurred is merely an opportunity to thank Him for creation (like I give thanks upon waking in the morning). This despite the fact that, absent a clear indication, I have no reason to assume that this is a case of divine involvement. The psychological feeling of miracle that exists in all of us provides an opportunity to give thanks for what truly deserves thanks.

That is as regards thanksgivings, but the requests are indeed the difficult part. Here there really is a conflict, because without divine involvement, what is the point of asking. On this matter I must say again that even if logically this would obligate us, that obligation cannot be carried out. As I explained, one cannot demand submission or obedience to authority regarding factual and intellectual determinations. Moreover, as I mentioned, with respect to worldview and facts authority has no meaning, neither substantive nor formal. The Sages erred in matters of science, and there is no reason to assume they did not err with respect to worldviews. Certainly not when today we possess better scientific knowledge than they did. Moreover, specifically on the subject of divine involvement and prayer, the Sages apparently assumed that there are gaps in nature that make it possible to pray for divine involvement within nature, although as I explained above, at least according to current scientific knowledge such a situation does not really exist.

I claim more than that. Even if there is some way to reconcile our tradition, and the words of the Sages and the sages of the generations, with scientific knowledge (let us say, by means of quantum theory, which supposedly allows non-deterministic gaps in nature), there is no reason and no logic in doing so. If the Sages and the sages of the generations possessed sources of information unavailable to the people of their own time and unavailable to us, then it would make sense to assume that there is a reconciliation for their words and that they do not contradict our scientific knowledge. But they had no such sources of information, and their wisdom was ordinary human wisdom of the people of their times. Therefore there is no apparent reason to assume that they did not err. Hence, if my conclusion is that nature does not allow divine involvement, I will maintain it and will not accept the words of the Sages, even if I can somehow reconcile them.

Example: the Issue of "One Who Cries Out Over the Past"

The point can be demonstrated very powerfully through the issue in Berakhot of praying about something already past (see also here). Talmudic law forbids praying for a miracle. The source is Mishnah Berakhot chapter 9, which states:

One who cries out concerning the past—this is a vain prayer. How so? If his wife was pregnant and he said, “May it be Your will that my wife give birth to a male,” this is a vain prayer. If he was traveling on the road and heard a cry in the city and said, “May it be Your will that these not be members of my household,” this is a vain prayer..

The Gemara there distinguishes between a situation in which there is not yet a fetus (up to forty days) and one in which it already exists (more than forty days old), and these matters are ruled as Jewish law in the Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chayim sec. 230:

One who prays concerning what has already occurred—for example, if he entered a city and heard a cry in the city and said, “May it be Your will that this not be from within my house”; or if his wife was pregnant, after forty days from conception, and he said, “May it be Your will that my wife give birth to a male”—this is a vain prayer. Rather, a person should pray for what is yet to come, and give thanks for what has already happened. For example, one who enters a city says: “May it be Your will, Lord our God, that You bring me into this city in peace.” If he entered in peace, he says: “I give thanks before You, Lord our God, for having brought me into this city in peace.” If he seeks to leave, he says: “May it be Your will, Lord our God, that You take me out of this city in peace.” If he left in peace, he says: “I give thanks before You, Lord my God, for having taken me out of this city in peace, and just as You took me out in peace, so may You lead me in peace,” etc., concluding with “Blessed are You, Lord, who hears prayer.”.

It is forbidden to pray about what has already happened; that is, they forbade prayer for a miracle. But in light of what we have seen, every prayer and request for divine involvement is a request for a miracle (because there is no involvement within nature). At first glance, one might have said that it is forbidden to pray for an open miracle (as in the case of praying about the cry heard in the city, that it not concern his household) but permitted to pray for a hidden miracle. But that too is incorrect, for the sex of the fetus after forty days is still hidden (before the era of ultrasound), so why was it forbidden to pray about it? Apparently because one may not pray about a state of affairs that already exists (this is precisely the case of "one who cries out over the past").

The conclusion is that it is forbidden to pray even for a hidden miracle, and not only for open miracles. But if so, there is no room to ask God for anything, for as I explained every prayer is a request for a miracle (because there is no divine involvement within nature). And yet, Jewish law rules that for a fetus up to forty days one may ask that it be male. Is that not a prayer for a miracle? We are forced to conclude that the Sages understood that in the case of a fetus before forty days, its sex is not yet determined, and therefore within nature it can be male or female. In such a case one may ask God that it be male, because this is involvement within nature. If so, it is clear that according to the Talmudic sages there are divine interventions that are within nature, and for them, and only for them, is it permissible to pray and ask. It is forbidden to pray for a miracle, whether open or hidden.

But they are apparently mistaken about this. Every divine involvement is a deviation from the laws of nature, whether hidden or open. For example, regarding the fetus, scientifically we already know this very well. From the moment the egg is fertilized it is already clear whether what will emerge is male or female (XX or XY). If so, prayer that the fetus be male, even when it is two weeks old, is a prayer for a miracle, exactly like prayer about a fetus one hundred days old or two years old. There is no difference at all on the principled plane. When the Sages instructed that one such prayer is permitted and the other forbidden, they erred either in fact (they assumed there is involvement within nature) or in norm (they determined that it is forbidden to pray for a miracle).

The conclusion from this is that the Sages themselves forbade praying for a miracle, hidden or open. Either because miracles do not happen, since God does not deviate from nature (in which case they themselves anticipated my approach), or because it is forbidden to ask Him to do so and we should leave the decision to Him (why? what is wrong with asking, if He in fact does such things?). In any case, according to their view there is still room for requests in prayer because, in their view, there are gaps in the laws of nature and in such situations the request is not a request for a miracle. But if today we know that this is not the case, we have two possibilities: either to permit what the Talmud forbids, namely prayer for a miracle, or to dispute the Talmud’s scientific-factual conception and understand that one cannot ask for anything in prayer at all (because every request is a request for a miracle). One must remember that in the halakhic sphere the Talmud has authority, unlike in the factual sphere. I am not laying down a final ruling here about what should be done, but presenting the picture so that you can see that there is no doubt that the Sages erred in their scientific conception, and therefore it is not reasonable to accept their words in these areas as authoritative and binding.

Of course, someone may still come and argue against me that I cannot rule out the possibility that there is sporadic involvement by God (I said this above). It is always possible that here and there He does intervene, only we do not see or notice it. So how, on the basis of non-conclusive arguments, am I disputing the accepted tradition and the view of almost all the sages (which is in any case not precise, as noted)? To that I say that this is indeed true. Sporadic involvement is possible, but I see no reason to assume it. Whoever claims it bears the burden of proof. We have seen that the words of the Sages in factual areas carry little weight, because they have no knowledge or wisdom in these areas beyond what I have (indeed, as we saw, they have less). So why look for excuses to reconcile their words at all? As I explained, in these cases even if we have an excuse there is no reason to resort to it. If, to the best of my understanding, there is no divine involvement in creation, then it is far more reasonable to say that they simply erred on this matter. This becomes especially sharp in light of the fact that this indeed was the accepted conception in their time, and sages in every generation (down to our own) held the scientific conceptions prevalent in their time, and today we know they were mistaken. So we too should adopt the updated scientific conception. There is no reason to adopt ancient scientific conceptions because of the authority of the Talmud.[6]

So what should one do? After all, this is a halakhic question (requests in prayer). First, it is important to understand that God cannot expect us to observe a law that is impossible to observe. One cannot demand that I recite something I do not believe. That is also worth nothing as prayer. God does not expect falsehood either, as the Gemara says in Yoma 69b:

And how could the Rabbis do such a thing and uproot the ordinance that Moses instituted? Rabbi אלעזר said: Since they know of the Holy One, blessed be He, that He is truthful, therefore they did not speak falsely of Him..

The Sages uprooted the prayer ordinance instituted by Moses our teacher because in their time they could not say the wording he had established. It follows that even without authority to change the law, because it was falsehood (from their perspective), they were not willing to say it in prayer.

Beyond that, we have seen that there is a dilemma regarding the halakhic ruling on this matter. One can argue that these sections should not be said in prayer. But one can also say that, contrary to the instructions of the Sages, there is permission to pray for a miracle (because otherwise requests in prayer have no place at all. They were not aware of this). This proposal is based on the assumption that in sporadic cases such miracles do indeed occur, although we cannot detect them.[7] This is not the place to expand further on that issue.

We can now approach Rabbi Moshe Rat’s arguments. Most of his arguments have already been answered in what I have written up to this point, but for the sake of completeness I will briefly return to the relevant points.

1. Policy: holy lies

Rabbi Moshe opens by claiming that this outlook is not only mistaken but also harmful. From my point of view, as he himself writes there, this argument is irrelevant. If this is the truth, it should be stated honestly. In my personal view it also prevents more damage than it causes (because people who reach this conclusion do not find themselves forced to abandon their religious commitment). But here my concern is not with the question of what should or should not be said, but with whether these claims are true or not.

2. What is providence

Rabbi Moshe repeats here the thesis of involvement within nature. As stated, there is no such thing. As I explained above, every involvement is a deviation from the laws of nature. But in the following paragraph ("The meaning of the laws of nature") he adds and argues that there is no contradiction because the laws of nature themselves reflect God’s will. But that is a ridiculous claim in our context. After all, I agree with that claim too. The laws of nature are His will, since He created them. In my third and fourth volumes I elaborate on this and prove the existence of God from it. The question in our discussion is whether the laws of nature respond to prayers and whether one can predict in advance what will happen (that is, whether they are fixed and rigid). If acetaminophen always lowers a fever, then from my standpoint there is no divine involvement. Clearly the laws of physiology are part of nature, which is the handiwork of God, but that is nature itself. It is not divine involvement in nature. Acetaminophen (with God’s gracious assistance) would lower the fever even for someone who does not deserve it spiritually. That is what I call non-involvement, and that is my claim. If Rabbi Moshe agrees to that, then we have no disagreement at all.

The discussion of a dual system of explanations or causality is simply unnecessary. This issue was treated at length in my book That Which Is and That Which Is Not, and I will not enter into it here, since the question is not whether God stands at the root of the laws of nature. I have already explained that I agree with that too. The dispute is over whether there are deviations from them, so why is the discussion of a double explanatory plane needed?

3. Intervention in the system

In the next paragraph Rabbi Moshe moves to the question of intervention in the system of fixed natural laws. Here there really is a disagreement between us. He argues that although the laws of nature are indeed fixed (and also express God’s will), divine involvement that departs from them can sometimes occur. This is already a truly absurd claim in terms of Rabbi Moshe’s own line of argument. If he needs this, then what was the whole previous section about the fact that the laws of nature are an expression of God’s will for? Who argued with that? Do I claim that He did not create them? I have already addressed the Ran’s claim that He is the One who gives us strength to achieve. Be that as it may, he requires the assumption that God deviates from the laws of nature, and that, and only that, is the subject of our dispute. Therefore everything written up to this point is entirely unnecessary and irrelevant to the discussion. From my point of view, all of that is deleted, and the discussion begins here.

His first claim is that God can certainly intervene in the system (all the more so from the free will of human beings, which by definition departs from the rigid laws of nature, as I myself write in The Science of Freedom). But that is beside the point. I have never claimed, and do not claim, that God cannot intervene. Of course He can. I only claim that there is no indication that He does so. I am speaking about His policy and not about His abilities. That is different from human will, which each of us experiences in an utterly immediate way as definitely affecting nature, involving itself in it, and departing from the laws. God gave us, out of His own power, the ability to intervene in the laws of nature. My claim is that He Himself apparently does not make use of this (except perhaps in sporadic cases).

He now raises my claim as to why we do not see this intervention. To that he answers that we do not have surveillance of every event at every moment and in every place in the universe. But again, this is beside the point. I do not make my claim because we do not see the involvement. I make it on the basis of the scientific worldview, which is well grounded, namely that there are fixed laws of nature. I myself said that we have no ability to see everything, but in light of current scientific knowledge, the burden of proof lies on whoever claims that there is divine involvement. If a prophet were to come and tell me that some event was done by God, I would believe him. But as far as I know there is no such prophet today, and Rabbi Moshe himself has not been granted prophecy, at least not as far as I know. So from where does he know about this involvement? His claim seems to me like Russell’s celestial teapot. Rabbi Moshe is essentially claiming that a small teapot is orbiting the planet Jupiter. When I ask why it cannot be seen, he answers: because it is small and cannot be seen. By this form of argument one can speak of pink winged fairies around each of us, like a thorn in a furrow (see Berakhot 6a). Why can they not be seen? Because they are small and their color lies beyond the range of visible wavelengths. Claims that cannot be falsified can be floated endlessly (even if not refuted) to your heart’s content. As stated, I claim that the burden of proof is on whoever claims that there is divine involvement, not on whoever claims that there is none. There is a nature that all of us acknowledge and know, and it describes the ordinary conduct of the world. Anyone who claims an exceptional event must prove it. A doubt does not displace a certainty (I have already touched on the question of the status of the sources and will return to it later).

This is also my response to his claim about our inability to detect hidden miracles. My question is why assume their existence in the first place. True, if they exist we will not be able to detect them (like Russell’s teapot), but there is no reason to accept the claim itself that they exist. Why discuss it at all if there is no indication of it? Only because it cannot be refuted? There are millions of claims that cannot be refuted, and Rabbi Moshe too would never think to discuss them (we are back to the teapot).

4. What providence looks like

In the next paragraph he once again returns to exactly the same claim. One cannot see providence. As stated, this is a thesis that cannot be falsified, and I have already explained why this is no argument against me (the teapot), and therefore I will not address it again. But there he cites my claim that in earlier periods there was divine involvement, except that God’s policy has changed. Rabbi Moshe says that even then we could not have detected providence, and he does not understand why there I concede the point.

To that I say that as regards the open miracles, which he himself admits have ceased, there is no need to ask. There one did plainly see the hand of providence. On the contrary, that is evidence for my view: just as the policy changed with respect to open miracles, I claim that it changed with respect to hidden miracles as well. He himself argues there against me: why do I claim that the policy changed if once it was different? A kind of prior presumption that places the burden of proof on me. To that I say: by your own reasoning. For on your own view, the change that you too concede with respect to open miracles proves a change of policy. This is not merely a presumption that might change; it is a presumption that has actually changed. I again remind you of the cessation of prophecy and of all types of connection (the open one at least) between the world and its Creator. It is strange that his argument about a change in the presumption is directed specifically at me, when in fact it attacks his own position.

Let me add that as regards hidden miracles that allegedly existed in the past, I myself am not really sure that such things actually existed. But there are cases in which the Torah itself and the prophets testified about some event that it was the handiwork of God (a hidden miracle). And I have already written that if today there were a prophet who revealed to me that some event was the fruit of providential action, I would accept it. My claim is that without a prophet there is no way to determine this. Note carefully: I am not claiming that I know there is no involvement today. My claim is twofold: a. there is no indication that there is. b. without an indication there is no reason to assume that there is. The burden of proof lies on whoever claims that there is involvement. If it ceased openly, there is no reason to assume that it continues in secret (this is once again the argument of a transparent and invisible teapot).

Later he cites my argument about the fact that medical research, and all other human activity, ignore spiritual influences on phenomena (such as healing and the like). Rabbi Moshe argues against me that we have no way to handle this scientifically, and therefore we do what we can. But that is a ridiculous argument. If I knew that there is a parameter that has the greatest effect on some phenomenon, and I had no scientific way of dealing with it, I would cancel the experiment and declare that I have no way to understand the phenomenon. After all, we are not talking about a marginal matter. Healing is in God’s hands and not in the hands of medicines, is it not? Does the unqualified trust that all of us place in these studies not indicate that in our view there is not really a significant influence of the spiritual on healing? Moreover, these studies yield results that work (= all the medical information we possess), despite their ignoring this supposedly all-important parameter. Is that not an indication that it does not really have any influence?

5. Why believe that there is providence?

Here Rabbi Moshe arrives at the main point. As stated, reality can be interpreted in several ways and fashions, at least with respect to hidden miracles. The question is what the point of departure is. I ask: why assume there is providence (= involvement), and he asks: why assume there is none. In answer to my question, why assume there is providence, he offers three reasons:

1. The tradition. Regarding the verses of Scripture, I explained my position above. There is no contradiction whatsoever between the picture I describe and a reasonable interpretation of the biblical verses. As for the interpretive tradition that accompanies Scripture, I have already explained my opinion of this reason. It does not carry the slightest weight for me. I have not seen even a single sage who claims to have a tradition on this from Sinai. These are reasonings of people influenced by prior assumptions about the interpretation of Scripture. They assume that it necessarily speaks about our own time as well, an assumption that is by no means interpretively compelled (as above), and which is contradicted by a simple look at reality (and also by the change in policy regarding prophecy and open miracles). Everyone recoils from drawing this conclusion because it is perceived as heresy. So I deny that this is heresy, and I also claim that almost everyone does not really believe it, but only recites slogans on which they were educated (see the previous column and the columns mentioned in my remarks above). As stated, in my opinion even if there were a full consensus on this (and there is not), that would not even suffice to place the burden of proof on me. This is an ad hominem/ad populum fallacy. The opinion of very many people who know nothing about something is worth no more than my opinion about that same thing. Moreover, we are dealing with facts, and with facts there is no authority, neither of a majority nor of anyone else. Beyond that, even if this were an issue in which the majority has weight (as in a halakhic issue), is a person forbidden to hold a minority opinion? Should Maimonides, who introduced several sweeping innovations in Jewish law (such as the status of rabbinic legislation for all laws derived through interpretation, in the second root) and in thought (such as his attitude toward demons and mysticism), have refrained from doing so because almost all the great sages of Israel throughout the generations stood against him? Astonishing! The argument from reliance on tradition and the majority is generally nothing but a way of silencing dissent.
2. Intuition. It seems to me that on the subject of intuition I am something of an authority (I have written books about it and about its importance and meaning). As for this "intuition," it is nothing but the fruit of dogmatic belief. People educated to think that God intervenes, and that it is heresy to think otherwise, will certainly go on "intuitively" feeling His involvement. After all, every event in which they see God’s open and clear hand has a simple statistical explanation. Therefore this "intuition" is worth nothing in my eyes. It is not intuition but education and the implantation, over many years, of belief in divine involvement. That is all.
3. Here he claims that, contrary to what I said, one actually does see providence. People do indeed have such fantasies, but there is no indication whatsoever of the existence of divine involvement. This is once again the fruit of long and intensive education to see the hand of God in every event. An independent examination by an objective factor (scientific) shows nothing of the sort. Have we forgotten the medical studies in which even he admits that the results do not take into account the effect of prayers and divine providence, and yet they produce reliable information? Where is that open providence there? Did we see an answer to the prayers for Nachshon Wachsman or for the three boys? If in those prayers, in which almost the entire public participated, we were not answered, then it seems to me that the claim that one sees answers to prayer is a truly pitiful form of disingenuousness. We have already grown accustomed to the excuses that "He does not work for us," and "His mind is not like ours," and "no one was behind the curtain," and the like. So I say that no one was behind the curtain and saw that there are indeed answers to prayers and that there is divine involvement. These are inventions that reality refutes again and again, and we merely keep offering excuses and patches again and again in order to keep the dogma from collapsing.

Regarding the statistical explanations that I offer, Rabbi Moshe argues that there is an intuition that this really is involvement. He adds that I too have no proof that this is a statistical matter and not divine involvement. To that I will repeat that the fundamental question is: on whom does the burden of proof rest? When some event has a statistical explanation, the suggestion that it is nevertheless divine involvement is baseless. By the same token, you could say that the fact that I ate bread for breakfast today is divine involvement. After all, I have no proof that it is not. Why do you resort specifically to exceptional events? If they have a statistical explanation, there is no difference between them and ordinary natural events. In my eyes this is blatant dishonesty and tendentiousness.

6. Providence steadily increases

In this section Rabbi Moshe speaks about experimental results that show an effect of prayer. He himself criticizes their method, but nevertheless chooses to believe them. I return again to the end of the previous section. The suggestion that this is divine involvement when there is a simple statistical or natural explanation has no basis whatsoever. By the same token you can claim that when there is no difference between believers and others in the chances of recovery and quality of life, this too is divine involvement. God made sure there would be no difference. It is not a serious argument.

I have already responded above to his remarks about the hand of God in our history. There too there are very good explanations, including explanations for the fact that these events are predicted in advance in Scripture, and therefore the suggestion that this is divine involvement is baseless for the very reasons I have now enumerated.

I can only conclude with Rabbi Moshe’s own words:

We have gone the whole way, it seems, only to discover that it was actually unnecessary [entirely. Most of it consists of arguments irrelevant to the discussion, and the others were already answered in my original remarks]: indeed there is nothing in science or nature that negates individual providence [except for the scientific picture of the world itself, and except for the fact that there is no reason at all to assume the existence of such providence], and therefore there is no obstacle to believing in it [nor to denying it]. What therefore stands here is Rabbi Miky’s personal (lack of) faith [and all of ours, if only we are honest and ignore the "intuitions" implanted within us] as against that of all [certainly not all] the great sages of Israel throughout the generations [none of whom has any ability to determine a position on this question, and therefore we have here an ad hominem fallacy]. Whoever wishes to choose his side [or Rabbi Moshe’s], good health to him.

Good health to all of us.

[1] In the past I was asked about free will, since in my book The Science of Freedom I explained that the will can indeed move an electron without physical force (or that a field can be created without physical sources). For our purposes here, human will is part of nature and its laws. This is something we experience in a very immediate way, and I see no reason to cast doubt on it.

[2] And spare me Joseph and the midrashim of the Sages about him. First, because as I explained, the Sages knew no more than you and I do about this matter. And second, because Joseph was a prophet, and therefore one cannot extrapolate from him to us. He knew things about God’s action that ordinary people do not know, and therefore it is possible that he was supposed to know that specifically in his case God would save him. We have not heard complaints about our father Abraham, that he planned the war of the kings in order to win rather than relying on God, or about any other biblical figure who took the necessary steps in order to be saved and to achieve results.

[3] Most of the miracles and rescues that are reported are fantasies and folk tales that swell over time, with many testimonies of "The incident happened to me personally." But as stated, even if they did happen, generally speaking this is not a miracle. Statistics is a very confusing matter for someone not skilled in the field.

[4] According to my own view, even this is not precise, but I am speaking here according to the view of those who defend traditional theses against my conceptions.

[5] I ignore here the well-known homiletical quips to the effect that the world is renewed at every moment ex nihilo. This is another Matrix that we have grown used to reciting, despite the fantastical nature of it, which none of us really accepts.

[6] I am ignoring for the moment the possibility that there was a change in God’s policy, and that in the time of the Sages He really was involved. This is true mainly regarding open miracles that occurred in the past and not today. But with regard to determining the sex of the child, it is not plausible that the biology of that time was different. Be that as it may, the Sages themselves said that one should not pray for a miracle even if it happened in their time.

[7] In such a situation, it is very reasonable to turn to God only in very extreme cases in which there is no natural solution and it is beyond our power to deal with the problem. Incidentally, that is exactly what Rabbi Kook writes in the passage cited in the previous two columns. In such a situation, the requests in the Amidah should concern cases of people in the world who are in an insoluble situation, and not ourselves.